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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey will review major criminal cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Florida and Florida District Courts of Appeal that cover substantive
criminal issues published between the time period of July, 2004 through July,
2007. The time period begins where the last Criminal Law Review Survey
created for this Law Review ended.' It will discuss cases that interpret the
provisions of statutes, as well as defenses, which deal with elements that
constitute the definitions of the same. It will focus on cases that address pro-
visions or issues for the first time, clarify areas that have created confusion,
or change existing understandings. Therefore, this article will follow the
conventions followed in selecting cases for discussion utilized in prior Crim-
inal Law Survey articles.2
1. William E. Adams, Jr., Criminal Law: 2002-2004 Survey of Florida Law, 29 NOVA
L. REV. 1 (2004).
2. As in past criminal law surveys, this article will not address criminal procedure issues
such as search and seizure. Although significant to the practitioner, those issues raise consti-
tutional concerns that extend beyond the substantive focus of this piece. Furthermore, consis-
tent with past articles, this survey will not generally address the complex and specialized areas
of death penalty convictions and the proper application of sentencing guidelines.
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II. ASSAULT AND BATTERY
In Miller v. State,3 the Second District Court of Appeal decided an ap-
peal that reviewed the fear element in an aggravated assault case.4 In this
case, Ms. Miller was dismissed "from her job at a bank," and when she "at-
tempted to collect her final paycheck," was escorted from the bank by its
security officer, Trace Barnes.5 Miller became upset and "made an audible
threat" as she got into her car. 6 "She then drove her car" at Barnes and "an-
other bank employee, Katherine Zevetchin."7 "Zevetchin testified that she
was frightened," but at least some evidence indicated that Barnes was not. 8
The appellate court reversed the conviction because the trial court's instruc-
tion permitted the jury to find Miller guilty if either victim had a well-
founded fear that violence was about to take place. 9 As the appellate court
correctly noted, section 784.011 of the Florida Statutes "requires that [a]
person who is threatened ... fear that [the] violence is imminent."'
The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed what constitutes a deadly
weapon, in aggravated battery convictions, in Zapata v. State." Zapata bat-
tered his ex-girlfriend by beating her "head against a cement pillar wall and
then ... against a car."' 2 He was "convicted of aggravated battery with a
deadly weapon, the wall, and battery as a lesser included offense of [the
charged] aggravated battery [with a deadly weapon], the car."' 3 The court
reversed the aggravated battery charge holding that a wall cannot be consid-
ered a weapon and, therefore, reduced that conviction to a battery.' 4 It also
directed the trial court to vacate one of the battery convictions because "the
two convictions [arose] from the same continuous criminal act or episode."' 5
Whether stationary objects such as walls or floors are considered weapons,
especially when the defendant beats a part of the victim's body against it, has
caused interpretational problems for courts; but this decision is consistent
with that of other jurisdictions.
3. 918 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
4. Id. at 415-16.
5. Id. at 416.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Miller, 918 So. 2d at 416.
9. Id. at 416-17.
10. Id. at417.
11. 905 So. 2d 944, 944-45 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
12. Id. at 945.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing State v. Houck, 652 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1995)).
15. Id. (citing Olivard v. State, 831 So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
[Vol. 32
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In Munoz-Perez v. State,16 the Fourth District Court of Appeal also in-
terpreted an element of aggravated battery-this time what constituted "use[]
[of] a deadly weapon."' 7 The defendant argued that his conviction should be
overturned because "he never touched the victim with the knife,"' 8 rather "he
.. held it near her throat" during the burglary.' 9 The court agreed, deciding
that the Florida Statutes' reference to "uses [of] a deadly weapon"2 requires
that the weapon commit the touching in order to constitute a battery.2'
In Jones v. State,2 the Fourth District considered another battery case,
but this time the issue was what constitutes a deadly weapon.2 3 Jones was
"convicted of sexual battery with a deadly weapon., 2 4 Jones entered "the
apartment of the victim" by displaying a stun gun and pulling the trigger.25
"[T]he device . . . emitted a blue light and a buzzing sound., 26 The court
reversed the conviction because it deemed "that [a] stun gun was [not] a
deadly weapon [in] its ordinary use or in the manner in which it was used on
the victim.
27
III. HOMICIDES
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed a felony murder conviction pur-
suant to the merger doctrine in Brooks v. State.28 This case involved the
stabbing to death of a woman and her daughter, by Brooks.29  Although
Brooks' murder convictions and death sentence were upheld on other
grounds, the Court, in a per curiam opinion, found that it was erroneous to
use the underlying felony of aggravated child abuse as the predicate felony
crime in a first-degree felony murder charge. 30 The Court relied on its prior
decision in Mills v. State3' in finding that, because the child was killed by a
single stab, the felonious conduct that constituted the child abuse was the
16. 942 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
17. Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 1027.
19. Id. at 1026.
20. FLA. STAT. § 784.045(1)(a)2 (2007).
21. Munoz-Perez, 942 So. 2d at 1028.
22. 885 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
23. Id. at 467.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 467-68.
27. Jones, 885 So. 2d at 468.
28. 918 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam).
29. Id. at 186.
30. Id. at 199.
31. 476 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1985).
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same that caused the death and, thus, the felony merged into the homicide. 32
The Court distinguished the case of Mapps v. State,33 in which the defen-
dant's felony murder conviction was upheld where "the underlying felony
[was] aggravated child abuse,, 34 but "there were separate acts of striking,
shaking, or throwing" the child. 35 Justice Lewis, dissenting in part and con-
curring in part, argued that Mills is inapposite because Brooks was not sepa-
rately charged and convicted of felony child abuse, 36 and because the felony
murder statute had been amended since Mills to "include 'aggravated child
abuse' [amongst] the felonies that would invoke ... felony murder., 37 As a
result, it could be a predicate felony for felony murder .3' Although the stat-
ute does indicate that the crime of child abuse is a predicate felony,39 the
majority opinion is defensible and consistent with what some courts would
deem an appropriate application of the merger doctrine.
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed the intent requirements
concerning a homicide inflicted by a single blow to the head in Hall v.
State.40 The victim in the case "threw a large rock toward the deck of [a
restaurant, which] struck an innocent bystander in the back, causing her to
fall to the ground."41 Hall, who did not know the victim or the bystander,
happened upon the scene.42 After asking the bystander and other witnesses
who threw the rock, he began to chase the victim.43 The defendant struck the
victim with a single blow to the jaw." Unfortunately for both the victim and
the defendant, this single punch caused a fatal brain hemorrhage. 45 Expert
testimony indicated that this outcome was "a very unusual occurrence" as a
result of a single punch because of its placement.46 In addressing this trag-
edy, the court first rejected the defendant's argument that it was an excusable
32. Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198.
33. 520 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
34. Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198.
35. Id. (citing Mapps, 520 So. 2d at 93).
36. Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 218 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 219. Compare FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1979), with FLA. STAT. §
782.04(1)(a)2h (Supp. 1984) (indicating that "aggravated child abuse" constitutes felony mur-
der "[w]hen committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpe-
trate").
38. Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 218; see also FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2h (Supp. 1984).
39. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2h (2002).
40. 951 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 93.
45. Hall, 951 So. 2d at 93.
46. See id.
[Vol. 32
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homicide "in the heat of passion ... [or] sudden combat., 4 7 The court noted
that these arguments had "been rejected in [other] single-punch-to-the-head
cases."48 Further, this case involved a situation in which the victim did not
demonstrate aggression towards the defendant, who "chased [the victim]
down and dodged intervention attempts by" a security guard and deputy
sheriff.49 Furthermore, the fatal blow was landed while the victim was oth-
erwise distracted." The court also rejected defendant's argument that he
could not be convicted of manslaughter by an act where he lacked the intent
to kill.51 The defendant argued that because homicide is considered a result
crime, the defendant needed to intend the result-the death of the victim. 2
The court held that the intent to commit the act that caused the death was
sufficient.53 Although the intent to kill is not required for manslaughter, it is
usually required that the defendant's state of mind concerning the death is an
element.54 However, it could easily be argued here that the defendant had
the required state of mind with regard to the death, for this crime.5
The Second District Court of Appeal also considered an appeal of a sin-
gle-punch manslaughter conviction in Acosta v. State.56 This case involved
two teens who got into an argument and decided to meet after school to settle
their disagreement with a fight."7 A number of friends accompanied them,
and while the victim argued with one of the other students, Acosta punched
him in the face at the moment the victim was distracted and "unprepared to
defend himself."58 Similar to the case discussed above, the medical exam-
iner determined that the victim died from a rare, but well documented, verte-
bral artery hemorrhage caused by a single blow."9 The court noted the trag-
edy of committing this young man to prison. 0 However, it did not accept
the defendant's argument that he could not be found guilty of manslaughter
in the case of a brief disagreement where the death was not caused by a dan-
47. Id. at 94 (citing Acosta v. State, 884 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 95.
50. Hall, 951 So. 2d at 93.
51. Id. at 95.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 96.
54. Id. at 95-96.
55. See Hall, 951 So. 2d at 96.
56. 884 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 114.
60. Id. at 115.
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gerous weapon or involve an act done in a cruel or unusual manner.6 The
court also rejected the claim that it was the result of sudden combat.62
The Third District Court of Appeal overturned a "motion to dismiss the
... prosecution of a vehicular homicide charge" in State v. Gensler.6 3 Gens-
ler was a police officer, who proceeded through an intersection with a flash-
ing yellow light, on her way to a call. 64 She was traveling at "approximately
ninety miles per hour" in an area "where the posted speed limit was forty-
five miles per hour. '65 She struck the victim who was crossing the road "just
north of the crosswalk., 66 "At the time of the collision, the victim had alco-
hol and cocaine in her body., 67 The defendant argued that she was not the
proximate cause of the death. 68 The appellate court held that it was not ap-
propriate to remove this case from the jury where the facts presented an issue
of whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of the risk of the
danger created by defendant's speed while going through an intersection, in a
business district, at three o'clock in the morning.69 In the dissent, Judge
Schwartz argued that insufficient facts were presented to demonstrate that
the defendant was the legal "but for" cause of the death. 70
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a conviction for solicita-
tion to commit second degree murder in Jones v. State.71 While incarcerated,
Jones reportedly told another inmate that he wanted someone to make sure
that David Hunt did not show up in a courtroom, or otherwise make sure he
did not testify against Jones.72 However, "Jones did not actually use the
word 'kill"' in this exchange. 73 The inmate reported this conversation to law
enforcement. 7' A sting operation was initiated in which a meeting with
Jones was set up with an undercover detective.75 During the meeting with
the detective, Jones made some statements that could be interpreted as him
wanting Hunt killed, and others that indicated "that he wanted Hunt beaten
61. Acosta, 884 So. 2d at 114.
62. Id. at 115.
63. 929 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Gensler, 929 So. 2d at 30.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 32 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
71. 908 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
[Vol. 32
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so bad[ly]" that he needed a wheelchair.7 6 Under the facts of the case, the
court held that the jury could find that he either committed a "solicitation to
commit first degree murder or solicitation to commit aggravated battery. '
While the court would not go so far as to say "the crime of solicitation to
commit second degree murder.., does not exist, ' 78 it did acknowledge that
it could not envision a contract kilijng that was not premeditated, 79 and held
that it was not present in this case. It did indicate that some Florida cases
have stated that such a crime does exist,"' and it also noted that both conspir-
acy and "attempt to commit second degree murder are crimes" in Florida. 82
In Dorsey v. State,8 3 the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the de-
fendant could be found guilty of both aggravated child abuse and first degree
felony murder where the child abuse claim constituted the underlying fel-
ony. 84 It distinguished the case from Brooks, 5 discussed above. The Fifth
District noted that Brooks involved a single act of stabbing, unlike the case
before it where Dorsey shook the baby to death. 6 There was other evidence
to indicate that the abuse occurred over more than a single moment in time. 87
Like the Supreme Court of Florida, the District Court also noted that Flor-
ida's felony murder statute includes aggravated child abuse as one of the
enumerated felonies.88
IV. RESISTING ARREST
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the Third District Court of Ap-
peal in a case involving a conviction for resisting arrest in Polite v. State. 9
In this case, an undercover officer in plain clothes attempted to arrest the
defendant who attempted to hit the officer and also fled the scene.9° The
defendant appealed the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury "that the
state must prove that [he] knew that [the undercover officer] was an offi-
76. Jones, 908 So. 2d at 618.
77. Id. at 620.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Miller v. State, 430 So. 2d 611, 615 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
80. Id.
81. Jones, 908 So. 2d at 620.
82. Id. at 620 n.l.
83. 942 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct, App. 2006).
84. Id. at 984, 986.
85. Id. at 986.
86. Id. at 984-85.
87. Id. at 985-86.
88. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2 (2007); Dorsey, 942 So. 2d at 984.
89. 32 Fla. L. Weekly S576, S576 (Sept. 27, 2007).
90. Id.
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cer."' The Third District had held that since the statute requires a person to
"knowingly and willfully resist[], obstruct[], or oppose[] any officer,"92 the
adverb "knowingly" only modified the verbs and not the noun "officer. 93
That court also stated that the resistance with violence statute was a general
intent offense and, therefore, the intent requirement only applied to commit-
ting the proscribed act.94 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected this inter-
pretation as being contrary to the statute's plain language, a potential viola-
tion of due process, and contrary to a proper construction when compared to
lesser included offenses.95
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed the element of "lawful
execution of any legal duty" in Yarusso v. State.96 Yarusso was approached
by plain clothes officers in an auto dealership parking lot at three quarters
past ten in the evening, while the dealership was closed and in a "high-
burglary area." 97  The officers asked the defendant to produce identifica-
tion.98 The defendant proceeded to return to his truck.99 After entering his
truck, the defendant proceeded to lock the doors and drive away, hitting one
of the officer's hands with his rearview mirror. 100 The parties agreed that the
encounter was initially consensual.'l The court stated that a citizen has a
right to terminate a consensual encounter with law enforcement officers at
any time,"' and that Yarusso unequivocally expressed this intention when he
entered "his truck, locked the door, and started the ignition."' 3 Thus, the
officer was not "engaged in the lawful" exercise of duty when his hand was
hit. " The court also held that fleeing from the officers did not constitute
resistance because the officers lacked a sufficient basis for detaining him. '05
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the required elements for
Florida's lewd and lascivious acts statutes °6 in State v. Kees.107 Undercover
91. Id. at 589.
92. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 843.01 (2007)).
93. Id.
94. See Polite at 2790771.
95. Id. at 27907774-76.
96. 942 So. 2d 939, 942 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
97. Id. at 941.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Yarusso, 942 So. 2d at 942.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 943.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. FLA. STAT. § 796.07 (2004) (lewdness); FLA. STAT. § 800.03 (2004) (exposing sexual
organs in public).
[Vol. 32
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officers went to the Red Horse Saloon and arrested the defendants after ob-
serving "women exposing their breasts and men kissing them, men inserting
their fingers into women's exposed vaginas, and a man lifting the skirt of a
woman and performing cunnilingus on her."' ° The county court held that
"an essential element of the crime[]" was that someone be offended. 19 The
appellate court disagreed, and distinguished the Supreme Court of Florida
case of Schmitt v. State,"° which stated that a lewd act required a lewd "act
of sexual indulgence or public indecency.""' The court argued that the latter
case required intentionality because the act occurred in a private place."'
V. KIDNAPPING
The Second District Court of Appeal reviewed an armed kidnapping
charge in Cole v. State.1"' Cole appealed his conviction for his actions at a
Dollar Store in which he pulled a handgun and ordered the cashier to 'get in
the bathroom [of the store] and to stay there."'"" The movement only re-
quired the victim to move a few feet and was confined for only a few min-
utes." 5 This occurred at the end of the robbery. 6 The court noted that
courts in Florida have held that "simply moving a robbery victim" to another
room, "even if [the] door is closed and the victim is ordered not to [leave], is
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain" a kidnapping conviction." 7 The
court determined that such confinement was "likely to naturally accompany
[the] robbery."'" 8 The court found that the evidence was sufficient to uphold
a false imprisonment conviction, however." 9
The Third District Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion in a
similar case, Frederick v. State. 20 Frederick broke into a McDonald's res-
taurant with two other men. 121 While the robbers proceeded to rob the safe,
two of the restaurant's employees were ordered into the freezer and "told to
107. 919 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
108. Id. at 504.
109. Id. at 506.
110. 590 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1991).
111. Id. at410.
112. Kees, 919 So. 2d at 506.
113. 942 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1012.
118. Cole, 942 So. 2d at 1013.
119. Id.
120. 931 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
121. Id. at 968-69.
11
: Nova Law Review 32, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
stay there."'122 After the robbers fled, the manager of the restaurant opened
the door and let them out. 123 Similar to the Second District, the court held
that this confinement was of the type that naturally accompanied the
crime. 124  Both cases correctly applied a test established by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Faison v. State. 
125
VI. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed a criminal mischief con-
viction in Stinnett v. State. 126 The defendant shot his gun at another patron at
a bar that he had visited, but instead, hit a parked car. 127 The court held that
the defendant's intent to cause harm to a person could not be transferred to
satisfy the specific intent to harm property required for criminal mischief.'28
The Third District Court of Appeal, in MH. v. State,129 was asked to de-
termine if criminal mischief required specific intent, and found that it did
not. 130 The court reasoned that the statute does not use specific intent lan-
guage, which it apparently believed requires use of the word "intent." 
131
The Fifth District Court of Appeal also decided a case involving crimi-
nal mischief in Sanchez v. State.'32 Sanchez "attempted to purchase mer-
chandise with a credit card that did not belong to him." 133 When the clerk
refused to return the card, Sanchez tried to forcibly retrieve it.134 A struggle
ensued in which the defendant ended up biting the clerk. 135 Also, during the
122. Id. at 969.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 970.
125. 426 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 1983) (citing State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 723 (1970)). In
Faison, the Supreme Court of Florida applied the following test to establish whether a con-
finement is deemed as kidnapping:
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of an-
other crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement:
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other
crime substantially easier of commission or lessens the risk of detection.)
Id.
126. 935 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
127. Id. at 633.
128. Id. at 634.
129. 936 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
130. Id. at 2.
131. See id. at 3.
132. 909 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
133. Id. at 982-83.
134. Id at 983.
135. Id.
[Vol. 32
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struggle, "the clerk dropped the telephone, [which] broke."'' 36 Because Flor-
ida's criminal mischief statute requires an intent to damage or destroy the
property, 137 the court held that the malice directed towards the clerk could
not be transferred to the telephone. 38 The court also held that the defen-
dant's robbery conviction could be upheld, even though the force used by
Sanchez, the bite, occurred prior to the taking, because acts prior to the tak-
ing could be considered in the course of the taking, if the act and the taking
constituted a "continuous series of acts or events."' 39
VII. THEFT
The First District Court of Appeal addressed the requirements of Flor-
ida's "[r]obbery by sudden snatching" statute 40 in Nichols v. State."' The
court reversed the conviction of a thief who "grabbed a purse from a shop-
ping cart being pushed" by the victim where no force was used against her,
nor did any touching occur."'4 The court held that the crime requires that the
"taking [be] from the victim's person" as opposed to her custody."' There-
fore, it would not permit a conviction where the property was not taken from
the victim's "embrace."'" This is consistent with decisions from the Second
and Fourth District Courts. 145
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed an abandonment claim in
a grand theft conviction in Longval v. State.'46 Michelle Longval accompa-
nied her boyfriend, Anthony Hile, to Wal-Mart. 147 Hile testified that while
Longval was obtaining cigarettes from the cashier, he decided that he could
steal some items.148 Hile told Longval to take the shopping cart that he was
pushing and pick out a couple of items for herself, indicating that he would
purchase the items. "9 When he later asked her to "push the cart out of the
136. Id.
137. FLA. STAT. § 806.13 (2002).
138. Sanchez, 909 So. 2d at 985.
139. Id. at 984.
140. FLA. STAT. § 812.131(1) (2004).
141. 927 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
142. Id. at 90.
143. Id. at 91.
144. Id.
145. State v. Floyd, 872 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Brown v. State, 848
So. 2d 361, 363-64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
146. 914 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
147. Id. at 1099.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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store," she refused. 5 0 Instead, Hile pushed the cart out of the store.' 5' Hile
also "testified that he had no plan with Longval to distract the cashiers."' 52
"The trial court denied [Longval's] request" for an "instruction on the 'com-
mon law defense of abandonment."" 53
The appellate court then discussed the issue, which has arisen in Flor-
ida, of whether the defense of abandonment or renunciation, recognized in
Florida Statutes,'54 only applies to inchoate crimes. 155 It noted that the First
District Court of Appeal held that it did apply. 56 This court disagreed. 157 It
noted that the statute expanded the defense beyond the common law defense,
which did not apply if the defendant had proceeded far enough to be guilty of
attempt. '58 Then, it reasoned that Florida's grand theft statute includes "en-
deavors to obtain or... use,"'59 including within its scope acts that constitute
an attempt to commit grand theft. 160 By so defining the substantive crime,
Florida does not recognize attempted grand theft as a separate crime. 161
Therefore, the court concluded that abandonment as a defense applies to sub-
stantive crimes "that include attempts within their definition[s]."' 62 It also
noted that the language of the abandonment statute had been changed since
Dixon v. State,163 and the conclusion that abandonment could be raised as a
defense to theft was in accord with the reasoning of a theft case decided by
the Third District. 64
The Fifth District addressed the breadth of coverage of the state's theft
statute in Isenhour v. State. 165 Isenhour co-founded a private academy that
provided distance education to students who had been unsuccessful in public
school. 166 He also formed a nonprofit Scholarship Funding Organization
150. Id.
151. Longval, 914 So. 2d at 1100.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. FLA. STAT. § 777.04(5) (2004).
155. Longval, 914 So. 2d at 1101-02.
156. Id. (discussing Dixon v. State, 559 So. 2d 354, 356 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
157. Id. at 1100.
158. Id. at 1101.
159. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1) (2004).
160. Longval, 914 So. 2d at 1101.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. 559 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990). The language of the abandonment
statute since Dixon has since been amended to broaden the scope of substantive crimes "that
include attempts within their definition." Longval, 914 So. 2d at 1101.
164. See Carroll v. State, 680 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
165. 952 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
166. Id. at 1217.
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(SFO) pursuant to Florida statutes that could seek corporate donations but
required 100 percent of the donations be given to "children in the form of
scholarships."' 67 He, unsuccessfully, attempted to get the academy to iden-
tify eligible students.168 The academy eventually experienced serious finan-
cial difficulties. 169 Eventually, Isenhour used funds for administrative costs,
which he knew was prohibited, but before he did so, he had telephoned both
the Department of Education and the Department of Revenue (DOR), seek-
ing advice as to what to do with the funds. 70 Because the statute was new,
he failed to receive helpful advice. 171 He also called the corporate donor
seeking to return the funds, but was rejected. 172 The court held that the de-
fendant lacked the intent to steal required by the statute. 73 Additionally, the
donor had relinquished its right to the funds. 174 The DOR had no right to the
funds during the dates alleged, and would not have been out any funds-tax
credits given to the corporate donor-had the scholarships been awarded. '75
Thus, the State failed to prove that the defendant possessed the required in-
tent, or that anyone had a superior interest in the funds during the time peri-
ods alleged. 1
76
VIII. MEDICAID FRAUD
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal decided a Medicaid patient brokering and fraud case in State v. Rubio. 177
The defendant dentists had successfully argued to the Fifth District that the
anti-kickback portion of the Florida statute was unconstitutional. '78 At the
time of the alleged acts, this part of Florida's statute defined "knowingly" to
mean "a person who is aware or should be aware of the nature of his or her
conduct." 179 The controlling federal statute for Medicaid fraud required that
the person make or cause to be made false statements "knowingly and will-
167. Id. at 1217-18.
168. Id. at 1218.
169. Id.
170. Isenhour, 952 So. 2d at 1219.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1222.
174. Id.
175. Isenhour, 952 So. 2d at 1223.
176. Id. at 1223-24.
177. 2007 WL 2002586 (Fla. 2007).
178. 917 So. 2d 383, 387 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (referencing FLA. STAT. § 409.920
(2002)).
179. FLA. STAT. § 409.920(1)(d) (2002).
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fully."'8° The appellate court agreed that the statute violated the Supremacy
Clause by permitting conviction on a lesser intent requirement.,8' The Su-
preme Court argued that the statute could be salvaged by severing the
"should be aware" language from 409.920(l)(d) as it pertains to
409.920(2)(a). '82
The Third District also considered a Medicaid fraud case in State v.
Wolland.'83 Wolland, who was charged with 115 counts of filing false
claims, argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it was "pre-
empted by federal law." '184 This court addressed the difference between the
two statutes, noting that Florida required that the acts be done knowingly,
185
while the federal statute required knowingly and willfully. 186 It had also
previously held that this subsection was preempted. 187 It held that there was
no preemption in this case because the knowledge element implicitly in-
cluded willful behavior, and the court distinguished State v. Harden188 by
saying that the latter case dealt with a conflict in which the federal statute
had a safe harbor provision lacking in the Florida statute. 189 The Florida
statute has since been amended to indicate that the knowledge requirement
includes a willful state of mind.'90
IX. CONSPIRACY
The Third District Court of Appeal decided an appeal, in Campbell v.
State,191 involving a dispute concerning the requirements for "attempted traf-
ficking in cocaine."' 92 Campbell was caught in an undercover sting opera-
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (2000).
181. SeeRubio, 917So. 2dat392.
182. See Rubio, 2007 WL 2002591.
183. 902 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
184. Id. at 279-80.
185. Compare FLA. STAT. § 409.920(1)(d), with 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (indicating
that because the Florida statute omits the term "willfully" as a requirement, conduct that
would otherwise be lawful under the federal statute will be deemed unlawful under Florida
law).
186. Wolland, 902 So. 2d at 280.
187. State v. Harden, 873 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
188. Id. at 352.
189. Wolland, 902 So. 2d at 286.
190. Compare FLA. STAT. § 409.920 (2003), with FLA. STAT. § 409.920 (2004) (indicating
a change in the knowingly requirement through the addition of "willfully" or "willful" in the
statute's definition of "knowingly").
191. 935 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
192. Id. at 615.
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tion designed to target persons involved "in drug-related 'rip-offs." 93 Be-
cause there was no cocaine actually involved in the sting operation, the de-
fendant argued that he could not be guilty of attempted trafficking. 94 The
court rejected this argument, despite the fact that trafficking would require
the existence of the drug, because attempt is satisfied if there is an intent to
commit a crime and an overt act taken towards commission-both of which
were clearly met in this case. 95
X. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
The Second District Court of Appeal considered a Due Process chal-
lenge to amendments of the Florida statutes regarding possession of con-
trolled substances 9 6 in Wright v. State.'97 Following the Supreme Court of
Florida decisions in Scott v. State'98 and Chicone v. State,'99 the Florida leg-
islature found that the Court's holdings in those cases, which required "that
the state must prove that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of [the] con-
trolled substance ... [were] contrary to legislative intent., 200 Thus, the stat-
ute was amended to remove "knowledge of the illicit nature" as an element,
but to still permit the defendant to assert lack of knowledge as an affirmative
defense.2' However, if the defendant raises lack of knowledge as an af-
firmative defense, "a permissive presumption that the [defendant] knew of
the illicit nature" is raised.20 2 The court argued that the statute does not im-
properly shift the burden of proof of the knowledge element to the defendant
because the defendant is not required to disprove knowledge; instead, it
leaves it as an option to raise it as a defense.203 It also held that there was a
rational relationship between eliminating the element of knowledge because
of its difficulty to prove, 2°4 and because of the legitimate governmental inter-
est of addressing the drug problem.20 5
193. Id. at 615-16.
194. Id. at617.
195. Id. This is consistent with other rulings in Florida. E.g., Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d
879, 897 (Fla. 2000); State v. Cohen, 409 So. 2d 64, 64-65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
196. FLA. STAT. § 893.101 (2004).
197. 920 So. 2d 21, 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
198. 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002).
199. 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996).
200. FLA. STAT. § 893.101; Wright, 920 So. 2d at 24.
201. FLA. STAT. § 893.101(2).
202. Id. § 893.101(3).
203. Wright, 920 So. 2d at 25.
204. See id.
205. Id.
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The Second District Court of Appeal again considered Due Process and
First Amendment challenges to the Florida statute criminalizing receipt of
computer transmissions of information about a minor for purpose of sexual
conduct with a child2°6 in Wegner v. State.2 7 The defendant argued that the
statute is unconstitutional for failing to require that the offender know that
the person from whom the transmission is received is a minor. 20 ' By includ-
ing this element, the court also rejected the claimant's overbreadth argument,
which was based upon the lack of a mental element in the statute.20 9
XI. MISCELLANEOUS
In Czapla v. State,210 the First District Court of Appeal addressed the
defendant's claim that he raised a complete defense because he was adminis-
tering non-excessive corporal punishment in a child abuse case.21" ' In the
case, the defendant punched his son in the head and pushed him onto the
floor where he kicked him in the side. The defendant argued that the con-
viction could not be sustained because the state did not prove that his son had
sustained injuries more significant than bruises or welts. 2 3  The court re-
jected this argument, however, because intentionally kicking a child lying on
the ground is not reasonable corporal discipline as a matter of law.214
The First District also considered the definition of a convenience busi-
ness in a Florida statute in Baker v. State.215 Baker was "convicted of sale,
manufacture, delivery, or possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, manu-
facture or deliver cocaine within 1,000 feet of a convenience business.26
The relevant statute defines a convenience business to be one "that is open
for business at any time between the hours of 11 p.m. and 5 a.m.,, 217 The
store at issue in this case usually closed at ten o'clock in the evening, but
sometimes stayed open past eleven o'clock in the evening. 2I8 The court rec-
ognized that the statute was ambiguous and could be read to either include
206. FLA. STAT. § 847.0135(2)(d) (2000).
207. 928 So. 2d 436,437 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 440.
210. 957 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
211. Id. at 679.
212. Id. at 677.
213. Id. at 679.
214. Id. at 680.
215. 951 So. 2d 78, 78 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
216. Id.
217. FLA. STAT. § 812.171 (2005).
218. Baker, 951 So. 2d at 79.
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stores that are regularly open between the stated hours, or those that have at
some point opened between the listed times. 2 19 It held that the first reading
was more logical, and the appropriate interpretation under the Rule of Len-
ity.220
The Third District Court of Appeal decided two companion cases,
Cloyd v. State22" ' and Hughes v. State (Hughes IIJ),222 which attracted some
notoriety because they involved two intoxicated commercial airline pilots.
23
After a late night of drinking, the pilots got into a dispute with security per-
sonnel when they arrived at the airport for duty. 224 The personnel noticed the
odor of alcohol and reported the same to the Transportation Security Ad-
ministration (TSA) and the pilots' airline. 2 '5 The TSA notified the police,
who responded to the airport.226 By the time the police arrived, the pilots
were in the cockpit of the plane that they were to fly, "the jet way had been
pulled ... from the [airplane], and the [plane] was connected to the tug that
pushes it ... from the gate. 227 The police officers ordered the "tug driver to
return the [plane] to the gate., 2 ' The aviation expert testified that "the cap-
tain [was] in actual control of the aircraft" at that point in time and that the
plane could not be pushed back until the pilot so instructed.229 The driver of
the tug testified that the engines were not on, and that "the pilot [could not]
steer the aircraft" while "hooked up to the tug. ' 230 The State's expert testi-
fied that the pilots had activated and checked systems, and entered critical
data into the computer by this time.23'
After the trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss based
upon federal preemption,232 they petitioned the federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus, which was granted. 233 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court should have abstained be-
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 943 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
222. 943 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
223. Id. at 182; Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 156.
224. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 156; Hughes I1, 943 So. 2d at 182.
225. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 156; Hughes I1, 943 So. 2d at 182-83.
226. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 156; Hughes I1, 943 So. 2d at 183.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 157; Hughes I11, 943 So. 2d at 184.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 158; Hughes I1, 943 So. 2d at 185.
233. Hughes v. Eleventh Jud. Cir. of Fla. (Hughes 1), 274 F.Supp. 2d 1334, 1335-36 (S.D.
Fla. 2003), rev'd, 377 F.3d 1258 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
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cause the preemption claim was not facially conclusive.234 The Third Dis-
trict rejected the preemption argument, 2" and also rejected arguments that
Florida's statute is vague, and that it unconstitutionally incorporated federal
standards. 236  Finally, the court found that the defendants could be found
guilty of operating the aircraft while intoxicated even though the engines had
not yet been started.237
Statutes outlawing loitering frequently cause courts and law enforce-
ment officers difficulties in application because of the indeterminacy of the
terms. Such statutes, in fact, frequently raise constitutional concerns. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal, sought to clarify the requirements for Flor-
ida's loitering statute in G.G. v. State.238 This case involved an officer ob-
serving juveniles at three forty-five in the morning behind a shopping plaza,
one of whom, not the defendant, was carrying a piece of brick.2'39 The juve-
niles claimed that "they were looking for their dog," and the defendant origi-
nally gave the officer a fictitious name.2 4' The defendant then advised her of
his real name, and was arrested for loitering and prowling. 241 Although the
court felt that the State had properly shown that the defendant was 'loitering
and prowling in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens, ' ' '141 it did not
think that the facts supported a finding that a "breach of the peace [was] im-
minent or the public safety [was] threatened, ' 243 and therefore, reversed the
conviction.24
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the requirements for a
duress or necessity defense in Pflaum V'. State.2 45 Ryan Pflaum was con-
victed of perjury for "false statements [that he made] in a deposition and at a
subsequent trial., 246 Pflaum, Conrad Urbanowski, and others "were involved
in a fight with [Leonard] Albritton. ' ' 247 "Albritton was ... charged with ag-
gravated battery, and his defense was based upon presentation of' a video-
234. Hughes v. Att'y Gen. of Fla. (Hughes 11), 377 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1051 (2005).
235. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 158; Hughes III, 943 So. 2d at 185.
236. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 161, 164; Hughes 111, 943 So. 2d at 188, 190.
237. Cloyd, 943 So. 2d at 175; Hughes III, 943 So. 2d at 198-99.
238. 903 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1033 (quoting Von Goff v. State, 687 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1997)).
243. G.G., 903 So. 2d at 1033.
244. Id. at 1034.
245. 879 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
246. Id. at 94.
247. Id.
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tape of the fight.248 Pflaum falsely testified that the video did not exist and
that "Urbanowski did not have a reputation as a fighter or bully. 2 49 At his
perjury trial, Pflaum admitted that the statements were false, but that he
made them because of threats made by Urbanowski.50 Pflaum testified that
Urbanowski told him to deny the existence of the videotape and threatened
him several times before his deposition if he did not. 5 Included in the
threats was at least one in which Urbanowski threatened to kill him.
252
Pflaum introduced "ample evidence of Urbanowski's cruel and violent char-
acter, ' 253 and his knowledge of it.2 54 The court accepted the State's argu-
ment that duress cannot be proven with "[a] threat of future harm," and that
the harm must be imminent and impending.255 It rejected Pflaum's argument
that such a requirement is appropriate in self-defense cases, but not for per-
jury where "it would be absurd to think that anyone could ever have a gun
held to one's head while they testify. 256 The court reasoned that official
proceedings are not always private, and that imminent and impending danger
could be directed to a close family member, so that duress could apply to
some testimonial situations. 25' The court correctly noted that the require-
ment for imminent harm is in accord with case law on the duress defense.258
The Fourth District Court of Appeal interpreted the statute criminalizing
the deprivation of an "officer of means of protection or communication" in
Rodriguez v. State.25 9 The Deputy involved in this case responded to a call
of "domestic disturbance between [the defendant] and his father. 2 60 The
defendant continued to yell and scream at his father after the officer's arrival,
and Deputy Keegan decided to handcuff the defendant. 26' Rodriguez
grabbed the handcuffs.2 62 The defendant argued "that [the] handcuffs [were]
not a means of defending oneself as required by the statute ' 263 applying the
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Pflaum, 879 So. 2d at 94.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Pflaum, at 94-95.
256. Id. at 95.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. 931 So. 2d 991, 991 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 992.
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"rule of ejusdem generis.,,2' The court declined to apply the rule to limit the
statute to only apply to weapons as "'means' to defend oneself. 2
65
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the common law privi-
lege to prevent escape as it applies to bail bondspersons in Buchanan v.
State.266 Buchanan was a bail bondsman who was attempting to apprehend
Kevin Brinson, a "client[] who had jumped bail., 267 "Brinson attempted to
[escape] a car by climbing over the driver's seat, at which time Buchanan
shot [him] in the buttocks ... ,268 The defendant argued that he was "privi-
lege[d] to 'use whatever [force] necessary to affect ... surrender. ' '269 The
court first acknowledged "that a person 'under bail is in the vicarious cus-
tody of his bondsman,"' who may apprehend him. 270  "Having found no
Florida case law... [supporting an] unfettered privilege [for a bondsperson]
to use deadly force, 271 it refused to find that one existed.272
XII. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion indicates, Florida courts have interpreted a
number of statutes, defenses, and common law doctrines since the last review
article. The decisions seem to uniformly recognize existing criminal doc-
trines and theories-rather than attempt to establish controversial or novel
concepts. The courts also seem to have provided clarification in some areas
of confusion.
264. Rodriguez, 931 So. 2d at 992.
265. Id.
266. 927 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. (citing Register v. Barton, 75 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1954)).
271. Buchanan, 927 So. 2d at 211.
272. Id. at 212.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey reviews Florida appellate court decisions and legislation
enacted during 2006 and 2007 of potential, immediate interest to business
owners and their counsel. A quick glance at the table of contents reminds the
reader of a few of the many distinct areas of the law that have a direct, or at
least a significant peripheral impact, on doing business in Florida.
The survey does not include every case decided by the Supreme Court
of Florida and the five District Courts of Appeal that could be said to affect
business owners. Only those cases that appear to be of special interest, have
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unusual facts, involve conflicts certified to the Supreme Court of Florida by
the District Courts of Appeal, clarify or expand existing principles of law, or
address matters of first impression made the cut. Several federal court deci-
sions have also been included, the first case in the survey being a decision of
the United States Supreme Court.'
There were also important legislative developments that persons engag-
ing in business in Florida will need to consider. Therefore, an overview of
some of the legislation enacted in 2006 and 2007 has been included. The
reader's own in-depth analysis of the statutes is strongly suggested.
II. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Arbitration
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Cardegna /),2 Mr. Car-
degna (Cardegna) entered into an agreement with Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. (Buckeye) that purported to require submission of all controversies to
binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), if a party
to the agreement (or certain third parties) elected arbitration.3 The agree-
ment also provided that the FAA would apply.4 Cardegna sued Buckeye in
Florida state court claiming that "Buckeye charged usurious interest rates." 5
He also alleged that the agreement violated various other Florida laws and
was "criminal on its face."6 Buckeye asked the court to order arbitration.7
The trial court ruled that a court, not an arbitrator, decides if "a contract is
illegal and void ab initio."8 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court, but the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the Fourth District
Court of Appeal.9 The Supreme Court of Florida, ruling in favor of
Cardegna, concluded that it would violate Florida public policy and contract
law to enforce an arbitration clause in a contract challenged as unlawful.'"
The United States Supreme Court granted Buckeye's petition for certiorari."
1. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Cardegna 1), 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 442-43 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 443.
6. Cardegna I, 546 U.S. at 443.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 446.
11. Cardegna 1, 546 U.S. at 443.
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Justice Scalia stated the issue as, "whether a court or an arbitrator
should consider the claim that a contract containing an arbitration provision
is void for illegality." 12 The United States Supreme Court, relying on its
decisions in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.' 3 and
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 14 reversed the Supreme Court of Florida. 5 The
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that an arbitration clause
in a contract involving a transaction subject to the FAA is severable from the
contract as a whole.' 6 This is so even if the contract is alleged to be void and
illegal under state law. 7 Under the FAA, the issue of the validity of the con-
tract itself is to be heard in the first instance by the arbitrator, and this applies
in both state and federal courts. 8 Had the challenge been to the validity of
the arbitration clause, a court would have been the proper forum in the first
instance. '9
The Court noted that there is also a distinction between the issue of the
validity of the contract, which is to be determined by the arbitrator, and the
issue of the existence of a contract in the first place.2° Included in the latter
category are determinations such as whether the person against whom the
contract was sought to be enforced ever signed the contract, whether the per-
son signing had the authority to sign on behalf of an alleged principal, and
issues of capacity. 21 The Court declined to rule on whether the courts or the
arbitrator should decide questions regarding the existence of contract. 22 Jus-
tice Thomas dissented, stating that it remains his position that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply in state court proceedings.23
In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cardegna ,
Florida's appellate courts reviewed some of their decisions under the FAA.24
12. Id. at442.
13. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
14. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
15. Cardegna 1, 546 U.S. at 448-49.
16. Id. at 445.
17. Id. at 446.
18. Id. at 445-46.
19. Id. at 445.
20. Cardegna 1, 546 U.S. at 444.
21. Id. at 444 n.l.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Betts v. Fastfunding the Co. (Belts 1), 950 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2006) (remand-
ing to the Fifth District Court of Appeal in light of Cardegna 1, 546 U.S. 440); Cardegna v.
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. (Cardegna I1), 930 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2006) (on remand from the
United States Supreme Court); Fastfunding the Co. v. Betts (Betts I1), 951 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (on remand from the Supreme Court of Florida, remanding to the trial
court to refer to arbitration pursuant to Cardegna 1). The Supreme Court of Florida in turn
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In addition, several important decisions involving the Florida Arbitration
Code were rendered.25 The Supreme Court of Florida, in O'Keefe Architects,
Inc. v. CED Construction Partners, Ltd. ,26 addressed the issue of whether the
arbitrator or the trial court should have ruled on a statute of limitations de-
fense to arbitration. 2' The case was before the Supreme Court of Florida
based on conflict certified by the Fifth District Court of Appeal with the
Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Reuter Recycling of Florida,
Inc. v. City of Dania Beach.28 0 'Keefe Architects, Inc. involved a claim by
CED, a contractor, against O'Keefe, an architect, for damages arising from
alleged negligent design and construction.29 The arbitration clause in ques-
tion3" provided in part that, "[i]n no event shall the demand for arbitration be
made after the date when institution of legal or equitable proceedings based
on such claim, dispute or other matter in question would be barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations."'"
CED filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration As-
sociation.32  O'Keefe objected, arguing that arbitration was barred by the
remanded Cardegna II to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Cardegna 11, 930 So. 2d at
611. The Fourth District Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial court, which en-
tered an order compelling arbitration and staying proceedings. Order Granting Defendant
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.'s Motion For An Order Compelling Arbitration And Staying
Proceedings at 1, Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., No.
502001CA001 162XXXOCAJ (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. June 23, 2006); see also Reuter v. McKenzie
Check Advance of Fla., L.L.C., 825 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002), rev. denied,
930 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2006).
25. See, e.g., O'Keefe Architects, Inc. v. CED Constr. Partners, Ltd., 944 So. 2d 181 (Fla.
2006); Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Bryant, 937 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); see
also infra notes 27, 39, 61.
26. 944 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2006).
27. Id. at 183.
28. 859 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
29. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 183. CED fixed certain problems on a con-
struction project upon demand of the property owners and the property owners assigned to
CED their claim against O'Keefe, the architect. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida declined to
address O'Keefe's contention that the claim was not assignable, since the issue was not in-
cluded in the conflict certified by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. Id. at 183 n.2.
30. Id. The arbitration clause was contained in two contracts between O'Keefe Archi-
tects, Inc., as the architect, and Vero Club Partners Ltd. and Clearwater Phase I Partners Ltd.,
the property owners who had assigned their claims against O'Keefe to CED Construction
Partners, Ltd. Id. at 183. CED Construction Partners, Ltd. was not a party to the agreements
that contained the arbitration clauses. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 183.
31. Id. at 184. The parties agreed, and the Court confirmed, that the Florida Arbitration
Code, not the Federal Arbitration Act, applied, there being no interstate commerce involved.
Id; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-.22 (2005).
32. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 183.
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statute of limitations, but the arbitrator disagreed.33 O'Keefe then filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court, seeking a ruling that the trial court, not the
arbitrator, was required to decide the statute of limitations issue. 3' The trial
court declined to grant the requested relief and O'Keefe appealed.35 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court, but certified con-
flict with Reuter Recycling of Florida, Inc.36 The Supreme Court of Florida,
interpreting the Florida Arbitration Code and citing Stinson-Head, Inc. v.
City of Sanibel,37 upheld the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal. 31
In resolving the conflict, the Court noted that both cases involved arbitration
provisions with "similar language regarding timelines,"39 and concluded that
under the broad clauses in question, the arbitrator was the proper arbiter of
the statute of limitations defense.4'
Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Bryant41 arose from Mrs. Bryant's resi-
dency at Alterra Healthcare Corp's (Alterra) Vero Beach facility and later,
another Alterra facility in Vero Beach.42 Mrs. Bryant's husband, acting un-
der a durable power of attorney given to him by Mrs. Bryant, checked her
into both facilities.43 Mr. Byrant signed a residency agreement on Mrs. Bry-
ant's behalf when she entered the first facility, but no agreement was signed
when she moved to the second facility. 44 Mr. Bryant, as his wife's attorney-
in-fact, sued Alterra, alleging violation of the Assisted Living Facilities Act
and negligence. 45 The residency agreement contained arbitration provisions,
33. Id. The arbitrator ruled against O'Keefe on another issue as well as the statute of
limitations defense. Id. at 184.
34. Id. O'Keefe also argued that CED could not demand arbitration "because the con-
tracts were not assignable." Id.
35. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 184.
36. Id.
37. 661 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
38. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 185-86, 188.
39. Id. at 184.
40. Id. at 188. The Court noted that there were three threshold issues that a court has to
consider with respect to a motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 185. First, is there "a valid
written agreement to arbitrate"; second, is there an arbitrable issue; and third, was the right to
arbitrate waived. Id. (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999)).
The Court noted that there was agreement between CED and O'Keefe that all of these re-
quirements were satisfied. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at 185 n.4.
41. 937 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
42. Id. at 265.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 270. The trial court also found that the residency agreement applied to Mrs.
Bryant's stay at the second facility as well as the first facility. Id. at 271. See infra note 398-
401 and accompanying text.
45. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 265.
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and Alterra moved to compel arbitration.46 The arbitration provisions pur-
ported to prohibit punitive damages, limit non-economic damages, prohibit
attorney's fees, waive the right to appeal, and limit discovery.47 The trial
court found that these provisions were void as against public policy under
chapter 400 of the Florida Statutes and the Nursing Home Resident's Rights
Act, and were "egregiously unconscionable. 48  However, the residency
agreement had a severance clause that essentially provided that the invalidity
of some parts of the agreement would not affect the validity of other parts.49
The trial court severed the unenforceable provisions from the enforceable
portions of the arbitration clause and ordered that the parties proceed to bind-
ing arbitration.50 Alterra appealed and Mrs. Bryant cross-appealed. 5' The
Fourth District Court of Appeal stated that the remedial nature of the As-
sisted Living Facilities Act was a matter of first impression for the Florida
appellate courts.52 Analogizing the Assisted Living Facilities Act to the
Nursing Home Residents Act, sections 400.022 and 400.023 of the Florida
Statutes, the court held that the former was also a remedial statute designed
to protect its subjects.53 As a remedial statute, it had the effect of voiding, as
against public policy, the arbitration agreement's punitive damages prohibi-
tion, limit on non-economic damages, attorney's fee award limitation, and
restrictions on discovery.5 4 In addition, the Florida Arbitration Code was
expressly made applicable by the agreement.5 5 The Florida Arbitration Code
allows "a limited right of appeal."56 Thus, prohibiting the appeal was also
void as against public policy.57
Alterra argued that the arbitrator, not the court, should have decided the
validity of the limitations contained in the contract.5 8 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal stated that limit of liability provisions are proper for the
arbitrator, not the trial court, unless they are part of the arbitration clause
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 265-66.
49. Id. at 270.
50. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 265-66.
51. Id. at 265.
52. Id. at 266.
53. Id. The Nursing Home Resident's Act was held to be remedial in Romano ex rel.
Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
54. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 265.
55. Id. at 267.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 267-68.
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itself.' 9 The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the limit of li-
ability provisions were part of the arbitration clause itself, and therefore, the
trial court's consideration of the clauses in the first instance, even before
severing them, was proper. In an attempt to convince the court to rule to the
contrary, Alterra argued that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Cardegna I applied, and under Cardegna 1, a challenge to the validity of the
contract had to go to the arbitrator. 60 The Fourth District distinguished Car-
degna I since Mrs. Bryant's challenge was to the provisions of the arbitration
clause itself. 61
The Fourth District Court of Appeal's comments regarding Cardegna I
are interesting. Before distinguishing the facts of Alterra from those of Car-
degna , a case that had been before the Fourth District Court of Appeal and
whose opinion was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, 62 the
Fourth District Court of Appeal said that "[i]n [Cardegna 1], the Supreme
Court of the United States reaffirmed the principle that 'regardless of wheth-
er the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity
of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must
go to the arbitrator."'
63
However, in Cardegna , the United States Supreme Court had before it
an agreement subject to the FAA. 64 The agreement in Alterra expressly pro-
vided that the Florida Arbitration Code applied. 65  Did the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Alterra hold that the principle of Cardegna I applies to
proceedings in Florida state courts subject to the Florida Arbitration Code?
Or was the implication that even if Cardegna I applied, the facts were dis-
tinguishable because the challenge, in the court's view, was to the arbitration
59. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 267; but see O'Keefe Architects, Inc. v. CED
Constr. Partners, Ltd., 944 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 2006) (statute of limitations defense based on
a provision contained within the arbitration clause was proper for the arbitrator in the first
instance). See also supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. Alterra Healthcare Corp. was
decided on September 13, 2006, about a month before O'Keefe Architects, Inc. was decided
by the Supreme Court of Florida on October 19, 2006. O'Keefe Architects, Inc., 944 So. 2d at
181; Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 263. Cardegna I was decided by the United
State Supreme Court on February 21, 2006. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Car-
degna 1), 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
60. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 268.
61. Id. Had the limitations been somewhere else in the agreement, would the result have
been different? This is reminiscent of Judge Schwartz's dissent in Cutler v. Cutler, 32 Fla. L.
Weekly D583, D586 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2007) (Schwartz, J., dissenting). See also
infra note 1296 and accompanying text.
62. Cardegna I, 546 U.S. at 443.
63. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 268.
64. See id; Cardegna 1, 546 U.S. at 442-43.
65. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 267.
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clause itself rather than the contract? The issue of severability was also con-
sidered by the Second District Court of Appeal in Reeves v. Ace Cash Ex-
press, Inc. 66 Mary Reeves, alleging violations of the Florida Consumer Col-
lection Practices Act (FCCPA), sued Ace Cash Express, Inc. 67  The trial
court required her to arbitrate her dispute with Ace Cash Express, Inc. and
she appealed.68 She argued on appeal that enforcement of the arbitration
clause violated public policy, claiming that the arbitration clause failed to
afford her all of the rights and remedies provided under the FCCPA. 69 The
Second District Court of Appeal first noted that under Seifert v. U.S. Home
Corp.,70 a court, before compelling arbitration, must determine that: 1) there
is a valid written agreement to arbitrate; 2) there is an arbitrable issue; and 3)
the right to arbitration has been waived.7' With respect to prong two of the
test,72 Ms. Reeves contended that the issues were not arbitrable because of
the alleged failure to provide the rights available under the FCCPA, which
caused the arbitration agreement to be against public policy. 7
3
The court, before considering the public policy argument, addressed the
question of whether, as a matter of law, claims under the FCCPA are not
arbitrable. 74 The court drew an analogy to its reasoning in Orkin Exterminat-
ing Co. v. Petsch,75 a case involving arbitration under the Florida Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act. 76 There, as in Reeves, the Second District
Court of Appeal concluded that there was no express provision in the appli-
cable statute that would demonstrate the legislature's intent to preclude arbi-
tration. 77 Having so determined, the court in Reeves noted that the question
of whether arbitration of FCCPA claims was against public policy was an
issue of first impression.
7 8
The court concluded that the arbitration agreement did not, with one ex-
ception, prevent Reeves from asking for relief otherwise available under the
66. 937 So. 2d 1136, 1138 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006), rev. denied 952 So. 2d 1191
(Fla. 2007).
67. Id. at 1137.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999).
71. Reeves, 937 So. 2d at 1137 (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636).
72. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's determination under
prong one of the test that there was a valid written agreement to arbitrate. Reeves, 937 So. 2d
at 1137.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 872 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
76. Id. at 261; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (2007).
77. Petsch, 872 So. 2d at 261;see also Reeves, 937 So. 2dat 1137.
78. Reeves, 937 So. 2d at 1137.
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FCCPA.79 The exception related to the portion of the arbitration clause that
precluded class actions, which provision was contrary to the FCCPA.8 °
Since the arbitration agreement contained a severability clause, the class ac-
tion prohibition could be severed, leaving the remaining portions of the arbi-
tration agreement intact.8 With respect to all of the other forms of relief that
Reeves claimed were not available in arbitration, the court observed that
although the arbitration clause did not specifically state the types of relief an
arbitrator may grant, an arbitrator generally has the power to fashion equita-
ble remedies.82 The court rejected the public policy argument and af-
firmed.83
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Roth v. Cohen," in determining
if a party had waived arbitration, considered both prong two and prong three
of the Seifert test. 85 Mr. Roth entered into a contract with Mr. Cohen's com-
pany pursuant to which Mr. Cohen would provide home decoration services
and obtain design items for Mr. Roth.86 The design items were to be pro-
vided at cost.87 The contract contained an arbitration clause.8 8 After Mr.
Cohen and Mr. Roth had a falling out, Mr. Roth and his wife, who was not a
party to the contract, met with, and later sent a letter to, the third-party who
had recommended Mr. Cohen.89 At the meeting and in the letter, the Roths
questioned both Mr. Cohen's billing practices and the continued referral of
Mr. Cohen's services by the third person to others in their community.9 ° Mr.
Cohen then sued the Roths for libel, slander, and tortious interference.9' The
Roths filed a counterclaim against Mr. Cohen, alleging, among other claims,
79. Id. at 1137-38.
80. Id. at 1138.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1137. The court also noted that an arbitrator could award punitive damages for
a statutory tort under the FCCPA, even though the arbitration agreement did not specifically
so provide. Reeves, 937 So. 2d at 1138. The court relied on its recent decision in Morton v.
Polivchak, where the court held that an arbitrator may award punitive damages for fraud. 931
So. 2d 935, 941 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
83. Reeves, 937 So. 2d at 1137-38.
84. 941 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
85. Id. at 500.
86. Id. at 498.
87. Id.
88. Id. The relevant clause provided for arbitration of"[a]ny controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof." Roth, 941 So. 2d at 498 (emphasis
and quotations omitted).
89. Id. at 498-99.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 499. The category of the tortious interference claim is not specified in the
opinion. See id. at 498-50 1.
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breach of contract, fraud, and fraud in the inducement. 92 The Roths also
filed a third-party complaint on these grounds against Mr. Cohen's com-
pany.9
3
Mr. Cohen and his company moved to compel arbitration of the Roths'
counterclaim and third-party complaint.94 The trial court ordered the parties
to arbitration on the counterclaim and third-party complaint, and the Roths
appealed. 9' Mr. Cohen argued on appeal that under Seifert, his libel and
slander claims against the Roths were not subject to arbitration. 96 Therefore,
he could not, by filing suit with respect to those claims, be said to have
waived arbitration of the counterclaim and third-party complaint. 97 The
Third District Court of Appeal quoted the Supreme Court of Florida in Sei-
fert, where the court stated that even if there are "'broad arbitration provi-
sions, the determination of whether a particular claim must be submitted to
arbitration ... depends on the existence of some nexus between the dispute
and the contract containing the arbitration clause."'' 98 The Third District
Court of Appeal allowed that under Seifert, for a tort claim to be subject to
an arbitration clause, there has to be at least an issue "'the resolution of
which requires reference to ... the contract itself."' 99 The court found that
Mr. Cohen's claims against the Roths had sufficient nexus with the contract
to bring it within the provisions of the arbitration clause.'00 Further, by filing
suit against the Roths, Mr. Cohen waived his right to arbitration. I"' Mr. Co-
hen could not insist that the Roths arbitrate the counterclaim and third-party
complaint and at the same time proceed to court for resolution of his claims
against the Roths. 1°2 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's order compelling arbitration. 03
92. Roth, 941 So. 2d at 499.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 500.
97. See Roth, 941 So. 2d at 500.
98. Id. at 499 (quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999)).
99. Id. (quoting Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 638).
100. Id. at 500.
101. Id. at 501.
102. Roth, 941 So. 2d at 501.
103. Id. The appellate court reversed only as to the counterclaim against Mr. Cohen, not
the arbitrability of the third-party complaint against his company, since the Roths did not
argue this issue on appeal. Id. at 498 n.1.
2007]
33
: Nova Law Review 32, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
B. Mediation
An agreement reached in mediation was reduced to writing and signed
by the parties and their attorneys in Raho of Pass-A-Grille, Inc. v. Pass-A-
Grille Beach Motel, Inc. " A consent order adopting the mediation agree-
ment was signed by the trial judge.'05 However, when presented with mo-
tions by both parties to enforce the agreement, the trial judge held that there
was no agreement because there was no "real meeting of the minds."l0 6 The
Second District Court of Appeal found that while the agreement was am-
biguous in certain respects, it was not void.'07 The parties were in agreement
as to the essential terms and intended that the agreement bind them.0 8 The
parties' subsequent disagreement about the meaning of the terms and what
was required under the agreement did not warrant the conclusion that there
was no meeting of the minds.'0 9 The trial court should have resolved any
ambiguities based on the evidence introduced rather than concluding that
there was no agreement." 0 Therefore, the decision was reversed and re-
manded for the court to consider the evidence and resolve the ambiguity, "'
The First District Court of Appeal held that the party seeking to enforce
a mediation settlement agreement failed to meet its "strict burden" of proof
that the other party's attorney had "'clear and unequivocal authority to set-
tle' the case in Fivecoat v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. 1 2 In this workers'
compensation case, the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) concluded that
a valid settlement agreement had been reached during mediation between the
claimant and her employer."3 The JCC ordered the claimant to sign the set-
tlement papers."' The claimant appealed.' The appellate court found that
the record showed both a misunderstanding between the claimant and her
attorney and that the attorney did not have the requisite authority to settle." 6
The First District Court of Appeal, did, however, observe that "[a]dherence
104. 923 So. 2d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Raho of Pass-A-Grille, Inc., 923 So. 2d at 565 (citing Blackhawk Heating & Plumb-
ing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., 302 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 1974)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 565-66.
112. 928 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Sharick v. Se. Univ. of
Health Servs., Inc., 891 So. 2d 562, 565 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 43-04.
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to this rule does not preclude the application of principles of equity when a
party has relied to its irreparable detriment on the representations of the op-
posing attorney.""17 The First District Court of Appeal reversed and re-
manded. 8
In DVDPlay, Inc. v. DVD 123 LLC," 9 the Third District Court of Ap-
peal held that a mediation clause in a franchise agreement survived the ter-
mination of the agreement.12' The agreement contained a survival provision
that expressly referred by section number to the mediation clause.' 2' DVD
123 LLC requested mediation of issues involving alleged breaches of per-
formance under the franchise agreement. 122 DVDPlay, Inc. refused to medi-
ate, taking the position that as the result of DVD 123 LLC's breach of the
agreement and DVDPlay, Inc.'s termination of the agreement, there was
nothing to mediate. 23 The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed with
that argument, but concluded that mediation had been waived by DVD 123
LLC.124 By not seeking judicial assistance in compelling the mediation, and
filing suit instead, DVD 123 LLC waived mediation. 1
25
C. Enforcement of Settlement Agreements
In Architectural Network, Inc. v. Gulf Bay Land Holdings II, Ltd.,126 the
trial court was asked to enforce a purported settlement agreement.127 Archi-
tectural Network, Inc. alleged that its attorney did not have the authority to
settle on its behalf. 28 The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing
before it ruled that there was a valid settlement agreement and entered an
order enforcing the agreement.121 On appeal, Gulf Bay Land Holdings II,
Ltd. argued that the existence of the contract was undisputed. 3 0 The Second
District Court of Appeal cited Fivecoat, noting that the transcript failed to
show that Gulf Bay Land Holding II, Ltd. had demonstrated that the exis-
117. Fivecoat, 928 So. 2d at 404. The court noted that application of this exception would
require factual determinations and therefore "is appropriately raised" at the trial level. Id.
118. Id.
119. 930 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
120. Id. at 819.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 817.
123. Id.
124. DVDPlay, Inc., 930 So. 2d at 818.
125. See id. at 818-19.
126. 933 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
127. Id. at 733.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 733-34.
130. Id. at 733.
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tence of a valid settlement agreement was undisputed.'31 Architectural Net-
work, Inc. was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of its attorney's
authority to settle. 
132
In Masztal v. City of Miami, 133 the trial court set aside a settlement
based upon breach by the original plaintiffs in what was to be a class action,
and their attorneys, of the fiduciary duty owed by them to Mr. Masztal and
the others in the class. '34 The Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the
trial court that the attorneys breached their fiduciary duty to those other class
members. 135 This was true even though the class had not been certified at the
time the settlement agreement was concluded. 136 The trial court found that
this "was an implied class action."' 137 The original lawsuit had been brought
as a class action and certification was certain; it was a mere ministerial act.'38
III. BUSINESS ENTITIES AND AGREEMENTS
A. Franchises
In addition to the waiver of mediation issue discussed earlier in the sur-
vey, the Third District Court of Appeal, in DVDPlay, Inc. was called upon to
determine if a forum selection provision survived the termination of a fran-
chise agreement.139 The principal places of business of DVDPlay, Inc., the
franchisor, and DVD 123 LLC, the franchisee, were California and Florida,
respectively. 4 ' The franchise agreement between DVDPlay, Inc. and DVD
123 LLC provided that any legal action instituted under the agreement must
be brought in California. 14 The agreement also stated that disputes between
the parties were "first . . . subject to non-binding mediation."' 142 Disputes
arose and the parties accused each other of breach of contract. 143 DVDPlay,
Inc. refused to go to mediation and declared that the agreement was termi-
nated.'44 DVD 123 LLC, alleging breach of contract, sued DVDPlay, Inc. in
131. ArchitecturalNetwork, Inc., 933 So. 2d at 733.
132. Id. at 733-34.
133. 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1881 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2007).
134. Id. at D1881, D1883.
135. Id. atD 1884.
136. Id. at D1883.
137. Id.
138. Masztal, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1883.
139. DVDPlay, Inc. v. DVD 123 LLC, 930 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. DVDPlay, Inc., 930 So. 2d at 817.
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Florida. 145 DVDPlay, Inc. moved to dismiss the complaint alleging improper
venue based on the forum selection clause. 146 The trial court denied the mo-
tion holding that because DVDPlay, Inc. "had repudiated the agreement, it
could not enforce the forum selection clause." 147 The trial court, in ruling for
DVD 123 LLC, relied on Aberdeen Golf & Country Club v. Bliss Construc-
tion, Inc. 148 for the proposition that when the contract was terminated, the
forum selection clause was also terminated. 149 The Third District Court of
Appeal distinguished Aberdeen by noting that the arbitration clause involved
there was intended to function during the term of the agreement. 5 ° Further-
more, the court noted how the Aberdeen court stressed the lack of a survival
clause in the agreement.' 5' The Third District Court of Appeal reversed.' 52
The forum selection provision will survive unless it is expressly or implicitly
provided in the agreement that the forum selection clause is not intended to
survive termination of the agreement. 153 The trial court must enforce a man-
datory forum selection clause absent a showing that it would be unreasonable
or unfair, as the result of unequal bargaining positions of the parties to en-
force the provision-an argument the Third District Court of Appeal noted
had not been raised by DVD 123 LLC. 1
5 4
B. Limited Liability Companies
The operating agreement of a limited liability company specified as an
event of dissolution the "'sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of
[the company's] property and assets."" 55 The agreement also provided that
the company's "net cash flow" after taxes would be reinvested or, at the elec-
tion of the members, distributed to them. 15 6 The company purchased some
real estate, and then it sold the real estate at a profit. 57 As a result, the com-
pany then held only cash. 5' A member sought to have the sale declared a
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 932 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
149. DVDPlay, Inc., 930 So. 2d at 818.
150. Id. at 819.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 820.
153. Id. at 819-20.
154. DVDPIay, Inc., 930 So. 2d at 818.
155. O'Neal v. Blackerby, 950 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 425-26.
158. Seeid. at 426.
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dissolution event, alleging there were no assets. '59 The other parties asserted
that the cash was being held for reinvestment, was an asset, and was a sub-
stantial asset."r The trial court, on motion for summary judgment, ruled, as
a matter of law, that the cash was not a company asset and the sale was a
dissolution event. 6 ' The First District Court of Appeal reversed. 162 The
operating agreement was ambiguous on the issue of whether cash would be
excluded from the definition of assets for purposes of triggering a dissolution
event, and therefore summary judgment was inappropriate. 163 Judge Benton
concurred in the reversal, but observed that after considering all evidence on
the point, the trial judge might very well again rule the same way. 4
Recent legislation modified the method of identifying limited liability
companies. 16' The only approved abbreviation or designation is now "LLC"
or "L.L.C." used as the last words of the name of every limited liability com-
pany. 166 "L.C." and "limited company" are no longer approved. 67 "Limited
Liability Company" and "Ltd. Liability Co."-or some combination of the
words and abbreviations-may still be used as the last words. 168 "The name
of the limited liability company must be distinguishable on the records of the
... Department of State" except they do not have to be distinguishable from
1) "fictitious name registrations filed pursuant to [section] 865.09" of the
Florida Statutes, and "general partnership registrations filed pursuant to [sec-
tion] 620.8105" of the Florida Statutes; or 2) when use of an indistinguish-
able name is consented to in writing by the "owner entity" and "filed with
the Department of State" at the time the limited liability company registers
its name.'69 Except for names falling within those exceptions, the Depart-
ment of State may no longer disregard other recorded names. 170
For limited liability companies formed before July 1, 2007, the distin-
guishability of names requirement will not apply unless and until that limited
liability company files documents after June 30, 2007, that affect its name. '71
159. Id.
160. O'Neal, 950 So. 2d at 426.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (Benton, J., concurring).
165. Act effective Jan. 1, 2008, ch. 2007-134, § 1, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1115, 1116-
17 (West) (amending FLA. STAT. § 608.406 (2007)).
166. Id. § 1, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1116 (amending FLA. STAT. § 608.406(1)(a)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 608.406(2)).
170. Ch. 2007-134, § 1, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1117 (amending FLA. STAT. §
608.406(3)).
171. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 608.406(4)).
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A conforming amendment was made to section 608.407 of the Florida
Statutes with respect to the name of the limited liability included in the arti-
cles of incorporation. 72
C. Partnerships
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in the context of a partnership dis-
solution, considered the issue of modification of the terms of a partnership
agreement by the subsequent conduct of the partners.'73 Rhodes entered into
a partnership agreement with BLP Associates, Inc. 7 4 The written general
partnership agreement provided that if money, in addition to the initial capi-
tal contributions, was necessary for partnership operations, "then such addi-
tional sums ... may be (but shall not be required to be) advanced as loans
from the Partners."' Rhodes, as managing partner, requested more money
from the partners, but he described his requests as "capital calls" and "capital
contributions."'' 76 The partners, including Rhodes, sent money, with one of
the other partners referring to the payment as a capital contribution. ' No
partner referred to these payments as loans, and no one objected to Rhodes'
characterization of the payments.'78 In addition, the partnership's federal
income tax returns for the pertinent years classified the additional contribu-
tions as capital contributions.'79 The partnership was eventually dissolved, a
receiver was appointed, and the receiver submitted a final accounting. '80 The
trial court determined that for the purpose of distributing partnership funds,
the additional contributions were capital contributions, not loans. 18'
Rhodes appealed, alleging that these contributions were loans.' 82 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal had no difficulty confirming the trial court's
ruling on the characterization of the payments as capital contributions.'83
The court observed that a written agreement can "be modified by the [later]
conduct or course of dealing of the parties," provided there is mutual consent
and consideration for the modification, even when the agreement purports to
172. Id. § 2, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1117 (amending FLA. STAT. § 608.407 (2007)).
173. Rhodes v. BLP Assocs., Inc., 944 So. 2d 527, 530 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
174. Id. at 528.
175. Id. at 529.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Rhodes, 944 So. 2d at 529.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 528.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 528-29.
183. See Rhodes, 944 So. 2d at 530.
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allow only written modification.'84 The court disagreed with Cox v. CSX
Intermodal, Inc."85 and Flagship National Bank v. Gray Distribution Sys-
tems, Inc. 8 6 to the extent that those cases suggested "that a written contract
cannot be modified by the subsequent course of conduct of the parties" if the
conduct is inconsistent with the terms of the agreement. 87 Furthermore, the
court noted that even if Cox stated the law correctly, the rule would be inap-
plicable.188  There was nothing inconsistent between the language of the
partnership provision at issue and the parties' subsequent conduct treating
the additional funds as capital contributions. 
89
A second issue in the case involved a loan by the other partners to Rho-
des that enabled Rhodes to make his initial capital contribution. 90 The
promissory note given by Rhodes to the other partners provided that the ob-
ligation matured when "capital contributions were 'paid in full.""9191  The
other partners persuaded the trial court to retain Rhodes' share of the partner-
ship capital distributions until their suit against him on the note was con-
cluded. 192 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed on this issue, find-
ing that neither the promissory note nor the partnership agreement provided
for this hold back. 19 The trial court was not permitted to aid the other part-
ners in the collection of debt in that manner. 94
D. Corporations and Shareholder/Buy-Sell Agreements
In Alvarez v. Rendon, 95 two pathologists formed a professional associa-
tion for the practice of medicine. 96 Dr. Rendon owned a slight majority of
the stock.' 97 The employment contract Dr. Alvarez subsequently signed pro-
vided that he could be terminated for cause and specified what would consti-
tute cause.' 98 His employment could also be terminated without cause, but in
that event, Dr. Alvarez would be entitled to notice and compensation during
184. Id.
185. 732 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
186. 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3dDist. Ct. App. 1986).
187. Rhodes, 944 So. 2d at 531.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 529.
191. Id.
192. Rhodes, 944 So. 2d at 531.
193. Id. at 532.
194. Id.
195. 953 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
196. Id. at 705.
197. Id. Rendon owned 51% and Alvarez owned 49% of the stock. Id.
198. Id.
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the notice period.199 The doctors also entered into a buy-sell agreement un-
der which Dr. Alvarez would be paid a specified sum for his shares in the
event of termination without cause, but would only receive half of that
amount in the event of termination for cause or his voluntary termination.00
The buy-sell agreement contained a noncompete provision effective upon
redemption of shares, but not conditioned on the reason for termination of
employment.2°1
Dr. Rendon, acting as the professional association's president, termi-
nated Dr. Alvarez's employment and attempted to begin making "for cause"
buy-out payments. 2  Dr. Alvarez did not accept the payments because he
claimed he was improperly fired for cause and therefore entitled to the lar-
ger-without cause-buy-out amount. 2 3 After Dr. Alvarez left the practice,
he began working in South Florida for a medical laboratory that had clients
in the geographic area specified in the noncompete clause.20 4
Dr. Alvarez sued Dr. Rendon and the professional association alleging
breach of the employment contract based on alleged improper termination
for cause and improper reduction of his salary.205 He also claimed that they
breached the buy-sell agreement.2 6 Dr. Rendon and the professional asso-
ciation counterclaimed, alleging breach of the noncompete provision by Dr.
Alvarez. 2 7 The jury found that Dr. Rendon was not justified in terminating
Dr. Alvarez for cause. 2 8 Dr. Alvarez was awarded the difference in the
amount Dr. Rendon tendered and the amount Dr. Alvarez would have re-
ceived for the buy-out without cause, plus damages based on the wrongful
termination for cause. 2 9 The jury also found that Dr. Alvarez was bound by,
and violated, the restrictive covenant. 2 0 The trial court awarded damages to
Dr. Rendon and granted her motion for a permanent injunction. 21 ' Dr. Alva-
rez appealed, and Dr. Rendon and the professional association cross-
appealed.212
199. Alvarez, 953 So. 2d at 705.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
203. Id.
204. Alvarez, 953 So. 2d at 705.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 706.
208. Id.
209. Alvarez, 953 So. 2d at 706.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 707. The effect of the monetary awards was a net judgment to the professional
association of $602,970.48. Id.
212. Id. at 708.
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, concluding
that the jury's verdict was inconsistent. 21  The jury could not have found
that Dr. Alvarez violated the noncompete clause if they also found that Dr.
Rendon's termination for cause was improper." 4 Since Dr. Alvarez was not
terminated for cause, he was entitled to a greater payment for his shares un-
der the agreement, and since that amount was not paid, and his shares were
not redeemed, his obligations under the noncompete clause could not have
arisen.2 5 The proper remedy for the inconsistent verdict was a new trial.2 16
However, in order to preserve the issue of inconsistency in the verdict for
review on appeal, the party alleging the inconsistency must have raised it
before the jury was discharged, which the Fifth District Court of Appeal con-
cluded that Dr. Alvarez did.217
In an unusual case, Henao v. Professional Shoe Repair, Inc.,218 it was
the buyer of a business who was prohibited from soliciting business from
existing customers of the business he was buying.2 9 The buyer and the
seller had been in business together, and their corporation had a very lucra-
tive contract with a customer.22° It was that relationship that formed the ba-
sis for the restrictive covenant and the litigation.2 1 The seller sold his equal
share of the business to the buyer, and the buyer assigned to the seller all of
the buyer's interest in the contract with the customer.222 The buyer also
agreed that he would not solicit that customer for ten years. 223 The seller
sought an injunction, alleging that the Buyer breached the covenant not to
compete.224 The trial court found that the covenant was void and unenforce-
able. 225 The Fifth District Court of Appeal was called upon to determine if
the provisions of section 542.335 of the Florida Statutes, with respect to
enforcement of restrictive covenants against a "seller," also apply to enforce
restrictive covenants against a buyer.226 Based on the purpose stated in the
statute to construe restrictive covenants in a manner that will provide "rea-
213. Alvarez, 953 So. 2d at 707, 713.
214. See id. at 710.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 712.
217. Id. at711.
218. 929 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
219. Id. at 725.
220. Id. at 724.
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. Henao, 929 So. 2d at 724.
224. Id. at 724-25.
225. Id. at 725.
226. Henao, 929 So. 2d at 727; see also FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(d)(3) (1999).
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sonable protection to all legitimate business interests," the court concluded
that the provisions apply to buyers as well as sellers. 2 7 Furthermore, al-
though the duration of the restrictive covenant was in excess of seven years
and therefore presumptively unreasonable under section 542.335 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, the seller showed that the noncompete provision protected a
legitimate interest of the seller and the provision was therefore not void or
unenforceable. 28 The court had the authority to cut the agreement back to a
reasonable period of time.229 Another issue arose because the agreement
only gave the buyer the right to enforce the covenant, and it was the buyer
who was subject to the covenant.23° The court noted that was an obvious
misnaming of the parties and the seller could enforce the agreement.
31
IV. CHOICE OF LAW AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. Actions Based on Contract
Mr. and Mrs. Hodges were Indiana residents.232 They purchased a sec-
ond home in Florida in 1993 where they spent about five and one-half
months each year.233 Their automobile insurance was issued to them by
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance (State Farm) in Indiana.23" During
their 2001 stay in Florida, Mr. and Mrs. Roach, the Hodges' neighbors, while
passengers in the Hodges' car, were involved in a crash with another car.
235
Mr. and Mrs. Roach were injured and they sued both Mr. Hodges, who was
driving the car, and the driver of the other car. 36 They also claimed unin-
sured motorist benefits under the Hodges' Indiana insurance policy.237 Be-
cause the Indiana and Florida uninsured motorist laws differed, the Roaches
could receive compensation under Florida law that they could not receive
under Indiana law. 238 The Second District Court of Appeal ruled that Florida
law could apply to the Indiana policy, provided that Florida had a "signifi-
cant connection" to the insurance policy, and State Farm had "reasonable
227. Henao, 929 So. 2d at 727 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(h)).
228. Id. at 728.
229. Id.
230. Id
231. Id.
232. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So. 2d 1160, 1168 (Fla. 2006).
233. Id. at 1162.
234. Id.
235. Id. Mrs. Hodges died in the accident. Id.
236. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1162.
237. Id.
238. See id.
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notice" of the Hodges' Florida connection. 239 The Second District Court of
Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to make this determination,240
and the question certified to the Supreme Court of Florida was restated by
the Supreme Court of Florida as follows: "Where residents of another state
who reside in Florida for several months of the year execute an insurance
contract in that state, may they invoke Florida's public policy exception to
the rule of lex loci contractus to invalidate an exclusionary clause in the pol-
icy?"
241
The Supreme Court of Florida said no, holding that the rule providing.
that the law of the place where the contract was made-lex loci contractus-
governs the insurance contract unless the public policy exception applies.242
In other words, lex loci contractus is the law in Florida, but a departure from
this rule can be made to enforce some paramount public policy with respect
to Florida citizens.243 The Hodges were not Florida citizens and that re-
solved the matter.2" Therefore, it was not necessary to determine if Indiana
law offended some paramount rule of Florida public policy.245 The court did
note, however, that in the context of insurance contracts, the exception ap-
plies only if the insurer had "reasonable notice that the insured is a Florida
citizen. 2 46 The Hodges' Indiana citizenship made that question moot. 247
Justice Pariente concurred, but stated that "if [she] were to write on a
clean slate, [she] would apply the 'significant relationship' test. 2 48 Justice
Pariente agreed that the result reached by the majority was required, absent
receding from the Court's precedent. 49 She concluded, however, that even
under the "significant relationship" test, Indiana law would have applied.250
Although this case did not arise in a business context, the Supreme
Court of Florida's continued rejection of the "most significant relationship"
test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, in contract cases, in-
239. Id. at 1163.
240. Id.
241. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1162.
242. Id. at 1164-65, 1168.
243. Id. at 1164-65.
244. Id. at 1168.
245. Id. at 1168-69.
246. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1165.
247. Id. at 1168. The opinion did not state if the Roaches were Florida citizens, or, if they
were, if that would have changed the result. See id. at 1168. It would seem that the Hodges
were third-party beneficiaries under the contract between the Hodges and State Farm Insur-
ance Company. See id. at 1162.
248. Id. at 1169 (Pariente, J., concurring).
249. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1169 (Pariente, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 1169-70.
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surance related, and otherwise, is significant.251 Justice Lewis, concurring in
the result only, noted that the majority was applying "the doctrine of lex loci
contractus in Florida more rigidly than ever before.2 52 Justice Lewis' dis-
cussion regarding Decker v. Great American Insurance Co.,253 a case involv-
ing a Georgia business with a Florida traveling salesman, makes a compel-
ling argument for adopting the "significant relationship" test.254
B. Tort Actions
The First District Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether the
"modified" comparative negligence law of Georgia or the "pure" compara-
tive negligence rule of Florida applied to a car accident in Georgia between
residents of Florida and Georgia. 255 The Florida resident, Mr. Connell, was
commuting from his home in Florida to a project on which he was working
in Georgia when his truck collided in Georgia with a compact car driven by
Caleb Riggins, the Georgia resident.256 Mr. Riggins was injured and he
brought an action in Florida against Mr. Connell.257 Mr. Connell filed a mo-
tion seeking a ruling that Georgia law applied with respect to all questions
related to negligence and damages.258 Under the Georgia rule, if the defen-
dant and plaintiff are found to be equally negligent, or the defendant's negli-
gence is less than the plaintiffs, then the plaintiff cannot recover from the
defendant.259 Mr. Riggins argued that Georgia law applied to some issues,
but that Florida's comparative negligence law applied.260 If Florida law ap-
plied, then liability would have been divided "according to each party's per-
centage of negligence. '2 6' The trial court found that Florida law applied to
those issues.262 After final judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Riggins,
Mr. Connell appealed, alleging, among other errors, that the trial court im-
properly applied Florida law to the issues of comparative negligence and
damages. 2
63
251. Id. at 1163-64; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
252. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1170-71 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
253. 392 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
254. Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1173 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
255. Connell v. Riggins, 944 So. 2d 1174, 1176-77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
256. Id. at 1176.
257. Id. Mr. Connell's employer was also named as a defendant. Id.
258. Id. at 1178.
259. Connell, 944 So. 2d at 1177.
260. Id. at 1178.
261. Id. at 1177.
262. Id. at 1180.
263. Id. at 1176.
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The First District Court of Appeal relied heavily on Bishop v. Florida
Specialty Paint Co. 21 in concluding that Georgia law applied. 265 The court
observed that the Supreme Court of Florida, in Bishop, rejected the old lex
loci delicti rule in favor of the "significant relationship" test found in sec-
tions 145 and 146 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.266 Un-
der the "significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second), the ques-
tion is which state's law "has the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties under the principles" set forth in the Restatement (Sec-
ond).267 In making the choice of law, Bishop advises consideration of: "1)
'the place where the injury occurred,' 2) 'the place where the conduct caus-
ing the injury occurred,' 3) 'the domicil, residence, nationality, place of in-
corporation and place of business of the parties,' and 4) 'the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.' ' 268 "The state where
the injury occurred" will usually be the primary factor in resolving the con-
flict of law issue.269
Applying the four-factor test, the First District Court of Appeal held,
"[a]s a matter of law, Florida [did] not have a more significant relationship
than Georgia to the [event] and to the parties" and certainly not enough to
overcome the consideration that had to be given to Georgia as the place
where the injury occurred. 7°
V. CONSUMER RIGHTS
A. Telephone Solicitation and Telemarketing
In 2000, Cricket's Termite Control, Inc. (Cricket's) leased an automated
telemarketing system to use in offering pest control services to potential cus-
tomers.2 17 1 After Cricket's began using the system, it received a notice from
the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services that com-
plaints had been received that Cricket's was making automated sales solicita-
264. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
265. See Connell, 944 So. 2d at 1180.
266. Id. at 1177; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145-46
(1971).
267. Connell, 944 So. 2d at 1176.
268. Id. at 1177 (quoting Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla.
1980)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1180.
271. De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d 1001,
1002 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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tion calls in violation of section 501.059 of the Florida Statutes.272 Cricket's
was ordered to stop making calls in violation of the statute and advised that
failure to do so could result in an injunction against it and civil penalties of
as much as $10,000 per call.273 Cricket's not only immediately stopped mak-
ing such calls, it stopped making lease payments to the lessor of the system,
De Lage Landen Financial Services, Inc. (DLL).274 DLL sued Cricket's to
collect the lease payments.275 Cricket's defense was that the lease was illegal
and unenforceable because the intended use of the leased property turned out
to be illegal.2 76 The trial court agreed, refusing to enforce the lease, and
awarded Cricket's attorney's fees.277 DLL appealed and the Fifth District
Court of Appeal framed the issue as "whether the lease agreement is an en-
forceable contract, or if it is void for violating Florida Statutes or Florida
public policy. 278  The court determined that the lease violated neither.2 79
The lease agreement was purportedly governed by Oregon law. 280 The court
noted that Oregon's automated call statute is similar to the Florida statute.28'
Both statutes contain exceptions to the prohibition of automated calls so that
automated calling systems can be put to legal uses.282
The court, in reaching its decision, looked to a case with similar facts283
in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas concluded that just because an item
subject to a sales contract can be put to illegal uses does not render the con-
tract void.284 There are, however, two similar, although not identical, excep-
tions to this rule.285  Under the first exception, if a seller knows of the
buyer's illegal purpose and that illegal purpose "'involves the commission of
a serious crime or an act of great moral turpitude,"' the seller cannot enforce
272. Id. at 1002-03; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.059 (2007).
273. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1003.
274. Id. The lease, originally between Cricket's and U.S. Bancorp, was assigned to De
Lage Financial Services, Inc. Id. at 1002.
275. Id. at 1003.
276. Id.
277. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1003.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1005-06.
280. Id. at 1004 n.1.
281. Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 759.290 (2003).
282. See FLA. STAT. § 501.059 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 759.290 (2003).
283. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1004; see also Potomac Leasing Co. v.
Vitality Centers, Inc., 718 S.W.2d 928 (Ark. 1986).
284. Potomac Leasing Co., 718 S.W.2d at 929.
285. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1005-06. One exception is mentioned
in the body of the Cricket's decision, and the other is in a footnote. Id. at 1005, 1006 n.3.
2007]
47
: Nova Law Review 32, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
the contract. 286 The second exception applies when the seller of the product
knows that the buyer's use of the product will be a "'flagrant violation of the
fundamental rights of man and society." 287 The court in Cricket's found that
there was no indication that either "DLL or U.S. Bancorp, [the original les-
sor,] knew of Cricket's planned use of the System.288 Even if they had,
Cricket's use of the automated call system would have to have constituted a
"'flagrant violation of the fundamental rights of man and society' to void
the lease. 289
The court found additional reasons to reverse the trial court.290 Section
680.1031(1)(g) of the Florida Statutes and section 72A.1030 of the Oregon
Revised Statutes do not permit a finance lessee to refuse payments to the
finance lessor if the goods in question turn out not to be as expected.29 The
lessor's covenants to the finance lessee are also irrevocable and independent
of any defense the lessee may have against a third-party seller.292 Finally,
the court noted, with apparent approval, the finance lessor's broad boiler
plate liability disclaimers set out in the lease agreement.293
TSA Stores, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Ser-
vices, 294 also decided by the Fifth District Court of Appeal, raised several
questions of first impression. 295 As in Cricket's, section 501.059 of the Flor-
ida Statutes was involved.296 The Department alleged that TSA violated the
automated calling provisions and the do-not-call list rules.297 The parties
agreed that all of the calls originated from California.298 TSA had its princi-
286. Id. at 1005 (quoting Potomac Leasing Co., 718 S.W.2d at 930). The Arkansas court,
in turn, cited 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1519 (1962), in support of its
holding. Potomac Leasing Co., 718 S.W.2d at 929-30. Corbin notes that even "a fountain
pen can.., be used for... criminal purposes." 6A CORBIN, supra, § 1519.
287. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1006 n.3 (quoting Potomac Leasing
Co., 718 S.W.2d at 929).
288. Id.
289. Id. Although not stated in the opinion, it would seem that the Florida court agreed
with the Supreme Court of Arkansas that the Arkansas flagrant violation of human rights test
was "essentially the same" as the Corbin serious crime or moral turpitude test. See Potomac
Leasing Co., 718 S.W.2d at 929-30.
290. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1006.
291. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 680.1031(1)(g) (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 72A.4070 (2003).
292. Cricket's Termite Control, Inc., 942 So. 2d at 1006 (citing FLA. STAT. § 680.407
(2007); OR. REv. STAT. § 72A.4070 (2003)).
293. Id. at 1006-07.
294. 957 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
295. Id at 26.
296. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.059 (2004).
297. TSA Stores, Inc., 957 So. 2d at 26.
298. Id. at 30. The court noted that the automated calling provisions of the statute do not
contain a preexisting relationship provision. Id.
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pal place of business in Broward County, Florida, and the calls were made to
people in Orange County, Florida, inviting them to a sale at TSA stores in
Orange County.299 TSA raised several defenses, including that the Federal
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) preempted section 501.059 of
the Florida Statutes.3" The court easily dismissed this argument because the
TCPA expressly provides that it does not preempt state law.3' 1 Another issue
was the interpretation of an exception to the do-not-call list rules that allow a
telephone solicitor to call persons on the list with whom the solicitor "'has a
prior or existing business relationship,' 3 2 a phrase not defined by the stat-
ute.3°3 TSA argued that the persons who were alleged to have been improp-
erly called all consented to telephone solicitations by providing a telephone
number to the sales clerks.3" The court found that this did not constitute
express consent, which is required by the statute, although it might be im-
plied consent. 35 The court looked for guidance to the definition applicable
under the TCPA of "established business relationship. 30 6 Relying on that
definition, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that if a person made
a purchase from TSA within eighteen months prior to the telephone solicita-
tion, solicitation was permissible, even to persons on the do-not-call list.307
With respect to the automated calls, TSA argued that Florida had no au-
thority to regulate interstate calls that originated in California.3 8 The court
concluded that it did not need to address the issue of jurisdiction over calls
emanating from outside of Florida, since these calls were otherwise covered
by section 501.059 of the Florida Statutes.3 09 The Florida provisions prevent
a person from simply taking the automated machines out of Florida and call-
ing consumers in Florida, as a way of avoiding the statute.310 The Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held that the causation underlying this statutory viola-
tion involved a business in Orange County, Florida, Orange County consum-
299. Id. at 26.
300. Id.
301. TSA Stores, Inc., 957 So. 2d. at 28 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) (2000)).
302. Id. at 27.
303. Id. at 29.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. TSA Stores, Inc., 957 So. 2d at at 29-30 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4) (2006)).
307. Id. at 30.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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ers, and a sale being held in Orange County. 31 The court concluded that the
place from which the calls originated was irrelevant "in this context.,
312
There were two prohibitions added to Florida's telephone solicitation
statute in 2006.313 The first prohibition makes it unlawful, with limited ex-
ceptions, for telephone sales solicitors to fail to disclose their names and tel-
ephone numbers.3t 4 The second prohibition makes it unlawful to alter voices
with intent to defraud or confuse.315
B. Deceptive Trade Practices
In South Motor Co. of Dade County v. Doktorcyk,316 Doktorczyk
brought an action against South Motors under the Florida Deceptive and Un-
fair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). 317 He claimed that when he purchased a
used car, "South Motors misrepresented that the factory warranty . . . had
expired" and persuaded him to buy an extended warranty.318 The alleged
misrepresentations were made almost six years before Doktorczyk filed his
action.319  Section 95.11(3)(f) of the Florida Statutes imposed a four year
statute of limitations for FDUTPA claims and other statutory causes of ac-
tion.320
Doktorczyk claimed that under section 95.05 1(1)(f) of the Florida Stat-
utes, the statute of limitations was tolled by the installment payments he
made for five years on the auto extended warranty purchase. 32' This section
states that the statute of limitations is tolled by "payment of any part of the
principal or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written in-
strument. 32  The Third District Court of Appeal held that Doktorcyzk's
claim was founded on a statutory cause of action, not on a written instru-
ment, and therefore his action was filed too late.
3 23
311. TSA Stores, Inc., 957 So. 2d at 31.
312. Id.
313. FLA. STAT. § 501.059(7)(c), (d) (2007).
314. Id. § 501.059(7)(c).
315. Id. § 501.059(7)(d).
316. 957 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
317. Id. at 1216.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1216-17 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(f) (Supp. 1996)).
321. SeeDoktorczyk, 957 So. 2d at 1217.
322. FLA. STAT. § 95.05 1(1)(f) (2004).
323. Doktorczyk, 957 So. 2d at 1217-18.
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In another FDUTPA case, the Florida Attorney General, on behalf of
small businesses, sued several leasing companies.324 The trial court found
that certain telecommunications equipment leases were not "consumer leas-
es" because under the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, section
680.1031(e) of the Florida Statutes, they were not considered "consumer
leases., 32" The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that it was
error for the trial court to have relied on a statute other than the FDUTPA,
since the FDUTPA contains its own definition of consumer, which is not
limited to "personal, family or household purposes. 326
C. Warranties
The Supreme Court of Florida was asked if an automobile lessee is enti-
tled, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Magnuson-Moss),327 to en-
force auto warranties.328 The Second District Court of Appeal, having said
yes, certified conflict between its decision and the First District Court of Ap-
peal's decision in Sellers v. Frank Griffin AMC Jeep, Inc.,329 to the con-
trary.330 In Cerasani, Jennifer Cerasani leased a Honda Civic on a long-term
lease basis. 33 ' She had problems with the automobile. 332 Unsuccessful at-
tempts were made to repair the car, and Cerasani eventually sued the manu-
facturer, American Honda, under Magnuson-Moss for breach of written war-
ranty and breach of implied warranty.333 The trial court dismissed her com-
plaint finding that the written warranty defined in Magnuson-Moss applied to
automobile purchasers only, not to lessees. 334 The trial court also found "that
Cerasani was not in privity of contract with Honda, as required" for an im-
plied contract claim. 35 Cerasani appealed and the Second District Court of
Appeal affirmed the dismissal of her claim with respect to the implied war-
ranty, but reversed the dismissal of the express new-car warranty claim under
324. State v. Commerce Commercial Leasing, LLC, 946 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2007).
325. Id. at 1258.
326. Id.
327. 15 U.S.C. § 2301-12 (2000).
328. Am. Honda Motor Co., v. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2007).
329. 526 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
330. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d at 544.
331. Id. at 545.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d at 545.
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Magnuson-Moss.33 6 It was the reversal that conflicted with Sellers. The
Supreme Court of Florida held that an automobile lessee is entitled to en-
force auto warranties under Magnuson-Moss.337 The court also held that the
narrow definition of "written warranty" contained in Magnuson-Moss yields
to the broader definition under state law, specifically section 681.102(23) of
the Florida Statutes, the Lemon Law.338
Magnuson-Moss, according to the Supreme Court of Florida, was de-
signed "to enhance the enforceability of warranties on consumer products
and protect the 'ultimate user of the product.' ' 339 Nevertheless, only a "con-
sumer" may sue under Magnuson-Moss.34 The court noted that three cate-
gories of consumers are identified in Magnuson-Moss. 34' They are: 1) a
buyer, as long as not bought for resale; 2) anyone to whom the consumer
product is transferred while the warranty or service contract is in effect; or 3)
"any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service
contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or
service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract). 342
The court placed Cerasani in the third category finding that under Florida's
Lemon Law, auto lessees are entitled to enforce auto warranties.343
D. Consumer Report Security Freeze
In 2006, Florida enacted a "consumer report security freeze" statute,
section 501.005 of the Florida Statutes, to allow a consumer to place a "se-
curity freeze" on his or her credit report. 34 The term "security freeze" refers
to "a notice placed in a consumer report that prohibits a consumer reporting
agency" from releasing specified consumer information without express au-
thorization of the consumer.345 A consumer's request for a security freeze is
made by a request in writing sent by certified mail to a consumer credit re-
porting agency.3 46 Except as otherwise provided by the numerous exceptions
336. Id.
337. Id. at 549.
338. Id. at 548-49 (citing FLA. STAT. § 681.102(23) (2006)).
339. Id. at 545.
340. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d at 546.
341. Id.
342. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (2000).
343. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d at 548-49.
344. Act effective July 1, 2006, ch. 2006-124, §1, 2006 Fla. Laws 1621, 1621 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 501.005(1) (2007)). The meaning of the term "consumer report" is the same as
contained in 45 U.S.C. § 168 la(d). Id.
345. FLA. STAT. § 501.005(1) (2007).
346. Id. § 501.005(2)(a).
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contained in the statute,34 7 the consumer's credit report cannot be released
without the consumer's consent.348 The freeze can last indefinitely.349 The
reporting agency can make it known to a third-party that a freeze has been
put on the information. 5° The reporting agency may charge a fee of not
more than ten dollars for the initial freeze, for a temporary freeze or removal
of the freeze, and for the permanent removal of the freeze. 351' However, no
fee for an initial placement or for removal of a freeze may be charged to a
consumer who is at least sixty-five years old.352 Violation of this law may
result in an award of actual damages, costs, and attorneys fees, and in certain
cases, punitive damages.353
E. Gift Certificates
In 2007, legislation was enacted that affects credit memos and gift cer-
tificates. 35 Under the new section 501.95 of the Florida Statutes, gift cer-
tificates and credit memos sold in Florida generally "may not have an expira-
tion date, expiration period, or any type of post-sale charge or fee... [such
as] service charges, dormancy fees, account maintenance fees, or cash-out
fees. 355 Definitions of "credit memo" and "gift certificate" are provided.356
If there is no consideration provided, the rule does not apply.357 Some ex-
ceptions are provided.358 For example, gift certificates that are charitable
contributions may have an expiration date (of atleast three years) provided
"the expiration date is prominently disclosed in writing to the consumer."' 359
An expiration date is also permitted where a gift certificate is issued as part
of an event of limited duration, such as a conference or vacation, provided
that most of the consideration paid by the recipient of the gift certificate is
347. E.g., id § 501.005(8), (12).
348. Id. § 501.005(1).
349. Seeid. § 501.005(11).
350. FLA. STAT. § 501.005(1).
351. Id. § 501.005(13).
352. Id. § 501.005(13)(b)(1).
353. Id. § 501.005(16)(a)-(c), (e).
354. Id. §§ 501.95, 717.1045. Section 717.1045 of the Florida Statutes deals with gift
certificates and credit memos from the standpoint of the unclaimed property statute. FLA.
STAT. § 717.1045 (2007).
355. Id. § 501.95(2)(a).
356. Id. § 501.95(1)(a), (b).
357. See id. § 501.95(2)(a).
358. Id.
359. FLA. STAT. § 501.95(2)(a).
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for the event, not the gift certificate.36 ° There are also exceptions to these
prohibitions for certain state-chartered banks and credit unions."6
VI. CONTRACTS
A. Formation
Hammond owned real estate in Indian River County.362 He and DSY
Developers, LLC., having its principal place of business in Miami-Dade
County, negotiated for several months over the sale and purchase of Ham-
mond's land.363 There were offers and counteroffers and on November 11,
2004, DSY made another counteroffer and tendered a $25,000 deposit that
required acceptance by Hammond by November 25, 20 04 .364 Hammond
changed the acceptance date for the contract to December 10, 2004, and
mailed his counteroffer back to DSY on December 15, 2004.365 On January
12, 2005, DSY faxed its acceptance in the form of an executed contract to
Hammond.3 66 Hammond refused to proceed with the deal on the grounds
that the contract was void because DSY did not accept by December 10,
2004.36' DSY sued Hammond in the Circuit Court in Miami-Dade County
seeking specific performance. 36' The trial court ruled that a contract had
been formed and ordered Hammond to convey title to the property to
DSY.3 69 The trial court's order also provided that the order would convey
title if Hammond did not comply with the contract.370
On Hammond's appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal noted that
the case presented an issue of first impression of "whether a deadline for
accepting an offer may be waived by delivering the offer after the deadline
has passed.,, 371 The question presented to the Third District Court of Appeal
was whether Hammond, by not mailing the offer (counteroffer) until Decem-
ber 15, 2004,-after the date he had provided in his counteroffer for accep-
360. Id
361. See id. § 501.95(2)(b).
362. Hammond v. DSY Developers, LLC., 951 So. 2d 985, 987 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
363. See id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Hammond, 951 So. 2d at 987.
368. See id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 988.
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tance had passed-waived the requirement that the contract be accepted by a
certain date.3 72 The Third District Court of Appeal said yes and found, as a
matter of law, that Hammond's late mailing of the offer was an "implied
waiver" of the provision.3 73 Furthermore, since the offer was then without an
acceptance deadline, a "reasonable time" for acceptance would be implied.374
The Third District Court of Appeal found as a matter of law, based on the
undisputed dealings between the parties, that acceptance by January 12,
2005, was within a reasonable time, considering the Christmas holidays.
3 75
The trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of DSY and
directing specific performance by Hammond was approved, but only to the
extent it did not operate as a mandate transferring title.3 76 The Third District
Court of Appeal noted that the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over
the parties in a suit for specific performance under a real estate contract.
377
However, the trial court did not have in rem jurisdiction over the property
located in Indian River County.3 78 Citing the "local action rule," the Third
District Court of Appeal stated that if a court does not have in rem jurisdic-
tion over the real property involved in the action, then the court does not
have jurisdiction to convey title.379 Therefore, if court action became neces-
sary to enforce the order and to transfer title, then it would be necessary to
transfer the case to the court having in rem jurisdiction, that court being the
Circuit Court for Indian River County.38 °
In another offer and acceptance case, Polk v. BHRGU Avon Properties,
LLC,381 the Second District Court of Appeal considered whether offers, over-
lapping counteroffers, counter-counteroffers, counter-counter-counteroffers,
a failure to reject counteroffers, and an alleged option contract resulted in the
formation of a contract.382 The facts were that Polk listed real estate for sale
and on January 24, 2005, BHRGU Avon Properties, LLC. (Avon), offered to
purchase Polk's real estate.383 Polk made counteroffers on February 2, 2005,
and February 3, 2005." 4 The counteroffers both provided that Avon's dead-
372. Hammond, 951 So. 2d at 987-88.
373. Id. at 988.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 989.
377. Hammond, 951 So. 2d at 989.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. 946 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
382. See generally id.
383. Id. at 1121-22.
384. Id. at 1122.
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line for acceptance of Polk's counteroffer and delivery of the acceptance was
5:00 p.m. on February 7, 2005.385 Another offer was made by Avon to Polk
on February 4.386 That offer changed the material terms of Polk's counterof-
fers.387 However, before the February 7, 2005, deadline, Avon signed and
delivered both of Polk's counteroffers, and a $25,000 check was provided to
Polk's attorney as a deposit., 388 Although the attorney took the check, it was
not deposited, and, eventually, the attorney marked it "VOID." '389 Polk re-
fused to perform under the terms of her February 2 and February 3 counter-
offers, and Avon sought and was granted an order of specific performance.39
Polk appealed, arguing that there was never a contract formed for the
court to enforce.39' Avon argued that Polk's two counteroffers were, in fact,
options to purchase the property, and the options were duly and timely exer-
cised.392 The Second District Court agreed with Polk and reversed the trial
court. 
3 9 3
An option contract requires consideration and there was none. 394 The
$25,000 check was clearly consideration for the purchase of the property, not
for the purchase of an option. 395 The sequence of events as seen by the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal was: 1) offer by Avon; 2) counteroffers by
Polk which served to reject Avon's offer; and 3) a second offer by Avon
which served to reject Polk's counteroffers.396 Since Avon's second offer
was not accepted, there was no contract.397
In Alterra Healthcare Corp., the arbitration case discussed earlier in this
survey, Betsy Bryant argued that there was no signed written agreement that
required arbitration with respect to her stay in the second facility.398 Appar-
ently the residency agreements for the second facility were virtually identical
to the residency agreement for the first facility that had been signed by Betsy
Bryant's husband, as her attorney-in-fact. 399 The Fourth District Court of
385. Id.
386. Polk, 946 So. 2d at 1122.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Polk, 946 So. 2d at 1122.
392. See id at 1123.
393. Id. at 1125.
394. Id. at 1122-23.
395. Id. at 1123.
396. See Polk, 946 So. 2d at 1122-23.
397. Id. at 1125.
398. Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Bryant, 937 So. 2d 263, 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
399. SeeAlterra Healthcare Corp., 937 So. 2d at 270-71.
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Appeal noted that Mr. Bryant had been given a residency agreement to sign
for the second facility, but he did not get around to signing it.4 0 Neverthe-
less, the Fourth District Court of Appeal did not disturb the trial court's find-
ing that the Bryants and Alterra performed under the terms of one signed
agreement at both facilities; therefore, the first residency agreement was ap-
plicable to the second residence as well.4 °1
The First District Court of Appeal, in De Vaux v. Westwood Baptist
Church,"2 was called upon to determine if a contract existed after the trial
court dismissed with prejudice, the purported purchaser's complaint for spe-
cific performance. 43 The facts showed that by letter dated May 19, 2005, De
Vaux offered to purchase certain real estate from Westwood for $535,000.4 04
The letter set out several terms and conditions including Westwood taking
back a mortgage from De Vaux with interest at a specified sum to be paid
quarterly. 405 The letter stated that "[t]his contract will take precedent until a
more detailed legal contract can be drawn up stating terms, conditions, dates
and financing., 406  A church meeting was held six days later."4 7  At the
meeting, the sale of the property to De Vaux was approved. 48 The minutes
noted the approval and also stated that the church trustees were "authorized
to work out all the details" with De Vaux. 40 9 The First District Court of Ap-
peal noted that the plaintiff did not allege that the church trustees communi-
cated to him its "acceptance of his offer or the terms of the 'details' [of the
deal still] to be worked out., 410 The First District Court of Appeal held that
there was no contract to enforce.4 It is fundamental that "acceptance of the
offer must be communicated to the offeror.' '412 Furthermore, even if accep-
tance had been communicated, the essential terms of the agreement had not
been negotiated and there was "no meeting of the minds., 413 The court af-
400. Id. at 271. It is not stated in the opinion if the second residency agreement was
signed by a representative on behalf of Alterra. See generally id.
401. Id.
402. 953 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
403. Id. at 681.
404. Id. at 680.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. De Vaux, 953 So. 2d at 680.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 682.
412. De Vaux, 953 So. 2d at 682 (citing Kendel v. Pontious, 261 So. 2d 167, 169-70 (Fla.
1972)).
413. Id. at 681.
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firmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and
remanded for a determination of appellate attorney's fees to Westwood.414
An interesting aspect of the case was Westwood's motion on appeal for
an award, pursuant to section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes, of appellate
attorney fees.415 The court stated that with respect to the new statutory "'not
supported by the material facts or would not be supported by application of
then-existing law to those material facts' standard" that replaced the old
"'frivolous' standard, ... an all encompassing definition ... defies us."4 6
However, the court found it clear that there has been a lowering of the statu-
tory bar for the imposition of this sanction.' 17 The court determined that De
Vaux's complaint and appeal were "wholly without merit," and thus, subject
to sanction under either standard.418 The court observed that once the re-
quirements of section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes are satisfied, the court is
required "to award fees to the prevailing party in equal amounts to be paid by
the losing party and the losing party's attorney., 4 19 The matter was re-
manded for determination of the amount of the award of appellate attorney
fees.
420
B. Modification
Hadden and the radio station WSOS made an agreement in 1998 giving
Hadden the exclusive right to sell the radio station for a 5% commission.42'
The agreement provided for termination by either party on thirty days prior
written notice to the other.422 The listing agreement provided that the agree-
ment would remain in effect indefinitely absent such termination.423 Hadden
was entitled to his commission not only if the radio station was sold during
the term of the agreement, but also in two other situations.424 One situation
was if Hadden presented an offer that satisfied the asking price and terms but
the station declined the offer.4 25 The other situation would apply if WSOS
414. Id. at 685.
415. Id. at 682-85; see also FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (2007).
416. De Vaux, 953 So. 2d at 683 n.6.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 684.
419. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1).
420. De Vaux, 953 So. 2d at 685.
421. WSOS-FM, Inc. v. Hadden, 951 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
422. Id. The termination provision could not be used for the first 180 days of the agree-
ment. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Hadden, 951 So. 2d at 62.
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entered into an agreement to sell the station within twenty-four months after
the termination of the agreement, if the sale was to a buyer solicited by Had-
den.426 In September 2002, Hadden sent a fax to the WSOS station manager
to advise him that Hadden had a potential buyer for $3,500,000.47 The sta-
tion manager sent a letter to Hadden the day he received the fax in which he
took the position that the listing agreement between Hadden and WSOS had
been cancelled during a telephone conversation between Hadden and the
manager two years earlier.428 Hadden wrote back that the agreement had not
been cancelled two years earlier, but he would agree to treat the station man-
ager's letter as a thirty day notice of termination of the agreement. 429 WSOS
was sold for $4,000,000 about nine months later. 430 Hadden sued to collect
his 5% commission.431 The trial court found in favor of Hadden and WSOS
appealed.432
The Fifth District Court of Appeal, like the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal in the Rhodes case,433 relied on Pan American Engineering Co. v. Pon-
cho's Construction Co. 4 34 in stating that written agreements prohibiting later
oral modifications can nevertheless be modified orally. 435 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal noted that such agreements can be modified orally only
when modification "has been accepted and acted upon in such a manner that
refusing to enforce it would constitute fraud upon either party. 436 The court
reversed and remanded because it could not tell if the trial judge ruled that
the oral modification was invalid due to the writing requirement or that there
was no oral modification and termination in 2000. 4 37
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 62-63.
430. Hadden, 959 So. 2d at 63. The opinion does not state that the sale was to a buyer
Hadden had solicited or indicate upon which of the two grounds Hadden based his claim. See
id.
431. Id. at 63.
432. Id.
433. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. In Rhodes, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal considered whether a written agreement could "be modified by the subsequent con-
duct of the parties." Rhodes v. BLP Assocs., Inc., 944 So. 2d 527, 530 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006). The court in Rhodes noted that mutual assent and consideration are required for such
modification. Id.
434. 387 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
435. Hadden, 951 So. 2d at 63 (citing Pan Am. Eng'g Co. v. Poncho's Constr. Co., 387
So. 2d 1052, 1053 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
436. Id. at 63-64 (citing Prof I Ins. Corp. v. Cahill, 90 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1956)).
437. Id. at 64.
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C. Remedies
In Ocean Communications, Inc. v. Bubeck,43 plaintiffs entered into a
contract with defendant whereby defendant would provide advertising re-
lated services.439 Plaintiffs sought damages and restitution of amounts paid
under the contract, alleging breach of contract. 440 The trial court found there
were breaches of contract by the defendant, but that restitution is an equitable
remedy that is not available when there was an actual contract between the
parties. 44' The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in reversing and remanding
the case, discussed damages, restitution, and specific performance, the three
remedies the court noted are available for breach of contract." 2 The first,
damages, is intended to put the non-breaching party in as good a position as
that party would have been in had the contract been performed." 3 The sec-
ond, restitution, requires the breaching party to give back what that party
received because this tends to put the non-breaching party in as good a posi-
tion as that party "occupied before the contract was made."444 Restitution is
available as a remedy for breach of an express contract. 445 However, in this
case, because restitution was sought, plaintiff was required to return to de-
fendant the value, if any, of defendant's part performance."16 The court,
therefore, remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing as to the value of
defendant's services to be used to offset the restitution award to plaintiff."7
In Key v. Trattmann,448 Key sought specific performance of an alleged
oral agreement by Trattmann to convey real estate or the imposition of a re-
sulting trust, and summary judgment was granted in favor of Trattmann. 449
On appeal-for purposes of determining whether the motion was properly
granted by the trial court-the First District Court of Appeal "[took] as true"
the allegations that "to help Mr. Trattmann obtain United States' citizenship"
438. 956 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
439. Id. at 1224.
440. Id. The claim for restitution was originally based on unjust enrichment, which the
Fourth District Court of Appeal noted is not an available cause of action when there is an
express contract. Id. But the trial court had permitted the plaintiff to amend its complaint to
conform to the evidence by changing the claim from a claim for unjust enrichment seeking
restitution to a claim for breach of contract seeking restitution. Id. at 1226.
441. Bubeck, 956 So. 2d at 1224.
442. Id. at 1225.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Bubeck, 956 So. 2d at 1226.
447. Id.
448. 959 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
449. Id. at 341.
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the following occurred: 1) Key purchased real estate in Tallahassee; 2) Key
provided all of the consideration for the purchase and upkeep of the property;
3) Trattmann promised to convey the property to Key upon demand, but
when demand was made, refused to convey; and 4) there was no written
agreement between Key and Trattmann with respect to the property.45° In
the trial court, Key argued that a resulting trust had arisen and that he was the
beneficiary. 45 The trial court found that Florida's four year statute of limita-
tions under section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes applied and that Florida's
statute of frauds contained in section 689.01 of the Florida Statutes also ap-
plied.452
The First District Court of Appeal reversed, observing that a resulting
trust arises by operation of law. 453 The statute of frauds applies to actions
arising from a contract. 454 Therefore, the statute of frauds does not apply to a
resulting trust claim. 455 A resulting trust claim involving real estate can be
proven by oral testimony.4 56 The lack of a written contract was not fatal to
Trattmann's case.457 The court noted that with respect to the application of
the statute of limitations, it was not clear from the record when the statute
might first be said to have begun to run.458 That would have been when
Trattmann repudiated the trust or held the property adversely with Key's
knowledge. 459 The court found that Key's allegations fit the definition of a
resulting trust as set forth in Steigman v. Danese, 460 where it was stated that
"where a person furnishes money to purchase property in the name of an-
other, with both parties intending at the time that the legal title be held by the
named grantee for the benefit of the unnamed purchaser of the property. 461
The First District Court of Appeal gave Key a chance to prove his allegations
and, presumably gave the trial court the opportunity to revisit the statute of
limitations defense.462
450. Id. at 341-342.
451. Id. at 342.
452. Id. at 342, 344, 346 n.4; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 95.11, 689.01 (2007).
453. Key, 959 So. 2d at 345.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. See id.
457. Id.
458. Key, 959 So. 2d at 345-46.
459. Id. at 346.
460. 502 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
461. Key, 959 So. 2d at 342-43 (quoting Steigman v. Danese, 502 So. 2d 463, 467 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
462. Id. at 346.
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The next three cases deal with liquidated damages. The first two in-
volved real estate contracts and the third arose in the context of an alleged
breach of a noncompete agreement.463
In the first case, Hot Developers, Inc. v. Willow Lake Estates, Inc.,
464
the Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed a summary judgment that al-
lowed a seller of commercial real estate to retain deposits of $550,000 as
liquidated damages. 465 The buyer claimed that allowing the seller to retain
the deposit was improper because the forfeiture amounted to an unenforce-
able penalty and was unconscionable.466 Hot Developers, Inc., as purchaser,
had entered into an agreement with Willow Lake to buy real estate for
$5,700,000.467 The contract was not conditioned upon Hot Developers ob-
taining financing, and time was stated to be of the essence.468 Hot Develop-
ers made the first deposit of $100,000, which would be refunded if Hot De-
velopers cancelled the contract for any reason within a "due diligence" pe-
riod.469 After that period expired, Hot Developers, not having cancelled the
contract, made a $200,000 deposit in accordance with the contract.47° It was
apparently only then that Hot Developers had problems with an appraisal and
asked for an extension of the original closing date. 47' The contract also pro-
vided that if Hot Developers extended the closing date, it would pay "an ad-
ditional non-refundable deposit" of $250,000.472 That amount was paid, and
unlike the first two deposits, the contract called for immediate distribution of
that money to Willow Lake to be credited against the purchase price. 473 Hot
Developers was unable to close on the first extended closing date.474 Be-
cause there was no provision in the agreement regarding another extension,
the parties signed an addendum to the agreement for a short additional exten-
sion date, which provided that Hot Developers agreed to the release as nonre-
fundable deposits of the first two deposits that were being held in escrow.475
463. See Hot Developers, Inc. v. Willow Lake Estates, Inc., 950 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2007); Burzee v. Park Ave. Ins. Agency, Inc., 946 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); Bradley v. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
464. 950 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
465. Id. at 539.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 538.
468. Id.
469. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 538.
470. Id. Unlike the initial deposit, apparently the contract was silent with respect to refund
of the $200,000 deposit. See id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 538.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 538-39.
[Vol. 32
62
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss1/1
FLORIDA LA WAFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS
Hot Developers failed to close on the second extended date, and Willow
Lake exercised its option under the contract to terminate the contract and
retain the $550,000 as "liquidated and agreed damages. 4 76 The Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal noted that it has been held that it is not unreasonable for
a payment to be required in exchange for an extended closing.477 However,
when that deposit will be forfeited if closing does not occur, forfeiture may
amount to "an unenforceable penalty in certain circumstances., 478 The court
agreed with Willow Lake that, as a matter of contract interpretation, the
funds were not refundable.479
The remaining issue was whether the forfeiture was a penalty.4 80 That
required a Hyman v. Cohen481 "liquidated damages analysis" based on the
circumstances that existed when the contract was made. 482 The provisions
will be upheld under Hyman v. Cohen if the damages were not then "readily
ascertainable ' 483 and the amount of the liquidated damages were not "grossly
disproportionate''44 to what seller's damages might be, unless enforcement
would be unconscionable. 485 The court concluded that the deposit amount,
being under 10% of the purchase price, was "well within the range of liqui-
dated damages approved by Florida courts., 486 Both parties to the transac-
tion were commercial entities with no apparent difference in bargaining
power between them. 48 7 The remaining question then was whether, based on
circumstances existing at the time of the breach, equity required a finding
that the liquidated damages, although not unenforceable penalties, were nev-
ertheless unconscionable.4 88 The court concluded that there also was nothing
to support a finding of unconscionability.48 9 This analysis included, in part, a
comparison of the forfeiture amount to the contract price, similar to the test
applied in determining if a forfeiture is an unenforceable penalty. 490 The
476. Id. at 539.
477. Id. (citing Waksman Enters., Inc. v. Or. Props., Inc., 862 So. 2d 35, 41 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2003)).
478. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 539 (quoting Waksman Enters., Inc., 862 So. 2d
at 42).
479. Id. at 540.
480. See id. at 539-40.
481. 73 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
482. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 540.
483. Id. (quoting Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d 129, 132 (Fla. 1972)).
484. Id. (quoting Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393, 401 (Fla. 1954)).
485. Id.
486. Id. at 541.
487. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 540-41.
488. Id. at 541.
489. Id.
490. Id. n.2.
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court cited cases where liquidated damages of 50% and 55% of the contract
price were unconscionable, but others with forfeitures of 18.2% and 22%
were upheld.49 1 The court also noted that the fact that the value of the prop-
erty had appreciated in value over the relevant period did not make the liqui-
dated damages unconscionable.492 In Bruce Builders, Inc. v. Goodwin,4 93 a
seller was entitled to liquidated damages even though the seller found an-
other buyer and made a net profit of about $2500. 414
In Bradley v. Sanchez,495 the Bradleys entered into a written agreement
with Mr. Sanchez on December 4, 2002, to purchase a home from Mr. San-
chez for $10,500,000.496 The agreement was contingent on the Bradleys
obtaining financing for 50% of the purchase price, with application to be
made by December 9, 2002. 49' The Bradleys paid a "deposit of $10,000 on
November 27, 2002," and were required to make an additional deposit of
$500,000 on December 20, 2002.498 The closing was originally set for
March 1, 2003, but at Mr. Sanchez's request, the executed contract provided
for a June 2, 2003, closing. 499 The contract stated that binding modifications
to it had to be written and signed.500
The buyers delayed in applying for financing.5"' They claimed that the
seller's agent told them on December 17, 2002, that they could wait until
closer to closing to apply for a loan.50 2 The agent claimed she never said
that, and denied having the authority to say that.50 3 "On December 12, 2002,
the [buyers] were served with a federal search warrant" which they claimed
made the requirement that they apply for a loan moot.5°4 They argued that
they would have been required to disclose to the bank the facts of the federal
investigation, which would have made it impossible for them to qualify "for
a large home mortgage." 505 On December 20, 2002, the Bradleys tried to
491. Id. at 541-42.
492. Hot Developers, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 542.
493. 317 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The liquidated damages were 4.1% of
the contract price. Id. at 870. It would seem that a combination of the forfeiture percentage
and a profit on sale might lead to a different result in an appropriate case. See id.
494. Id.
495. 943 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
496. Id. at 220.
497. See id.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d at 220.
501. Id. As it turned out, they never applied. See id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d at 220.
505. Id.
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cancel the contract and demanded the return of the $10,000 deposit.51 6 Mr.
Sanchez refused and demanded the $500,000 additional deposit due that
day. °7 The Bradleys sued for the return of the $10,000.8 Mr. Sanchez
filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract. 09 Mr. Sanchez asked to
keep the $10,000 deposit and for payment of the $500,000 deposit. 50 Mr.
Sanchez moved for summary judgment on his breach of contract counter-
claim.5 ' His motion was granted by the court and a final judgment was en-
tered awarding him both the $10,000 and the $500,000 deposits plus pre-
judgment interest.5 1 The Bradleys moved to amend their complaint before
final judgment was entered to allege that Mr. Sanchez sold the house on
April 18, 2005 for $10,400,000 and was therefore unjustly enriched.5"3 The
trial court denied the motion, and the Bradleys appealed.51 4 The Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that "there were no genuine issues of
material fact."5 5 The events upon which the buyers relied to excuse their
failure to apply for financing took place after the time to apply for the loan
had passed.1 6 Any waiver of the financing provision was required to have
been in writing.1 7 The court noted that it was aware that under certain cir-
cumstances, a later oral modification of a written contract would be upheld,
but none of those circumstances were present. 8 The court also found that
the liquidated damages amount of 4.85% of the contract price was neither an
impermissible penalty nor unconscionable.1 9
In Burzee v. Park Avenue Insurance Agency, Inc.,52° Ms. Burzee entered
into a written noncompete agreement with her then employer, Park Avenue
Insurance Agency, Inc.521 The agreement provided that for two years after
her employment ended, she would not communicate with any customers of
Park Avenue Insurance Agency, Inc. who were customers during her period
506. Id. at 220-21.
507. Id. at 221.
508. Id.
509. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d at 221.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at221-22.
514. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d at 220.
515. Id. at 221.
516. Id.
517. Id. at222.
518. Id.
519. Sanchez, 943 So. 2d at 222.
520. 946 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
521. Id. at 1201. Her employment contract was not in writing. Id.
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of employment. 522 The agreement also contained an agreed measure of dam-
ages clause if Ms. Burzee breached the agreement. 23 Park Avenue Insur-
ance Agency, Inc. would be entitled to the sum of all commissions earned by
it on the accounts sold or serviced by Ms. Burzee during the two years prior
to her termination, plus $10,000.524 Ms. Burzee's employment was termi-
nated by Park Avenue Insurance Agency, Inc. and she got a job with another
insurance agency. 25 Park Avenue Insurance Agency, Inc. claimed that Ms.
Burzee breached the noncompete agreement.5 26 The trial court agreed, and
based on the damages clause, awarded $161,572.88 in damages to Park Ave-
nue Insurance Agency, Inc.527 On appeal, Ms. Burzee argued that the dam-
ages award amounted to an unenforceable penalty and the Fifth District
Court of Appeal agreed.5 28 A liquidated damages clause that results in an
amount "so grossly disproportionate to any damages that might reasonably
be expected" will be deemed a penalty and unenforceable.5 29 The court, in
addressing the proportionality issue, pointed out that the same damage
amount would apply regardless of the number of customers with which Ms.
Burzee communicated, even if none of those customers actually became cus-
tomers of her new employer.53° The court concluded that "[t]he absence of
proportionality is patent., 531 In addition, even if this provision in some cir-
cumstances might be considered enforceable, it could not have been enforce-
able under the circumstances of this case. 532 "[E]quity may 'relieve against
[a] forfeiture"' if what might otherwise have been a proper liquidated dam-
ages provision "'appears unconscionable ... at the time of the breach.' 5 33
The court reversed insofar as the trial court had found that the damages
clause was a valid liquidated penalty provision and remanded the matter. 34
522. Id.
523. Id. at 1201--02.
524. Burzee, 946 So. 2d at 1201-02.
525. Id. at 1202.
526. See id.
527. Id.
528. Id. The legal effect of this contractual provision is an issue of law reviewed de novo.
Burzee, 946 So. 2d at 1202.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 1203.
531. Id.
532. Id. at 1203.
533. Burzee, 946 So. 2d at 1203 (quoting Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d 129, 132
(Fla. 1972)).
534. Id. Ms. Burzee also appealed the trial court's finding of civil contempt for violation
of an injunction and the fine imposed. Id. at 1201. The Fifth District Court of Appeal af-
firmed these portions of the trial court's decision without discussion. Id. at 1203.
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D. Right of First Refusal
In 1977, a right of first refusal had been granted to Old Port Cove Con-
dominium Association One, Inc. (Association) with respect to land adjacent
to Association's property, title to which had some time later vested in the
developer, Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc. (Developer).535 The option agree-
ment provided that the property would first be offered to Association on the
same terms and conditions as it would be offered to the public.536 Associa-
tion had thirty days to accept the offer.537 Failure to timely accept the offer
would terminate the right of first refusal.5 38 Developer brought an action to
have the right of first refusal declared void from the inception as being in
violation of the common law rule against perpetuities.539 The trial court
ruled in favor of Developer.54 ° On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal in Old Port Cove Condominium Ass 'n One, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Hold-
ing, Inc.,"' expressed doubt that the rule against perpetuities ever applied to
this kind of right of first refusal.542 Nevertheless, the court went on to sub-
ject the grant to a rule against perpetuities analysis.543 The court held that in
2000 the legislature abrogated the common law rule against perpetuities
when it amended section 689.225 of the Florida Statutes, and the abrogation
of the rule clearly was meant to be retroactive.544 Therefore, by statute, the
common law rule against perpetuities did not apply to the right of first re-
fusal.545 The court acknowledged that its decision regarding the retroactivity
of the 2002 amendment was in conflict with Fallschase Development Corp.
v. Blakey, 546 and certified conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida.547
535. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass'n One, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc., 954 So. 2d
742, 742-43. (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The grant was made by Developer's predecessor
in interest. Id. at 742-43. The court noted that Developer was aware of the grant for more
than a decade before it instituted this action. Id. at 744.
536. Id. at 742.
537. Id.
538. Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc., 954 So. 2d at 742.
539. Id. at 743.
540. Id.
541. 954 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
542. Id. at 743.
543. Id. at 744-46.
544. Id. at 745 (citing FLA. STAT. § 689.225(7) (2005)).
545. Id. at 744. The Florida statutory rule against perpetuities excludes these types of
restraints. Although there was a period of time during which the option existed that the law
was otherwise, Developer failed to act under that statute to reform the option. Old Port Cove
Holdings, Inc., 954 So. 2d at 744.
546. 696 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
547. Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc., 954 So. 2d. at 746-47.
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The court went on to say that the right of first refusal might be suspect
as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.54s The court concluded that the
Association's option did not impose any burden on the sale of the prop-
erty. 49 In reversing and remanding, the court noted that Developer would
either get its price from the Association or from some other buyer, but the
price would be based upon market value, not a value fixed in the option.5
Therefore, the right of first refusal was not an unreasonable restraint on
alienation. 5 ' Had the right of first refusal allowed purchase at a fixed price
for an unlimited period of time, the result would have been different. 552
VII. DEEDS AND MORTGAGES
A. Deeds
The Fifth District Court of Appeal was called upon to sort out the issue
of superiority of title as between two purchasers of the same real estate from
the same transferor, Virginia Schwartz (Seller).553 Seller's husband, a resi-
dent of North Carolina, owned real estate in Marion County, Florida when he
died in 1994. 51 4 Seller's husband devised all of his property to Seller, but
according to the court's opinion, the husband's will was never probated.55
On June 25, 2004, Seller signed a contract to convey the Marion County real
estate to Mr. Rice, and on August 4, 2004, Seller delivered a warranty deed
to Mr. Rice. 56 Almost two months later, Seller entered into another contract
to sell the same real estate, only this time, to Mr. Greene. 57 On October 28,
2004, Mr. Greene paid for the real estate and received a warranty deed from
Seller.558 His deed was recorded on November 8. ""9 Mr. Rice, however,
did not get around to recording his deed until several weeks after Mr. Greene
recorded his.56° So which purchaser had priority of title?
548. Id. at 746.
549. Id. at 743.
550. Id. at 746.
551. Id.
552. Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc., 954 So. 2d. at 746 (quoting Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So.
2d 610, 615 (Fla. 1980)).
553. Rice v. Greene, 941 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
554. Id. at 1230.
555. Id.
556. Id. Apparently Mrs. Schwartz entered into the contract "on behalf of her deceased
husband." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
557. Rice, 941 So. 2d at 1231.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.
[Vol. 32
68
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss1/1
FLORIDA LA W AFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS
The trial court granted summary judgment to Mr. Greene, purchaser
number two, declaring his rights superior as between the two purchasers, and
Mr. Rice appealed.561 Mr. Rice argued that Seller did not have title to the
real estate, and therefore, common law, not the recording statute applied. 62
The Florida recording statute provides that, with respect to the rights of pur-
chasers of the same property, a subsequent purchaser of property for value
and without notice of the prior transaction has priority over an earlier pur-
chaser when the subsequent purchaser's deed is recorded first.5 63 Mr. Rice's
argument was grounded on section 733.103(1) of the Florida Statutes, which
provides that a decedent's will is "ineffective to prove title ... or the right to
possession of' the decedent's property until the will is admitted to probate. 5"
The result, Mr. Rice concluded, was that Seller did not have title to convey to
Mr. Greene, so she could not have conveyed anything to make the recording
statute applicable; consequently, common law applied and Mr. Rice had pri-
ority under his purchase agreement565
The court looked instead to section 732.514 of the Florida Statutes
which states that it is "'[t]he death of the testator ... [that serves to] vest[]
the right to devises"' in the devisees, unless the will provides otherwise.566
The court, reading those two sections of the Florida Probate Code in pari
materia observed that because the will was never probated, Seller "lacked
marketable title to the property. 5 67 The Third District Court of Appeal, in
affirming the trial court, stated "[h]owever, she clearly acquired equitable
title to the property upon her husband's death, assuming, as have the parties,
that Mr. Schwartz's will, which was presented to the court below, is authen-
tic."5
6 8
Therefore, under the recording statute, as between Mr. Greene and Mr.
Rice, Mr. Green had the priority claim to the property, which was the only
question the court had before it. 
569
561. Id. at 1230.
562. Rice, 941 So. 2d at 1232.
563. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1) (2004)).
564. Id. at 1231 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 733.103(1) (2004)).
565. Id.
566. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 732.514 (2004)).
567. Rice, 941 So. 2d at 1231.
568. Id. But what if the will was subsequently determined not to have been authentic?
Would Seller still have had equitable title so that the recording statute could have applied?
Some facts relevant to the court's determination may not have been recited in the opinion.
569. Id. at 1232. It is important to bear in mind that the court's ruling addressed only the
claim of priority as between the two purchasers, not any issue of marketable title or breach of
contract claims against seller. Id. at 1231.
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B. Mortgages
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Feinstein v. New Bethel Mission-
ary Baptist,570 held, as a matter of first impression, that an express provision
that imposes a prepayment penalty in the event of acceleration of the mort-
gage and note by the payee is enforceable. 71 New Bethel Missionary Baptist
Church (New Bethel) defaulted on its payments on a mortgage and note.5 72
Feinstein, the holder of the note and mortgage, accelerated the debt pursuant
to the terms of the promissory note and began foreclosure proceedings.1
73
The note not only imposed a prepayment fee if New Bethel prepaid the note,
it provided that the prepayment fee would apply if the payments were accel-
erated by the mortgagee on default.574 The trial court entered a final judg-
ment of foreclosure in favor of Feinstein, but denied Feinstein the prepay-
ment fee on the accelerated amount, which he had also requested.175 On ap-
peal, the Third District Court of Appeal observed that it could not find any
Florida decisions directly holding "that an express provision of a promissory
note ... call[ing] for a prepayment fee" upon acceleration of debt payments
is enforceable.76 The court noted that there were, however, cases including
a Supreme Court of Florida case, Florida National Bank v. Bankatlantic,
5 77
that opened the door for that result by "indicat[ing] that such would be [their]
holding" if a case with these facts presented itself.578 On the invitation and
authority of those cases, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court. 57
VIII. EMINENT DOMAIN
Three District Court of Appeal cases were similar because all of the
land owners sought damages as a result of a change in traffic flow.58 ° The
570. 938 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
571. Id. at 563; see also Feinstein v. Ashplant, 961 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (enforcing a prepayment on acceleration penalty sought by the same lender under a
provision similar to that involved in, and referring to, the decision of the Third District Court
of Appeal in Feinstein v. New Bethel Missionary Baptist).
572. Feinstein, 938 So. 2d at 563.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. 589 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1991).
578. Feinstein, 938 So. 2d at 563-64.
579. Id. at 564-65.
580. Dep't of Transp. v. Fisher, 958 So. 2d 586, 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); City of
Jacksonville v. Twin Rests., Inc., 953 So. 2d 720, 720-21 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007); City
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first two-related, if not the same--cases were condemnation cases,58' while
the third was an inverse condemnation case.582 A fourth case considered a
tenant's compensable interest and valuation.83
In the first condemnation case, City of Jacksonville v. Twin Restaurants,
Inc. (Twin),584 the City took some of the land owner's property in connection
with a road project. 85 As part of the project, the City would build a median
that would change the traffic flow to Twin's property.586 Twin alleged that
the change in traffic flow impeded its business. 87 The jury awarded Twin
$143,420 for the property taken plus $685,000 in "severance damages" for
the change in traffic flow. 88 The City appealed the severance damage
award.589 The First District Court of Appeal reversed, citing Department of
Transportation v. Capital Plaza, Inc. 90 The court held that severance dam-
ages may not be awarded for a change in the traffic flow resulting from a
median. 9' It was the construction of the median, not the taking of the prop-
erty, that caused the change of traffic flow.592
In Department of Transportation v. Fisher,593 the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) was involved in a project to elevate part of U.S. 19 and
building frontage roads on the elevated portion. 94 The Fishers operated a
carwash on U.S. 19 in Pinellas County.5 95 Before the project, the Fishers'
customers could get to the car wash from U.S. 19, but after the project, cus-
tomers had to travel on a frontage road to get to the car wash.596 The Fishers
alleged that this amounted to inverse condemnation and they sought compen-
sation based on a taking of access.5 97 The court noted that "inverse condem-
of Jacksonville v. Westland Park Assocs., II, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D440, D440 (1st Dist. Ct.
App. Feb. 12, 2007).
581. Twin Rests., Inc., 953 So. 2d at 721; Westland Park Assocs., II, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at
D440.
582. Fisher, 958 So. 2d at 588.
583. Dames v. 926 Co., 925 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
584. 953 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 720-21.
588. Id. at 720.
589. Twin Rests., Inc., 953 So. 2d at 720.
590. Id. at 724 (citing Dep't of Transp. v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla.
1981)).
591. Id. at 721.
592. Id.
593. 958 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
594. Id. at 588.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id. at 589.
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nation [occurs] when governmental action causes a substantial loss of access
to" the owner's property. 98 A physical taking of the owner's property is not
required to establish the right to compensation from the government.599
When there is a taking of property, plus a loss of access, money awarded for
the access loss will be termed severance damages.6 °° To be compensable, the
loss of access need not be total but at least "substantially diminished."60'
Therefore, the question was whether DOT's actions on its property, as op-
posed to the Fishers' property, amounted to a taking of access."' There was
no question that the most convenient route to the car wash was eliminated.603
The issue, however, was whether or not access to the Fishers' property had
been substantially diminished.6" Based on the record, the court found that
access to the Fishers' property was not substantially diminished. 605
In Dames v. 926 Co.,606 the Fourth District Court of Appeal considered
the relevant date for determining who the holders of compensable interests
were for the property known as 910 West Atlantic Avenue, Delray Beach,
which was taken by eminent domain. 67  The compensable interest issue
arose out the Dames' purchase in 1998 of Delray Coin Laundry, Inc. from
the Millanises. 6 ' As part of the purchase, the Dames gave the Millanises a
$75,000 promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage. 60 9  Delray Coin
Laundry, Inc. was then the lessee of the subject property and 926 Company,
Inc., the property owner, was the lessor.610 In connection with the purchase
by the Dames, Delray Coin Laundry, Inc. assigned the lease to the Dames
598. Fisher, 958 So. 2d at 589 (quoting Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846,
849 (Fla. 1989)). Can construction of a median, with or without an actual taking ever support
a claim for inverse condemnation? Although it did not use the term inverse condemnation, the
court in Twin Restaurants also concluded that the access of Twin's customers would not be
"substantially diminished." City of Jacksonville v. Twin Rests., Inc., 953 So. 2d 720, 722-23
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Fisher, 958 So.2d at 589)). It appears that the cite to
Fisher is to the original opinion, which was withdrawn and substituted with a later opinion
after the denial of the motion for rehearing because Judge Isom dissented from the denial of
the motion. See Fisher, 958 So. 2d. at 593-94.
599. Id. at 589.
600. See id.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. Fisher, 958 So. 2d at 591.
604. Id. at 589.
605. Id. at 590-91.
606. 925 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
607. Id. at 1079-81.
608. Id. at 1079.
609. Id. at 1079-80.
610. Id. at 1079.
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individually.6"' In 2002, the Delray Beach Community Redevelopment
Agency (Agency) instituted an eminent domain proceeding with respect to
the property and included Mr. and Mrs. Dames among the respondents.
6 2
On July 17, 2003, Agency deposited $567,163 into the registry of the court
pursuant to the court's Agreed Order of Taking.613 926 Company, Inc. was
awarded compensation of $615,000 for the property taken by Agency. 614
The deposit by Agency allowed it title and possession as of July 17, 2003.615
In June 2003, the Dames defaulted on their installment obligation to the Mil-
lanises, and in December 2003, the Millanises sought to foreclose upon the
chattel mortgage.6t 6 The Millanises' foreclosure action resulted in their re-
taking of the leasehold interest.
617
With respect to the compensable interests issue, 926 Company, Inc.
claimed that the Dames were not entitled to any portion of the amount of an
award. 618 Although tenants are entitled to a share of condemnation proceeds,
926 Company, Inc. argued, and the trial court agreed, that the Dames "were
not entitled to compensation., 619 The Dames appealed and the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.62' The court held that July 17,
2003, the date on which proceeds were deposited with the clerk, which was
the date for valuation and the date that title was transferred under sections
73.071(2) and 74.061 of the Florida Statutes, respectively, was also the date
for determining compensable interests in the property.62' As of July 17,
2003, the Dames were the lessees of the property under a lease that was then
in full force and effect. 622 They were entitled to a share of the condemnation
611. Dames, 925 So. 2d at 1080. The landlord argued that the Dames' were not the les-
sees, but rather Delray Coin Laundry, Inc., the corporation that the Dames' had purchased,
was the lessee. Id. The court easily disposed of this issue, finding that Delray Coin Laundry,
Inc. had assigned the lease to the Dames, individually, as part of the sale of the corporation
and business assets. Id.
612. Id. at 1079.
613. Id.
614. Dames, 925 So. 2d at 1079.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 1081.
617. Id. at 1080.
618. Id.
619. Dames, 925 So. 2d at 1080.
620. Id. at 1082.
621. Id. at 1080-81.
622. Id. at 1081. The fact that the tenants abandoned the property after the date the title
transferred, but prior to the date vacation of the premises was required under the Order of
Taking, was irrelevant. Id. Also irrelevant was the fact that the tenants later defaulted on
their payments to seller under the promissory note and chattel mortgage, and that the seller
had instituted foreclosure proceedings in December 2003. Dames, 925 So. 2d at 1081. Fur-
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proceeds, as the events occurring after July 17, 2003 were held to be irrele-
vant. 
623
The legislature amended Florida's eminent domain laws in 2006 in re-
sponse to the United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New
London.624 The United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution did not prohibit the city from taking private
property by eminent domain for economic development, which the Court
held to be a "public purpose," even though the property might be transferred
to private individuals. 625  Among the revisions to the Florida Statutes are
provisions that remove the authority to take property to eliminate public nui-
sance, slum, or blight conditions, or preservation or enhancement of the tax
base,626 and prohibit transfer of taken property to a private entity, with excep-
tions for common carriers, private and public utilities, and certain "special
use" private entities.627
IX. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Covenants Not to Compete
There were numerous appellate cases decided during the survey period
that involved covenants not to compete, some of which were entered into in
the context of buy-sell agreements, 628 while in other cases, they arose solely
out of an employment relationship where there was no ownership interest. 629
In Whitby v. Infinity Radio, Inc.,630 Whitby, who worked for WRMF-
FM radio from 1980 to 1995, went to work for WEAT-FM in 1995.63, The
ther, the fact that the tenants were in default under the lease with owner was also irrelevant
where owner had not taken any action to terminate the lease. Id. at 1081 n. 1.
623. Id. at 1081.
624. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
625. Id. at 484.
626. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.014(1)-(2), 163.335(7) (2007).
627. Id. § 73.013(1)-(2).
628. See infra note 660 and accompanying text.
629. See, e.g., Whitby v. Infinity Radio, Inc., 961 So. 2d 349, 351 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007); Litwinczuk v. Palm Beach Cardiovascular Clinic, L.C., 939 So. 2d 268, 270, 273 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the medical clinic had a legitimate interest to protect the
existing patient goodwill in the specified geographic area); JonJuan Salon, Inc. v. Acosta, 922
So. 2d 1081, 1083-84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming an order granting a temporary
injunction against a former employee of a hair salon where salon demonstrated that a covenant
was supported by legitimate interests of protecting goodwill and the substantial relationship
with its customers, and the former employee breached covenant); Colucci v. Kar Kare Auto.
Group, Inc., 918 So. 2d 431, 434 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
630. Whitby, 961 So. 2d at 349.
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1995 employment agreement between Whitby and the then owner of WEAT-
FM contained a non-compete clause.632 In 2000, four days before her em-
ployment contract with WEAT-FM was due to expire, Whitby entered into
an employment agreement with the owner of WRMF-FM.633 On the day the
WEAT-FM agreement expired, Whitby started working for WRMF-FM. 634
Infinity Radio, Inc., the owner of WEAT-FM, sought and obtained a tempo-
rary injunction against Whitby, alleging violation of the non-compete agree-
ment.635 The trial court subsequently found that Whitby had violated the
temporary injunction and was "in indirect civil contempt," and she was fined
$100,000.636 The order allowed Whitby to avoid the fine by committing no
further violation of the temporary injunction.637 Subsequently, the trial court
found that Whitby had again violated the temporary injunction, directed
payment of the fine, and threatened Whitby with jail upon nonpayment.638
The court found that Whitby had the financial ability to pay the fine.639
Running parallel with the contempt proceeding was a breach of contract
action against Whitby and her new employer.6"° Whitby argued that once the
issues leading to the contempt citation had been resolved by the award in the
parallel proceedings, the court lost jurisdiction to impose contempt sanc-
tions."4  The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed. 642 The trial court
retained jurisdiction to conclude ancillary matters, which included the con-
tempt proceeding. 63 Although the court must find that the contemnor has
the ability to pay a coercive civil fine before enforcing it, the trial court so
found in this case on competent evidence. 644 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal also observed that threatening incarceration for nonpayment of a
coercive civil contempt fine is not improper. 645
631. Id. at 351.
632. Id. There were several changes in ownership of WEAT-FM during the following few
years, and in 1999, Whitby and the station's new owner, Infinity Radio, Inc., executed an
amendment to the 1995 agreement reaffirming the 1995 agreement. See id.
633. Id.
634. Whitby, 961 So. 2d at 351.
635. Id.
636. Id. at 352, 355.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 355.
639. Whitby, 961 So. 2d at 352.
640. Id.
641. Id. at 353.
642. Id.
643. Id. at 353-54.
644. Whitby, 961 So. 2d at 354.
645. Id. at 356.
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In another case, Leighton v. First Universal Lending, LLC, 6 a former
employee of a lending company opened a lending business. 47 The former
employer sought an injunction against the former employee and the em-
ployee's new company, although the employee's new company was not a
party to the non-compete agreement and was not made a party to the law-
suit.6 8 With respect to the injunction against the employee's new company,
the court noted that a third party could be enjoined in connection with en-
forcing a non-compete agreement, but notice and an opportunity to be heard
were required.,M 9 The former employee also claimed that the non-compete
agreement was unenforceable because the former employer had breached the
employment agreement.65 With respect to the breach of contract defense,
the court held that the former employer's breach of the employment contract
was an equitable defense that could be raised by the former employee, but
proof of the breach was required.65' However, the former employee failed to
demonstrate the breach of contract.652
In another covenant not to compete case, Colucci v. Kar Kare Automo-
tive Group, Inc.,653 Colucci sold his business to, and became an employee of,
Kar Kare. 654 He then entered into a non-compete agreement with Kar Kare
that, with the exception of a limited area in Florida, purportedly applied an-
ywhere in the United States for five years after termination of his employ-
ment.655 Kar Kare sought an injunction after Colucci left its employ, alleging
that Colucci beached the covenant not to compete by conducting business in
Florida that went beyond the scope agreed upon in the contract.656 The em-
ployer, therefore, stopped making payments on a promissory note that was
given in connection with the purchase of the business.657 However, the orig-
inal agreement between the parties provided that the covenant not to compete
would not apply if the payments on the purchase agreement were not
made. 658 The trial court granted the injunction and Colucci appealed. 659 The
646. 925 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
647. Id. at 463.
648. Id. at 463-64.
649. Id. at 465.
650. Id. at 464.
651. Leighton, 925 So. 2d at 464.
652. Id.
653. 918 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
654. Id. at 434.
655. Id.
656. Id. at 433-34.
657. Id. at 437.
658. Colucci, 918 So. 2d at 436-37. In this case, the covenant not to compete was effec-
tive upon the employee's termination of employment, even if that occurred before all pay-
ments under the promissory note given for the purchase of the business had been made. See
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Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that a court may consider an em-
ployer's breach of an employment agreement when determining if an injunc-
tion should be granted.660 If the breach is material, then the employee gener-
ally will be relieved from the covenant. 66' Further, the court noted that it
must consider the defense if it is raised.662 Colucci, however, did not claim
that the employer's breach was a complete defense, so the court was required
to consider whether the employer had met its burden of establishing that "it
[would] suffer irreparable harm . . . ha[d] no adequate remedy at law . . .
ha[d] a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and . . . that . . .
[granting the] temporary injunction [furthered] the public interest., 63  The
appellate court stated that irreparable harm could not be said to exist in this
case unless Kar Kare could demonstrate that it had a legitimate business in-
terest to protect. 664 However, Kar Kare could not specify any lost clients or
confidential business information, even though Colucci was using a similar
name in the new business. 665 Therefore, Kar Kare did not show that it had
suffered any irreparable harm, and thus could not qualify for the injunc-
tion.666 Section 542.335(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes sets out a "nonexclu-
sive list of 'legitimate business interests.' ' 667 Case law has expanded that
list.668 The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that the record did not
show that Kar Kare demonstrated that it had a legitimate business interest
under the statute or case law. 669
id. at 436. In Alvarez, the covenant not to compete was not effective until the redemption
occurred. Alvarez v. Rendon, 953 So. 2d 702, 710 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007). Also, the
payments for Rendon's stock in Alvarez would not have been required to have been made
until the redemption. Id. The impact a subsequent default in payment would have had on
Rendon's obligations under the covenant not to compete was not an issue. See id. In addition,
the court did not specifically address Rendon's defense that the employer breached the agree-
ment, as the court found that Rendon's obligation under the covenant could not have arisen
there having been no redemption of stock. Id.
659. Colucci, 918 So. 2d at 433.
660. Id. at 437.
661. Id. (citing Benemerito & Flores v. Roche, 751 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1999)).
662. Id.
663. Id. at 438 (quoting Net First Nat'l Bank v. First Telebanc Corp., 834 So. 2d 944, 949
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
664. Colucci, 918 So. 2d at 438.
665. Id. at 440. Even though that may have been evidence of Colucci's breach of the sale
agreement, it did not result in irreparable harm. Id. at 440-41.
666. Id. at 441.
667. Id. at 438.
668. Colucci, 918 So. 2d at 439.
669. Id. at 440.
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B. Discrimination
In El Toro Exterminator of Florida, Inc. v. Cernada,670 El Toro Exter-
minator of Florida, Inc. (El Toro) provided pest control services for Miami-
Dade County's bus fleet. 671  The contract between El Toro and the County
contained restrictions on the products that could be used.67 2 Mr. Cernada, El
Toro's former service operations manager, testified that he was told to use
and "conceal the use of' a particular pesticide and not to use protective gear
so as not to alert the County.6 3 The court found that when Mr. Cernada
complained to the owners about the physical effects the pesticide was having
on him, he was "subjected to racial and ethnic slurs" and given undesirable
work schedules. 674  Finally, Mr. Cemada informed Miami-Dade County's
Pest Control Manager of the probhibed use. 675 The court also found that one
of the owners of El Toro threatened Mr. Cemada.676 Mr. Cemada then quit
his job.677 He sued El Toro, alleging, among other claims, "retaliation under
the Florida Private Sector Whistleblower's Act," section 448.102(3) of the
Florida Statutes. 68 "At the conclusion of [Mr.] Cernada's case,. . . El Toro
moved for a directed verdict on the ... [whistleblower] claim" arguing that
Mr. Cernada failed to prove his case as pled.6 9 El Toro's position was that
Mr. Cernada had not specifically identified the laws El Toro was said to have
violated. 68" However, Cernada's lawyer had orally argued, without objec-
tion, the pertinent "ordinances and administrative code sections" El Toro was
alleged to have violated. 68 ' The trial court denied El Toro's motion and al-
lowed Mr. Cernada to amend his pleadings "to conform to the evidence. 6 2
El Toro appealed both rulings.6 3 In affirming the trial court, the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing Mr. Cemada to amend his pleadings. 6 4 'Leave to amend shall be
670. 953 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
671. Id. at 617.
672. Id.
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. Cernada, 953 So. 2d at 617.
676. Id.
677. Id.
678. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 448.102(3) (2002)). He also sought unpaid wages and al-
leged negligent supervision. Id.
679. Cernada, 953 So. 2d at 617.
680. Id.
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. Id.
684. Cernada, 953 So. 2d at 618.
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freely given .. ,,685 El Toro's conduct complained of in this case remained
unchanged after the amendment of Mr. Cemada's pleadings.686 Furthermore,
El Toro was not prejudiced because the trial court allowed the amendment.687
The allegations in the amendment should have come as no surprise to El To-
ro. 688
El Toro next argued that Mr. Cemada's claim under the Whistleblower
Act must fail because El Toro was not given "an opportunity to remedy [its
alleged] offensive conduct. ' 689 The court observed that the record of Mr.
Cemada's actions was contrary to El Toro's assertions. 69' This was a case
for the jury.691
X. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND GOVERNANCE
In Orlinsky v. Patraka,692 Orlinsky and Patraka were at one time both
employed by their father-in-law's company.6 93 Later, they decided to go into
business together without their father-in-law.694 They initially had a written
agreement. 695 The agreement provided that they would have "equal salaries
and benefits," and would share equally in business profits and losses from
Visual Scene, Inc.696 Patraka alleged that after several years, they decided to
do without a written agreement and "orally agreed [that] they would be equal
partners in any [business] they operated. 697 Indeed, for thirty years Orlinsky
and Patraka were in business together sharing everything equally. 698 How-
ever, due to a financial reverse, and in order to keep their business going
after a creditor foreclosed on the assets of Visual Scene, Inc., they decided
that in order to buy back Visual Scene from the creditor, it was necessary to
sell an interest in their business to investors who happened to be foreign-
ers. 69 9 A new entity was formed, Visual Scene International (VSI), in which
685. Id. (quoting Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Shulman, 481 So. 2d 965, 967 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986)).
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. Cernada, 953 So. 2d at 618.
690. Id..
691. Id.
692. 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1637 (3d Dist. Ct. App. July 5, 2007).
693. Id. at D1638.
694. Id.
695. Id.
696. Id.
697. Orlinsky, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1638.
698. Id.
699. Id.
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Orlinsky and Patraka "each received [a] 25.83% interest. '' 700 The upshot was
that as part of a conversion from a "C" corporation to an "S" corporation,
Orlinsky purchased the shares owned by the foreign investors in the operat-
ing company, VSI.701 Orlinsky then owned a 69% share of VSI, and Patraka
owned a minority interest. 72 Not long after that, the Articles of Incorpora-
tion were amended and all of the shareholders waived their preemptive
rights.7 3 Orlinsky and Patraka had a falling out and VSI's board of directors
fired Patraka.70 Patraka filed a complaint in court against Orlinsky. 75 He
alleged breach of oral contract in count one, breach of fiduciary relationship
in count two, sought imposition of a constructive trust in count three, and
alleged tortious interference in count four.706  The trial court granted Or-
linsky's motion for a directed verdict as to counts one, three, and four, but
allowed count two, breach of fiduciary duty, to go to the jury.707 The jury
returned a verdict for Patraka consisting of $887,000 for the VSI stock he did
not receive as part of the conversion to an S corporation and $3,431,248 for
benefits he did not receive because he was fired.70 8 On appeal, the court de-
termined that Orlinsky had not breached any fiduciary duty owed to Patraka
and reversed the trial court's denial of a directed verdict on count two. 709
The Third District Court of Appeal discussed the fiduciary duty issue in four
ways: 1) was there a general fiduciary duty?; 2) was there an agency rela-
tionship?; 3) was there a duty imposed on Orlinsky as majority shareholder?;
and 4) was Orlinsky obliged to support the continued employment of
Patraka?71 °
The court answered no to each of the questions.7 1 The court found no
evidence of breach of general fiduciary duty, concluding that this claim was
no different from the breach of oral agreement claim that had been properly
dismissed by the trial court.712 As to agency, there was no evidence that Or-
linsky agreed to act on Patraka's behalf in dealings with foreign investors.713
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Orlinsky, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1638.
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Id.
706. Id.
707. Orlinsky, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1638.
708. Id.
709. Id. at D1640.
710. Id at D1639-40.
711. Id.
712. Orlinsky, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D 1639.
713. Id.
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Although Orlinsky, a majority shareholder, owed Patraka, a minority share-
holder, a fiduciary duty, Orlinsky was a minority shareholder when he pur-
chased the stock from the foreign investor shareholders."' "There was no
shareholder agreement in place" that would have given Patraka the right to
purchase an equal number of shares-preemptive rights having been
waived'.7 5  Finally, and as a matter of first impression, the court adopted
Delaware's rule that issues of wrongful employment termination are personal
and contractual and are separate from any rights that the employee may have
as a shareholder.7 6 A majority shareholder's fiduciary duties are likewise
separate from employment issues.
7 17
XI. INSURANCE
Nob Hill Plaza (Landlord) leased shopping center space to New York
Buffet (Tenant). 71' The lease agreement required Tenant to obtain casualty
insurance covering the leased premises with the policy to name Nob Hill
Plaza as an additional insured or loss payee. 7 9 Tenant bought the insurance
from Lloyd's of London (Lloyd's), but failed to have the policy include the
Landlord.12 0 The premises were damaged by fire, and an insurance claim
was filed by Tenant.7 2 ' Lloyd's denied Tenant's claim, and Landlord sued
Tenant for damages. 722  Tenant filed a third-party complaint against
Lloyd's. 723  The trial court dismissed the third-party complaint.7 2 4  The
Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that it appeared that the trial court
concluded that because Landlord did not qualify as a third-party beneficiary
of Tenant's insurance policy, the third-party complaint was improper. 725 The
Fourth District Court disagreed with the trial court.726 Since Lloyd's may
have to pay for the damage for which Landlord was suing Tenant, the third-
714. Id.
715. Id.
716. Id. at D1640.
717. Orlinsky, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1640.
718. N.Y. Buffet, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 950 So. 2d 438, 439
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
719. Id.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id.
723. N.Y Buffet, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 439.
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. Id.
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party complaint was proper.7 27 The Court added that "the trial court could
sever the third-party action to prevent prejudice to [Lloyd's].72 8
XII. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE INTERNET
In 1991, Ms. Almeida's mother gave written permission to fashion pho-
tographer Fabrio Cabral to take and use Ms. Almeida's photograph for ex-
hibit and publication.729 Ms. Almeida was ten years old at the time.730 Ms.
Almeida's photo was published in a book, Anjos Proibidos (Forbidden An-
gels).73' A second edition of Anjos Proibidos was published in 2000.732 MS.
Almeida's photo was on the cover. 73 Amazon sold the second edition online
on its website.734 Amazon's product detail page displayed the second edition
photograph of Ms. Almeida. 7 In addition, a quote was attributed to her.736
Ms. Almeida's attorney sent a demand letter to Amazon for statutory dam-
ages under section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes "for its unauthorized use of
Ms. Almeida's image. Amazon responded by promptly removing the
book's listing from its websites.7 38 Ms. Almeida's lawyer sent a second let-
ter to Amazon demanding damages pursuant to section 772.11 of the Florida
Statutes for civil theft. 739 In November 2003, Ms. Almeida filed suit in Mi-
ami-Dade County Circuit Court alleging claims under both statutes relied
upon by her attorney in his letters. 740 Amazon removed the case to federal
district court based on diversity jurisdiction.74 ' The federal district court
granted Amazon's motion for summary judgment on all of Ms. Almeida's
claims,742 and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.743
The first issue was whether the Federal Communications Decency Act
of 1996 (CDA) preempted Ms. Almeida's right of publicity claim under the
727. Id. at 440.
728. NY Buffet, Inc., 950 So. 2d at 440.
729. Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (11 th Cir. 2006).
730. Id. at 1318.
731. Id. at 1319.
732. Id.
733. Id.
734. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1319.
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2006)).
738. Id.
739. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1319 (citing FLA. STAT. § 772.11 (2006)).
740. Id.
741. Id.
742. Id.
743. Id. at 1328.
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Florida law.'" The court observed that the CDA was intended to grant im-
munity to any cause of action that would make internet service providers
liable for information that originated with a third-party user of the service-
in this case, Ophelia Editions.745 The court also observed that the CDA was
not intended to affect intellectual property rights.746 Ms. Almeida argued
that the federal statute did not preempt the Florida publicity right statute
since a publicity right is an intellectual property right.74 7 The court stated
that "[w]hether the CDA immunize[d] an interactive service provider from a
state law right of publicity claim" was a question of first impression for the
Eleventh Circuit."' The court declined to decide the question because it
found that Ms. Almeida's publicity right claim failed the requirements of the
Florida statute.749 The court concluded that Ms. Almeida's photograph was
not used "for trade, commercial, or advertising purposes as those terms are
used in the statute., 750 The court found that Amazon's use of book cover
images only "simulates a customer's experience browsing book covers in a
traditional book store."75' The use of book covers is only "incidental to, and
customary for," internet book sellers.752 The court also rejected the civil
theft claim under sections 812.012-812.037 and section 772.11 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, finding that Ms. Almeida failed to provide clear and convincing
evidence of an injury that could have been caused by civil theft, and likewise
failed to show felonious intent on Amazon's part.
753
The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district court's award of attor-
ney's fees to Amazon pursuant to section 772.11 of the Florida Statutes,
finding that the civil theft claim was raised without substantial factual or
legal support. 754
Legislation was enacted in 2006 amending Florida's trademark law to
make it more consistent with the Federal Trademark Act of 1946, as
amended. 75 Chapter 495 of the Florida Statutes has been given the name
744. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1320; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
745. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1321.
746. Id. at 1323.
747. See id. at 1322; see also FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2006).
748. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1322.
749. Id. at 1324.
750. Id. at 1325.
751. Id. at 1326.
752. Id.
753. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1327 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 772.11, 812.012-.037 (2006)).
754. Id. at 1328.
755. Act effective Jan. 1, 2007, ch. 2006-191, § 20, 2006 Fla. Laws 1952, 1970 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 495.181 (2006)).
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"Registration and Protection of Trademarks Act." '756 The definitional section
of the statute has been substantially reworded.757 A trademark application
review, amendment, and administrative hearing process has been created. 758
Notably, the duration of a registered mark has been reduced from ten years to
five years.759 A change of trademark name is to be filed with the Department
of State. 760 The statute also now provides that a security interest in a mark
may be created and perfected under the Uniform Commercial Code."' It
also changes the law to allow an owner of a "famous mark" to pursue reme-
dies, including an injunction, to prevent dilution of the mark.762
XIII. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A. Torts
In Hunt v. Cornerstone Golf, Inc.,763 Daly, a golfer and Tennessee resi-
dent, and Chamberland, an employee of John Daly Enterprises (JDE), a Flor-
ida corporation, granted two companies, Cornerstone, a Georgia corporation,
and Hippo, a British corporation, owned partly by Hunt, overlapping "exclu-
sive" rights to the use of Daly's name and likeness. 71 JDE terminated Cor-
nerstone's trademark rights contract about six months before its scheduled
expiration date, and Cornerstone brought suit in Broward County against
Hippo, Hunt, a California subsidiary of Hippo, JDE, and Daly alleging tor-
tious interference with its trademark license. 765 The trial court denied Hunt's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and Hunt appealed.7 66 The
issue was whether, under Wendt v. Horowitz, 767 Cornerstone satisfied the
two-part jurisdictional test.7 68 First, were sufficient jurisdictional facts al-
leged that Hunt committed a tortious act in Florida and that the cause of ac-
756. Id. § 1, 2006 Fla. Laws at 1954 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 495.001 (2007)).
757. Id. §2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 495.011 (2006)).
758. Id. § 6, 2006 Fla. Laws at 1958-59 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 495.035 (2007)).
759. Id. § 9, 2006 Fla. Laws at 1960 (amending FLA. STAT. § 495.071 (2006)).
760. Ch. 2006-191, § 10, 2006 Fla. Laws 1962 (amending FLA. STAT. § 495.081(3)
(2006)).
761. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 495.081(5)).
762. Id. § 17, 2006 Fla. Laws at 1968-69 (amending FLA. STAT. § 495.151(1)-(2) (2006)).
763. 949 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
764. Id. at 229.
765. Id.
766. Id. The decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed personal jurisdic-
tion with respect to Hunt only. Id. The opinion does not mention if other defendants filed
motions to dismiss. See Hunt, 949 So. 2d at 229-31.
767. 822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002).
768. Hunt, 949 So. 2d at 230.
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tion arose from that alleged tortious act?769 Second, were there minimum
contacts between the defendant and Florida that would satisfy due process
requirements? 770
It was Cornerstone's burden to prove under the first part of the test that
the alleged tortious interference took place in Florida. 7 Under Wendt,
where a party asserts jurisdiction over another based on the commission of a
tort in Florida that involves a communication originating outside of Florida
and there is no physical presence of the other in Florida, the alleged tort must
have arisen from that communication. 7 " Hunt was never in Florida, but
Hunt made telephone calls and sent two e-mails to Chamberland in Florida
concerning JDE's contract with Cornerstone.7 73 The question, therefore, was
whether Cornerstone's claim arose from those contacts.77 ' The Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held that because Hunt initially got in touch with an
agent of Daly in Washington, D.C. and with Daly in Tennessee regarding
Hunt's interest in the exclusive trademark rights, any claim for tortious inter-
ference should have been made where those initial communications oc-
curred, not in Florida. 775 Having determined that Cornerstone failed the first
part of the jurisdiction test, it was unnecessary for the Court to opine on the
sufficiency of Hunt's contacts with Florida.776
In Deloitte & Touche v. Gencor Industries, Inc.,7 Gencor Industries,
Inc. (Gencor U.S.) acquired a United Kingdom company, which became
Gencor ACP (Gencor U.K.). 778 As part of the transaction, Gencor U.K. en-
gaged Deloitte & Touche (Deloitte & Touche U.K.), a United Kingdom part-
nership, to audit its books. 779 Gencor U.S.'s Florida auditor was Deloitte &
Touche U.S. 78° Deloitte & Touche U.K. conducted the audit of Gencor U.K.
and sent its audit report to Deloitte & Touche U.S. in Florida.7 "' Deloitte &
Touche U.S. passed the report on to Gencor U.S. 782 Gencor U.S. claimed
that the Deloitte & Touche U.K.'s audit report was defective and brought suit
769. Id.
770. Id.
771. Id.
772. Id.
773. Hunt, 949 So. 2d at 230.
774. See id.
775. Id.
776. Id. at 231 n.2.
777. 929 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
778. Id. at 679.
779. Id.
780. Id.
781. Id. at 681.
782. Deloitte & Touche, 929 So. 2d at 681.
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against Deloitte & Touche U.S. and Deloitte & Touche U.K. in the Orange
County Circuit Court alleging professional negligence and negligent misrep-
resentation.783 The first issue was one of in personam jurisdiction, that is,
whether or not Deloitte & Touche U.K.'s actions could be found to be the
commission of a tortious act in Florida under the long-arm statute, section
48.193(l)(b) of the Florida Statutes.7" The second issue was venue. 785
The Fifth District Court of Appeal stated that, under Wendt, the alleged
tort must have arisen from the "transmission" of that communication.786
Deloitte & Touche U.K. argued that Gencor U.S. claimed only to have relied
on a report received from Deloitte & Touche U.S. 78 7 Therefore, according to
Deloitte & Touche U.K., the alleged tort could not have arisen out of any
transmission by it to Gencor U.S. because its transmission of the report was
to Deloitte U.S. 788 The court acknowledged that this case differed from the
facts of OSI Industries, Inc. v. Carter,789 and all other Florida cases it knew
of, in that the communication from which the alleged misrepresentation was
said to arise was not transmitted to the person claiming to have relied on the
misrepresentation. 790 The Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded, based on
"the peculiar nature of the particular tort at issue," that it did not matter that
Deloitte & Touche U.K.'s audit report was not sent directly to Gencor
U.S.7 9' It was sufficient that Gencor U.S.'s unrefuted jurisdictional allega-
tions were to the effect that "the reports were sent to Florida" and that
Deloitte & Touche U.K. must have known "that [the] reports would be relied
on in Florida by Gencor [U.S.] and they were relied upon in Florida by Gen-
cor [U.S.].
79 2
Perhaps the most important aspect of the decision, however, is what the
Fifth District Court of Appeal said with respect to liability of accountants for
negligent misrepresentation. 79 In reaching its decision on the jurisdictional
issue, the court noted that although the Supreme Court of Florida had not
783. Id. at 679.
784. Id.
785. Id.
786. Id. at 680. There was no claim that Deloitte & Touche U.K. had any physical pres-
ence in Florida or that anyone from Deloitte & Touche U.K. was ever in Florida in connection
with any business dealings with Gencor U.S. or any of its subsidiaries, including Gencor U.K.
Deloitte & Touche, 929 So. 2d at 680.
787. Id. at 680-81.
788. Id. at 681.
789. 834 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
790. Deloitte & Touche, 929 So. 2d at 680-81.
791. Id. at 681.
792. Id. at 683.
793. Id. at 681.
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made it perfectly clear whether Florida has adopted the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts... rule with respect to liability of accountants for negligent
misrepresentation in connection with an audit, 795 based on Florida Supreme
Court cases, 796 "it is difficult reasonably to reach any other conclusion.
' 79 7
The other issue, venue, was based on the audit agreement between Gen-
cor U.K. and Deloitte & Touche U.K., which provided that claims by a party
would be litigated in the United Kingdom. 79' The trial court found that the
provision did not apply to Gencor U.S. because it "was not a party to the
contract.,, 799 The Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled that a non-party could
be bound by a choice of forum clause if, as the court found with respect to
Gencor U.S., "the interests of a non-party are directly related to or com-
pletely derivative of those of a contracting party."8 ° Therefore, even though
the Orange County Circuit Court acquired jurisdiction over Deloitte &
Touche U.K., Gencor U.S.'s claim against Deloitte & Touche U.K. had to be
litigated in the United Kingdom.80
In another Fifth District Court of Appeal case, Thorpe v. Gelbwaks,80 2
the Thorpes sued Gelbwaks in Florida, in connection with the Thorpes' pur-
chase of a franchise operation.80 3 The Thorpes alleged, among other things,
that Gelbwaks defrauded them in Florida.80 4 Gelbwaks, a New Hampshire
resident, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under Flor-
794. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). The Restatement (Second) rule
extended liability of accountants for negligent misrepresentation (negligence) beyond the
privity limitation set forth in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). See
First Fla. Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 11-12 (Fla. 1990). Under the
Restatement (Second), liability extends to those with whom the alleged tortfeasor is in privity
of contract, those to whom the tortfeasor intends to supply it, and those the alleged tortfeasor
"knows that the recipient intends to supply it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a)
(1977).
795. Deloitte & Touche, 929 So. 2d at 681 (citing Nationsbank, N.A. v. KPMG Peat Mar-
wick, LLP, 813 So. 2d 964, 967 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
796. See, e.g., Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 696 So. 2d 334, 339 (Fla.
1997); First Fla. Bank, N.A., 558 So. 2d at 15.
797. Deloitte & Touche, 929 So. 2d at 681.
798. Id. at 680.
799. Id. at 683.
800. Id. at 684.
801. Id. at 683.
802. 953 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
803. Id. at 608.
804. Id. The claims included "violation of the Sale of Business Opportunities Act," sec-
tions 559.80 to 559.815 of the Florida Statutes, and violation of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201 to 501.213 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 608
nn.2-3.
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ida's long-arm statute."' Gelbwaks' supporting affidavit denied all allega-
tions of wrongdoing. 0 6 The Thorpes filed the affidavit of Robert Gregg, a
former employee of the same corporation that employed Gelbwaks. °7 Mr.
Gregg's affidavit was to the effect that Gelbwaks was Vice President of
Franchise Operations and would regularly stay in Florida during the work
week. 808 The trial court granted Gelbwaks' motion to dismiss, finding that
Gelbwaks' affidavit shifted to the Thorpes the burden of proving that Gelb-
waks committed a tort in Florida, a burden that they did not carry.809 In addi-
tion, the trial court concluded that Mr. Gregg's affidavit did not refute Gelb-
waks' sworn denials of wrongdoing.1 ° The Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded.81' The trial court mistakenly believed that the Thor-
pes had the burden of proving that the Gelbwaks actually committed a tort in
Florida.812 However, the Thorpes need only prove that the acts alleged to
have constituted the tort occurred in Florida to invoke the long-arm statute.813
In addition, Gregg's affidavit established Gelbwaks' sufficient minimum
contacts with the state. 814 Thus, the Thorpes passed the two-part jurisdic-
tional test.815
B. Contracts
In Woodard Chevrolet, Inc. v. Taylor Corp.,816 Woodard Chevrolet, a
California company, and Taylor Corporation, a Florida corporation that does
direct mail advertising from Florida, entered into a contract for Taylor to
perform advertising services for Woodard Chevrolet. 8 7 Taylor had solicited
Woodard's business with respect to mailing advertising to Woodard's poten-
tial California customers. 81 8 The contract was signed by Woodard Chevrolet
in California, and "[n]o meetings were held in Florida" regarding the con-
tract. 819  Taylor performed services and Woodard made some of the pay-
805. Id. at 608.
806. Thorpe, 953 So. 2d at 608.
807. Id.
808. Id. at 608-09.
809. Id. at 609.
810. Id.
811. Thorpe, 953 So. 2d at 612.
812. Id. at 611.
813. Id. at 609.
814. Id. at 611.
815. Id.
816. 949 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
817. Id. at 269.
818. Id.
819. Id.
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ments due to Taylor under the contract. 2° Taylor sued Woodard in Broward
County for breach of contract.82' Taylor alleged that there was jurisdiction
based on Woodard Chevrolet's breach of contract by its failure to make
payments that were required to be made in Florida.122 The trial court ruled
that it had jurisdiction over Woodard and Woodard appealed.823
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, once again relying on Wendt, ob-
served that Florida has a two-part test for determining if "there is long-arm
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. '8 24  First, are sufficient jurisdic-
tional facts alleged?825  Second, are there enough "minimum contacts be-
tween the defendant and Florida to satisfy . . . due process require-
ments[?] '' 826 The allegations satisfied the first part of the test under section
48.193(1)(g) of the Florida Statutes.827 However, the court was unable to
find sufficient minimum contacts between Woodard and Florida to satisfy
due process. 828 Taylor made contact with Woodard in California. 29 No one
claiming to be a representative of Woodard was ever in Florida. 83 It could
not be said that Woodard ever sought the privileges of doing business in
Florida.83' The second part of the test was not satisfied and the trial court's
judgment was reversed. 832
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The case of Hammond v. DSY Developers, LLC,833 discussed earlier in
this survey,834 dealt with the local action rule and in rem jurisdiction in a real
estate matter. 835 The Third District Court of Appeal said that, "[a]lthough the
trial court's jurisdiction to enter the order in question was not raised below or
820. Id.
821. Taylor Corp., 949 So. 2d at 269-70.
822. Id. The court noted that the contract did not contain a choice of venue provision,
"[ajlthough not dispositive to this appeal." Id. at 269 n. 1.
823. Id. at 270.
824. Id. (citing Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1257 (Fla. 2002)).
825. Taylor Corp., 949 So. 2d at 270.
826. Id.
827. Id.
828. Id.
829. Id.
830. Taylor Corp., 949 So. 2d at 270.
831. Id. at270-71.
832. Id. at 271.
833. 951 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
834. See supra Part VI.A and accompanying text.
835. Hammond, 951 So. 2dat 988-89.
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on appeal, it is the duty of this [c]ourt to remain vigilant to the issue of sub-
j ect-matter jurisdiction." 836
The trial court was found to have subject matter jurisdiction with re-
spect to the specific performance aspect of the action, an in personam cause
of action. 837 However, while the trial court's summary judgment order in
Hammond that directed specific performance was approved, the summary
judgment was disapproved to the extent that it attempted to operate to trans-
fer title. 838 The trial court did not have in rem jurisdiction over the property
located in Indian River County.839 Citing the "local action rule," if a court
does not have in rem jurisdiction over the real property involved in the ac-
tion, then the court does not have jurisdiction to convey title.840 The court
ruled that if court action became necessary to enforce the order and to trans-
fer title, then it would be necessary to transfer the case to the court having in
rem jurisdiction, that court being the Circuit Court for Indian River Coun-
ty.841
D. Service of Process
In Mecca Multimedia, Inc. v. Kurzbard,842 Kurzbard alleged that he was
injured in a slip-and-fall on Mecca's premises.843 Kurzbard sued Mecca for
negligence. 8" Kurzbard tried to serve Mecca's registered agent at the
agent's address on file with the Florida Secretary of State. 845 The address
turned out to be the address of the agent's parents, "who refused to accept
service" or provide any information regarding their son, the named agent. 846
Kurzbard tried two more times "to serve an officer or employee of Mecca at"
Mecca's business address in Miami, but no one was there.8 47 Finally, Kurz-
bard resorted to substituted service on Mecca by serving the complaint on the
Secretary of State as provided in section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes. 
8
Effective substituted service on a corporation under that statute requires that
836. Id. at 988.
837. Id. at 989.
838. Id.
839. Id.
840. Hammond, 951 So. 2d at 989.
841. Id.
842. 954 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
843. Id. at 1180.
844. Id.
845. Id.
846. Id. at 1180-81.
847. Kurzbard, 954 So. 2d at 1181.
848. Id; FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (2007).
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a plaintiff plead and prove that service of the complaint in the normal way
under section 48.081 of the Florida Statutes was not possible for one of the
reasons enumerated in section 48.181; in this case, a defendant who con-
cealed his or her whereabouts. 9 Kurzbard failed to allege in his complaint
facts supporting substituted service.85 ° Substituted service was held to be
ineffective.851
E. Comity
Plaintiff sued defendant in New York for "breach of contract [and] tor-
tious interference with a business relationship." 852 Defendant instituted an
action in Florida with similar claims.853 Plaintiff moved to stay the Florida
proceeding pending the conclusion of the New York action on the ground
that the Florida action involved basically the same parties and substantially
the same issues as the New York action.854 Plaintiff also claimed that the
New York action would ultimately decide most of the claims involved in the
Florida action.855 The stay was denied because defendant's claims-brought
by defendant as the Florida plaintiff--could not be brought in New York
against certain Florida residents who were named as defendants in the Flor-
ida action.856 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed on the basis of
comity, stating that "[c]omity principles dictate that an action should be
stayed, and a trial court departs from the essential requirements of law by
failing to grant such a stay, when the first-filed lawsuit involves substantially
similar parties and substantially similar claims.
857
The Third District Court of Appeal noted that the policy discouraging
forum shopping "would be meaningless if a party could avoid the dictates of
comity [by simply] naming nominal defendants in a second-filed action. 858
While the addition of those parties would preclude an abatement of the Flor-
ida proceedings, it does not justify departure from the doctrine of comity.859
849. Kurzbard, 954 So. 2d at 1182.
850. Id.
851. Id. at 1182-83.
852. Pilevsky v. Morgans Hotel Group Mgmt., LLC, 961 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2007).
853. Id.
854. Id.
855. Id.
856. Id.
857. Pilevsky, 961 So. 2d at 1035 (citing Cuneo v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 899 So. 2d 1139,
1141 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
858. Id.
859. Id.
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The court observed that if the New York case does not resolve all issues con-
cerning the Florida residents, then the Florida action may be pursued after
the New York proceedings are concluded. 6
XIV. LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
A. Assignment of Lease
In Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Tropic Enterprises, Inc. 86' Tropic,
as lessor (Landlord), entered into a commercial lease with Speedway, as les-
see (Tenant).8 62 The lease agreement contained a "no assignment" clause
that required Tenant to obtain Landlord's prior written consent to Tenant's
assignment of the lease. 863 This clause provided in part that "[a]ny such as-
signment without consent shall be void, and shall, at the option of the Lessor,
terminate this lease."'8" Landlord refused to consent to the assignment, but
Tenant nonetheless assigned the lease to Sunoco, Inc.8 65 The trial court de-
termined that Landlord had the unfettered right to refuse consent and granted
summary judgment in favor of Landlord. 866
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding
that there was an implied obligation of good faith on Landlord's part not to
deny consent unreasonably.8 67 If a lease doesn't resolve an issue, or if one
party has discretion to act but no standards are set forth regarding the exer-
cise of discretion, then the obligation of good faith will be implied.8 68 Since
the lease did not resolve the question in that it did not give Tropic the abso-
lute discretion to withhold consent, and it did not contain any standard re-
garding the exercise of discretion, the obligation of good faith would be im-
plied.8 69 The implied covenant "is a gap-filling default rule" under these
circumstances. 87' The court, quoting Cox v. CSX Intermodal, Inc.,871 held
that "[w]here the terms of [a] contract afford a party substantial discretion to
860. Id. at 1036.
861. 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1032 (2d Dist. Ct. App. April 20, 2007).
862. Id.
863. Id. at D1032-33.
864. Id. at D1033.
865. Id. at D1032-33.
866. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1032.
867. Id. at D1033-34.
868. Id. at D1033 (citing Publix Super Mkts., Inc. v. Wilder Corp., 876 So. 2d 652, 654
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
869. Id.
870. Id. (quoting Wilder Corp., 876 So. 2d at 654).
871. 732 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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promote that party's self-interest, the duty to act in good faith nevertheless
limits that party's ability to act capriciously to contravene the reasonable
contractual expectations of the other party. 872
B. Renewal Options
In PL Lake Worth Corp. v. 99Cent Stuff-Palm Springs, LLC,8 73 PL Lake
Worth Corporation (Landlord) leased shopping center property to 99Cent
Stuff-Palm Springs, LLC (Tenant).8 74 The lease agreement gave Tenant an
option to renew the lease. 875 In order to make an informed decision on the
exercise of the option, Tenant needed and requested certain financial infor-
mation from Landlord well in advance of the option exercise date.8 76 The
lease agreement did not explicitly require Landlord to provide the informa-
tion and it refused to do SO. 8 77 With judicial intervention, Tenant finally ob-
tained the necessary information.8 78 Almost immediately after receiving the
information, Tenant exercised its option to renew the lease. 879 However, by
that time the option date had passed.88° Landlord sought to have the lease
declared terminated.88' The trial court ruled in favor of Tenant, holding that
Landlord breached its implied duty to act in good faith by refusing to provide
the necessary information to Tenant.882 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed citing Bowers v. Medina,883 which held that "[a]n established con-
tract principle is that a party's good-faith cooperation is an implied condition
precedent to performance of the contract." '884 On the authority of Sharp v.
Williams 885 and Cox v. CSX Intermodal, Inc.,886 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal dismissed Landlord's argument that the contract was silent and,
872. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D1033 (quoting Cox, 732 So. 2d
at 1097-98).
873. 949 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
874. Id. at 1200.
875. Id.
876. Id.
877. Id.
878. PL Lake Worth Corp., 949 So. 2d at 1200-01.
879. Id. at 1201.
880. Id. at 1200.
881. Id.
882. Id. at 1201.
883. 418 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
884. PL Lake Worth Corp., 949 So. 2d at 1201 (citing Bowers, 418 So. 2d at 1069).
885. 192 So. 476 (Fla. 1939).
886. 732 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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therefore, there was no duty to provide the information requested by Ten-
ant. 
88 7
In Peavey v. Reynolds,88 Peavey (Landlord) leased certain commercial
property to Reynolds (Tenant). 889 Landlord claimed that provisions in the
lease agreement amounted to "an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of
property" and the lease was therefore void 9.8" The lease was upheld by the
trial court and Landlord appealed. 89' The Fifth District Court of Appeal re-
versed. 892 Under the terms of the lease agreement, Tenant had "the right to
renew the lease indefinitely at [amounts] fixed by the . . . lease" agree-
ment.893 The agreement also provided that any successor landlord would be
bound by the terms of the lease. 894 The court, citing Seagate Condo Ass 'n v.
Duff, 895 stated that restraints on alienation are a matter of public policy.896
The court observed that the lease terms gave little incentive to any landlord
to make improvements to the property.897 The court also noted that it was
highly questionable that Landlord would ever be able to sell the property
burdened as it was by the lease agreement.898 The test is one of reasonable-
ness and the Fifth District Court of Appeal, stating that the court knew of no
case directly on point, concluded that the onerous terms of the lease agree-
ment constituted an "unreasonable restraint on alienation" thereby voiding
the lease.899
In Chessmasters, Inc. v. Chamoun,9 °° the Chamouns (Landlord) leased
certain commercial property to Chessmasters, Inc., (Tenant). 91 Landlord
was the successor lessor as the result of its purchase of the property. 92
887. PL Lake Worth Corp., 949 So. 2d at 1201.
888. 946 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
889. Id. at 1126.
890. Id.
891. Id.
892. Id. at 1127.
893. Peavey, 946 So. 2d at 1127.
894. Id.
895. 330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
896. Peavey, 946 So. 2d at 1126 (citing Duffy, 330 So. 2d at 485).
897. Id. at 1127.
898. Id.
899. Id. at 1127, & n. 1. The result in the case seems to be consistent with the observation
of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Old Port Cove Condominium Ass 'n One, Inc. v. Old
Port Cove Holdings, Inc., regarding the impact a fixed price for the right of first refusal for an
unlimited time may have had on the outcome of the case. 954 So. 2d 742, 746 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2007); see also supra note 547 and accompanying text.
900. 948 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
901. Id. at 986.
902. Id.
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Landlord sought to have the lease agreement declared void on the grounds
that certain provisions granted to Tenant in the lease agreement amounted to
"an unreasonable restraint on alienation."9 3  The trial court agreed with
Landlord that the lease could be renewed by Tenant in perpetuity and de-
clared the lease void. 9°4 Tenant then appealed.9 5 The offending lease re-
newal provision allowed for the automatic renewal of the lease for five addi-
tional years unless the Tenant gave the Landlord timely notice of non-
renewal.9"6 If the lease was renewed rent would increase by "not more than
10% current rental price. 9 °7 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
before a renewal right could be said to be perpetual and an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation, the lease agreement had to contain a clear and explicit
right to perpetual renewals.9"8 The subject lease agreement did not so
state.9"9 Therefore, the renewal right could not be said to be perpetual."'
The court had to grapple with the fact that likewise, renewals were not ex-
pressly limited by the agreement. 91' How many renewals does the Tenant
get? The court, citing Schroeder v. Johnson,912 said only two. 91 3 However,
unlike the lessee in Schroeder, Tenant gets only one extension because the
lease refers to "period" in the singular, whereas the lease in Schroeder re-
ferred to "periods," allowing the grant of two extensions. 9 4
C. Restrictive Covenants
Winn-Dixie (Tenant) was the "anchor" tenant at Crest Haven Shopping
Plaza (Landlord).9"5 Tenant's lease with Landlord gave Tenant "the exclu-
sive right to sell groceries" in the shopping center, subject to one excep-
tion. 916 The exception allowed other stores to sell groceries in a space no
larger than 500 square feet.917 The lease also provided that Landlord's ex-
903. Id. at 985.
904. Id. at 986.
905. Chamoun, 948 So. 2d at 985.
906. Id. at 986.
907. Id.
908. Id. at 987.
909. Id.
910. Chamoun, 948 So. 2d at 987.
911. See id
912. 696 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
913. See Chamoun, 948 So. 2d at 987 (citing Schroder, 696 So. 2d at 499).
914. Id. at 987-88.
915. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 964 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
916. Id. at 263.
917. Id.
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clusive right was deemed to be a covenant running with the land.918 A short
form version of the lease was recorded in the Palm Beach County public
records.919 Dolgencorp then opened a Dollar General Store in the shopping
center and began selling groceries from an area larger than 500 square
feet. 920 Tenant sued Dolgencorp and Landlord, and the trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of Dolgencorp.92' Tenant appealed, and Dolgen-
corp argued that Tenant's exclusive right was not binding on Dolgencorp
because Dolgencorp was not a party to the lease agreement between Tenant
and Landlord. 922 Ruling in favor of Tenant, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal determined that Tenant's exclusive right was a covenant running with
the land and enforceable against Dolgencorp. 923 The court defined an "en-
forceable covenant running with the land" as a covenant: 1) "that touches
and involves the land;" 2) that was created intentionally; and 3) notice of
which is given to "the party against whom enforcement is sought., 924 Based
on the record, the court found that Tenant satisfied the first two criteria but
had a little more difficulty ruling that the third requirement, the notice re-
quirement, had been satisfied. 925 Stating that notice can be constructive, ac-
tual, or implied actual, the Fourth District Court of Appeal determined that
Dolgencorp had "at least implied actual notice" of Tenant's exclusive
right. 926 The court based its conclusion on the fact that "Dolgencorp was an
experienced commercial tenant" that had many of its sites in shopping cen-
ters, and it had a duty to inquire further.927 In fact, Dolgencorp insisted on
"exclusive[] [rights] in its own leases. 928 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal also concluded that Dolgencorp had constructive notice, relying on sec-
tions 28.222(3)(a), 695.11, and 695.0 1(1) of the Florida Statutes.9 29 A lease
is "one kind of instrument that the clerk... is required to record" and there-
fore, it is notice under Section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes when it is "of-
ficially recorded." 93° For purposes of section 695.01(1) of the Florida Stat-
918. Id.
919. Id.
920. Dolgencorp, 964 So. 2d at 263.
921. Id. Dolgencorp sought an injunction, specific performance, and damages. Id. There
was also a claim of unjust enrichment. Id..
922. Id. The Landlord was involved in this appeal and claims against it remained unre-
solved. Dolgencorp, 964 So. 2d at 263.
923. Id at 264.
924. Id. at 265.
925. Id.
926. Idat 266..
927. Id.
928. Dolgencorp, 964 So. 2d at 266.
929. Id. at 266-67.
930. Id.
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utes, "which describes the effect of recording a lease," the court concluded
that "a lessee of real property is a 'purchaser' and "a recorded lease 'shall be
good and effectual' against subsequent purchasers for value."93'
In Autozone Stores, Inc. v. Northeast Plaza Venture, LLC.,932 the retail
lease agreement between Northeast Plaza Venture, LLC (Landlord) and Au-
tozone Stores, Inc. (Tenant) identified and designated certain unoccupied
areas in the shopping center as being reserved "for the exclusive joint use of
all tenants. 933  Landlord later decided to develop part of the designated
property.934 Landlord filed a declaratory judgment action, alleging that Ten-
ant threatened "to enjoin the sale of the [parcels] or to prevent construction"
on the site.935 Landlord sought and was granted the determination that Ten-
ant had no right to injunctive relief because Tenant had "an adequate remedy
at law in the form of mone[y] damages. '"936 Tenant appealed, and the Second
District Court of Appeal reversed. 937 The absence of an adequate remedy at
law is not a condition precedent to enjoining the violation of a restrictive
covenant.938 This rule applies in commercial real estate contexts as well as
residential. 939 Every piece of land has a peculiar value.94°
931. Id. Another issue presented in the case was whether Tenant's exclusive right violated
the Florida Antitrust Act of 1980, section 542.335 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 267-68. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal held that section inapplicable to covenants running with the
land. Dolgencorp, 964 So. 2d at 267-68.
932. 934 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
933. Id. at 672.
934. Id.
935. Id.
936. Id.
937. Autozone Stores, Inc., 934 So. 2d at 672, 675.
938. Id. at 673.
939. Id. at 674. Two of the three cases upon which the Second District Court of Appeal
relied addressed restrictive covenants involving setbacks in residential developments. Id. at
673-674; see also Stephl v. Moore, 114 So. 455 (Fla. 1927); Daniel v. May, 143 So. 2d 536
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962). The third case involved a commercial tenant. Autozone Stores,
Inc., 934 So. 2d at 674; see also Jack Eckerd Corp. v. 17070 Collins Ave. Shopping Ctr., Ltd.,
563 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
940. The landlord relied on an earlier Third District Court of Appeal decision, Liza Dan-
ielle, Inc. v. Jamko, Inc., 408 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), where, in a dispute
involving a commercial lease, injunctive relief was denied. Autozone Stores, Inc., 934 So. 2d
at 674. The Second District Court of Appeal, in Autozone Stores, Inc., distinguished Jamko
without acknowledging agreement with the holding there, reasoning that the Jamko case was
more in the nature of a non-compete clause rather than a real property restrictive covenant. Id.
at 674-75. The Third District, in deciding Jack Eckerd Corp., similarly distinguished the
facts in Jack Eckerd Corp. from its earlier decision in Jamko. Id. at 674.
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D. Taxes
Wellington Realty Co. (Landlord) entered into a build-to-suit lease with
ColorAll Technologies International, Inc. (Tenant) in 2000."41 Landlord fin-
ished construction of the leased premises near the end of 2001 and Tenant
occupied the premises on December 20, 2001.942 Tenant was obligated to
pay any real estate tax increase "after the base year of occupancy."943 The
real estate tax was $23,000 in 2001 and $32,300 in 2002. 944 Tenant paid its
rent for 2002 in addition to "a pro-rated amount for [its] eleven days [of oc-
cupancy] in 2001." However, Tenant refused to pay the almost $9300 real
estate tax increase, claiming that 2002, not 2001, was the base year of occu-
pancy.946 The real estate tax increase was clearly due to the post-
improvement value of the property assessed January 1, 2002. 9 4' Tenant was
in possession under a 2001 certificate of occupancy, and the property "was
'substantially completed' in 2001. '  Under these facts, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, in Wellington Realty Co., had no difficulty determining that
the base year of occupancy was 2001 . 949 The court distinguished the facts
from those in Handelsman v. Royal Trust Bank of Palm Beach, N.A., 950
where the property was not substantially completed during the year of first
possession, and the second year of possession was held to be the base year. 951
The court also stated "that Handelsman did not [create] a bright-line" test. 952
XV. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
In Carnes v. Fender,953 Mr. and Mrs. Carnes obtained a $3 million jury
verdict against Great Harbour Cay Realty. 954 Unable to collect the judgment,
941. Wellington Realty Co. v. ColorAll Techs. Int'l, Inc., 951 So. 2d 921, 921 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
942. Id. at 922-23.
943. Id. at 921-22.
944. Id. at 923.
945. Id. at 922.
946. Wellington Realty Co., 951 So. 2d at 922.
947. See id. at 923.
948. Id.
949. Id.
950. 426 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
951. Wellington Realty Co., 951 So. 2d at 922-923.
952. Id. at 923.
953. 936 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
954. Id. at 13; see also Great Harbour Cay Realty & Inv. Co. v. Carnes, 862 So. 2d 63, 65
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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they sued Mr. Fender, the principal of Great Harbour.955 Mr. and Mrs.
Carnes alleged that at one time Great Harbour was worth $30 million.956
They also alleged that Mr. Fender was the sole shareholder of Great Harbour,
made all corporate decisions, depleted Great Harbour's assets to defeat their
claim, and used Great Harbour "as a sham to defraud investors." '957 Mr.
Fender moved for summary judgment and conflicting evidence bearing on
the plaintiffs' allegations was filed with the court.95 The trial court granted
the motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed.959
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, noting that
summary judgments are rare in fraudulent conveyance cases.960 The evi-
dence presented on this issue by Mr. Fender conflicted with evidence pre-
sented by Mr. and Mrs. Carnes.96' Only "the scintilla of appreciable evi-
dence [is] required to defeat a motion for summary judgment." 962 There was
also conflicting evidence on the issue of the ability to pierce the corporate
veil. 963 Summary judgment was inappropriate as a jury could reasonably
have drawn an inference favoring Mr. and Mrs. Carnes from the evidence
presented.964
In Priskie v. Missry,965 Priskie and his wife owned forty percent of
EXA. 966 From time to time, Priskie made capital contributions to EXA to
keep it going.967 Tiring of this, Priskie asked Missry, another shareholder,
for a $20,000 loan to EXA. 968 Missry made the loan, although there was no
contemporaneous documentation of the loan. 9 69 Loan proceeds were used
for corporate purposes, and "EXA's board of directors" ratified the loan and
EXA's obligation to repay Missry.97° When EXA defaulted, Missry sought
to hold both EXA and Priskie liable.97 The trial court ruled in favor of Mis-
955. Fender, 936 So. 2d at 13.
956. Id.
957. Id.
958. Id.
959. Id. at 12.
960. Fender, 936 So. 2d at 14-15.
961. Id. at 14.
962. Id.
963. Id. at 15.
964. Id.
965. 958 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
966. Id. at 614.
967. Id. at 615.
968. Id. at 614.
969. Id.
970. Priskie, 958 So. 2d at 615.
971. Id. at 614.
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sry, and both EXA and Priskie appealed.91 2  The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that the corporate veil could not be pierced to im-
pose liability on Priskie even though Priskie was instrumental in obtaining
the loan. 973 In order for Missry to prevail, he would have to prove that: 1)
the corporation had no independent existence-the corporation's sharehold-
ers being its alter egos; 2) the corporation was "used fraudulently or for an
improper purpose[s]"; and 3) "the [fraud] or improper use of the" corporation
caused Missry's injury. 9 74 Missry failed to meet his burden of proof.9 75
XVI. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
In Huffinan v. Breezes Full Service Car Wash,976 the car wash was
closed because of rain, and Cash, one of Breezes' owners, took several of the
employees of the car wash out to lunch9 77 Lackowski, another manager, was
also there.9 78 Alcoholic beverages were consumed during lunch. 979 After
lunch, Lackowski was involved in car accident.9 0 Melissa Jones, the driver
of the other car, was killed.98" ' Her son, who was a passenger in her car, was
injured., 982 The personal representatives of the estate of Mrs. Jones sued
Breezes for wrongful death, 983 "alleging that Breezes was vicariously liable
for [the] negligent acts committed by" its employees. 984 In support of its
motion for summary judgment, Breezes argued "that it could not be vicari-
ously liable for the alleged negligence" of its employees because the facts
demonstrated that the employees "ceased acting within the scope of their
employment" before the lunch.985  The trial court agreed and granted the
motion. 986 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that "the
972. Id.
973. Id. at 615.
974. Id. at 614 (citing Seminole Boatyard, Inc. v. Christoph, 715 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
975. Priskie, 958 So. 2d at 615.
976. 956 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
977. Id. at 1204.
978. Id.
979. Id.
980. Id.
981. Huffinan, 956 So. 2dat 1204.
982. Id.
983. Id. at 1204-05.
984. Id. at 1205.
985. Id.
986. Huffinan, 956 So. 2d at 1205.
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trial court improperly resolved disputed issues of fact" on the scope of em-
ployment question where the record showed disputed issues of fact. 
987
In Palafrugell Holdings, Inc. v. Cassel,98 the Third District Court of
Appeal considered exceptions to the rule that a third party may rely on the
apparent authority of an agent. 989 In this legal malpractice case, the attorney
was dealing with a long-standing client, Hernandez-the agent-in connec-
tion with the attorney's representation of a new client, Palafrugell Holdings,
Inc.-the principal. 99  Palafrugell Holdings, Inc.-through Hernandez-
hired an attorney to represent the corporation in purchasing a "50% interest
in a mortgage [from] AAX, Inc." 99' Hernandez also secured investors and
arranged the mortgage purchase by Palafrugell Holdings, Inc., all with the
knowledge of the investors that he had secured.992 Hernandez claimed to be
a majority shareholder of Palafrugell Holdings, Inc. 9 93 There was no ques-
tion that Hernandez had the authority to hire the attorney as corporate coun-
sel for Palafrugell Holdings, Inc. 994 The investors wired $350,000 of pur-
chase funds to the attorney's trust account.9 5 Hernandez directed the attor-
ney to prepare a mortgage assignment in Hernandez's name alone, and to
disburse the purchase funds to several payees, including $43,375 to Hernan-
dez to repay advances. 996 Hernandez was not an officer or director of the
corporation, but the attorney complied with Hernandez's directions without
obtaining the consent of, or confirmation from, an officer of Palafrugell
Holdings, Inc. 997 The attorney argued, and the trial court agreed, that Her-
nandez, as the corporation's agent, had at least apparent authority to direct
the attorney as he did.998 The Third District Court of Appeal, recognizing
that "' [t]he acts of an agent, performed within the scope of his real or appar-
ent authority, are binding upon his principal,' 999 stated that there are cir-
cumstances where failure to make further inquiry into the agent's authority
may preclude reliance on the agent's representations. 0  One situation
987. Id.
988. 940 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
989. Id. at 494.
990. Id. at 493. There were also causes of action alleging "negligent bailment" and
"breach of fiduciary duty arising out of negligent disbursement of trust funds." Id.
991. Id.
992. Palafrugell, 940 So. 2d at 493.
993. Id.
994. Id. at 493-94.
995. Id. at 493.
996. Id. at 493, 494 n.2.
997. Palafrugell, 940 So. 2d at 493-94.
998. See id. at 494.
999. Id. (quoting Indus. Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 So. 2d 23, 26 (Fla. 1952)).
1000. Id.
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where there may be a duty to inquire further, is where an agent directs acts
by the third-party that, on their face, are contrary to the interests of the prin-
cipal.' °
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that summary
judgment in favor of the attorney was improper. 100 2 The trial court failed to
consider whether Hernandez's actions should have raised a reasonable doubt
as to the extent of Hernandez's authority and prompted the attorney to in-
quire further. 003
XVII. TAXES
In Geiger v. Commissioner,"'°4 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) de-
termined a deficiency in Mr. Geiger's 2000 federal income tax of $159,008
and, pursuant to Section 6662(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, also assessed
an accuracy related penalty of $31,802."°5 Mr. Geiger's "S" corporation
reported a theft loss of $1,645,986, which was passed through to Mr. Geiger
and claimed by him as a deduction on his individual income tax return pur-
suant to section 165(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. 10 6 On audit, the IRS
allowed a theft loss of $5586, which resulted in the deficiency and the pen-
alty. 07 Mr. Geiger was required to establish that a theft, within the meaning
of section 165, had occurred and the amount of the loss.1008 The question of
.whether the actions alleged to have occurred constituted a theft turned on the
definition of the crime under Florida law.'00 9 The Tax Court held that Mr.
Geiger failed to prove that a theft occurred under section 812.014 of the
Florida Statutes. 'o"0 As the trier of fact, the United States Tax Court upheld
the deficiency, finding Mr. Geiger's explanation of the theft loss to be in-
credible.' 0" The IRS has the burden of proving that the accuracy-related
penalty is appropriate. 12 In this case, because of Mr. Geiger's loss deduc-
1001. Id.
1002. Palafrugell, 940 So. 2d at 495.
1003. Id. at 494.
1004. 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 510 (2006).
1005. Id.
1006. Id. at 513.
1007. Id.
1008. Id. at 513.
1009. Geiger, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 513 (citing Monteleone v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 688, 692
(1960)).
1010. Id.
1011. Id.
1012. Id. at 514 (citing I.R.C. § 7491(c) (2000)).
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tion, Mr. Geiger paid no income tax for 2000.1013 The 20% accuracy related
penalty is appropriate if the tax is underpaid by more than the greater of ei-
ther 10% of the tax due or $5000."°14 Having not paid anything, Mr. Geiger
"qualified" for the penalty.1015 The penalty can be avoided if the taxpayer
can show reasonable cause for the tax amount, if any, paid. 1016 Mr. Geiger
claimed that he relied on the information provided to him by his then
wife. 1017 However, his wife had no bookkeeping experience.1018 Under the
circumstances, it was unreasonable for Mr. Geiger to not consult an account-
ant or other tax professional, and the penalty was upheld. 019
The Florida annual intangible tax for individuals, businesses, and per-
sonal representatives has, with limited exceptions, been repealed, effective
January 1, 2007.1020 The exceptions cover leases of government owned
property 1021 and a one-time intangible tax where notes are secured by mort-
gages on Florida real property. 0 22 All obligations for years before 2007 re-
main in full force and effect subject to prior laws and rules regarding assess-
ment and collection. 1
023
XVIII. TORTS
A. Negligence, Products Liability, and Strict Liability
In a case of first impression, Vincent v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 1024 the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal concluded that a designer of a product may be
liable to foreseeable users of a product, even if the designer does not have
any subsequent involvement with the product.0 25 The court saw no distinc-
tion between a designer who is the manufacturer and a designer who is not
1013. Id.
1014. Geiger, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 514 (citing I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A) (2000)).
1015. Id.
1016. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2000)).
1017. Id.
1018. Id.
1019. Geiger, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) at 514.
1020. FLA. STAT. §§ 199.012, .023, .032, .033, .042, .052, .057, .062, .103, .1055, .106,
.175, .185 (2005), repealed by Act effective Jan. 1, 2007, ch. 2006-312, § 1, 2006 Fla. Laws
3167.
1021. FLA. STAT. § 196.199(2)(b) (2007).
1022. Id. § 199.133(1).
1023. Id. § 199.303(3).
1024. 944 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
1025. Id. at 1086. The trial court was unable to find that Bard was also a manufacturer. Id.
at 1085.
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the manufacturer. 1126  Where the designer is also the manufacturer, under
existing Florida law, the designer has a duty to all foreseeable users, as well
as intended users, to exercise reasonable care in the design of the product. 1027
However, with respect to the situation where the designer is not the manufac-
turer, the court could find no Florida case directly on point. 1 28 Thus, the
question, as framed by the Second District Court of Appeal, was whether or
not "a designer of a product who did not manufacture, sell, distribute or have
any other involvement in getting the product to the user may be liable in neg-
ligence for the defective design of the product." 10 29 The action in Vincent
was instituted after the plaintiff's son received an overdose from a patient
controlled morphine pump while in the hospital. 10 30 The overdose left the
son "totally and permanently disabled."'0'" No record was made of the
amount of morphine remaining in the pump, and "the pump permanently
disappeared while in the custody of the hospital."'132 The plaintiff sued C.R.
Bard, Inc. (Bard) and Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Baxter) alleging negli-
gent design of the pump. 1033 It was undisputed that either Bard or Baxter was
the manufacturer of the pump used by the plaintiffs son."34 Plaintiff also
sued Bard for negligent design of the pump. 1035 With respect to this claim, it
was clear that Bard had designed the pump, even though it could not be de-
termined who had manufactured the particular pump. 1 36 The trial court en-
tered summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants, and the plaintiff
appealed. 10
37
The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment was properly
granted on the negligent design issue in favor of Baxter and Bimeco, the
distributor who was also named as a defendant, since the pump could not be
1026. Id. at 1085.
1027. Id. at 1086 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049, 1052 (Fla. 1981)); see
also Light v. Weldarc Co., 569 So. 2d 1302, 1303 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
1028. Vincent, 944 So. 2d at 1085.
1029. Id.
1030. Id.
1031. Id.
1032. Id.
1033. Vincent, 944 So. 2d at 1084-85.
1034. Id. at 1085. Baxter had taken over the division of Bard that had designed and manu-
factured the pumps, so it could not be determined which of the two companies actually manu-
factured the missing pump. Id.
1035. Id.
1036. Id.
1037. Vincent, 944 So. 2d at 1085. The distributor of the pump, Bimeco, Inc. was also a
named defendant, and the summary judgment was also granted to this defendant on the same
grounds. Id.
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found."38 However, as to Bard, the designer, the court disagreed.0 39 The
court noted that a manufacturer, who is also the designer, is under a duty to
foreseeable users to exercise reasonable care in the design of the product. 0" 0
The court could find no reason why the designer of a product who is not also
the manufacturer should, for that reason, be relieved of liability to foresee-
able users if the product was negligently designed.'"' The plaintiffs son
was a foreseeable user.' 2 With respect to the negligent design claim, the
absence of the particular pump was not an insurmountable obstacle in light
of an unopposed affidavit submitted by the plaintiff's expert, that in his opin-
ion, the overdose was the result of a design error. 043
In Saullo v. Douglas,"°44 Mr. Douglas owned the tractor part of a
tractor-trailer rig.'045 Dart Transit Company (Dart), an interstate motor car-
rier, owned the trailer. 0" 6 Mr. Douglas agreed to permanently lease the trac-
tor to Dart, and to drive the tractor exclusively to carry freight in trailers
owned by Dart. 047 The operating agreement between Mr. Douglas and Dart
described Mr. Douglas as an independent contractor.' 8 While driving the
rig for Dart in central Florida, Douglas responded to a call for help from his
brother.0 49 Mr. Douglas detached the trailer from the tractor and, leaving the
trailer parked in the far right-hand lane, left the tractor to assist his broth-
er.0 50 In the early morning hours, Mr. Saullo, who was driving to his
friend's apartment, swerved to avoid the trailer, hit a tree, and was killed. 1051
The court stated that Mr. Saullo was intoxicated, and that he was not wearing
a seatbelt when the accident occurred. 0 52 Mr. Saullo's personal representa-
1038. Id. Although not specifically stated, presumably the affirmance of the summary
judgment on the issue of negligent design applies to Bard as well. See id. at 1085-86.
1039. Id. at 1085.
1040. Vincent, 944 So. 2d at 1085.
1041. Id.
1042. Id. at 1086.
1043. Id. The court noted that there was still, therefore, a genuine issue of material fact-
"whether Bard breached its duty to" plaintiffs son. Id. The court did not address what impact
the fact that the affidavit was uncontroverted might have on the breach of duty issue. See
Vincent, 944 So. 2d at 1086. In any event, there presumably is also still the issue of proximate
cause. See id.
1044. 957 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
1045. Id. at 82.
1046. Id.
1047. Id.
1048. Id.
1049. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 82.
1050. Id.
1051. Id.
1052. Id.
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tive alleged liability on Dart's part by reason of federal regulations governing
interstate trucking, and alternatively, that the principle of respondeat superior
applied to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. 0 53 The trial court rejected
both theories and granted summary judgment in favor of Dart. 1054
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal observed that two lines
of decisions had developed on the effect of pertinent federal regulations "on
state tort law in negligence actions.""" One was a strict agency/lease liabil-
ity paradigm, and the second was an application of "a state law respondeat
superior/'scope of employment' analysis."' 10 56 Finding the choice between
the two theories a matter of first impression in Florida, the Fifth District held
that the better approach was respondeat superior/scope of employment.
10 57
Clearly, Mr. Douglas acted outside the scope of employment regarding the
trailer. 05 8 The negligent use of a dangerous instrumentality by the agent,
even if not within the scope of the agent's employment, can result in vicari-
ous liability to the principal.' 059 The court noted that "[i]t is well-established
in Florida.. .that the trailer [part] of the tractor-trailer rig [has been held] not
[to be] a dangerous instrumentality.'°6° However, the tractor was a danger-
ous instrumentality." 0 61 The court found that Dart, "owner of the trailer and
• ..lessee of the tractor," put "Douglas in operational control of both,"
thereby subjecting it to vicarious liability. 1061 The court used the analogy of
a dump truck that negligently deposited a load of gravel on the roadway re-
sulting in injury to another driver, as to which the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine would apply. 10 63 The court said that "[j]ust because the trailer was
dropped off rather than a load of stones should not change that result." 1064
Finding that the "case present[ed] an issue of causation," the court reversed
and remanded the matter to the trial court.'065
In Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI Utilities, InC., 1066 Atlanta Gas Light
Company (Atlanta Gas) and the City of St. Augustine settled a pollution li-
1053. Id.
1054. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 82.
1055. Id. at 85.
1056. Id.
1057. Id. at 86.
1058. Id.
1059. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 86.
1060. Id. at 87.
1061. Id. at 88.
1062. Id. at 87.
1063. Id. at 88.
1064. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 88.
1065. Id.
1066. 463 F.3d 1201 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
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ability claim with the Environmental Protection Agency under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA).1067 Atlanta Gas instituted suit against UGI Utilities, Inc. (UGI)
and Center Point Energy Resources Corporation (Center Point) seeking con-
tribution. 10 68 The polluted land at issue had accommodated an energy pro-
ducing plant since 1886.1169 UGI and Center Point were successors to parent
corporations that, at various times, controlled subsidiaries operating the
plant. 1070 Under CERCLA, liability-and claims for contribution- for envi-
ronmental pollution can be asserted against "owners" of the damaged prop-
erty and "operators" of pollution causing facilities.' 0 7' Atlanta Gas did not
assert ownership liability against UGI and Center Point because the prede-
cessor corporations never owned the land involved. 107' Atlanta Gas claimed
that the predecessor corporations operated the pollution causing facilities by
virtue of their subsidiary operators. 1073 The court, relying on the test created
by United States v. Bestfoods10 74 to determine if the parent corporation is in
fact the operator of its subsidiary's pollution-causing facility, stated that the
parent must have "manage[d], direct[ed], or conduct[ed] operations specifi-
cally related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with the leakage or
disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environ-
mental regulations."' 1 75 Under this test, the parent may be subject to liability
if: 1) the parent actually operated the facility alone or jointly with the sub-
sidiary; 2) a person serving as an officer or director of the subsidiary and
parent is serving only the parent; or 3) an agent of the parent is placed with
the subsidiary to conduct operations. 1076 Atlanta Gas was unable to prove the
defendants "passed" the test. 1077
An interesting issue in the case was the liability of the defendant insur-
ance company, Century Indemnity Company (Century). 1 78  Century had
issued indemnity policies to the subsidiaries for five years during the period
from 1940-1947. 1079 The policies covered damage to the property caused by
1067. Id. at 1202.
1068. Id. at 1203.
1069. Id. at 1202.
1070. Id. at 1202-03, nn.1-2.
1071. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1204.
1072. Id.
1073. Id. at 1204-05.
1074. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
1075. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1204-05 (quoting Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66-67).
1076. Id. at 1205 n.6.
1077. See id.
1078. Id. at 1208.
1079. Id.
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accident.18 "'Accident' [was] not defined in the policy."'0 81  The court
noted that there was no evidence of contamination during policy coverage
periods.°12 There was expert testimony to the effect there must have been
routine leakages and contaminants during the coverage period. 1083 However,
routine leakages are not accidents-they are not unintentional, unexpected
events. 1084 No liability was imposed on the insurance company. 108'
B. Misrepresentation and Fraud
In Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.,18 6 Sun-
beam, Inc. (Sunbeam), "[p]ursuant to [a] merger agreement, . . . bought the
Coleman [Company, Inc.] stock" owned by Coleman (Parent) Holdings,
Inc. 87 Sunbeam paid Parent "approximately half of the purchase price"
with Sunbeam stock.10 88 The Sunbeam stock Parent received had an "esti-
mated value of over $600 million."'1 89 "The transaction closed on March 30,
1998." 1090 Parent was subject to a "lockup" restriction in the agreement."'
Parent could only sell the Sunbeam stock in increments over time and could
not have sold all of it until 270 days after the transaction closed. 19 2 The
average per share price for Sunbeam from the time Sunbeam's deal with
Parent publicly disclosed was $48.26.1093 Parent had acquired 14.1 million
shares.' 94 Almost immediately after the closing, bad news about Sunbeam
began arriving.1°9  In April 1998, on poor sales reports, the stock price
dropped to $34 per share. 0 96 In June 1998, fraudulent bookkeeping was
alleged, and the stock fell to $18 per share. 197 Arthur Anderson, Sunbeam's
1080. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1208.
1081. Id.
1082. Id.
1083. Id. at 1209.
1084. Id. at 1210.
1085. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 463 F.3d at 1210.
1086. 955 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
1087. Id. at 1126.
1088. Id.
1089. Id.
1090. Id.
1091. Morgan Stanley & Co., 955 So. 2d at 1126.
1092. Id.
1093. Id. at 1127.
1094. Id.
1095. Id. at 1126.
1096. Morgan Stanley & Co., 955 So. 2d at 1126.
1097. Id.
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accountant, revoked its audit certificates for 1996 and 1997.1098 Parent was
unable to sell its Sunbeam stock even after the lockup because Arthur Ander-
son's actions had delayed having the stock registered for sale to the pub-
lic.' 099 Registration "could not be completed until late 1999." 1°" ° On Febru-
ary 6, 2001, Sunbeam went bankrupt and its shares became worthless. 10 '
Parent sued Morgan Stanley claiming that Morgan Stanley, Sunbeam's in-
vestment banker, helped Sunbeam carry out a "fraudulent scheme to inflate
the price of [Sunbeam] stock until after the merger."' 10 2 The trial court de-
nied Morgan Stanley's motion for a directed verdict, and the jury returned a
verdict against Morgan Stanley for conspiracy and fraud."0 3  The jury
awarded Parent $604,334,000 in compensatory damages and $850 million in
punitive damages."'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded "with di-
rections to enter judgment for Morgan Stanley. '105 The court observed that
"the flexibility theory of damages" is the law in Florida with respect to
fraud."0 6 This theory allows a trial "court to use either the 'out-of-pocket'
[rule] or the 'benefit-of-the-bargain' rule, depending [on] which is more like-
ly to fully compensate the injured party.""0 7 The trial court, at Parent's re-
quest, used the benefit-of-the-bargain rule. 11
08
Damages are then "measured by the difference between the value of the
property as represented and the actual value of the property on the date of the
transaction.""0 9 Determining actual value is essential to arriving at a dam-
ages amount."' 0 The court found that Parent's expert on damages failed to
opine on "the 'fraud-free' price of Sunbeam stock on the . . . closing"
date."".. This required "event study" or "event analysis" to consider the eco-
nomic effect each particular event might have had on the stock price, not just
the effect of the alleged fraud."' 2  This type of analysis was not con-
1098. Id.
1099. Id.
1100. Id.
1101. Morgan Stanley & Co., 955 So. 2d at 1127.
1102. Id. at 1125-26.
1103. Id. at 1126.
1104. Id. at 1127-28.
1105. Id. at 1133.
1106. Morgan Stanley & Co., 955 So. 2d at 1128 (internal quotations omitted).
1107. Id. (quoting Nordyne, Inc. v. Fla. Mobile Home Supply, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1283, 1286
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
1108. Id.
1109. Id.
1110. Id.
1111. MorganStanley& Co.,955 So. 2dat 1127.
1112. Id. at 1130.
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ducted. "3 Parent argued that the fraud-free value of the stock on the closing
date did not matter because it could not have sold any of the stock on that
day.i"'4 It also argued that it should be allowed to collect damages measured
by the decline in stock value from the closing date until it could first have
been resold after December 1999.1115 The court was not persuaded."' 6 "The
bargain, in this case, included sale restrictions."' 17 Absent proof of the
fraud-free value of Sunbeam on the transaction, the jury's damage award
could not be correct. 1118 Parent was not entitled to a new trial.'' 9 It had a
chance to prove correct damages and failed.".2  On the issue of punitive
damages, the court ruled that the verdict could not stand where "no legally
cognizable damage was shown as a result of the alleged fraud." 2'' . Judge
Shahood concurred without opinion." 22  Judge Farmer dissented with an
opinion. 2
C. Slander and False Light Invasion of Privacy
The next two cases, false light invasion of privacy cases, are pending in
the Supreme Court of Florida. "24 According to the renowned torts professor,
Dean William Prosser, a category of the invasion of privacy tort is "false
light. ' 125 False light is said to be different from defamation in that the ob-
jectionable false light in which a person is put by the tortfeasor "may be
based on a statement that is not defamatory."". 126 In this case, Mr. Anderson
complained of articles about him that appeared in the Pensacola News-
Journal between December 13, 1998, and July 12, 2000.1127 Mr. Anderson
1113. Id.
1114. Id. at 1128-29.
1115. Id. at 1129.
1116. Morgan Stanley & Co., 955 So. 2d at 1129.
1117. Id.
1118. Id. at 1131.
1119. Id.
1120. Id.
1121. MorganStanley&Co.,955 So. 2dat 1132.
1122. Id. at 1133 (Shahood, J., concurring).
1123. Id. (Farmer, J., dissenting).
1124. Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 944 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006), appeal
docketed, No. SC06-2491 (Fla. Dec. 20, 2006); Gannett Co. v. Anderson, 947 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006), appeal docketed, No. SC06-2174 (Fla. Nov. 11, 2006). Both cases
have been rescheduled for oral argument on March 6, 2008. Order at 2, Jews for Jesus, Inc. v.
Rapp, No. SC06-2491 (Fla. Sept. 26, 2007).
1125. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 4.
1126. Id.
1127. Id. at 2.
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admitted that the articles were factually correct but the December 14, 1998,
article was written so as to put him in the "false light" in that it "it falsely
implied that he had murdered his wife and gotten away with it.""128 His first
complaint, filed on March 21, 2001, brought an action "for libel and tortious
interference with a business relationship."' 29 Mr. Anderson amended his
complaint "to include a ... claim for invasion of privacy based on the false
light theory."" 3  Some of the articles, including the December 14, 1998,
article, were subject to the two-year defamation statute of limitations under
section 95.11 (4)(g) of the Florida Statutes."3' "The libel and tortious inter-
ference claims were voluntarily dismissed ... ... However, relying on
Heekin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc.,"33 Mr. Anderson argued that unlike defa-
mation, a false light invasion of privacy action was an unspecified tort that
was subject to the four-year statute of limitations found in section
95.11 (3)(p) of the Florida Statutes and would thus bring the 1998 article
back into the litigation.' '3' The trial court agreed, and the case went to the
jury on the invasion of privacy count only.' 3 The jury awarded Mr. Ander-
son $18,280,000 in compensatory damages." 36 The issue raised on appeal
by Gannett was whether the statute of limitations was two years or four
years."137 The First District Court of Appeal observed that thus far in Flor-
ida, only the Second District Court of Appeal in Heekin had recognized a
false light invasion of privacy action."38 The court concluded that the Su-
preme Court of Florida has not directly held that this tort is cognizable in
Florida. " 39 The court then conducted an extensive review of the law of other
states and pointed out that North Carolina refuses to recognize false light as a
tort."114  The court essentially found that defamation actions and false light
claims are virtually indistinguishable and therefore the false light claim
should be "subject to the two-year statute" of limitation.'4" The court was
1128. Id.at3.
1129. Id. 2.
1130. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 2.
1131. Id. at 4, 7; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(g) (2007). Section 95.11(4)(g) places a
two-year limitation to bring an action for libel or slander. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (4)(g).
1132. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 3.
1133. 789 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
1134. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 4 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(p) (2006)); see also Hee-
kin, 789 So. 2d at 358.
1135. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 3.
1136. Id. at 1.
1137. Id. at 3-4.
1138. Id. at 7.
1139. Id. at6.
1140. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 4-5.
1141. Id. at 7.
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also concerned with the ease with which a plaintiff could avoid the two year
statute of limitation simply by making a false light invasion of privacy
claim.. 42 Conflict with Heekin was acknowledged, and the First District
Court of Appeal certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida: "Is an action for invasion of privacy based on the false light theory
governed by the two-year statute of limitations that applies to defamation
claims or by the four-year statute that applies to unspecified tort claims?""'1 43
Judge Lewis concurred in the result only. 1'
About a month after Gannett was decided, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal issued its opinion in Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. 1145 Mrs. Rapp's
stepson, Bruce Rapp, was employed by Jews for Jesus.1146 In a Jews for Je-
sus newsletter published on the internet, Bruce claimed that Mrs. Rapp had
converted from Judaism to Christianity. 147 A relative of Mrs. Rapp saw the
newsletter and informed her of what it said."4 Mrs. Rapp sued Jews for
Jesus and after several amendments to her complaint, there remained counts
for false light invasion of privacy, defamation, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent train-
ing and supervision. 1149 The trial court dismissed the complaint on First
Amendment grounds."5  On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
upheld the dismissal of all counts except the false light invasion of privacy
claim and the negligent training and supervision claim.' 1' 1 The court said
that the lower court mistakenly applied the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 1 52 The First Amendment bars "'courts from resolving
internal church disputes [requiring application] of religious doctrine."""' It
does not apply to "'disputes between churches and third parties.' 1154
The court made fairly short work of Mrs. Rapp's defamation and emo-
tional distress claims.' 1 The newsletter was held not to be defamatory be-
cause it "was intended for group members who would have" taken the news
1142. Id. at 8.
1143. Id. at 11.
1144. Id. (Lewis, J., concurring).
1145. 944 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
1146. Id. at 462.
1147. Id.
1148. Id.
1149. Id. at 462-63.
1150. Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 462-63.
1151. Id. at 468-69.
1152. Id. at 464.
1153. Id.
1154. Id.
1155. Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 464-67.
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about Mrs. Rapp in a positive way, utilizing the "common mind" rule. 1156
The court looked at how the information would be viewed by those to whom
the ideas were intended to be conveyed. 15 7  The intentional infliction of
emotional distress did not rise to the level of atrociousness necessary to sus-
tain it. 1158 False light invasion of privacy was another story, Gannett having
been decided a month earlier. 1159 The court concluded that misrepresentation
of a person's religious beliefs fell squarely within the definition of the tort of
false light invasion of privacy."" It was not as clear, however, to the court
that the tort exists in Florida, even though the Supreme Court of Florida de-
cisions seem to imply that the tort of false light invasion of privacy is recog-
nized in Florida. 16' The court allowed that if it was "writing on a blank
slate" it would reject the cause of action."62 However, given the "toehold"
that the cause of action has in Florida, the court certified the question as one
of great public importance as follows: "Does Florida recognize the tort of
false light invasion of privacy, and if so, are the elements of the tort set forth
in section 652E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts?"'1 163
D. Tortious Interference with Business Relationships
In Walters v. Blankenship,"' the Walters owned four units in a condo-
minium. 1165 They offered to sell all four at an auction which was to be with-
out reserve. 1166 Each bidder was required to deposit $50,000 in order to par-
ticipate, and more than twenty bidders participated. 1167 "On the day of the
auction, the defendants" who were owners of other units in the condominium
put "'for sale by owner' signs in front of their" units in violation of condo-
1156. Id. at 465 (internal quotations omitted).
1157. Id. This was true even though the newsletter was disseminated on the internet and
persons other than the intended group saw the newsletter. Id. The court, having found no
case where the Supreme Court of Florida adopted comment e to section 559 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, declined to adopt the rule that a communication is defamatory if the
"plaintiff is prejudiced in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority of the commu-
nity." Id. at 465-66. The court noted that if comment e applied, "a court might well find that
the amended complaint stated a claim for defamation." Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 466.
1158. Id. at 466-67.
1159. Id. at 467-68.
1160. Id. at 468.
1161. Id.
1162. Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 468.
1163. Id.
1164. 931 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
1165. Id. at 138-39.
1166. Id. at 139.
1167. Id.
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minium rules. 1168 Immediately after the Walters' four units were sold at auc-
tion for an aggregate amount of more than $2 million, the defendants re-
moved the "for sale" signs. 1 169  The Waiters sued the defendants alleging
"tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy to commit [those
torts]."" 70 They sought combined total compensatory and punitive damages
totaling $6 million.17 ' The trial court dismissed the complaint with preju-
dice and the Walters appealed. 1172 The Fifth District Court of Appeal held
that the Walters did state a cause of action for tortious interference with pro-
spective economic advantage and civil conspiracy. 117' A cause of action for
tortious interference exists if the plaintiff alleges "1) the existence of a busi-
ness relationship; 2) the defendant's knowledge of the [business] relation-
ship; 3) the defendant's intentional and unjustified interference with the rela-
tionship; and 4) damages to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the rela-
tionship." ' 1 74 The court had no difficulty finding that the allegations fit the
cause of action.' 7 The court then set out the elements of civil conspiracy,
which could be based on tortious interference
or as an independent tort... a conspiracy between two or more
parties, to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by an unlawful
means, the doing of some overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy,
and damage to plaintiff as a result of the acts performed pursuant
to the conspiracy. "
76
Again, the court found the plaintiffs allegations sufficient to state this
cause of action. 1177 One of the defendant owners was alleged to have said to
another unit owner: "'you wait until the day of the sale and see what we are
going to do to Dick Walters.""'178 The majority opinion did not discuss the
plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 1179 Judge
1168. Id.
1169. Walters, 931 So. 2d at 139.
1170. Id.
1171. Id.
1172. Id. at 138.
1173. Id. at 139-40.
1174. Walters, 931 So. 2d at 139 (citing Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647
So. 2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1994)).
1175. Id.
1176. Id. at 140.
1177. Id.
1178. Id. at 139.
1179. See generally Walters, 931 So. 2dat 137.
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Torpy concurred specially with an opinion.l 8° Judge Lawson dissented with
an opinion:."8'
E. Negligent Hiring
Mr. Copeland went into an Albertson's store, "brandish[ed] a knife,
robbed a clerk, and fled."" 82  He was pursued by store employees who
caught him in a neighboring parking lot."83 Copeland claimed that the em-
ployees attacked and injured him. 18 The employees claimed that Copeland
"threatened them with his knife" and that they were only trying "to restrain
him and protect themselves."" 85 Copeland "was convicted of armed robbery
and aggravated assault.""8 6 He then sued the employees for assault and bat-
tery and Albertson's for negligent hiring and training of its employees.""
The defendants moved for summary judgment which was granted." 8 The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded." 89 Section 776.085
of the Florida Statutes provides a defense to a civil action for damages based
on personal injury if the injury happened to "a participant during the com-
mission or attempted commission of a forcible felony."' 90 The defendants
raised the statutory defense in the trial court, but they failed to plead it or to
include it in their motion for summary judgment. "9' "A defendant cannot
present evidence of a statutory defense unless" pleaded." 92 Rule 1.510 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure requires "substantial matters of law" be
included in the motion and the motion be served at least twenty days before
the hearing on it. "' The statutory defense was a substantial matter of
law.' "' The defendants argued that the summary judgment could be upheld
anyway, since it was right, albeit for the wrong reason.'"" The statute was a
1180. Id. at 141 (Torpy, J., concurring).
1181. Id. at 143 (Lawson, J., dissenting).
1182. Copeland v. Albertson's, Inc., 947 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
1183. Id.
1184. Id.
1185. Id.
1186. Id.
1187. Copeland, 947 So. 2d at 665.
1188. Id. at 665-66.
1189. Id. at 668.
1190. FLA. STAT. § 776.085(1) (2007).
1191. Copeland, 947 So. 2d at 666.
1192. Id.
1193. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.510(c).
1194. See Copeland, 947 So. 2d at 666.
1195. Id.
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total bar to Copeland's claim. "96 Copeland argued that the statute would not
apply because the forcible felony of which he was convicted occurred in the
store, and the actions about which he complained occurred outside of the
store after the felony had been committed. "97 Copeland raised a question of
fact concerning the applicability of the defense requiring reversal of the
summary judgment. "98
F. Vicarious Liability/Scope of Employment
In Huffinan v. Breezes Full Service Car Wash, 1199 Breezes was closed
one day on account of rain, and one of the owners took several of the em-
ployees went out to lunch. 2' Lackowski, a manager, was also there. 20'
Alchoholic beverages were consumed at lunch. 2 °2 After lunch, Lackowski
left in his car and collided with another automobile. 203 Melissa Jones, the
driver of the other car, was killed. 12' Her son, who was a passenger in her
car was injured.2 °5 The personal representatives of the estate of Melissa
Jones sued Breezes, among others, for wrongful death, "alleging that Breezes
was vicariously liable for negligent acts committed by" its employees.
206
Breezes moved for summary final judgment arguing "that it could not be
held vicariously liable for the alleged negligence" of its employees because
the facts showed that the employees had ceased acting in the scope of their
employment before the lunch. 1207 The trial court agreed and granted the mo-
tion for summary judgment. 1208 The appellate court, finding that "the trial
court improperly resolved disputed issues of fact," reversed the summary
judgment. 1209 The record did not resolve disputed issues of fact on the scope
of employment issue. 
2 1
1196. Id.
1197. Id. at 666-67.
1198. Id. at 667.
1199. 956 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
1200. Id.
1201. Id
1202. Id.
1203. Id.
1204. Huffinan, 956 So. 2d at 1204.
1205. Id.
1206. Id. at 1204-05. The managers, individually, and the restaurant were among the oth-
ers named as defendants. Id. at 1204.
1207. Id. at 1205.
1208. Huffman, 956 So. 2d at 1205.
1209. Id.
1210. Id.
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XIX. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND DEBTORICREDITOR RIGHTS
Substantial changes were made to Florida's version of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) that take effect on January 1, 2008.1211 An impor-
tant change is the clarification that the substantive rules of chapter 671 of the
Florida Statutes applies to all transactions governed by any chapter of the
UCC. 12 12 The UCC imposes "obligations of good faith, diligence, reason-
ableness, and care [on the parties]."' 1213 These obligations may not be waived
by contract. 1214 However, the parties may agree on a standard of perform-
ance that will be upheld unless it is "manifestly unreasonable"' 1215 The new
statute provides that if the UCC requires that an action be done within a rea-
sonable time, the parties may set the time by agreement, as long as it is not
"manifestly unreasonable." 1216
There are extensive amendments to the definitions contained in section
671.201 of the Florida Statutes.1217 In addition, the new section 671.209
contains detailed definitions of "notice" and "knowledge."' 1218 "[A] person
has notice of a fact if the person: a) [h]as actual knowledge of it; b) [h]as
received a notice or notification of it;" or c) has reason to know of the exis-
tence of a fact based on other facts and circumstances "known to the person
at the time."' 1219 Knowledge is the same as actual knowledge. 122' There are
numerous other aspects of notice that are addressed by this new section, in-
cluding when notice is considered provided and when notice is received or
considered to have been received. 1221
Notably, new section 671.211 of the Florida Statutes provides that "a
person gives value for rights" if the rights are acquired "[a]s security for, or
in ... satisfaction of, a preexisting claim; [b]y accepting delivery under a
preexisting contract; [i]n return for any consideration sufficient to support a
simple contract; or [i]n return for a binding commitment to extend credit or
1211. See generally Act effective Jan. 1, 2008, ch. 2007-134, §§ 4-31, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 1115, 1115-29 (West).
1212. Id. § 4, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1117 (amending FLA. STAT. § 671.101 (2007)).
1213. Id. § 5, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1117 (amending FLA. STAT. § 671.102(2)(b)
(2007)).
1214. Id.
1215. Id.
1216. Ch. 2007-134, § 5, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1117.
1217. See id. § 8, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1118-23 (amending FLA. STAT. § 671.201
(2007)).
1218. Id. § 15, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1124 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 671.209).
1219. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 671.209(1)(a)-(c)).
1220. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 671.209(2)).
1221. Ch. 2007-134, § 15, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1124 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
671.209(4)-(6)).
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for the extension of immediately available credit."'1222 There are exceptions
provided for those situations elsewhere in the UCC where value has a differ-
ent meaning, more specifically, with respect to negotiable instruments and
bank collections. 1
223
New section 671.212 of the Florida Statutes, dealing with electronic
signatures, provides that the UCC "modifies, limits, and supersedes the fed-
eral Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act," except
with respect to electronic delivery of certain notices. 1
224
There were substantial statutory revisions in 2007, effective July 1,
2007, with respect to a debtor's assignment of assets for the benefit of credi-
tors. 1225 The statute prohibits levy, execution, and attachment by a judgment
creditor, other than a consensual lienholder, against assets of the assignor
that are in the possession or control of the assignee. 1226 Consensual lienhold-
ers may enforce their rights in the collateral subject to the lien. 1227 A defini-
tion of consensual lienholder was added.1228 The definition of "assets" for
purposes of chapter 727 of the Florida Statutes was amended to include
"claims and causes of action," including tort claims. 1229 The statute also al-
lows the assignee to make a secondary assignment of claims. 1230 Under the
new statute, the assignee may operate the assignor's business for no more
than fourteen days without court authorization. 1231  To operate the business
for more than fourteen days, but less than forty-five days, court authorization
and notice to creditors may become necessary depending upon whether any
objections are made. 1232 After forty-five days, court authorization is required
if there is an objection to the assignee's "motion for authority to operate the
assignor's business."' 1233 The statute allows an assignee to reject an unex-
pired lease. 1234 Unlike the prior statute, a limitation on damages is provided
in the event the assignee rejects a lease or terminates employment con-
1222. Id. § 17, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 671.211).
1223. Id.
1224. Id. § 18, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 671.212).
1225. See generally Act effective July 1, 2007, ch. 2007-185, §§ 3-13, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 1314, 1315-24 (West).
1226. FLA. STAT. § 727.105 (2007).
1227. Id.
1228. Ch. 2007-185, § 3, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1316 (amending FLA. STAT. § 727.103
(2007)).
1229. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 727.103(1)).
1230. FLA. STAT. § 727.108(1)(a) (2007).
1231. Id. § 727.108(4).
1232. Id.
1233. Id.
1234. Id. § 727.108(5).
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tracts.1235 There are also new provisions with respect to objections to claims
and priority of claims, those sections having been rewritten. 1
236
Section 222.25 of the Florida Statutes increases to $4000-from
$1000-the amount of personal property that a person can exempt from the
claims of creditors, provided the person does not receive the benefit of the
homestead exemption under article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitu-
tion.1237 If the person does have a homestead exemption, then the personal
property exemption is $1000, as provided in the Florida Constitution. 1238
XX. WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, AND SPOUSAL RIGHTS
A. Marital Agreements
Florida enacted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, effective Octo-
ber 1, 2007, with prospective effect. 123 9 The statute does not affect agree-
ments made under sections 732.701 and 732.702 of the Florida Probate
Code.'2" The new statute sets forth both a nonexclusive list of subjects that
may be covered by the agreement, such as property rights, spousal support,
life insurance, choice of law, and grounds for invalidation. 1241  Premarital
agreements must be in writing and signed by the parties, as must amend-
ments and revocations. 1
242
B. Dissolution of Marriage
In Haley v. Haley,1243 the Fifth District Court of Appeal was asked to
decide if capital loss carry forwards, resulting from non-marital property,
belong to the property-owning spouse or constitute marital property. 24 John
and Myra divorced. 1245 Myra had brought to the marriage, as non-marital
property, an interest in Igo Family Partnership (Igo), a partnership formed by
1235. FLA. STAT. § 727.112(6)-(7).
1236. Id. §§ 727.113-.114.
1237. Id. § 222.25(4). The personal property exemption does not apply to claims for spous-
al or child support. Id.
1238. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(2).
1239. Act effective Oct. 1, 2007, ch. 2007-171, §§ 1-3, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1244,
1244-45 (West) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.079 (2007)).
1240. FLA. STAT. § 61.079(10) (2007).
1241. Id. § 61.079(4), (7)-(8).
1242. Id. § 61.079(3), (6).
1243. 936 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
1244. See id. at 1137-38.
1245. Id. at 1137.
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Myra's parents before Myra's marriage. 1246 "It was undisputed [that] John
had no interest in Igo ... , 1247 The Igo passed through capital losses to Myra
during the marriage, resulting in capital loss carry forwards. 12 48 The issue
was whether the capital loss carry forwards that could offset capital gains in
later tax years were marital assets subject to equitable distribution between
John and Myra. 249 The trial court determined that the capital loss carry for-
wards were owned by John and Myra as tenants in common after the dissolu-
tion of marriage.1250 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed.251 The
court decided as an issue of first impression in Florida that capital loss carry
forwards resulting from non-marital property belong to the property-owning
spouse, that is, the carry forwards are not marital property.1252 The court also
cited section 1.1212-1 of the Treasury Regulations in support of its deci-
sion. 1253
In Wamsley v. Wamsley, 154 the Second District Court of Appeal held
that it was proper for a husband to have excluded his distributive share of S
corporation net income from his financial affidavits."255 The Second District
Court of Appeal, relying on the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Zold
v. Zold,1256 held that the trial court did not err in excluding undistributed
pass-through income from the husband's gross income. 1257  Zold "set the
standard for determining" if S corporation distributions are gross income
under chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes. 1251 Under Zold, the burden is on the
shareholder-spouse to show that the S corporation income was properly re-
tained for business purposes, rather than "to avoid alimony, child support or
attorney's fees obligations."' 1259 Factors to be considered include the amount
of control the shareholder has over the income, any statutory restrictions that
would preclude distribution by the corporation, and any other reasons why
the income is being "retained by the corporation." 126° Husband, the chief
executive officer and majority shareholder of an S corporation, explained
1246. Id.
1247. Id.
1248. See Haley, 936 So. 2d at 1137-38.
1249. Id. at 1137.
1250. Id. at 1138
1251. Id. at 1140.
1252. Id. at 1139-40.
1253. Haley, 936 So. 2d at 1139 n.3; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1212-1 (as amended in 1980).
1254. 957 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
1255. Id. at 91.
1256. 911 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2005).
1257. Wamsley, 957 So. 2d at 91.
1258. Id.
1259. Id.
1260. Id.
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that there were business reasons why the income could not be distributed to
him. 126' The wife failed to rebut husband's evidence as to the corporation's
need to retain the income for its corporate needs, and she failed to present
evidence that husband caused the corporation to withhold distributions in
order to avoid his obligations in connection with the divorce. 12 62 The court
held that Zold applied although it was decided after the Wamsley hearing in
the trial court, since the facts demonstrated that the trial court could reasona-
bly have reached the conclusion that the corporation was statutorily required
to retain the income to meet its debts. 1
263
C. Wills, Trusts, and Elective Share
The Second District Court of Appeal in Trenchard v. Estate of Gray,121
relying on Dempsey v. Dempsey,1265 held that the trial court's order determin-
ing that the decedent's interest in jointly held property was part of the elec-
tive estate was not a final, appealable order. 2 ' The surviving joint tenant,
claimed ownership of the property, and appealed the trial court's order."267
Issues regarding ownership, amount of elective share, and contribution had
not been determined. 1268 Thus, the order was a non-final, non-appealable
order. 1269
The Second District Court of Appeal noted that the trial court had also
entered an order allowing the surviving spouse to file a lis pendens.
127
However, the appellant did not appeal that order. 1
271
D. Homestead
Mrs. Cutler died, survived by a son and a daughter. 1272 She was not sur-
vived by a spouse. 1273 Not long before she died, at a time when she was un-
1261. See id.at 91-92.
1262. Wamsley, 957 So. 2d at 92.
1263. Id. at 91-92 (citing FLA. STAT. § 607.06401(3)(a) (2005)).
1264. 950 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
1265. 899 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that an order determining
entitlement to elective share, which is a non-final and non-appealable order as judicial labor
on issues involved, is not terminated).
1266. Trenchard, 950 So. 2d at 1278.
1267. Id.
1268. Id.
1269. Id.
1270. Id.
1271. Trenchard, 950 So. 2d at 1278.
1272. Cutler v. Cutler, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D583 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2007).
1273. Id.
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married, she created the Cutler Irrevocable Land Trust naming herself and
her two children as co-trustees. 274 She deeded two parcels of real estate to
the trust.1275 The first parcel was her residence, in which she retained a life
estate. 1276 The second parcel was a vacant lot adjacent to her residence. 1277
The trust agreement provided that all assets remaining in the trust when Mrs.
Cutler died were to be distributed to her estate. 1278 Under the will, she spe-
cifically devised her residence to her daughter and the vacant lot to her
son. 1279 The provision in the will that dealt with debts, administration ex-
penses, and tax apportionment directed payment of these items from Mrs.
Cutler's residuary estate. 1280 To the extent that the residuary was insuffi-
cient, then these items were to be charged in equal shares to the daughter's
and son's devises. 1281' Naturally, there was a shortfall, and the son argued
that both devises were required by the terms of the will to abate equally. 1
282
The daughter's position was that her devise was of homestead property and
was constitutionally protected from abatement. 1283  The trial court agreed
with the daughter, and the son appealed. 1284 Referring to Snyder v. Davis, 1
285
the Third District Court of Appeal reviewed the facts in evidence to deter-
mine if the real property was "protected homestead" exempt from forced sale
for payment of creditor's claims after Mrs. Cutler died. 1286 It was the daugh-
ter's burden to prove: 1) the property was devised to her; 2) she is an heir
within the meaning of the article X, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution;
and 3) when Mrs. Cutler died, the real estate was Mrs. Cutler's home-
stead. 1287 The court ruled that the daughter had proved each element. 128 8 The
son argued that to be protected homestead, the real property had to have been
owned by a natural person and here it was held in an irrevocable trust. 1
289
The court dismissed this argument by noting that Mrs. Cutler's life estate
was a property interest eligible for homestead status-at least from the
1274. Id.
1275. Id.
1276. Id.
1277. Cutler, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D583.
1278. Id.
1279. Id.
1280. See id. at D584.
1281. Id.
1282. Cutler, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D584.
1283. Id.
1284. Id. at D583.
1285. 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997).
1286. Cutler, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D584.
1287. Id.
1288. Id. atD586.
1289. Id. at D585.
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standpoint of forced sale and the homestead real estate tax exemption-
because she had resided on the property for many years, and thus was an
"owner" of her residence for purposes of making a devise of protected home-
stead. 1290 The court also noted that other courts had ruled that real estate held
in trusts, albeit revocable trusts, 1291 could retain its character as home-
stead. 1292 The Third District Court of Appeal saw no reason why this should
be otherwise for real estate held in irrevocable trusts. 1293 Judge Schwartz
dissented. 12
94
1290. Id.
1291. Cutler, 32 Fla. L. Weekly at D585.
1292. Id.
1293. Id.
1294. Id. at D586 (Schwartz, J., dissenting). With respect to another context where home-
stead issues have arisen, there are now contrary decisions between the District Courts of Ap-
peal as to whether or not a cooperative apartment is homestead for purposes of article X, sec-
tion 4(c) of the Florida Constitution and section 732.4015 of the Florida Probate Code. See
Phillips v. Hirshon, 958 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that a coopera-
tive apartment is not homestead for purposes of devise and descent). The Third District Court
of Appeal certified, conflicting with the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Southern
Walls, Inc. v. Stilwell Corp., because of the different results that may be reached in the various
contexts in which the determination of homestead is relevant. Compare Southern Walls, Inc.
v. Stilwell Corp., 810 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002), with Phillips, 958 So. 2d at
430.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This legal note describes the circumstances leading up to the recent de-
cisions of the Third District Court of Appeal, in Florida Department of
Revenue v. Leon' and Florida Department of Revenue v. Bridger (Bridger
I),2 and their implications for Florida taxpayers. This note contains argu-
* James F. McAuley currently holds the position of Chief Counsel in the Office of
Financial Regulation. He has previously held positions with the Florida Office of the Attor-
ney General as Chief Assistant Attorney General and Senior Assistant Attorney General. He
is also a former Assistant General Counsel for the Florida Department of Revenue. He is an
honors graduate of Nova University Law School. The author would like to express gratitude
to his wife, Lisa Raleigh, a former law review editor at Florida State University College of
Law and current Special Counsel for the Office of the Attorney General, for her critique of
this article. He would also like to thank the Nova Law Review Editorial staff for their time
and dedication to this article. This note is a greatly expanded version of a column previously
published in the March 2007 issue of the Florida Bar Journal entitled Getting Back Your Fair
Share: Seeking Refunds of Unconstitutional Taxes and Fees. While this note is not a re-
publication of the same article, the author would like to acknowledge permission of the Flor-
ida Bar Journal to re-publish that article to the extent this note presents a common theme or
argument.
1. 824 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
2. 935 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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ments that limitations found in Florida statutory "non-claim" provisions 3
should not be applied to run from the time of payment of an unconstitutional
tax or fee, but rather, from the time the statute is first declared unconstitu-
tional.
II. CONNECTING THE DOTS
"On October 14, 1988, [Mark] Herre was stopped by Monroe County
sheriffs deputies after they received an anonymous tip that someone was
transporting illegal drugs in a car fitting the description of the car Herre was
driving."4 The deputies thereafter proceeded to search "Herre's vehicle and
found 300 pounds of marijuana in the trunk."5 Unfortunately for Mr. Herre,
one year earlier, in 1987, the legislature enacted a sales tax on illegal narcot-
ics. 6 On November 17, 1988, the Department of Revenue, acting under Flor-
ida sales and use tax statutes, "sent Herre a notice of tax assessment and jeo-
pardy findings." 7 Approximately eighteen years later, on June 7, 2006, the
Third District Court of Appeal entered its decision in Bridger P.8
Bridger I arose as a class action regarding the collection of tax under
section 212.0505 of the Florida Statutes, concerning the very same statute
under which Herre was prosecuted.9 These two points in time are directly
connected because the Bridger I decision represents the latter of the twin
class actions, the earlier being Florida Department of Revenue v. Leon.'0
The decisions discussed in this note represent but the latest chapters in a sto-
ry of protracted litigation concerning maintenance of a class action against
the State of Florida for unconstitutionally imposed taxes or fees. The latter
of these two Third District class actions, decided in 2006, ended in 2007 with
denial of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court of Florida."
3. See FLA. STAT. § 215.26 (2007).
4. Herre v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue (Herre I), 617 So. 2d 390, 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
5. Id.
6. FLA. STAT. § 212.0505 (1987).
7. HerreI, 617 So. 2d at 390.
8. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Bridger (Bridger 1), 935 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
9. Id. at 537.
10. See id.; see also Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Leon, 824 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
11. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Bridger (Bridger I), 952 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2007).
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III. LOOKING BACK TO HERRE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FLORIDA TAX LAW
The decisions in Bridger II and Leon are directly connected to Mr.
Herre by the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Florida Depart-
ment of Revenue v. Herre (Herre I). 2 Both of these class actions arose after
the Court's 1994 decision, affirming Herre 1,1" declaring unconstitutional a
1987 Florida tax statute which imposed Florida sales and use tax on transac-
tions involving illegal substances.' 4 The statute imposed taxes on various
forms of illegal narcotics trade and fundamentally had the noble, if some-
what misguided goal, of restricting the flow of illegal drugs via heavy taxa-
tion and statutory penalties.' 5 This statute also imposed significant penalties
and mandated disclosures to law enforcement.'6
Unlike the recent class actions, the Herre I case presented the appeal of
a single individual from a Department of Revenue final administrative order
which reached the Third District without resolution of the constitutional
questions presented.'7 The Third District reversed the final order, conclud-
ing that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion prohibited the sanctions imposed under the tax statute.'8 In so doing,
not only did the Third District take a clear and bold step of declaring the
statute unconstitutional, but it certified conflict with a prior First District
opinion that upheld a Revenue assessment under the same statute by reject-
ing a challenge on common grounds."' As is always the case in tax cases,
and usually the case of life in general, the devil, as they say, is in the details.
One very important detail, which turned out to be of constitutional dimension
for Mr. Herre and the State of Florida, was that chapter 212 of the Florida
Statutes not only mandated payment of tax, but also required each "taxpayer"
to disclose information concerning the sources of the transaction upon which
12. 617 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
13. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Herre (Herre II), 634 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1994).
14. See id. at 618. "Every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in this
state in the unlawful sale, use, consumption, distribution, manufacture, derivation, production,
transportation, or storage of any medicinal drug, as defined in chapter 465, cannabis, as de-
fined in [section] 893.02, or controlled substance enumerated in [section] 893.03." Id.
15. Id. "For the exercise of such privilege, a tax is levied on each taxable transaction or
incident, including each occasional or isolated unlawful sale, use, consumption, distribution,
manufacture, derivation, production, transportation, or storage. . . ." Id.
16. Under subsection 212.12(2) of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Legislature imposed a
penalty for failing to file a return and an additional 100 percent of the tax due penalty for
willful intent to evade payment of the tax. FLA. STAT. § 212.12(2) (1993).
17. Herrel, 617 So. 2dat392.
18. Id.
19. Harris v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue (Harris 1), 563 So. 2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990).
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the tax was paid by the filing of a return.2" While this mechanism represents
a mundane necessity for collection of most excise tax transactions, it proved
anything but mundane to a person engaging in the "privilege" of illegal nar-
cotics trafficking within the state. 2' Because of this mechanism and related
penalty provisions, the Supreme Court of Florida relied on Marchetti v. Unit-
ed States22 in accepting Mr. Herre's arguments. 23 The Court reached the
conclusion that Mr. Herre's position under Florida law was indeed indistin-
guishable from the United States Supreme Court decision in Marchetti, with
respect to the violation of Mr. Herre's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
2 4
IV. ENTER NEWSWEEK, VICTOR CHEMICAL, AND KUHNLEIN
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Florida declared unconstitutional a statu-
tory scheme that imposed a sales tax on magazines, but not on newspapers.25
Relying on this ruling, Newsweek magazine sought a tax refund of sales tax
paid to Florida claiming that it had been compelled to pay taxes pursuant to
the unconstitutional statutory scheme.26 The Florida trial and appellate
courts rejected the magazine's request by granting summary judgment to the
state on procedural grounds, 27 notwithstanding earlier United States Supreme
Court precedent in McKesson Corp. v. Florida Department of Business Reg-
ulation.28 The Florida courts did so by reasoning that, unlike the circum-
stances in McKesson, a remedy existed to dispute the tax prior to payment.29
The appellate opinion relied squarely on reasoning which has its parallel in
20. FLA. STAT. § 212.12(2)(a) (1993). Subsection 212.12(2) stated in part: "[w]hen any
person ... required ... to make any return or to pay any tax ... imposed by this chapter fails
to timely file such return or fails to pay the tax ... due within the time required hereunder,...
a specific penalty shall be added." Id. This provision was identified by the court in Herre II
as imposing a requirement which created Fifth Amendment implications. Fla. Dep't of Reve-
nue v. Herre (Herrel), 634 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1994).
21. See Herre II, 634 So. 2d at 620-21.
22. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
23. See id. at 61.
24. Herre II, 634 So. 2d at 620-21.
25. Dep't of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of Am., Inc., 565 So. 2d 1304, 1310 (Fla.
1990).
26. Newsweek, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (Newsweek 1), 689 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
27. Id. at 364.
28. 496 U.S. 18, 22 (1990).
29. Newsweek I, 689 So. 2d at 363.
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the Leon and Bridger I opinions.3" In Leon and Bridger I, the view was
taken that persons who paid the unconstitutional tax, found in section
212.0505 of the Florida Statutes, but failed to timely challenge the statue-
meaning within three years of payment-lost those rights. 3' The Florida
appellate opinion in Newsweek I stated:
In the present case, the taxpayer could have availed itself of a
predeprivation remedy under section 72.011, Florida Statutes
(1987). Newsweek had the option of filing suit in circuit court to
contest the legality of this tax and paying the amount of the con-
tested tax into the registry of the court.
32
Ultimately, this position was rejected by the United States Supreme
Court in Newsweek, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue (Newsweek I), 33
when the case reached it based upon certiorari jurisdiction.34 As will be dis-
cussed in more detail below, the Newsweek II Court observed, inter alia, that
the case arrived before the Court in the context of the underlying taxing stat-
ute having been declared invalid on constitutional grounds.35 In this context,
it ruled that procedural due process required access to a post-petition refund
provision under Florida law.36 In so doing, the Court observed that under
Florida law, there has been "a longstanding practice of permitting taxpayers
to seek refunds under [section] 215.26 for taxes paid under an unconstitu-
tional statute., 37 The practice of providing redress for an unconstitutional
taxing was followed in Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein.38 In the Kuh-
nlien decision, Florida residents challenged the constitutionality of an impact
fee imposed on cars purchased out-of-state but later brought into Florida.39
The Supreme Court of Florida declared this statute to be facially unconstitu-
30. See id.; see also Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Bridger (Bridger 1), 935 So. 2d 536, 539
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Leon, 824 So. 2d 197, 200-01 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
31. See Bridger I, 935 So. 2d at 539; Leon, 824 So. 2d at 200-01.
32. Newsweek I, 689 So. 2d at 363.
33. 522 U.S. 442 (1998).
34. Id. at 445.
35. Id. at 442.
36. See id. at 445.
37. Id. at 444 (citing State ex rel. Hardaway Contracting Co., v. Lee, 21 So. 2d 211 (Fla.
1945)).
38. 646 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1994).
39. Id. at 719; see also FLA. STAT. § 319.231 (1991).
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tional as a violation of the Commerce Clause.40 The Kuhnlein decision re-
jected the State's argument that a class action was an inappropriate mecha-
nism to deal with tax refunds, and that class members could not seek a refund
of a vehicle impact fee because they failed to comply with the requirements
in section 215.26.41 Despite the failure of the class members to apply for a
refund from the Comptroller, as mandated by the statute, the Supreme Court
of Florida concluded that the class action for a refund could proceed.42
Given the history of the Florida "non-claim" statute, as discussed fur-
ther below, it is not surprising that the Kuhnlein ruling by the Supreme Court
of Florida sparked controversy and uncertainty in the district courts about the
limits of its application. Florida's jurisprudence had previously established
that "[a] refund is a matter of grace and if the statute of non-claim is not
complied with, the statute becomes an effective bar in law and in equity."4 3
This often repeated, unequivocal language was derived, not only through the
establishment of time-tested jurisprudence, but also by successive re-
enactments of section 215.26 by the Florida Legislature over several dec-
ades. Notwithstanding the weight of this legislative and jurisprudential
background, the Kuhnlein court seemed to eliminate the need to file a refund
application with the State of Florida when a law was declared facially uncon-
stitutional." However, this reading of the Kuhnlein decision seemed to cre-
ate an exception to the jurisprudence previously established by State ex rel.
Victor Chemical Works v. Gay45 and other Florida decisions; in fact, the Su-
preme Court of Florida acknowledged this shift in its later decision in De-
partment of Revenue v. Nemeth (Nemeth 11).46
40. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d at 726. Section 319.231, Florida Statutes (1991), imposed a
$295.00 impact fee upon the titling of a motor vehicle in Florida. Act effective July 1, 1991,
ch. 91-82, § 9, 1991 Fla. Laws 619, 622.
41. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d at 720.
42. Id.
43. Reynolds Fasteners, Inc. v. Wright, 197 So. 2d 295, 297 (Fla. 1967); State ex rel.
Victor Chem. Works v. Gay, 74 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 1954); see also State ex rel. Butler's Inc.
v. Gay (Gay 11), 29 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 1947); State ex rel. Butler's, Inc. v. Gay (Gay 1), 27
So. 2d 907, 908 (Fla. 1946); N. Miami v. Seaway Corp., 9 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 1942); City of
Orlando v. Gill, 174 So. 224, 226 (Fla. 1937).
44. See Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d at 725.
45. 74 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1954).
46. 733 So. 2d 970, 973 (Fla. 1999).
[Vol. 32
129
: Nova Law Review 32, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
TWIN CASES OF A TAXING SORT
V. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA REAFFIRMS ITS 1954 DECISION:
VICTOR CHEMICAL WORKS IN NEMETH H
In Nemeth II, the Supreme Court of Florida returned to the issues raised
in Kuhnlein, after conflict arose in district opinions, when it answered the
Fourth District's certified question concerning the remaining validity of Vic-
tor Chemical Works.4 7 Following an initial ruling by the circuit court relying
on Victor Chemical Works in favor of the State, the Fourth District reversed,
relying on Kuhnlein, by ruling that the Nemeths, the named plaintiffs, need
not satisfy the requirements of section 215.26 of the Florida Statutes because
it determined the statute was facially unconstitutional and read the Kuhnlein
case to eliminate the "non-claim" statutory requirements of section 215.26.48
The Fourth District nonetheless certified the case to the Supreme Court of
Florida as being in conflict with a Third District decision.49 The Supreme
Court of Florida subsequently clarified that it intended to honor the statutory
"non-claim" limitations on the right to redress-regardless of the existence
of facially unconstitutional taxation-by breathing life back into its Victor
Chemical Works decision, post Kuhnlein.5 ° In so doing, the Court over-
turned the Fourth District's 1997 decision in Nemeth L5
The First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal seem to have read Kuh-
nlein to eliminate the need for taxpayers to comply with the provisions of
Florida Statutes section 215.26 in the narrow context of a facially unconsti-
tutional statute. 52 But this ultimately did not prove to be the case as the Su-
preme Court of Florida relied upon its precedent in Victor Chemical Works
and its reading of the McKesson decision from the United States Supreme
Court, and restricted the right to a refund to those who paid the tax and filed
an action for refund within three years.53 This limitation was imposed by
requiring compliance with section 215.26.
Moreover, Nemeth H did not abandon the earlier decision in Kuhnlein,
but rather distinguished it in part and followed the earlier ruling in part by
reaffirming Kuhnlein's elimination of the need to pursue administrative re-
47. Id. at 971.
48. Nemeth v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue (Nemeth 1), 686 So. 2d 778, 780 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
49. Id.
50. Nemeth 1, 733 So. 2d at 973.
51. Id. at 975.
52. See Nemeth I, 686 So. 2d at 779-80; Pub. Med. Assistance Trust Fund v. Hameroff,
689 So. 2d 358, 359 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
53. Nemeth II, 733 So. 2d at 973-75.
54. Id. at 974.
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medies before seeking redress in court.'5 At the same time, this rule was
restricted to those circumstances when the sole issue contested was whether
the tax statute was facially unconstitutional.56 Later cases, such as the First
District's decision in Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v.
Sarnoff,57 although not relevant here, further explicated this distinction. 8
For various reasons, including principles of exhaustion of remedies-outside
the context of constitutional issues-and judicial economy, this limitation
made sense. This exception has been referred to as the "direct-file" rule be-
cause of the elimination of administrative compliance with Florida Statutes
section 215.26(2).' 9 In Nemeth II, the Supreme Court of Florida also harmo-
nized its many prior decisions regarding the exhaustion of remedies with the
futility of such a procedure by saying: "We recognize that the Comptroller
cannot declare a tax unconstitutional, and thus, when the claim is solely that
the refund is required because the tax is unconstitutional, to file the claim
with the Comptroller would be a futile act."'6
VI. LEON AND BRIDGER I AND THEIR CLAIMS TO MCKESSON FOLLOWING
NEMETH 11
Elimination of administrative remedies is all well and good under such
circumstances as found in both Kuhnlein and Nemeth II, but the elimination
of administrative procedures did little to alleviate the sting of the State's ex-
traction of tax monies based upon a facially unconstitutional statute as found
in the Bridger, Leon, and Nemeth cases.6 Kuhnlein addressed this problem
by requiring backward-looking relief.62 Nemeth II did not deny such relief,
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 776 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
58. Id. at 978-79.
59. Id. at 978. In deciding Nemeth II, the Supreme Court of Florida returned to early
precedent in Reynolds Fasteners, Inc. v. Wright. Nemeth II, 733 So. 2d at 974 n.8 (citing
Reynolds Fasteners, Inc. v. Wright, 197 So. 2d 295, 298 (Fla. 1967)). The Reynolds Fasten-
ers, Inc., case is interesting because it was decided based upon a general statute of limitations
(chapter 95) rather than a specific statute of non-claim---such as Florida Statutes section
215.26. Reynolds Fasteners, Inc., 197 So. 2d at 296.
60, Nemeth II, 733 So. 2d at 974. It is well established that a challenge to the facial
constitutionality of a statute cannot be resolved by an administrative agency. Key Haven
Associated Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 427 So. 2d
153, 157 (Fla. 1982).
61. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Bridger (Bridger 1), 935 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2006); Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Leon, 824 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2002); Nemeth II, 733 So. 2d at 972.
62. Dep't of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 726 (Fla. 1994).
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but narrowed the availability of it by subjecting the class members to com-
pliance with the refund statute.63 Nemeth II eliminated administrative com-
pliance with the refund process administered by the Department of Revenue,
but it did nothing to eliminate the need to take legal action, once payment
occurred, under the penalty of a ticking legal clock.' 4 Unfortunately, elimi-
nation of compliance with administrative remedies proved to be a distinc-
tion-without a difference-because it did not help by redressing constitu-
tional injury through backward-looking relief.65
This decision separated Nemeth from Kuhnlein but resolved the conflict
because certain Florida district courts read Kuhnlein to stand without excep-
tion-albeit limited to a facially unconstitutional statute-for the legal max-
im: "[N]either the common law nor a state statute can supersede a provision
of the federal or state constitutions."66 Ultimately, this maxim was the basis
upon which Kuhnlein was grounded.67 However, in Nemeth II, as discussed
earlier, the Court reaffirmed that the legislature, through enactment of Flor-
ida Statutes section 215.26, limited a taxpayer's right to obtain a refund, in-
cluding redress from an unconstitutional statute.68 At the end of the day, the
reaffirmation of the validity of Victor Chemical Works means that the Florida
Legislature has the right to establish limitations on redress from unconstitu-
tional taxation-whether the "non-claim" period is decided to be one year or
three years.69 This interpretation eliminated the Nemeths from class repre-
sentative status in the case of the automobile fee,7" and ultimately, directed
the outcome of the Leon and Bridger decisions by limiting class participation
in their circumstances as well.7 '
VII. LEON AND BRIDGER SEEK REDRESS RELYING UPON MCKESSON?
In Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund v. Hameroff the First Dis-
trict read the Kuhnlein decision, what appeared to be at face value, as reject-
ing a belated invitation of the Department of Revenue to tie refunds in com-
63. Nemeth II, 733 So. 2d at 974.
64. Id.
65. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d at 726.
66. Id. at 721.
67. Id. at 725-26.
68. Nemeth II, 733 So. 2d at 974.
69. Id. at 973-74.
70. See id.
71. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Bridger (Bridger I), 935 So. 2d 536, 539 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2006); Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Leon, 824 So. 2d 197, 202 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
72. 689 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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pliance with Florida Statutes section 215.26, regardless of the basis for the
claim. 73 The First District made the observation that
[s]overeign immunity does not exempt the State from a challenge
based on violation of the federal or state constitutions, because any
other rule self-evidently would make constitutional law subservi-
ent to the State's will. Moreover, neither the common law nor a
state statute can supercede a provision of the federal or state con-
stitutions.74
This observation was set forth because of the contrast between this
viewpoint and the results in Nemeth I, Leon, and Bridger L As reported in
the Third District opinion in Leon, on February 8, 1990, while the criminal
charges were pending against Ana Leon,
the Department served Leon with its form "Notice of Assessment
and Jeopardy Findings," alleging that she owed $45,798.75 in tax-
es and penalties, pursuant to section 212.0505. On March 21,
1991, the Department issued a revised Notice, lowering the
amount due to $10,502.28. With her criminal case still pending,
Leon paid the assessment.75
Likewise, another member of the Leon class, Richard Munson,
received the same form "Notice" in May 1989, seeking $24,750 in
taxes and penalties. Munson, unlike Leon, filed a timely adminis-
trative challenge to the assessment, but his appeal was denied.
Due to his cooperation with state law enforcement authorities,
however, the Department agreed to reduce the assessment to
$7,500, which Munson paid.
These facts are recited, not as a mere recitation of the mundane facts of this
case, but instead, because payments of these tax assessments became impor-
tant, post Nemeth, due to the circumstances which surrounded the pay-
ments-how the amount of payment was established and finally paid. In the
scenarios in this case, unlike in Nemeth or Victor Chemical,' the payments
were made following a "Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings. 77
The Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings was important because in
73. See id. at 359.
74. Id.
75. Leon, 824 So. 2d at 200.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Leon, the court made the following important observations about these jeop-
ardy findings.
The appellees in this case are the plaintiff class members in the
circuit court, constituting the 815 taxpayers who, between 1986
and 1994, were identified by the Department as accused drug traf-
fickers and served with jeopardy tax assessments under section
212.0505. The class members were notified that their assets
would be frozen or seized if the tax and penalties were not imme-
diately paid.
78
Thus, the court in Leon acknowledged the existence of a classic case of
state imposed duress in the extraction of the tax payments. 79 The existence
of this duress, in the extraction of an unconstitutional tax via jeopardy find-
ings, represents distinguishing circumstances from the circumstances of Ne-
meth and Victor Chemical. As discussed above, under Florida law found in
Victor Chemical and reaffirmed in Nemeth II, the right to seek a refund of
taxes and fees alike, even when paid pursuant to an unconstitutional statute,
accrued upon payment and was limited to three years from the date of pay-
ment by legislative fiat.8° In Leon and Bridger, the class plaintiffs argued
due process, as found in McKesson, required that section 215.26 of the Flor-
ida Statutes should be read to allow access to a statutory remedy via the re-
fund provisions of Florida law. 8 In Leon, the Third District reversed the
trial court, granting final summary judgment to the named taxpayers, Leon
and Munson, because they had paid taxes under their Notice of Assessment
and Jeopardy Findings, more than three years before the Supreme Court of
Florida's ruling in Herre 11.82 The direct result of the Third District's appli-
cation of the Nemeth I1 precedent to the facts before the court in Leon, and
subsequently in Bridger I, eliminated the right to a refund with respect to the
original class representatives. 83  As reported in Leon, the class representa-
tives argued that the right to a refund should not have accrued until the Su-
preme Court of Florida acted to declare the statute unconstitutional in Herre
78. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
79. See generally id. at 198-202.
80. See Dep't of Revenue v. Nemeth (Nemeth 11), 733 So. 2d 970, 974 (Fla. 1999) (citing
FLA. STAT. § 215.26(2) (1999)); State ex rel. Victor Chem. Works v. Gay, 74 So. 2d 560, 565
(Fla. 1954) (citing FLA. STAT. § 215.26(2) (1954)).
81. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Bridger (Bridger 1), 935 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); Leon, 824 So. 2d at 201; see also McKesson Corp. v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 496
U.S. 18, 24 (1990).
82. Leon, 824 So. 2d at 200, 202; see also Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Herre (Herre I1), 634
So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1994).
83. BridgerI, 935 So. 2d at 539; Leon, 824 So. 2d at 202.
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11.84 The focus of this argument, discussed separately below, depends on an
examination of the McKesson decision, but because of Nemeth II, the court
did not have the authority to approve such a result even if it so desired.85
In Bridger I, the court observed that the decisions of the court in Leon,
its sister case, fell within "the law of the case" doctrine.86 The Bridger I
opinion both rejected and seemed to chastise attempts to reargue the issues
decided in Leon, following from the law of the case doctrine.87 The Bridger
I decision, concerning the law of the case, held in favor of a class action that
consisted of taxpayers who fell within a specified range.88 That range, incor-
rectly decided by the trial court, represented all taxpayers who paid tax under
the unconstitutional statute "within the preceding three-year period of when
this action was originally filed (after January 16, 1993). ,89
VIII. INQUIRING WHETHER LEON AND BRIDGER'S CLAIM TO MCKESSON
HAS MERIT
The opinion in Leon reflects the fact that the Third District reluctantly,
but given the precedent, correctly disagreed with the Leon class' arguments,
based upon the controlling precedent of Nemeth 9° Given this history, the
key to the Leon opinion, beyond the obvious observation by the court of the
existing Nemeth I precedent, was the rejection of the argument that under
McKesson the state had not provided adequate post-petition relief.91 Clearly,
this argument was not one which the Third District had the luxury of indulg-
ing, given the Nemeth I precedent. Moreover, in Bridger I, the Supreme
Court of Florida did not accept jurisdiction to speak again on its Nemeth I
decision. 92 Nevertheless, questions remain outside of the context of strict
legal precedent within Florida jurisprudence.
Discussion of what McKesson means to the facts involved in these cas-
es, as well as equitable consideration should, at the very least, be aired.
McKesson may be fairly characterized as holding that "the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaning-
ful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation." 93
84. Leon, 824 So. 2d at 199.
85. See Dep't of Revenue v. Nemeth (Nemeth fl), 733 So. 2d 970, 975 (Fla. 1999).
86. Bridger 1, 935 So. 2d at 537.
87. Id. at 538.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 539.
90. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Leon, 824 So. 2d 197,201 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
91. Id.
92. Bridger 1, 935 So. 2d at 539.
93. McKesson Corp. v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990).
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But the Court also acknowledged, in dicta, the right of the state to maintain
sound fiscal planning by interposing procedural requirements to refund re-
quests.94 Notwithstanding the importance of sound fiscal planning, when
considering what was equitable in these twin cases, the Leon and Bridger I
class' argument has great appeal based upon logic, fairness, and principles of
adequate notice.
First, as to the logic, the simple and clear logic, if applied with no other
criteria, would dictate a refund because it is the decision by a court which
precipitates the right to refund, not the actual date of payment of the tax.95
Beyond arguments based simply on logic, there exists an issue of fairness to
taxpayers. The fairness issue simply flows from the logic just described, but
the need for fairness is heightened by the existence of duress in the acquisi-
tion of the tax monies. It is of no great mental stretch to understand that the
date of payment of the tax represents a unique, and in many instances, com-
pelled act by the taxpayer, following state action with the threat of the impo-
sition of significant financial, if not criminal, penalties. For example, in
these twin cases, the class was subject individually to a penalty of fifty per-
cent of the estimated tax due. 96 Therefore, it is clear that duress accompa-
nied payment. However, the decision to declare a state tax statute unconsti-
tutional, in particular, is not only a rare event-it is the rare event which trig-
gers the right to a refund.9 7 Finally, awareness of the decision, even if the
"non-claim" statute were to be applied from the date of a trial court decision,
would at least establish a clear demarcation point for all previous taxpayers.
A rhetorical question can be raised, based upon the facts surrounding
the original class representatives found in Leon and Bridger I: Should a tax-
payer who has paid tax, and, as reported in the Leon decision, filed a chal-
lenge as a named class member, be left without redress when the tax statute
is subsequently declared facially unconstitutional? Clearly, the reason per-
sons so situated received no recompense for this particular unconstitutional
taking is the payment of tax under duress. Under such circumstances, it is
both unjust and ironic that the duress used by the state, in extraction of the
tax, works against the taxpayer twice. First, the duress works to compel
payment wrongly, and then, once payment is received, the compelled pay-
ment works against the right to recovery instead of providing grounds for a
refund. This is because the payment operates under Florida's non-claim sta-
94. Id. at 44-45.
95. See, e.g., BridgerI, 935 So. 2d at 539; Leon, 824 So. 2d at 202.
96. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Herre (Herre 11), 634 So. 2d 618, 618 (Fla. 1990); see also
Bridger 1, 935 So. 2d at 537; Leon, 824 So. 2d at 198-200.
97. Bridger I, 935 So. 2d at 537.
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tute so as to trigger a dwindling hour-glass of time under the statute. 98 In
essence, time begins to run out under the refund statute once the money is
paid regardless of the unconstitutional nature of the statute and the duress
used in its acquisition.99 How fair or just is such a result and does it really
comply with federal due process?
Originally, Kuhnlein seemed to say no,"° but Nemeth II said yes.'°
Moreover, under the maxim, "neither the common law nor a state statute can
supersede a provision of the federal or state constitutions," there should be,
at least in theory, no legislative impasse to access a refund once such a
wrong has been committed. 02 This result, however, was not the outcome for
all but for approximately fifty-one class members in Leon and Bridger, "3 nor
was it given the same hour-glass reading of the refund statute in the earlier
decision in Nemeth I.1 4 Despite the equity of such arguments, as presented
in Leon and Bridger, the result did not follow in these cases. Different con-
clusions can be drawn, but one logical one suggests that under current Flor-
ida law, as found in Nemeth, due process would dictate no recompense is
necessary." 5 Returning to the McKesson case, by examining the later deci-
sions from the United States Supreme Court, regarding unconstitutional taxa-
tion and refunds of state taxes and decisions of other states on the same sub-
ject, can perhaps add further light, if not heat, to the issues.
LX. RETURNING TO MCKESSON VIA NEWSWEEK, A TAX PROCEDURE CASE,
AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
In Newsweek II, the United States Supreme Court rejected the state dis-
trict court's interpretation of the McKesson decision, as rationalized by Flor-
ida, during the state appeals process, but prior to arriving in the United States
Supreme Court. 0 6 As touched upon earlier, during this process, a rationali-
zation was accepted that McKesson was distinguishable, balanced on the
basis of the existence of a pre-deprivation statutory remedy.0 7 The state
court accepted the argument that the absence of a pre-deprivation remedy,
98. FLA. STAT. § 215.26(2) (2007).
99. See id.
100. Dep't of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 726 (Fla. 1994).
101. Dep't of Revenue v. Nemeth (Nemeth I1), 733 So. 2d 970, 975 (Fla. 1999).
102. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d at 721.
103. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Bridger (Bridger 1), 935 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2006); Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Leon, 824 So. 2d 197, 201 n.l (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
104. See Nemeth I, 733 So. 2d at 970.
105. See id. at 974-75.
106. Newsweek, Inc. V. Fla. Dep't. of Revenue (Newsweek Il), 522 U.S. 442, 443 (1998).
107. Id. at 442.
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which had been enacted into Florida law after the McKesson decision, elimi-
nated the need for access to refund statutes.'08 The Newsweek II Court ob-
served that the effect of the district court's opinion was to cut off a post-
petition remedy to section 215.26, thus denying a retroactive remedy to tax-
payers affected by an unconstitutional statute, when it stated: "While Florida
may be free to require taxpayers to litigate first and pay later, due process
prevents it from applying this requirement to taxpayers, like Newsweek, who
reasonably relied on the apparent availability of a postpayment refund when
paying the tax."' 09
Moreover, in Newsweek II, the Court explicitly indicated the reasoning
found in Reich v. Collins (Reich 11).. was applicable."' In the Reich deci-
sion, the Court observed a set of facts parallel to those which later arose in
Leon and Bridger."2 The Court disapproved the ruling by the Supreme
Court of Georgia, which, if let stand, would have allowed the state of Geor-
gia to refuse a refund when "the law under which the taxes are assessed and
collected is itself subsequently declared to be unconstitutional or otherwise
invalid."' ' The very nature of the circumstances outlined in Reich-a state
tax statute declared unconstitutional when duress existed in the extraction of
the tax, mandated retroactive reliefl' 4-- establish the grounds for redress.
These are the same circumstances present in the twin class actions, Leon and
Bridger. 1' The issue of payment of a tax under duress, as alluded to earlier,
is a circumstance which the United States Supreme Court called for remedial
solution. 6 In McKesson, the Court stated:
The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, ex-
hausts the requirements of federal law. The answer is no: If a
State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when
due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he
can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful
108. Id. at 443.
109. Id. at 444-45.
110. 513 U.S. 106 (1994).
111. Newsweek H, 522 U.S. at 443.
112. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Bridger (Bridger I), 952 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2007); Fla.
Dep't of Revenue v. Leon, 824 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
113. Reich II, 513 U.S. at 109 (quoting Reich v. Collins (Reich 1), 422 S.E.2d 846, 849
(Ga. 1992)).
114. Idatlll.
115. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Bridger (Bridger H), 952 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2007); Fla.
Dep't of Revenue v. Leon, 824 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
116. See McKesson Corp. v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. Reg., 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990).
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backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional depriva-
tion. ' 7
Perhaps, the Court did not literally mean that meaningful "backward-
looking relief to rectify an unconstitutional deprivation" does not always
mean a refund, but the strength of the language and the choice of these
words, in the context of the discussion of the Georgia tax involved in the
case, clearly gives this impression. 118 Under these circumstances, the mere
potential access to a tax procedure, at some point in time prior to the declara-
tion of the unconstitutional nature of the tax, would appear to be inadequate
to meet the standard set forth in Reich. It should also be stated, however,
that the establishment of time limits for refund actions, whether in the form
of a statute of limitations or a statute of non-claim, is a generally accepted
method of insuring a state's fiscal stability." 9
State tax courts in other jurisdictions have addressed this issue in light
of McKesson.120 The New York Tax Court opinion in Brault v. New York
State Tax Appeals Tribunal, '21 represents one example of the common ra-
tionale that is found in these opinions. That rationale is simply one grounded
in the state's need for fiscal planning. '22 The McKesson Court addressed this
by saying: "The State's interests in avoiding serious economic and adminis-
trative dislocation and additional administrative costs may play a role in
choosing the form of and fine-tuning the relief to be provided McKesson,
though Florida's interest in financial stability does not justify a refusal to
provide relief." 1
23
Thus, the McKesson Court seemed to acknowledge the need for such
overarching concerns such as "financial stability," but did not suggest these
concerns eroded the need for relief. 24 The circumstances of Leon and Bridg-
er can be viewed as particularly inequitable to the taxpayers, even beyond
the use of duress in obtaining payment of the unconstitutional tax. Indeed,
an argument within the bounds of reason could go so far as to characterize
the denial of relief after the application of duress as a type of legal "gotcha."
This is not simply attributable to the existence of duress in extracting pay-
ments, but also because the unconstitutional nature of the underlying tax
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 44.
120. See Reich v. Collins (Reich I/), 513 U.S. 106, 109 (1994); see also Newsweek, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep't of Revenue (Newsweek fl), 522 U.S. 442, 443 (1998).
121. 696 N.Y.S.2d 579 (App. Div. 1999).
122. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 44.
123. Id. at 21.
124. Id. at 37.
[Vol. 32
139
: Nova Law Review 32, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
TWIN CASES OF A TAXING SORT
statute, as a Fifth Amendment violation, was raised on appeal in the First
District in an appellate decision preceding the class actions and let stand by
the Supreme Court of Florida in Harris v. Florida. Dep 't of Revenue (Harris
). 125 This decision and jurisdictional appeal occurred before conflict juris-
diction ultimately brought the constitutionality of the unlawful statute before
the court in Herre. 126 Also, as in Newsweek I, taxpayers reasonably relied
upon the apparent availability of a post-payment remedy when paying the
tax. 127 Unfortunately, the post-payment remedy represented an hour-glass of
rights, which was tipped over upon payment; therefore, it ran out before the
statute was declared unconstitutional. Such a remedy sounds in theory, more
than fact, if it begins to disappear once a tax is paid, especially if paid under
duress.
In Kuhnlein, the Supreme Court of Florida appeared to follow the
McKesson decision because it recognized that the statute at issue was both
void ab initio and, equally important under McKesson, there was no way the
State of Florida could correct the wrong which had resulted from the imposi-
tion of the fee. 121 In the Newsweek 1I and McKesson decisions, an adequate
remedy was not balanced upon elimination of an administrative application
for refund. Instead, the legal lens was focused on remedies of constitutional
dimensions. Both cases addressed tax procedures to provide backward look-
ing relief from facially unconstitutional taxation. 129 Under the circumstances
present in Leon and Bridger, elimination of an administrative exhaustion
step, via the State of Florida, provided no adequate backward looking relief
to the original class of plaintiffs and therefore, it may be argued, an incom-
plete constitutional remedy. Application of precedent, such as Victor Chem-
ical, based upon a concept of sovereign immunity, through the enactment of
a non-claim statute, seems incongruent with the maxim that statutory limita-
tions cannot override constitutional rights. As stated eloquently by the Su-
preme Court of Florida in Kuhnlein: "Sovereign immunity does not exempt
the State from a challenge based on violation of the federal or state constitu-
tions, because any other rule self-evidently would make constitutional law
subservient to the State's will."'3 ° Therefore, to begin the running of an
125. 563 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 574 So. 2d 141 (Fla.
1990).
126. Herre v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue (Herre 1), 617 So. 2d 390, 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1993); see also Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Herre (Herre I1), 634 So. 2d 618, 618 (Fla. 1994).
127. Newsweek, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue (Newsweek]), 689 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
128. Dep't of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 726 (Fla. 1994).
129. See Newsweek, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue (Newsweek II), 522 U.S. 442, 442-44
(1998); see also McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31.
130. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d at 721.
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hour-glass statute of "non-claim" from the payment of a tax, paid under du-
ress and pursuant to a statute later declared to be facially unconstitutional,
appears, at the very least, inequitable, offers no relief for wrongfully injured
parties, and steps outside the spirit, if not the letter of the law, found in the
context of McKesson, Reich, and Newsweek, as well as the Supreme Court of
Florida's earlier decision in Kuhnlein.
X. CONCLUSION
Perhaps statutory limitations and/or interpretation of the same, as out-
lined in this note, will be subsequently altered by the courts in the proper
case. Or perhaps alternatively, the issues will be addressed and remedied by
the Florida Legislature through amendment to Florida Statute section
215.26, thus eliminating the bar to recovery when taxes or fees are deter-
mined by Florida's courts to be facially unconstitutional. This would be ac-
complished by removing such circumstances in cases from the view that an
hour-glass effect begins at the time of payment, especially if payment occurs
under duress. Rather, under such circumstances, "non-claim" limitations
should not begin to run before the statute, under which the tax was paid, has
been declared unconstitutional.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent trends on the employment front, both nationwide and in Florida,
inspire hope on some fronts, but cause for alarm on others as the following
laundry list of employment-related data illustrates:
Aging and younger workers are calling for "more work-life
flexibility."'
Rising cost of living makes securing and retaining employ-
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University; B.A. Pomona College, 1974; J.D.,
Boalt Hall (University of California, Berkeley), 1977; L.L.M., Georgetown University, 1984.
1. Niala Boodhoo, South Florida's Economic Outlook: South Florida Employers Need
to Focus on Retention in 2007, Experts Say, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 15, 2007, at 23G [hereinaf-
ter Boodhoo, Focus on Retention]. Forty percent of the current United States labor force will
be eligible for retirement by 2010. Id.
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ees difficult. 2
While average age of retirement is sixty-two, many older
workers seek instead to opt for part-time work.3
Federal Reserve predicted that Florida would be hit hard
thanks to its high concentration of housing-related employ-
ment.4. "In Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, consumer
prices [increased] 4.4 percent" in 2007 over prices in 2006,
thanks to higher rents, home payments, and property insur-
ance seeing its largest yearly hike in twenty-five years:
8.2%.'
With a shortage of workers, wages rose in 2005 and 2006.6
There is a "critical shortage of health care workers" nation-
wide. 7 New nurses are receiving recruiting bonuses; incum-
bent nurses get retention bonuses.8
A 200 7 study found that 52% "of adults lack the literacy
skills they need to compete in the 21st century." 9
"A [striking] restructuring of the labor market [fueled] by
technology and globalization has [created rising] demand for
higher-educated workers and will" produce more pro-
nounced income inequality.10
"[T]he workforce will grow at a slower rate over the next 20
years [and] none of the growth will come from native-born
Americans between the ages of 25 and 54.' ' "
In 2004, "[t]he expected lifetime earnings of males with a
bachelor's degree" was 96% higher than their counterparts
2. Id. "At times, [Miami-Fort Lauderdale area prices] ran 30 percent higher than the
U.S. average for urban areas." Niala Boodhoo, After Years of Record Growth, 2007 May Be a
Year of Moderation for Economy, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 15, 2007, at 22G [hereinafter Bood-
hoo, Years of Record Growth]. Main cause: Housing prices and insurance premiums. Bood-
hoo, Focus on Retention, supra note 1.
3. See Boodhoo, Focus on Retention, supra note 1.
4. Boodhoo, Years of Record Growth, supra note 2.
5. Kevin G. Hall, Fed: Growth Tied to Housing Slump, MIAMI HERALD, July 19, 2007,
at lC.
6. Niala Boodhoo, Wage Growth Up in Dade, Broward, MIAMI HERALD, July 26, 2007,
at 3C [hereinafter Boodhoo, Wage Growth Up].
7. Boodhoo, Focus on Retention, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Gerry Smith, 'Perfect Storm' Threatens Economy, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 12, 2007, at
4B.
10. Id.
11. Id.
2007]
144
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss1/1
NOVA LAWREVIEW
with only a high school diploma. 12
"2.9 million manufacturing jobs have been lost" since
2001.'"
In 2007, "there was a notable increase in the rate [of] unmar-
ried mothers with children under age 1" in the labor force,
"up 4.3 percentage points to 59 percent."' 4
In 2007, for the second consecutive year, Florida has
achieved "the [number two] spot as the fastest growing high-
tech hub."' 5
In 2005, Florida ranked "as the fourth largest high-tech state
in the nation." 16 Florida's "high-tech industry added 10,900
jobs for an industry total of 276,400 tech workers in 2005."'"
This survey article covers the several phases of public (and at times pri-
vate) employment in Florida during 2006-07, beginning with the law (com-
mon, statutory, constitutional, and regulatory) governing the hiring of public
employees and public officials. Part III outlines recent legal developments
touching on the terms and conditions of public employment. Among other
topics, Part III explores recent legal issues in the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)-a variety of topics concerning wages and hours of employment.
The "Benefits" section covers developments involving health care, Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) issues, disability and death benefits, work-
ers' compensation, unemployment compensation, safety issues, and public
pensions. Part IV surveys recent cases and statutes governing discipline,
retaliation, the First Amendment and the Hatch Act. Part V, "Employment
Discrimination," outlines recent developments in the law relating to race,
national origin, affirmative action, gender, age, disability, religion, and con-
cludes with a brief roundup of remedies recoverable in employment dis-
crimination lawsuits.
12. Id.
13. Carolyn B. Maloney, Protect All Workers-Here and There, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 16,
2007, at 15A.
14. Moms Are in Labor Force, MIAMI HERALD, May 12, 2007, at 1C. "[O]nly 6 percent
of companies offer on-site day care centers." Christina Rexrode, Next Care Challenge: The
Elderly, ST. PETE. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 2007, at IF.
15. Madhusmita Bora, High-Tech Strides Earn High Marks, ST. PETE. TIME, Apr. 24,
2007, at ID.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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II. THE LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
A. Hiring Issues
1. Hiring Freezes
In 2007, Governor Charlie Crist ordered "all state agencies to cut 4 per-
cent from their budgets and prepare for 10 percent cuts," thanks to lower tax
collections. '8 In response, public universities and community colleges have
imposed a hiring freeze on new faculty.19 For example, Florida International
University (FIU) eliminated eighty positions through attrition.20 Moreover,
FIU is considering freezing employee raises. 21 Overall, eleven Florida pub-
lic universities must cut $100 million in spending in 2007 and were told to be
prepared to cut another $150 million.22 In 2007, Dania Beach's city manager
imposed a ninety-day hiring freeze until the Florida Legislature decides
"how much money local governments can collect" in property taxes after
reforms take effect.23 Despite budget cuts, Fort Lauderdale will increase its
police force to 478 in 2006, and to 498 in 2008, plus twelve frozen positions,
which will be hard to fill, in light of the trend of city police officers leaving
urban areas for suburbs that offer higher pay and less work.24
2. Hiring Incentives
In 2007, the United States Senate Judiciary Committee approved a bill
25
that would set up, "within the U.S. Department of Justice, a student loan re-
payment program for lawyers who [promise] to [stay] employed for... three
years [or more] as state or local criminal prosecutors, or as state, local or
federal public defenders in criminal cases. 26 While Broward County pays
18. Noah Bierman, FlU Spares Its Faculty as Others Put Freeze on Hiring, MIAMI
HERALD, July 12, 2007, at 3B [hereinafter Bierman, FIU Spares Its Faculty]. Facing lower tax
revenues, the Florida Legislature held a special session in September 2007 to balance the
state's $71.5 billion budget. Gary Fineout & Marc Caputo, Deeper Budget Cuts on the Way,
MIAMI HERALD, July 25, 2007, at IA.
19. Bierman, FIU Spares Its Faculty, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. City Manager Imposes 90-Day Hiring Freeze, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 2007, at 2B.
24. Diana Moskovitz, Budget Crunch Impacts Cop Hires, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 5, 2007,
at 1BR.
25. S. 442, 110th Cong. (2007).
26. Marcia Coyle, Bill Would Help Pay Loans for Public-Sector Attorneys, DAILY Bus.
REV., Apr. 19, 2007, at A9.
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$2500 of county employees' school tuition annually per worker, Miami-
Dade County pays up to "50 percent of county employees' school tuition
with no annual limits. '27 A Miami Herald editorial criticized Miami-Dade
County's reimbursement policy as too lenient and too generous, given that
the employee need only earn "a 'C' grade and work for the county one year
after receiving the degree. 28
A severe shortage of bus mechanics forced Broward County Transit, in
2007, to increase starting pay for new mechanics by 39%, which may neces-
sitate the first bus fare hike in the county "in more than 10 years. 2 9 Starting
pay will rise "from $16.64 to $23.19 an hour."3
B. Outsourcing and Privatization
"[O]utsourcing by foreign companies has created more than 6.5 million
jobs for American workers."31
One of the main causes of the "scandal over treatment of outpatients at
Walter Reed Army Medical Center" was the privatization of the hospital's
support workforce.32 "[T]he largest federal workers union, blamed pressure
on the [United States] Army from the White House's Office of Management
and Budget for the decision to privatize its civilian work force. 33 In 2007,
the Federal Office of the Director of National Intelligence revealed that "pri-
vate contracts now account for 70 percent of the intelligence budget., 34 One
expert urged Congress to exercise better oversight procedures to reduce the
"conflicts of interest that [emerge] when agencies and industry[ies get too]
close. 35 In Dania Beach, Florida, contentious efforts to outsource lifeguards
at the beach in order to save money came to the fore in 2007 as it had in
2006.36 Critics claim privatizing beach lifeguards will put lives at risk be-
cause the independent contractors "are less skilled, less experienced, and
lower-paid than" city employees.37
27. Editorial, Revise Employee Tuition Policies, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 28, 2006, at 22A.
28. Id.
29. Amy Sherman, Bus Mechanics Get 39 Percent Pay Increase, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
28, 2007, at lB.
30. Id.
31. Pete du Pont, Ensuring Economic Growth, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 16, 2007, at 15A.
32. Steve Vogel & Renae Merle, Staff Privatization at Walter Reed Under Scrutiny,
MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 11, 2007, at 9A.
33. Id.
34. Patrick Radden Keefe, Don't Privatize Our Spies, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 2007, at A19.
35. Id.
36. Jasmine Kripalani, Lifeguards at Risk Now, MIAMI HERALD, July 16, 2007, at 1 B.
37. Id.
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Learning from the wrenching fight to unionize janitors at the University
of Miami, FIU decided in 2006 "to end 10 years of outsourcing custodial
work.
38
Confounding the conventional wisdom that privatization saves money,
Florida's agency for aiding disabled residents insists it can cut its budget by
hiring more state employees and terminating the private contractors who
"now do the work., 39
C. Background Checks and Surveillance of Employees
A 2007 government report estimates there are "9.4 million illicit drug
users and 10.1 million heavy drinkers [holding down] full-time jobs., 40 But
"the rate of drug-abusing" and heavy-drinking employees is lower in the
South.41  As a result, more "employers are testing for drug and alcohol
abuse., 4 2 "The lowest rate of [illegal] drug use," 3.4%, was found among
firefighters and police officers.43 In 2006, the federal government mulled
over whether to include hair analysis in its existing employee drug testing
guidelines.'
In 2007, the University of Georgia subjected new hires to criminal re-
cord checks, prompting a faculty protest. 45 At a minimum, this screening
entailed "running fingerprints through the Federal Bureau of Investigation"
(FBI).46
Under the Jessica Lunsford Act, contractors who work at public schools
while children are present must undergo "fingerprinting and criminal back-
ground checks., 47 In 2007, thirty-seven workers were put on unpaid leave
after local school boards refused to give them clearance owing to minor
criminal infractions, committed sometimes decades earlier.48 If they are not
38. Ana Menendez, FlU Opts to Do the Right Thing About Janitors, MIAMI HERALD, Oct.
1, 2006, at lB.
39. Gary Fineout, Agency Urges Firing Firms to Save Cash, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9,
2007, at 6B.
40. Jeff Nesmith, Millions of Full-Time U.S. Workers Use Drugs, MIAMI HERALD, July
17, 2007, at 3C.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Curtis L. Taylor, Drug Tests Using Hair Debated, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 24, 2006, at
33A.
45. Jonathan D. Glater, Critics Question Breadth of Background Checks for Hiring at
Education Department, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 2007, at 18.
46. Id.
47. Niala Boodhoo, Workers'Pasts May End Jobs, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 22, 2007, at 1C.
48. Id.
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cleared for work, many workers fear they will be fired and "lose pensions
and healthcare benefits."49 A 2007 measure "would revise and standardize
background screening checks for school contractors."5
In March 2007, the Miami-Dade County School Board modified its
background screening standards to allow 500 excluded workers to file ap-
peals for their jobs. 51 The Florida Statutes provide that if a person's criminal
record has been expunged, the individual "may lawfully deny or fail to [con-
cede] arrests ... except when" applying for certain state jobs and school po-
sitions.5 2 Moreover, it is "illegal for [an] expunged record to be disclosed"
to a prospective employer outside the specified categories.5 3 "In 41 states,
people accused or convicted of crimes ... can have their criminal records
expunged."54
In 2006, the United States Department of Justice urged Congress to ex-
tend access to an FBI database consisting of criminal history information to
any employer who qualified for access. 5
A Florida school for the deaf and blind was accused in 2007 of allowing
felons on its campus to work on construction projects in violation of state
law.5 6 In its defense, the school insisted the felons were monitored "by a
full-time off-duty police officer and [it] only hired" them after the school
was unable to "find a felon-free construction crew."57
In 2007, a bill proposed in the Florida Legislature would strengthen
state regulation of the towing and wrecking industry by imposing "criminal
background checks of tow truck operators., 58 While Miami-Dade County
49. Id. For example, one contractor was not cleared because he publicly urinated on the
side of a Florida highway twenty years earlier. Id.
50. Id.
51. Niala Boodhoo, Dade Revises Policy, Allows Appeals, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 16,
2007, at 3C.
52. FLA. STAT. § 943.0585(4)(a) (2007); see also Inquiry: How Can One Keep Expunged
Record Free of 'Spies'?, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 10, 2007, at 1IB [hereinafter Inquiry].
53. Inquiry, supra note 52.
54. Adam Liptak, Criminal Records Erased by Courts Live to Tell Tales, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2006, at Al. Like Florida, "Illinois... prohibits prospective employers from asking
about or making decisions based on expunged or sealed criminal histories." Id.
55. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON CRIMINAL
HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 76-77 (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/ag_bgchecks report.pdf.
56. Felons Worked on Campus, Paper Says Head of School for Deaf Blind Defends
Action, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 27, 2007, at 8B.
57. Id.
58. Monica Hatcher, Legislature Considers Regulating Towing, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 6,
2007, at IA [hereinafter Hatcher, Legislature Considers]; see also Fla. SB 612, § 508.105(3)
(2007).
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already conducts background checks on tow company owners, Broward
County does not.59
A 1999 Florida law "requires adults who come in routine contact with
children," including teachers, principals, and coaches, "to report suspected
sexual abuse to authorities. 60 One Miami school violated this law, in 2006,
when school administrators failed to report a sexual encounter between the
school's star football player and an underage girl.6'
In an effort "[t]o protect high-end secure data," some employers have
gone beyond background checks, key cards, and clearance codes, and have
embedded microchips in employees for tracking purposes, however, this has
raised privacy concerns. 62 Wal-Mart was accused by a whistleblower, in
2007, of "spy[ing] on company [employees], critics, vendors, and consult-
ants., 63 A growing concern, pitting privacy against security, stems from the
employee practice of "forwarding their office e-mail to free Web-accessible
personal accounts," often simply to enable them to continue to work from
home. 6' But increasingly, employers are banning the practice and monitor-
ing outbound e-mail and Web traffic to ensure compliance.65
According to a 2007 study by the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, workplaces are about "40,000 lives a year safer than they were in
the 1930s. ' ' 66 In 2005, workplace deaths came to 5702, about 200 short "of
the all-time low in 2003."67
Employers have every incentive for hiring workers who will not expose
the employer to vicarious liability over negligent acts by employees, commit-
ted within the scope of employment. Florida precedent makes clear that an
employer may be liable for injuries caused by an intoxicated employee on his
way home from an employer-hosted party.68 In 2007, a case went to trial
over whether an employee was acting within the scope of employment when
59. Hatcher, Legislature Considers, supra note 58.
60. David Ovalle, Athlete's Sex Case Unreported for Weeks, Police Say, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 17, 2007, at IA.
61. Id.
62. Todd Lewan, High-Tech Helpers or the Tools of Big Brother?, MIAMI HERALD, July
22, 2007, at IL.
63. Marcus Kabel, Wal-Mart Defends Surveillance Tactics, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 5,
2007, at IC.
64. Brad Stone, Companies Fret as Office E-Mail Is Detoured Past Security Walls, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007, at Al.
65. Id.
66. Frank Greve, Workplaces Keep Getting Less Deadly, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 2, 2007, at
5A [hereinafter Greve, Workplaces].
67. Id.
68. E.g., Carroll Air Sys., Inc. v. Greenbaum, 629 So. 2d 914, 917 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
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he attended a luncheon hosted by his employer.69 A third party injured by
the intoxicated employee sought to hold the employer liable under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior.7"
In Copeland v. Albertson 's, Inc.," a robber sued an employer for inju-
ries inflicted by the employees in capturing him. 72 While the trial court dis-
posed of plaintiff's case through summary judgment alleging negligent hiring
and training,73 the appeals court sent the case back for a determination of
whether a Florida statute, which bars a claim for damages based on personal
injury sustained by a plaintiff during the commission of a forcible felony,
applies. If the assault occurred after the felony was committed, then the
employer is not immune from liability.75
In Garcia v. City of Hollywood,76 a pedestrian sued the City of Holly-
wood for injuries sustained when she was struck by an off-duty police officer
driving his marked police car. 77 The Florida appeals court allowed the neg-
ligence case to proceed to trial, emphasizing that the officer was on his way
to work to study for a work-related exam. 78 Although the court initially held
that driving a police car to and from work was within the scope of an offi-
cer's employment,79 the court later withdrew its opinion and held that such
activity was not within the scope of the officer's employment.80
D. Nepotism
Florida's anti-nepotism law basically prohibits public employers from
hiring members of their families or other relatives."1 In 2006, the Miami-
Dade County Police Department was accused of violating the state's anti-
nepotism law when the Department hired the police director's son.82 An
investigation found several other instances in which the county hired rela-
69. Huffman v. Breezes Full Serv. Car Wash, 956 So. 2d 1204, 1204 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2007).
70. Id. at 1204-05.
71. 947 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
72. Id. at 665.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 668; see also FLA. STAT. § 776.085 (2007).
75. Copeland, 947 So. 2d at 667.
76. 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1442 (4th Dist. Ct. App. June 6, 2007).
77. Id. at D1442-43.
78. Id. at D1443.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3135(2)(a), 760.10(8)(d) (2007).
82. Charles Rabin, Review: Son's Hiring a Nepotism Violation, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 15,
2007, at 3B.
[Vol. 32
151
: Nova Law Review 32, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
SURVEY OF FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LA W
tives of county employees.83 Specifically, Florida's anti-nepotism law pro-
hibits "public official[s] [with] authority over a particular job [from] em-
ploy[ing] or promot[ing] a relative into that job, or [from lobbying] for a
relative to get [the public] job."' To fill public positions, Florida public
employers must follow a competitive selection process that awards jobs
based on merit-not on family connections.85
E. Immigration
A 2007 study "found that 34 percent of documented and undocumented
immigrants arrive without a high school diploma and that 80 percent of im-
migrants without a diploma cannot speak English well or at all."86
In 2006-07, more than one hundred cities in twenty-seven states have
proposed measures that would punish employers who hire undocumented
immigrants. 87 Most of these efforts have failed either thanks to legal chal-
lenges or the cities themselves have changed their minds."8 A powerful legal
argument maintains that these local laws are preempted by federal immigra-
tion law.89 By contrast, New Haven, Connecticut, who offers identification
cards to undocumented immigrants, is in sharp departure from migrant re-
strictions imposed by other cities and states. 90 Moreover, New Haven "al-
ready offers federal tax help to immigrants and [bars] police from asking
about immigration status." 9' New Haven's beneficent treatment of undocu-
mented workers has stoked "interest in immigrant-rich South Florida." 92
In 2007, a bill was introduced in the Florida Legislature that would fine
employers who hire undocumented workers and revoke any tax breaks or
benefits they receive from the state. 93 At the local level, Palm Bay, Florida,
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Smith, supra note 9.
87. Michael Rubinkam, Crackdown Against Illegal Immigration Faces Legal Setbacks,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 21, 2007, at 14A. According to a study, "35 towns have approved un-
documented immigrant laws, 35 have defeated them, and 35 others have ordinances pending."
Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Cara Rubinsky, Connecticut City Approves IDs for Illegal Immigrants, MIAMI
HERALD, June 6, 2007, at 6A.
91. Id.
92. Alfonso Chardy et al., Local Officials Differ on City's ID Card Idea, MIAMI HERALD,
July 25, 2007, at IA.
93. Niala Boodhoo & Beth Reinhard, Bills Target Undocumented Workers, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 7, 2007, at IC.
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reversed a 2006 ruling that fined businesses that hired undocumented immi-
grants. 94 Likewise, in 2006, the Avon Park Florida City Council narrowly
defeated an ordinance that would have sanctioned employers who hire un-
documented workers. 9 Another proposal at the state level would force con-
tractors, who do business with the State of Florida, to take part in the De-
partment of Homeland Security's free internet-based screening.96
In 2007, Dunkin' Donuts sought to strip three Key West, Florida donut
shops of their franchises after the shops were accused of hiring undocu-
mented workers. 97 Critics allege "Dunkin' Donuts may be using [immigra-
tion] laws as a pretext for terminating franchise agreements."" Key West
employers have had a hard time finding workers due to "the lack of afford-
able housing."99
While current federal immigration law leaves it up to employers to ver-
ify that they are hiring legal employees, legislation proposed, but defeated in
the United States Senate in 2007, would have required that documentation of
legal status, such as Social Security numbers, "be run through the
[E]lectronic [Employer Verification] System.' Under the defeated meas-
ure, employers who violate the law could face fines and jail.' ' In August
2007, the Department of Homeland Security issued new regulations forcing
employers to dismiss workers "whose Social Security numbers and names
[do not] match government records." ' This new crackdown on illegal im-
migration will likely hurt key Florida industries such as "construction, agri-
culture, and hospitality."10 3
In 2007, the Department of Labor issued a final ruling prohibiting em-
ployers from substituting aliens' names on permanent labor certification in a
move to reduce immigration fraud. "
94. Id
95. Casey Woods, Immigration Opens Big Split in Small Town, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9,
2006, at 1A.
96. Boodhoo & Reinhard, supra note 93.
97. Patrick Danner & Niala Boodhoo, Dunkin' Donuts Sues Franchise Owner, MIAMI
HERALD, June 6, 2007, at 1C.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Suzanne Gamboa, Employers Protest Verification Rule, MIAMI HERALD, May 31,
2007, at 6C.
101. Id.
102. Casey Woods & Niala Boodhoo, ID Rule Rankles Florida Industries, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 8, 2007, at IA.
103. Id
104. Labor Certification for the Permanent Employment of Miens in the United States, 72
Fed. Reg. 27904 (May 17, 2007) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 656).
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On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit
allowed Mohawk Industries employees-alleging that the carpet-maker con-
spired with labor recruiters to hire illegal immigrants with the aim of de-
pressing wages for legal workers in Georgia-to press their claim under the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).105
F. Ethics and Conflicts of Interest
Many public governments have framed so-called codes of governmental
ethics that set standards of conduct for public officials among others.'0 6
Florida requires that violations of its Code of Ethics be established by clear
and convincing evidence of wrongdoing.l17
In 2007, a bill was proposed in the Florida Legislature that would re-
quire legislative staff members and lawmakers, but not members of the gen-
eral public, to speak under oath while addressing the Legislature.'08 Critics
of the measure insist the measure will "have a 'chilling effect' on debate."' 0 9
Whether public officials should refuse, on ethical grounds, to buy Super
Bowl "tickets at face value" when the general public must pay far higher
prices emerged as an issue in South Florida early in 2007.110 The Miami-
Dade ethics director ruled that the face value tickets do not amount to a gift,
and the public officials did not solicit the tickets.1" One public official re-
fused the offer in an effort to "avoid any appearance of receiving unauthor-
ized compensation or benefits."" 2
At the federal level, Democrats taking over Congress in 2007 proposed
"new restrictions on gifts, meals or trips paid for by lobbyists."' 3 Moreover,
lawmakers would have to reveal their support of pet projects "known as ear-
105. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1281, 1295 (11 th Cir. 2006). The
Second and Ninth Circuits also allow such RICO suits. See Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685,
687 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002); Com-
mercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001)). How-
ever, the Seventh Circuit, in Baker v. IBP, Inc., held that an employer that hired illegal em-
ployees did not share a common purpose with recruiters. Id. at 689.
106. See David D. Kirkpatrick, States Take Lead on Ethics Rules for Lawmakers, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 1, 2007, at Al.
107. Latham v. Fla. Comm'n on Ethics, 694 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
108. Breanne Gilpatrick, Legislature Trying Truth or Consequences, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
27, 2007, at 6B.
109. Id
110. Jack Dolan et al., Public Servants Offered Super Bowl Tickets at Face Value, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 11, 2007, at IA.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Kirkpatrick, supra note 106.
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marks that they [smuggle] into major bills."' 14 "An ethics bill passed the
House" by a 411 to 8 vote in late July 2007 "aimed at curbing corruption in
Congress."' 15  Among other reforms, the measure bars spouses "from the
payrolls of campaigns." ' 16 Three days after the ethics reform bill passed the
House, the Senate approved an ethics and lobbying law entailing "a battery
of new restrictions... on gifts, meals and travel paid for by lobbyists." 117
Florida's "zero tolerance" law that prohibits lawmakers from accepting
"gifts or meals from lobbyists" was challenged by lobbyists in 2006.118 Ac-
cording to the lawsuit, by "forcing lobbyists to [disclose] how much they get
paid," the law violates Florida's constitutional privacy right guarantee." 9
In 2006, the Miami-Dade Ethics, Integrity, and Accountability Task
Force proposed to frame "a new code of ethics for" the county that would
buttress the powers and duties of the County's Commission on Ethics and
Public Trust.120 To deal with the complaint that the ethics commission acts
in secrecy, one aim will seek to make the body more transparent.'2 Finally,
a whistleblower provision would allow the commission to prove claims of
retaliation against public employees.122 On September 19, 2006, the federal
judiciary enacted new rules requiring disclosure of "junkets for judges"'123
which raised perceptions that judges may have conflicts of interest when they
take part in cases involving corporate sponsors of the conferences. 124
In 2007, the Florida commission that polices judges filed ethics charges
with the Supreme Court of Florida against a Broward County Circuit Judge
over "a pattern of arrogant, discourteous, and impatient conduct."' 125 Since
2005, complaints have been filed against three other judges for a range of
114. Id.
115. Margaret Talev, Ethics Push Gains Ground, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 1, 2007, at 3A.
116. House Backs Barring Political Spouses From Campaign Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2007, at A 18.
117. Jeff Zeleny & Carl Hulse, Congress Votes to Tighten Rules on Lobbyist Ties, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at Al.
118. Gary Fineout, Suit Targets Ban on Freebies, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 29, 2006, at 8B.
119. Id.
120. Charles Rabin, Ethics Board Seeks to Broaden Its Reach, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 22,
2007, at 8B.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Ruth Marcus, Issues Groups Fund Seminars for Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1998, at
Al.
124. Press Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Conference Moves to Enhance
Judges' Accountability, Ethical Compliance (Sep. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/judicialconference091906.html.
125. Nikki Waller, Judge Faces Ethics Charges, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 7, 2007, at 1B.
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misconduct. 126 While the Supreme Court of Florida "rarely removes judges
from the bench," it has imposed "[o]ther forms of discipline, such as fines,
reprimands, and suspensions."'1
2 1
State ethics charges have also been threatened against Florida public
university professors over trips paid for by textbook publishers.12  Weeks
after such a trip, a professor's "three-member committee selected the pub-
lisher's book as required reading for all anatomy students at [Miami-Dade
College's] Kendall campus."' 29 Nationwide, colleges struggle "with how to
[frame] conflict-of-interest policies without" trampling on professors' au-
thority to select textbooks. 3°
In the past, Florida law required "'persons seeking any federal public
office' . . . to resign from one office to run for another."' 13' But "a giant loo-
phole [was created in 2007] in the resign-to-run law."' 132 Now, anyone in
public office in Florida can "run for Congress without having to resign from
their current [position]." 133
G. Affordable Housing for Employees
Sixty percent of Miami-Dade County business owners "said the rising
cost of housing in" South Florida has eroded "their ability to recruit employ-
ees."' 134 In response, most employers raised salaries or added relocation as-
sistance. 13  Other innovative programs aimed at recruiting employees in-
clude: 1) funding up to $300,000 of a new employee's mortgage; 2) offering
signing bonuses; and 3) offering forgivable loans for employees "who are
buying a first home." '136 In 2005, "the average wage in Miami-Dade County"
was $40,610; virtually pricing out many teachers and police officers from
home ownership.'37
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Noah Bierman, Colleges Review Ethics of Textbook Selection, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
16, 2007, at IA.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Steve Bousquet, Resign to Run: Politicians Welcome Loophole, MIAMI HERALD,
May 16, 2007, at 19A (quoting Sen. Charlie Justice).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Niala Boodhoo, Firms Unwilling to Tackle Housing Issues, Survey Says, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 15, 2006, at IC.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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One private hospital is contemplating purchasing distressed develop-
ments or building new homes on tracts of land it already owns. 3 ' The hospi-
tal "already has a program helping ... employees who are first-time home-
buyers with... forgivable loans to help with down payments."'' 39 A 2007
study found that health care workers are unable to afford home ownership,
especially in South Florida. 40 The study found that an average "of $93,500
[is] needed to qualify for a mortgage ... median-priced home," far above
incomes earned by health care workers.' 4
In 2007, a real estate developer funded a $5 million grant to address the
long commute that many South Florida teachers and nurses endure thanks to
the lack of affordable "housing near their jobs." 42 The Urban Land Institute
aims to add "3500 units of workforce housing in ... three [targeted] markets
within five years."' 143 Hallandale Beach is addressing the housing shortage
for lower-wage earners by launching a program lending the 20% down pay-
ment for eligible workers who need not repay the loan until the property is
sold.'"
In 2007, the Miramar Florida City Commission voted unanimously to
approve a proposal by a developer to discount twenty-one townhouses by
$30,000 for public service workers, including teachers and police officers. 45
Moreover, Miramar is assessing the feasibility of "modular housing, shotgun
homes and denser development lots as [ways of solving] its affordable hous-
ing crisis."' 46 The Broward County School Board hopes to solicit bids from
developers in October 2007 to build 300 affordable rental housing units for
new teachers on "four sites in Fort Lauderdale and Pompano Beach."'
' 47
138. John Dorschner, Housing Fix for Employees in Works, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 5, 2007,
at IA.
139. Id.
140. Jane Bussey, Home Ownership Hindered, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 11, 2007, at 3C.
141. Id.
142. Lesley Clark, Grant Targets Housing Woes, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 2, 2007, at 5B.
143. Id.
144. Jasmine Kripalani, Town Payments, MIAMI HERALD, July 29, 2007, at 1BR.
145. City OK'S Revised Offer from Builder, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 5, 2007, at 3B.
146. Natalie P. McNeal, Miramar Targets Its Housing Crisis, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 18,
2007, at lB.
147. Hannah Sampson, Board's Aim: Rental Units for Teachers, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 9,
2007, at 1BR.
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III. RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
A. Hours and Wages
1. Fair Labor Standards Act Issues
The FLSA governs minimum wage, overtime pay, and child labor in
both the public and private employment sectors.148 The federal minimum
wage was frozen at $5.15 an hour from September 1997 until July 24, 2007,
when the minimum wage rose "70 cents to $5.85 an hour," ending "the long-
est period without an increase since ... 1938.' 14 9 "Legislation signed in
May [2007] increases the [rate] 70 cents each summer until 2009, when it
will reach $7.25 an hour."' 50 Critics of minimum wage increases insist they
do not reduce poverty, but instead, "reduce the number of jobs for low-
skilled workers.""' Columnist George Will opposes increases in the mini-
mum wage, in part on the bald assertion that "most of the 0.6 percent
(479,000 in 2005) of America's wage workers earning the minimum wage
are not poor."' 152 Moreover, he cites studies that indicate that increases in the
minimum wage encourage more teens to drop out of school.'53 Some
economists insist that "a higher minimum wage" prompts employers to move
jobs offshore. 54 By contrast, one survey of small business owners found
that they can handle the boost in the minimum wage. 155
"Frustrated by Congress' inaction" until 2007, twenty-eight states-
including Florida--enacted "minimum wages above the federal floor, [cover-
ing] 70 percent of the work force."'15 6 For example, the minimum wage in
Florida is currently $6.67 an hour. 57 By constitutional amendment, Flor-
ida's minimum wage will be "adjusted each fall for inflation."' 58 Florida
"[b]usinesses that pay minimum wage", covering about 400,000 of the
state's 8.7 million workers, "must post signs in English and Spanish stating
148. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
149. Minimum Wage Goes Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2007, at A17.
150. Id.
151. Steven Greenhouse, Tax Cut Measure Could Be Stumbling Block for Increase in
Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at A18 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Tax Cut].
152. George F. Will, The Right Minimum Wage, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2007, at A17.
153. Id.
154. Experts Seek Wage Reform, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 12, 2006, at IC.
155. Study: Small Businesses Can Handle Wage Boost, MLAMI HERALD, Dec. 27, 2006, at
3C.
156. Greenhouse, Tax Cut, supra note 151.
157. Niala Boodhoo, Florida's Minimum Wage Rises 27 Cents Today, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 1, 2007, at 5G.
158. Id.
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the minimum [wage] and the rights of employees."' 59 About 3% of all work-
ers in Florida earn minimum wage."6  Since Florida raised its minimum
wage, the unemployment rate dropped to 3.3% from 4.4%, belying critics
who predicted increased unemployment in the wake of higher minimum
wage laws. 6'
The FLSA also governs overtime pay. In 2007, the United States Su-
preme Court, in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,r 2 resolved con-
flicting provisions of the FLSA's home companion exemption from overtime
rules as it applies to third-party employers.163 According to one study, "3
million people work in direct-care jobs ... as nursing assistants, home health
aides, and personal care aides."' 64 Their wages average "less than $10 per
hour" and 25% of such workers lack health insurance. 65 The Court's un-
animous decision denying these health care workers overtime pay was criti-
cized as "'another blow to struggling, low-wage women.""' 166 The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 2007 that companionship services are ex-
empt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 1
67
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court ruled that under the FLSA,
time spent walking between the area where workers put on and take off pro-
tective gear, an activity that is "integral and indispensable"'168 to the principal
activity, plus time spent waiting to doff, is compensable. 169 By contrast, time
devoted to waiting to put on the first article of gear is excluded from the
scope of the FLSA under section 4(a)(2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. 70 Simi-
larly, in 2006, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that under the
159. Id.
160. Gregg Fields, Florida's Great Low-Wage, High-Wage Debate, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
5, 2007, at 13G.
161. Id.
162. 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007).
163. Id. at 2351-52. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (2006) (includes third-party em-
ployers under the exemption), with 29 C.F.R. § 552.3 (2006) (provides an exemption to em-
ployers employed by an individual needing companionship care). "In 1974, Congress
amended the [FLSA] to [grant] minimum wage and overtime protections to maids, cooks, and
... domestic service workers [while] exempt[ing] baby sitters and workers who [offered]
companion services for the" sick and elderly. Steven Greenhouse, Day in Court for Queens
Home-Care Aide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at B2.
164. David Crary, Caregiver Shortage Looms, MIAMI HERALD, June 24, 2007, at 1E.
165. Id.
166. Pete Yost, Home-Care Employees Not Entitled to Overtime, MIAMI HERALD, June 12,
2007, at 3C.
167. Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151, 1156 (11 th Cir. 2007).
168. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 29 (2005) (quoting Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S.
247, 256 (1956)(quotations omitted)).
169. Id. at 30.
170. Id. at 42.
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Portal-to-Portal Act, an employee's time spent commuting to the job site in
an employer-owned vehicle was compensable under the FLSA, even though
the employer insisted that the vehicle be parked overnight at a secure parking
lot."' In 2007, a Florida appeals court ruled that construction workers at
Miami International Airport cannot be paid "for time spent on parking-lot
shuttles and clearing security checkpoints to get to their job site." 172 In 2007,
airline workers at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport sued
their employer after "they were forced to work through lunch breaks without
getting paid."' 173 Federal law requires greater airport security when the na-
tional terror threat is raised to "orange, or high, threat level.', 174 As a conse-
quence, "the Broward Sheriffs Office has spent [over] half a million extra
dollars [every] month to pay [officers] working overtime at Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood International Airport." 17
5
The FLSA also regulates child labor. The recent trend at the Depart-
ment of Labor is to relax the rules governing teenage workers.' 76 For exam-
ple, in 2004, an FLSA amendment authorized, under certain conditions, em-
ploying fourteen to eighteen-year-olds in workplaces "that use machinery to
process wood products." 177 The Department of Labor proposed rules in 2007
that would, for example, allow fifteen-year-olds to work as lifeguards at
swimming pools and water amusement parks, but not at beaches. '78
At the same time that the Department of Labor is relaxing restrictions
on teen employment, a 2007 study found significant numbers of teens "per-
forming [hazardous] tasks or working too late on school nights."'179 Accord-
ing to federal statistics, "[h]undreds of thousands of U.S. teenagers are in-
jured at work" annually and about seventy die each year from work-related
injuries. 80
171. Burton v. Hillsborough County, Fla., No. 05-10247, 2006 WL 1374493, at *8-9
(11 th Cir. May 18, 2006).
172. Jim Wyss, Pay Denied for Security Delays, MIAMI HERALD, June 7, 2007, at IC.
173. Ina Paiva Cordle, Workers Sue AirTran over Unpaid Breaks, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 7,
2007, at 1C.
174. Breanne Gilpatrick & Diana Moskovitz, Terror Level Raises Security Costs at Air-
port, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 8, 2007, at 6B.
175. Id.
176. See Child Labor Regulations, Orders and Statements of Interpretation, 72 Fed. Reg.
19337 (proposed Apr. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 570).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 19345-46.
179. Carla K. Johnson, Teens Tell of Labor Violations, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 5, 2007, at
10A.
180. Id.
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2. Teachers' Pay
A 2006 survey found that "the average teacher salary [in the United
States] increased by only $1,000 from 1994 to 2004, [far] less than the aver-
age [raise] for other professionals."'' In 2004, "the average annual salary
for teachers was $46,597."' 2 For 2005 to 2006, "the national average class-
room teacher salary" was $49,109.183 In Broward County, the 2005 to 2006
average salary was $44,000. 184
In 2006, the Florida Legislature approved a measure setting aside
$147.5 million "to reward outstanding teachers."' 18 5  "Under the Special
Teachers Are Rewarded, or STAR program," merit pay is tied to "how much
a teacher's students improve their scores on the Florida Comprehensive As-
sessment Test, or FCAT."' 18 6 The STAR program has been challenged by a
statewide teachers' union claiming that any merit system "is premature until
base salaries... [equal] the national average."' 187
Less than a year after the passage of the STAR program, however, the
Florida Legislature scrapped the plan after teachers protested that it did not
reward enough teachers and that it was unduly based on FCAT scores. 8 8 In
its place, in 2007, the legislature adopted a plan that still calls for school
"districts to evaluate teachers based on" FCAT scores, but also takes into
account "how principals rate teachers."' 19 Bonuses "can range between five
and [ten] percent of a teacher's annual salary."1 90
A perennial pay equity issue at the college level stems from the gaping
disparity between the salaries earned by professors and those earned by foot-
ball and basketball coaches.191 While the University of Florida professors'
"salaries rank 55th among 60 peer schools," the head coaches earn a com-
bined salary of $4 million.' 92 While academic departments face budget cut-
181. Erin Aigner, Teachers' Paychecks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2006, at B7.
182. Id.
183. Hannah Sampson, Deal Lifts Teachers'Pay 5.6%, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 23, 2007, at
lB.
184. Id.
185. State Ok's Teacher Merit-Pay Plan, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 18, 2006, at 8B. The first
performance-pay plan in the state was approved for Hillsborough County (Tampa). Id
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Gary Fineout, Teacher Bonus Plan in Peril, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 8, 2007, at 1 B.
189. Gary Fineout, Teacher Pay Plan Revised, MIAMI HERALD, June 30, 2007, at 7B.
190. Id.
191. See Fred Grimm, Taxpayers are Propping up the Jockocracy, MIAMI HERALD, Oct.
31, 2006, at lB.
192. Id.
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backs, "[a]thletic department budgets [grow] wildly."'' 93 A United States
Congressman for California, Bill Thomas, has challenged this state of affairs,
stating: "Why should the federal government subsidize the athletic activities
of educational institutions [through tax-exempt status] when that subsidy is
being used to help pay for escalating coaches' salaries, costly chartered tra-
vel and state-of-the-art athletic facilities?"'
194
Controversy erupted in 2006, at Florida State University (FSU), over a
$29.5 million gift to the university by one of its chemistry professors who
made millions for himself and the university from development of the anti-
cancer drug Taxol.195 The professor stipulated that the money be used, not
only to build a chemistry building, but also to endow four professorships.'96
But when building costs soared, the university decided to drop the endowed
positions, leading to a lawsuit and an order that FSU "return $11 million plus
interest . . . to the professor's foundation."'
' 97
In 2006, Broward Community College approved a new faculty contract
calling for "faculty salary [raises] of [around] 4 percent."'198 Trouble brewed
at Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, "the state's only public
[and] historically black college," when in 2007, 150 of the college's 400
"adjunct professors and graduate assistants" went for months without receiv-
ing a pay check.' 99 Even "some full-time professors who teach outside their"
fields went unpaid.200 The college has been rocked by scandal and financial
wrongdoing over the years.
20
'
3. Longevity Bonuses and "Living Wages" for Public Employees
In the wake of severe budget cuts in 2007, Miami-Dade County entered
negotiations with county employees to reduce bonuses guaranteed by con-
tract.202 "Cost-of-living raises alone will cost the county $56 million" in
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Samuel G. Freedman, Bricks and Mortar or Professors and Research? Florida
State's Choice, N. Y. TImEs, Dec. 6, 2006, at A25.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Breanne Gilpatrick, BCC Trustees Ok Faculty Contract, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 23,
2006, at 3B.
199. Brent Kallestad, FAMU Failed to Pay Part-Time Instructors, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
17, 2007, at 8B.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Matthew I. Pinzur, Miami-Dade Weighs Reducing Annual Raises, MIAMI
HERALD, July 16, 2007, at IA [hereinafter Pinzur, Miami-Dade Annual Raises].
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2008, while merit raises come to $46.5 million.2 °3 One solution proposed
was to eliminate 1200 jobs, among other CUts. 2°4 Another proposal would
suspend merit raises for executive employees.0 5
One controversial benefit reaped by Miami-Dade County government
workers, known as longevity bonuses, has come under scrutiny as the county
is forced by budget cuts to tighten its belt.206 While all but unheard of in the
private sector, these bonuses, ranging from $350 to over $2000, that are in
addition to cost-of-living raises, cost the county $15.9 million in 2006.207 An
editorial in the Miami Herald urged an end to this entitlement at the taxpay-
ers' expense, where "county employees with 15 years or more on the job get
a bonus paycheck just for sticking around. 20 1
Shrinking sales tax revenue in 2007 is forcing the Broward County
School District to employ fewer crossing guards, and instead of hiring 400
new teachers, it will only take on 200.209 Broward County's "living wage
law," adopted in 2003, requires county employees to be paid $10.63 an hour,
although the law does not govern contracts entered into before 2003.210
4. The Wage Gap Between Men and Women
Women make about 80% of the salaries their male counterparts do one
year after college.2 I After ten years working, the gap widens further.212
Apart from sex discrimination, the gap stems in part from people's choices.
For example, some employers assume that young women will leave their
jobs when they have children.21 3 For women without a college degree, the
pay gap with men has narrowed slightly since the mid-1990s.
21 4
In May 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled against a woman
who failed to sue "within the 180-day statute of limitations from when her
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Matthew I. Pinzur, Longevity Bonus Stretches Payroll, MIAMI HERALD, July 24,
2007, at IA.
207. Id.
208. In Another World on Taxpayers 'Dime, MIAMI HERALD, July 27, 2007, at 24A.
209. Nirvi Shah, School Cuts: Bus Service, Traffic Aides, MIAMI HERALD, July 27, 2007,
at lB [hereinafter Shah, School Cuts].
210. Amy Sherman, Shuttle Drivers Due Raises, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 21, 2007, at 3B.
211. Ellen Simon, Gender Pay Gap Widens Over Years, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 24, 2007, at
3C.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See David Leonhardt, Scant Progress on Closing Gap in Women's Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2006, at Al.
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first paycheck showed evidence of sex-based pay discrimination. '1 5  The
trouble with this ruling, however, is that given the secrecy shrouding pay
figures, women may not know what their male peers earned until it is too
late.216 Critics regard the decision as a "severe weakening of civil rights. '1 7
In August 2007, the House of Representatives "voted to reverse the Supreme
Court's [ruling] limiting the time workers have to sue their employers for
,,218pay discrimination.
Men, on average, earn more money than women. 21 9 "[A] woman earns
only 77 percent as much as her male counterpart with the same job descrip-
tion and experience.220 Among many possible reasons for this gap is that
traditionally, how much each employee earns has been shrouded in se-
crecy.22 l One proposed remedy that would enable women to know about
wage disparities between men and women would be legislation forcing all
employers to post salaries. 222 Even absent legislation, several internet web-
sites, such as Salary.com, PayScale.com, and Payscroll.com, try to level the
playing field by providing salary information to the forty-seven million peo-
ple looking for jobs each month, and to the untold "others who think they are
underpaid at the ones they have. 22 3 Surprisingly, a 2007 analysis of recent
census data found that young women in several of the country's largest cit-
ies, working full-time, earned 117% of men's wages for the twenty-one to
224thirty age group.
5. Wage Growth in South Florida
In 2007, Miami-Dade County's wage growth was the fastest among the
largest counties in the United States.22 5 While Miami-Dade County was up
8%, wage growth rose only 5.6% in Broward County between 2005 and
215. Diane Stafford, Court Ruling Complicates Pay-Disparity Issue, MIAMI HERALD, July
9, 2007, at 30G (discussing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162
(2007)).
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Supreme Court: House Against Pay Ruling, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 1, 2007, at 1C.
219. See David Leonhardt, Women Outpace Men in Wage Gains, TIMES UNIoN, Feb. 17,
2003, at Al.
220. Seeing Red, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 26, 2006, at IC.
221. See Susan E. Reed, Op-ed., Show Us the Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2007, at A23.
222. Id.
223. Damon Darlin, Using Web to Get Boss to Pay More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at
C1.
224. Sam Roberts, For Young Earners in Big City, Gap Shifts in Women's Favor, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at Al.
225. Boodhoo, Wage Growth Up, supra note 6.
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2006.226 While such statistics may be good news for the average worker,
people at the lower end of the pay scale face unexpected hardship. For ex-
ample, "wages have not kept pace" with the higher fines imposed for most
traffic violations. 27 As a result, many Floridians "fail to pay their tickets
and [end] up with a suspended license. 228 It is estimated that 1.8 million
Floridians have had their driver's licenses either revoked or suspended.229
Since 900,000 of these Floridians drive anyway, a bill was introduced in
2007 that would authorize police to "impound or boot vehicles operated by
anyone with a suspended or invalid license., 230 Two-time offenders could
receive a year in prison. 3
While $165,200 annual salaries, in the abstract, sounds like a lot of
money, such "low" pay is compelling some of the nation's best judges to
leave the federal court bench, eroding the quality of the federal judiciary
according to the testimony of Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy be-
fore Congress in 2007.232 With "first-year lawyers at leading [law] firms in
large cities ... earning almost as much as district judges," nineteen federal
judges have left the bench since 2004, many "to take higher-paying jobs., 233
In 2007, the United States Senate passed a bill that would raise federal
judges' salaries to keep pace with inflation.234
6. The Mommy Track and Part-Time Worker Issues
A 2007 study found a "notable increase in the rate among unmarried
mothers with children under age 1" in the labor force, "up 4.3 percentage
points to 59 percent. 2 35 Another 2007 study found that "[t]he marriages of
women who work outside the home are more likely to stay together than the
marriages of those who don't., 236 This finding runs counter to the view of
many economists who insist "that the specialization of a traditional mar-
226. Id.
227. Larry Lebowitz, Bill Puts Brakes on Drivers Who Have Suspended Licenses, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 5, 2007, at 1B.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Mark Sherman, Salary Lament: 'I'm Losing My Best Judges,' MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
15, 2007, at 5A.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Moms Are in Labor Force, supra note 14.
236. Frank Greve, Working Wives Help Marriages, MIAMI HERALD, May 23, 2007, at 7A
[hereinafter Greve, Working Wives].
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riage-a bread winner and a homemaker-[is] more efficient and produc-
tive. 23 7 The Bureau of Labor Statistics found an increase of roughly "8 per-
cent in the number of married women at home with infants from 1997 to
2004," with the biggest growth "among mothers with college degrees. 238
All too often, stay-at-home mothers find that even a short break from their
careers takes a "huge economic toll ... over a lifetime.,
23 9
An emerging alternative between stay-at-home and full-time working
moms is the rise in the appeal of part-time work. 40 One study found that
60% of working mothers favor part-time over full-time work, an increase of
12% since 1997.241 "[A] new generation of working mothers" cherish flexi-
bility, "but only 24 percent of them" achieve it. 242 "A decade ago, 49 percent
[of unmarried mothers] preferred full-time hours;" today only 26% do.243 By
contrast, 72% of fathers "say the ideal situation is a full-time job."2 4
Bucking the national trend, 60% of women and 67% of men "working
part time in Miami-Dade County want to work full time., 245 This departure
from the national norm may be explained, in part, by the fact that only 20%
of part-time workers have employer health insurance.246
B. Health Benefits
1. Generally
Roughly "43.6 million people in the United States, or 14.8 percent of
the population," lacked health insurance in 2006.247 In Florida, over three
million people do not have health insurance. 24 8 "More than 1.5 million full-
time [employees in Florida] are without health insurance. 2 49 Nearly "9.3
237. Id. In the new "'egalitarian marriages,' . . . husbands and wives share decision-
making power more equally and housekeeping and child-care duties more equitably." Id.
238. Ellen Goodman, New Direction for Mommy Track, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 9, 2007, at
15A.
239. Id.
240. Cindy Krischer Goodman, More Moms: Less Work, MIAMI HERALD, July 13, 2007,
at lC.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Trapped in a Part-Time World, MIAMI HERALD, May 23,
2007, at 1C.
246. Id.
247. Survey Finds 43.6 Million Uninsured in US., N.Y. TIMEs, June 26, 2007, at A13.
248. Menendez, supra note 38.
249. County Pay Boosts Families, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 19, 2007, at 3L.
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percent of children under 18 lacked [health] insurance," down from 13.9% in
1997.250 A bill in Congress proposes to extend health insurance to more un-
insured children, but President Bush opposes the measure as one step toward
socialized medicine.25'
"About 47 percent of parents in families earning" under $40,000 annu-
ally lack "health insurance through their employers"--9% less than in
1997.252 After Texas, Florida has the highest percentage of uninsured chil-
dren at 16.9%.253
"The percentage of large and medium-size employers paying 100 per-
cent of [employees'] individual [health insurance] premiums [dropped] to 17
percent in 2004 from 29 percent in 2000. ' '254 Only "6 percent of employers
in 2004" paid the full premium for family coverage, down from 11% in
2000.255 Moreover, employees "are paying more in co-payments for doctor
visits and for drug benefits. 256
In 2005, health care spending rose 6.9 0/o-the lowest increase in six
years.257 The slower pace is owed in part to a bigger reliance on generic
drugs.258 At the same time, 2005 spending on hospital care rose 7.9%, about
the same as in previous years. 259 About 2% of the U.S. population accounts
for a third of health care expenditures. 260 "Health insurance premiums ...
rose 7.7 percent [in 2006], twice the rate of inflation., 26'
250. Gail Moorstein, Private Sector Compensations Rise Incrementally in First Quarter,
CAREER JOURNAL, July 9, 2007, http://www.careerjournal.conVhrcenter/briefs/20070709-
bna.html.
251. Robert Pear, House Passes Children's Health Plan 225-204, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2007, at 13A.
252. See Employee Benefits Eroding, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 2007, at IC.
253. Id.
254. Milt Freudenheim, Fewer Employers Totally Cover Health Premiums, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2007, at IC.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Kevin Freking, Costs Rose More Slowly in 2005, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 9, 2007, at 4C.
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Ellen Simon, Firms Use 'Twinkie Taxes' to Make Workers Healthy, MIAMI HERALD,
Dec. 5, 2006, at 5C [hereinafter Simon, 'Twinkie Taxes ].
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2. National Developments
a. Federal Legislation
In his January 23, 2007 State of the Union address, President Bush pro-
posed changes to the Internal Revenue Code.262 Under the plan, employer-
provided health insurance would be treated as taxable income. 263 A standard
deduction would be provided: $15,000 for families, $7500 for individuals.2 4
On April 25, 2007, the House passed legislation that will make it illegal
for employers or health insurers to discriminate against individuals based on
their genetic information or test results.265
In 2007, "[a] bipartisan coalition in Congress [proposed] a mental
health-parity bill, which would [force] group health plans to [provide similar]
coverage for mental and physical illnesses. 266 The bill prohibits insurers
from having "different co-payments, deductibles and out-of-pocket limits for
mental-health benefits and medical/surgical benefits. 267
In 2007, the House of Representatives passed a measure forcing the
federal "government to negotiate lower drug prices for the Medicare pre-
scription drug program. '' 268 President Bush said he would veto the bill be-
cause it would be "tantamount to price controls.2 69
b. Innovative State Health Programs
In 2006, a Massachusetts law required all residents to have health insur-
ance coverage, but the governor vetoed a provision that forced employers
with eleven or more employees to provide employee health coverage, or pay
262. See The White House, Strengthening Health Care,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070223-4.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2007) [hereinafter The White House, Strengthening Health Care].
263. The White House, 2007 State of the Union, Affordable, Accessible, and Flexible
Health Care Coverage,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2007/initiatives/healthcare.html (last visited Nov.
3, 2007).
264. The White House, Strengthening Health Care, supra note 262.
265. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 493, 110th Cong., at 2
(2007). This would amend Title VII, among other federal laws. Id. at 69.
266. Rob Hotakainen, Congress Tackles Once-Taboo Issue, MII HERALD, Mar. 12,
2007, at IA.
267. Id.
268. Tony Pugh, Conflict Builds over Drug Costs, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 13, 2007, at 3A.
269. Id.
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an annual per worker assessment.27° On October 1, 2006, a Massachusetts
agency issued final regulations forcing all employers of eleven or more
workers to start making minimum contributions to employee health insur-
ance.27" ' Of the four states with plans aimed at universal health care cover-
age, "only Massachusetts has mandated individual coverage. 272
In 2007, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed a plan
that forced employers "with 10 workers or more to buy insurance for their
workers or pay a fee of 4 percent of their payroll into a program" to cover the
uninsured.273 The plan would also cover individuals otherwise denied health
insurance thanks to pre-existing medical conditions. 274 Already, "71 percent
of California employers offer [employees] health insurance." '275
Maryland's innovative Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, which is
aimed at forcing Wal-Mart Stores to spend more on employee health care,
was successfully challenged in court.27 6 In Retail Industry Leaders Ass 'n v.
Fielder,277 the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Act was preempted by the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 278 Meanwhile, Wal-Mart Stores
announced in 2007 that "the number of [employees] enrolled in [its] health
plan rose 8 percent" in late 2006, thanks to "its introduction of cheaper in-
,,271surance policies.
In Utah, an entrepreneur proposed that small businesses "should stop
[offering] group health insurance and instead" offer individual policies.280
Critics counter that people who are uninsurable, due to pre-existing illnesses,
will suffer.28'
270. H. 4850, § 32, 2006 Leg. (Mass. 2006), available at,
http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/184/ht04pdf/ht04850.pdf; see also Brian C. Mooney et
al., Ambitions Grow and the Stances Shift, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 2007, at Al.
271. 114.5 MASS. CODEREGS. 16.01 (2006).
272. Kevin Sack, California's Ambitious Health Plan Stalls, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at
A30.
273. Jordan Rau, Healthcare Overhaul Sought, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 9, 2007, at 2A.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See Michael Barbaro, Appeals Court Rules for Wal-Mart in Maryland Health Care
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at C4.
277. 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
278. Id. at 183.
279. Michael Barbaro & Reed Abelson, Wal-Mart Says Health Plan Is Covering More
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007, at C13.
280. Chad Terhune, Second Opinion: Employers Turn to Alternative for Insuring Staff
Despite Legal Concerns, Workers Are Encouraged to Use Individual Policies, WALL ST. J.,
July 30, 2007, at Al.
281. Id.
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3. Florida Developments
Health care experts met in Miami in 2007 to discuss ways of "cov-
er[ing] America's 46 million uninsured. 2 82 One plan, called Insurance-for-
All, calls for "$25 billion in federal tax funding," with the balance paid by
"subscribers who would pay $94 a month for coverage with a $1,000 de-
ductible and 20 percent co-pays. 283 Florida's new secretary of the Agency
for Health Care Administration favors covering all children "for preventive
and catastrophic care. 284
In 2007, Miami-Dade County weighed becoming self-insured to cov-
er family members of county employees against spending thousands of dol-
lars annually on insurance premiums. 285 Already, county workers have "free
HMO coverage for themselves, but family coverage" is expensive.286 But
instead of passing on savings to employees by going self-insured, the county
may have to use the fund to pay cost-of-living increases in light of the
mayor's plan to cut $222 million from the county's budget. 87
The North Broward Hospital District announced plans in 2007 "to set
up walk-up clinics in up to six Wal-Mart superstores." '88 The clinics will
charge $50 to treat simple medical problems and write common prescrip-
tions, but will refer more complex cases to one of its hospitals. 89 Wal-Mart
already has six clinics in Florida.29°
4. Wellness Programs
Thanks to mounting health care costs, many employers have set up
wellness programs aimed at encouraging workers to switch to healthier hab-
its that might reduce the incidence of diseases tied to "eating poorly and be-
ing overweight or inactive., 29' So-called "twinkie taxes" increase the price
282. John Dorschner, Who Pays for Uninsured?, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 24, 2007, at 1C.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Matthew I. Pinzur, Dade May Offer Own Health Plan, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 3, 2007,
at 1C.
286. Id.
287. Pinzur, Miami-Dade Annual Raises, supra note 202.
288. John Dorschner, Wal-Mart Getting Walk-Up Clinics, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 26, 2007,
at 5B.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Simon, 'Twinkie Taxes', supra note 261.
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of fatty foods in company cafeterias and lower the price for salads and
fruits.
292
According to one expert, "if healthcare costs keep rising, they could
consume 100 percent of the gross domestic product by 2026.,,293 But well-
ness programs face an uphill battle given that the food industry spends $25
billion annually to promote mostly unhealthy food choices while the federal
government spends only $1 million promoting fruits and vegetables per
day.
294
Of the 63% of major U.S. companies who said they would become
more involved in the health of their employees, about half in 2007 offered
incentives for workers to take part "in exercise or other wellness pro-
grams. '295 Some employers build gyms in the workplace,296 offer personal
"coaches and computerized health tracking., 297 One study found that health
care costs could be cut "in half if the employee is a nonsmoker, nonobese
and engages in physical activity three times a week., 298  While some em-
ployers charge smokers more for health insurance, few have been willing to
charge overweight workers more.299 Other employers use the carrot, not the
stick, such as lower deductibles for employees with "weight, cholesterol and
blood pressure under control. 3 °°
"The head of Florida's prison system" warned correctional employees
to get physically fit by 2009 or run the risk of losing their jobs.30 ' Under the
plan, male workers over the age of fifty must "walk or run 1.5 miles in 17
minutes, do 19 push-ups in two minutes and a minimum of 27 sit-ups. 3 2
While Florida's governor endorses the plan, some say the proposal is hurting
employee morale.30 3
The health of truck drivers has come under scrutiny given studies show-
ing that many truckers do not "wear seat belts because their stomachs get in
292. Id.
293. John Dorschner, Wellness Programs Can Save Big Money, MIAMI HERALD, June 6,
2007, at 3C.
294. Id.
295. John Dorschner, Shaping up the Workforce, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 29, 2007, at 1E
[hereinafter Dorschner, Shaping up].
296. E.g., John Dorschner, UMInvests $14M in Employee Gym, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 29,
2007, at 2E.
297. Dorschner, Shaping up, supra note 295.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Brent Kallestad, Prison's Leader Pitches Fitness Requirements, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 5,
2007, at 4.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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the way," 28% of them suffer from sleep apnea, and 50% of them smoke.3 4
Already, commercial drivers cannot be licensed if their blood pressure is too
high or if they suffer from severe heart conditions.0 5 One employer of
truckers offers free "blood pressure and cholesterol checks," while another
employer offers a twelve-week weight-loss program.30 6 Another provides
drivers, who suffer from apnea, with "air masks to help them sleep."30 7
The insurance company, Phoenix, is the first insurer to offer 20% dis-
counts "on life-insurance policies to customers whose" body-fat ratio is
low. 
308
In light of the fact "that 9.4 million illicit drug users and 10.1 million
heavy drinkers have full-time jobs," many employers, in addition to institut-
ing drug testing, are providing "benefits such as education and treatment.""3 9
5. Retiree Health Benefits
"[After] years of [massive] layoffs, employee buyouts and sending jobs
offshore, corporate America has helped create a pool of about 800,000 early
retirees who now find themselves in a health care bind., 310  Too young for
Medicare and unable to afford their own health insurance, former employees
aged fifty-five to sixty-four welcome some big employer plans offering
health insurance.3 ' Significantly, under these innovative plans, "no one
could be [denied] coverage [over pre-existing] medical condition[s]. 312
While the policies come with high annual deductibles and monthly premiums
ranging from $400 to $1200, this is far less than these early retirees would
pay on their own.3t 3 Over four million people ages fifty-five to sixty-four are
jobless and increasingly unable to afford health insurance.314 Only 18% of
large employers defray part of the cost of health insurance for retirees under
age sixty-five.315
304. Emily Fredrix, Road Hazards, MIAMI HERALD, July 11, 2007, at 1C.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Stephen Singer, Drop Pounds, and We Will Drop Rates, Insurer Says, ORLANDO
SENT., Mar. 1, 2007, at A14.
309. Nesmith, supra note 40.
310. Milt Freudenheim, Keeping Early Retirees Afloat, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 2007, at B 1.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Freudenheim, supra note 310.
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Under new rules effective in 2007, state and local public employers
must "disclose the value of the health care they have" pledged for their retir-
ees.316 The rule was enacted in 2004 by the Federal Governmental Account-
ing Standards Board to counter the common practice among public employ-
ers who promise retiree health care without disclosing the cost.3 17 Many
states with open-ended care obligations oppose the standard because these
states will likely find their credit ratings being lowered."I
New Jersey public employees were promised free health care when they
retired, provided they had worked twenty-five years.319 But in 1994, the
state stopped contributing to the health care fund and, today, New Jersey has
almost "no money in reserve to cover" the $58 billion needed to cover health
care for current and future retirees.32° One solution requires "retirees [to]
pay for part of their health premiums" and shifts "retirees into a network of
doctors at negotiated fees."32'
6. Domestic Partnership Benefits
Some states, and many cities and counties, extend dependent health
benefits to spousal equivalents of its public employees.3 22 In 2005, the Su-
preme Court of Alaska ruled that the state's grant of health insurance to mar-
ried employees' spouses, but not to same-sex domestic partners of employees
who could not legally marry, violated the Alaska Constitution's Equal Pro-
tection Clause.3 23 In 2006, Alaska Governor Sarah Palin pledged that the
state would obey the ruling affording health "benefits to same-sex partners of
state employees.,
324
316. Mary Williams Walsh, Texans Want to Strike Rule on Projecting Retiree Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007, at Cl.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Mary Williams Walsh, A $58 Billion Shortfall for New Jersey's Retiree Health Cov-
erage, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2007, at A14.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 791-92 (Alaska 2005). As
of 2007, while Massachusetts is the only state that recognizes gay marriage, the District of
Columbia and five states offer civil unions or domestic partnerships to gay couples. The Sky
Isn't Falling, WASH. POST, July 5, 2007, at 16A. In August 2007, Kathleen Sebelius, Gover-
nor of Kansas, "signed an executive order" extending protection to most state employees from
sexual orientation discrimination. Kansas: Governor Signs Ban on Bias Based on Sexuality,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2007, at A12. The order also extends protection to "people who have had
surgery for sex changes." Id.
323. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d at 793-94.
324. Same-Sex Partners to Get State Benefits, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 21, 2006, at 3A.
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In 2007, California became "the first state to" force businesses holding
"state contracts to offer domestic partners" of its employees the same bene-
fits that spouses enjoy.325
The Broward County, Florida, law granting "marriage-like benefits to
unmarried domestic partners of employees, homosexual or heterosexual,"
was allowed to stand by the Supreme Court of Florida.3
26
7. Disability and Death Benefits
According to a 2007 survey, "22 million Americans live and work in
chronic pain," up from 15 million in 1996.327 Part of the blame is owed to
ever-growing workloads.2 8 Another 2007 study found that when formerly
"uninsured people became eligible for Medicare, they had 13 percent more
doctor visits, 20 percent more hospitalizations, and reported 51 percent
greater medical expenditures than those with the same diseases who had in-
surance all along. 3 29 According to the Social Security Administration, one-
third of twenty-year-old workers in 2007 will become disabled by age sixty-
seven and the key cause of disability will be chronic disease, not work-
related illnesses, injuries, or non-workplace accidents. 331 "About 42 percent
of full-time workers have no short or long-term disability" insurance.331
In 2007, "Veterans Affairs Secretary Jim Nicholson" launched a plan to
guarantee that disabled veterans "receive state benefits they might" have no
knowledge of, owing to federal privacy law.332 Among other state benefits,
veterans are entitled to job training.333 In Florida, "[t]en severely disabled
veterans" received valuable state benefits "during a four-month tryout of the
plan. 334
325. In California, Equal Benefits for Partners Are Mandated, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2003,
at A23.
326. Caroline J. Keough, Broward Same-Sex Benefits Survive High Court Won't Hear
Attack on Law, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 7, 2001, at IA.
327. Study: Many Americans Work/Live in Pain, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 10, 2007, at 3C.
328. Id.
329. Gina Kolata, Some Chronically Ill Adults Wait for Medicare to Arrive, N.Y. TIMES,
July 12, 2007, at A14.
330. Hillary Chura, Disability, the Insurance That Is Often Sadly Overlooked, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2007, at B7.
331. Id.
332. Suzanne Gamboa, Veterans' Chances to Collect Benefits Improved, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 13, 2007, at 3A.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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In 2007, injured Iraq War veterans sued the federal government over de-
lays in securing disability pay and health care. 335 Among other allegations,
the lawsuit accuses the Veterans Benefits Administration of knowingly
cheating some vets by reclassifying post-traumatic stress disorder claims as
pre-existing personality disorders to avoid paying benefits.336
Under the Federal Hometown Heroes Act, "if an emergency responder
dies of a heart attack or stroke within 24 hours of duty, there is a 'presump-
tion' that the person died in the line of duty," entitling survivors to death
benefits.33 7 In 2006, of the 106 firefighters who died in the line of duty, thir-
teen were entitled to death benefits under the Hometown Heroes Act.338
However, nationwide, over 200 survivors of such heroes have not received
the $295,194 in death benefits, outraging advocates for fallen firefighters and
police officers.339
Under the federal Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act (PSOBA), Con-
gress extended death benefits to families of firefighters or police officers
"who enforce the criminal law rather than only civil law., 340 The Federal
Circuit ruled that a deputy sheriff, who did not actually enforce criminal laws
and was accidentally killed in a wild horse roundup, was not entitled to
PSOBA death benefits.34'
8. Family Medical Leave Act Issues
Under the FMLA, all state and local government eligible employees are
entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve-month period: (1) for
birth or adoption of a child or placement of a foster child; (2) to care for a
spouse, child or parent with a serious health condition; 342 or (3) for the em-
ployee's own serious health condition.343 In the twelve years since the
335. Hope Yen, Vets Sue over Healthcare, MIAMI HERALD, July 24, 2007, at 5A.
336. Id.
337. Barbara Barrett, 'Heroes' Family Benefits Stalled, MIAMI HERALD, May 7, 2007, at
5A.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Hawkins v. United States, 469 F.3d 993, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
341. See id. at 995-97.
342. Mark Zelek, Department of Labor Seeks Employer Input by Feb. 2, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 15, 2007, at 7G. "Only 7 percent of U.S. [employers] have specific policies on caring for
elderly family members," but about 16% of all employees care "for an elderly, ill or disabled
family member." Christina Rexrode, Next Care Challenge: The Elderly, ST. PETE. TIMEs,
Aug. 12, 2007, at IF.
343. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2000). The Department of Labor estimates that 94.4
million employees work for FMLA-covered employers, with about 76.1 million workers
eligible for FMLA leave. Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the De-
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FMLA was enacted, over fifty million workers have taken unpaid leave and
employers want clarification on what constitutes a "'serious health condition'
... and the use of unscheduled intermittent leave or sporadic absences." 3"
Moreover, employers seek the right to call doctors to confirm employee ill-
nesses. 
345
While employers aim at weakening the FMLA, employee advocates are
working to strengthen and extend its protections. For example, studies show-
ing that the marriages of women who work outside the home are more stable
than the marriages of those who do not are cited to support "public-policy
arguments for more paid maternal and paternal leave. 3 46 "In Miami-Dade
County, a local version of the [FMLA grants] unpaid time off to workers
caring for grandparents. 347
While the FMLA provides for unpaid leave, paid leave has become a
new battlefront. Already, "[a]t Ernst & Young, new fathers can take up to
six weeks paid paternity leave., 348 In 2007, a new law took effect in San
Francisco "requiring paid sick leave for all ... employees," the "first of its
kind in the United States., 349 In 2007, Ohio weighed the decision of whether
to join eighteen states that grant maternity leave going beyond the require-
ments of the FMLA. 35" The proposed Ohio law offers employees at a work-
place with four or more workers twelve weeks of unpaid leave for infant
care, no matter how long they have been on the job.'
"Legislation has been proposed nationally and in Florida to [force] em-
ployers [to grant] paid sick days;" eight other states are weighing legislation
too.352 Under the proposed federal Healthy Families Act, 353 employers with
fifteen or more employees must grant workers up to seven paid sick days a
year. 354
partment of Labor's Request for Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,550, 35,551 (proposed June 28,
2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825). In 2005 alone, between 6.1 million and 13 million
workers took FMLA leave. Id.
344. See Cindy Krischer Goodman, Sick? Prove It!, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 28, 2007, at 1 C.
345. Id.
346. Greve, Working Wives, supra note 236.
347. Zelek, supra note 342.
348. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Year of the Man, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 17, 2007, at IC.
349. Nancy S. Paik, Don't Let Groundbreaking Sick-Leave Law Become a Headache, THE
RECORDER, Feb. 9, 2007, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=l 170928964690.
350. Bob Driehaus, Ohio Pushes Added Leave for Maternity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007,
at A15.
351. Id.
352. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Cold Remedy, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 21, 2007, at 1C.
353. Healthy Families Act, H.R. 1542, 110th Cong. (2007).
354. Id. §§ 4(3)(B)(i)(I), 5(a)(1).
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Almost 50% of all full-time, private sector employees receive no paid
sick days.355 About 80% of employees in the bottom quarter of wage earners
get no paid sick days at all.356 About 145 countries grant paid sick leave,
leaving the United States as "the only industrialized [nation] lacking such a
[benefit] .
A 2006 survey found "that personal illness accounts for only 35 percent
of unscheduled absences, [with the balance owing] to family issues (24 per-
cent), personal needs (18 percent), stress (12 percent), and entitlement men-
tality (11 percent). 358
A Florida court ruled that an employer violated the FMLA by failing to
explain FMLA benefits and leave rights to an employee when she asked for
leave.359 This failure amounts to actionable interference with the worker's
capacity to exercise her right to FMLA leave if she can establish resulting
prejudice.360
A hog slaughtering plant in North Carolina protested a company's deci-
sion not to give them Martin Luther King Jr. Day as a paid day off by refus-
ing to work part of the day.3 61
On July 1, 2007, a new Florida law, "[a]n act relating to domestic vio-
lence," took effect.362 The law entitles certain employees up to three work-
ing days leave who are either victims of domestic violence themselves, or
have a family member who is a victim. 3 63 The law applies to workplaces
with fifty or more employees.3 64 Individuals requesting leave must have
worked for at least three months.365
C. Guns and Violence in the Workplace
In March 2007, the Florida Senate Criminal Justice Committee
adopted a measure that would bar employers from prohibiting guns, pornog-
355. Bob Herbert, The Right to Paid Sick Days, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2007, at A29.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Absenteeism Hits New High, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28, 2006, at IC.
359. See Patterson v. Browning's Pharmacy & Healthcare, Inc., 961 So. 2d 982, 986 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
360. Id. at 986-87.
361. Estes Thompson, Hog Slaughterers Protest Work on MLK Day, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
16, 2007, at 1IB.
362. Act effective July 1, 2007, ch. 2007-107, §§ 1-2, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 1034,
1034 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.313).
363. Id. § 1, 2007 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1035 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.313(2)(a)
(2007)).
364. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 741.313(3) (2007)).
365. Id.
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raphy, and other legal material from their parking lots. 3" Although the bill
shields employers if any of the legal materials were enlisted to commit a
crime, opponents insist the law infringes on employers' property rights and
Florida's "at will" labor laws.367 Advocates of the bill assert that if an em-
ployee "is licensed to carry a gun," that right also includes keeping it in his
car, no matter where it is parked.
368
In April 2007, however, the Florida House Committee killed the
NRA-backed measure a day after the gun slaughter of thirty-two people at
Virginia Tech.369  Employers cheered the bill's defeat, claiming the law
would have exposed them to marked liability and posed a risk to employ-
ees. 370 In a poll of 600 voters, 62% said they had no knowledge of the "gun
at work" law.371
In March 2007, a Florida "judge [flashed] a handgun in his court-
room after a man... punched a handcuffed defendant accused of molesting
his son., 372 "Duvall County['s] Public Defender ... questioned the safety of
[permitting] judges to carry guns," even though the practice is currently le-
gal.373
Violence in the workplace is more likely during downsizing and lay-
offs, and is often preceded by danger signals ranging from staring, to nasty
looks, to verbal threats, to stalking.374 Violence can stem from former em-
ployees who are "bitter about their separation," and domestic violence "can.
. .spill over into the workplace., 375  Prudent workplace security policies
should declare "zero tolerance for threatening or violent behavior., 37 6 In the
private workplace, federal law makes clear that "in [any] workplace [in
which] the risk[s] of violence and serious personal injury are [substantial]
enough to be 'recognized hazards,"' the employer must take reasonable steps
to counter those risks.377
366. Jim Wyss, Loaded Debate, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 28, 2007, at 1C.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Monica Hatcher, 'Guns at Work' Bill Rejected, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 19, 2007, at IC.
370. Id.
371. 62% Percent of Voters Unaware of Gun Bill, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 17, 2007, at 3C.
372. Judge Pulls out Gun in Court, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 28, 2007, at 7B.
373. Id.
374. Eilene Zimmerman, Danger Signals at Work, and How to Handle Them, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2007, at 18.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. OSHA Interpretation Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Director, Directorate of En-
forcement Programs, to Morgan Melekos (Sept. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.showdocument?ptable=INTERPRETATIONS&
p_id=25504.
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According to a survey of workplace violence conducted by the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, over 70% of U.S. workplaces lack a policy address-
ing workplace violence, and about 80% offer no training for preventing it.37 8
The survey also found that 5.3% of all employers faced an incident of work-
place violence in the previous year. 171
D. Workers' Compensation
In 2003, Florida's workers' compensation law was substantially
overhauled, resulting in fewer injured workers' claims, largely owing it to
"less fraud and abuse. 380 In late 2006, state regulators approved a reduction
in workers' compensation insurance rates, averaging 16% statewide. 381 Flor-
ida's Chief Financial Officer ordered a 50% reduction in the 2008 Workers'
Compensation Administration Trust Fund assessment rate, which is projected
to save Florida employers $19 million.382
Thanks to sagging sales tax collections, the Broward County School
District cut "$61 million from its budget" in 2007, including $2 million on
workers' compensation claims.38 3  Many employers saw annual workers'
compensation claims drop 80% after introducing wellness programs aimed at
preventing illnesses.3 4
In 2006-07, Florida case law addressed a wide range of workers'
compensation issues, including: 1) employee versus independent contractor
status;385 2) the exclusivity of workers' compensation as claimants' sole re-
course; 386 3) heart and lung acts creating rebuttable presumptions that some
378. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Survey of Workplace
Violence Prevention 2005 (Oct. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osnr0026.pdf.
379. Id.
380. Drop in Workers' Comp Rates Approved, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 1, 2006, at 3C.
381. See id
382. Assessment Rate Cut 50 Percent, MIAMI HERALD, July 9, 2007, at 5G.
383. Shah, School Cuts, supra note 209.
384. Emily Fredrix, Road Hazards, supra note 304 (explaining that as a result of the intro-
duction of wellness programs aimed at preventing illness, one company in Michigan saw an
80% drop in workers' compensation claims).
385. Compare Orange County Sch. Bd. v. Powers, 959 So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2007) (explaining that student teachers are not employees covered by workers' compen-
sation), with Fla. Dep't of Fin. Servs. v. MJ Versaggi Trust, 952 So. 2d 583, 586 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that construction workers who do not meet the definition of an
independent contractor are considered employees and covered by workers' compensation); see
also Blue Stone Real Estate v. Ward, 962 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
386. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(l)(b) (2007) (providing for tort claims against "an employer
[who] commits an intentional tort that causes" an employee's injury or death); see generally
Bakerman v. Bombay Co., 961 So. 2d 259, 265 (Fla. 2007) (finding an exception to workers'
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illnesses are job-related for police and firefighters; 387 4) medical benefits;3s8
5) pre-existing conditions;389 6) the dual purpose exception to the going and
coming rule; 390 7) offsets;391 and 8) remedies. 392
E. Unemployment Compensation
According to a 2007 "study, unemployment benefits [in the United
States] replace, on average, [only] 14 percent of workers' lost earnings. 393
At the federal level, in 2006, the Department of Labor issued a final rule
requiring state agencies doling out unemployment compensation to protect
confidential information as a condition for securing federal grants to operate
their departments.3 94 On January 16, 2007, the Department of Labor pub-
lished a final rule that codifies a federal requirement that states may only
compensation immunity where an employer's acts were substantially certain to result in injury
or death).
387. See Orange County Fire Rescue v. Jones, 959 So. 2d 785, 789 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (finding "hepatitis C is no longer recognized as an occupational disease for firefight-
ers"); City of Tarpon Springs v. Vaporis, 953 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(noting that the "presumption merely [shifts] the burden of proof' to an employer to prove that
a heart attack was not suffered in the line of duty).
388. James W. Windham Builders, Inc. v. Overloop, 951 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2007) (finding a written prescription is needed before attendant care may be provided).
See generally One Beacon Ins. v. Agency for Healthcare Admin., 958 So. 2d 1127, 1129 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (addressing reimbursement of an ambulatory surgical center charge).
In Florida, medical coverage for a workers' compensation injury lasts for the life of the in-
jured employee. See FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(c) (2007). The employer, however, is entitled to
select the doctors who treat the employee, and the employer is entitled to receive the injured
employee's workers' compensation medical records. See id. §§ 440.13(4)(b), 440.15(l)(e)1.
389. Pearson v. Paradise Ford, 951 So. 2d 12, 17 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
390. Wilcox v. AG Mart Produce, 942 So. 2d 959, 962-63 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(stating that although an employee was injured while driving his company car home from
work, he is not entitled to workers' compensation under the dual purpose exception to the
going and coming rule because the employer received no benefit from keeping its car at the
employee's house at night).
391. Fla. Marine Patrol v. Clifton, 959 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007);
O'Connor v. Hillsborough County Sec. Servs., 954 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
392. Chavez v. Bonnie Tile Corp., 959 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
See generally Minerd v. Walgreens & Kemper Nat'l Ins. Cos., 962 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (calculating reasonable attorney's fees).
393. Editorial, The Less-Than-Generous State, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 2007, at A24.
394. See Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Program (UC), 71 Fed. Reg. 56,830,
56,830 (Sept. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 603).
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award unemployment compensation to claimants "who are able [to work]
and available ... for work.
3 95
At the end of 2006, "Florida's overall non-farm [unemployment] rate,
seasonally adjusted, was 3.3 percent," with "Broward County's jobless rate.
. the lowest in South Florida at 2.7 percent," while Miami-Dade County's
unemployment rate was 3.5%.396 While Florida added 145,200 jobs in Janu-
ary 2007, which is a 1.8% growth, "the state's rate of employment growth
has slowed" markedly compared to the past few years.3 97 By June 2007,
Florida's jobless rate was 3.4%, still far lower than the national average and
"the lowest of the 10 most populous states."398 While experts insist Florida
is not "headed for a recession," earlier forecasts of how much the state's
economy would contract were too sanguine.3 99 By July 2007, however, Flor-
ida's jobless rate rose to its "highest [level] in two years., 40  The state's
unemployment rate in July registered 3.9%, quite a hike "over the June [to]
July 2006 rate of 3.3 percent," but Florida still ranks "below the national rate
of 4.6 percent.,
41
Claimants are not eligible for jobless benefits if they were "discharged
for misconduct connected with work. 40 2 A Florida court ruled in 2007 that a
claimant's refusal to allow his employer to inspect the contents of his brief-
case amounted to misconduct, especially since the former employee admitted
that he possessed company property in his briefcase. 3
395. Unemployment Compensation-Eligibility, 72 Fed. Reg. 1890, 1890 (Jan. 16, 2007)
(to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 604).
396. Niala Boodhoo, Florida's Jobless Rate Maintains Status Quo, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
20, 2007, at IC.
397. Niala Boodhoo, Job Growth Slow but Steady, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 9, 2007, at 3C.
398. David Royse, Report: Fla. Slowdown to Linger, MIAMI HERALD, July 13, 2007, at
IC.
399. 1d.
400. Niala Boodhoo, Jobless Rate Rises as Construction Slows, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 18,
2007, at IA.
401. Id.
402. Leedham v. State Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 950 So. 2d 475, 476 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
403. Id. at 477.
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F. Public Pensions
1. National Developments
Generally, nationwide public employee pensions are more secure than
private sector employee pensions.4" Increasingly, however, more and more
public employers are chipping away at those pension promises. 405 Thanks to
unexpectedly spiraling obligations to retirees, public employers have raised
the eligibility requirements for retirement; some have declared bankruptcy to
shed some of the nation's $1.4 trillion public pension debt.40 6
In the 1990s, many local governments started tapping their public
pension funds to help pay for retiree health care of former public employ-
ees.4"7 But with "double-digit increases in health care costs," some are re-
gretting it."'
At the federal level, "[t]he Governmental Accounting Standards
Board [(GASB)] . . . sets the rules for state and local governments."4 9 In
2006, the GASB proposed rules that would require public pension funds to
report their financial position, much like private corporations. 0
Until recently, public pensions of federal lawmakers could be for-
feited only if the office holder "commit[ed] crimes such as treason or espio-
nage."41' In 2007, however, a House bill weighed extending forfeiture for
other "felonies related to the performance of official duties.
4 12
2. Florida Developments
In 2007, "Florida became the first state" to enact a law banning state
pension fund investing "in any companies doing business with Iran's energy
404. Mary Williams Walsh, Once Safe, Public Pensions Are Now Facing Cuts, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2006, at A19.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Mary Williams Walsh, Paying Health Care from Pensions Proves Costly, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2006, at Al.
408. Id.
409. Mary Williams Walsh, Estimates for Pensions to Tighten, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 2006,
at Cl.
410. Id.
411. Jim Abrams, House Votes to Strip Convicted Members' Pensions, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 24, 2007, at 6A.
412. Id.
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sector and Sudan."4 3 Together, Florida's pension fund and the investment
fund for state employees amount to $130 billion.4
In Florida, public employees "can forfeit [their] taxpayer-funded pen-
sion benefits" if they "are found guilty or plead no contest" to "conduct that
represents a violation of public trust.,,41 5 Three Hollywood police officers
arrested in an FBI sting in 2007 faced losing their public pensions if they
accepted a plea deal or plead no contest to the charges.4" 6
As belt tightening grips Florida's cities and counties thanks to shrink-
ing tax revenues and property tax reform, lavish public pension benefits have
come under scrutiny. For example, some criticize Davie, Florida's generous
system, whereby firefighters are entitled to a 95% pension of their final sal-
ary after thirty years.4 17 By contrast, Fort Lauderdale police officers receive
only 60% after twenty years of service.418
The Broward County School District's 10,300 substitute and part-
time teachers' pensions, unlike their full-time counterparts, receive no
matching funds from the school district."9 Criticized as the "privatization"
of Social Security, the practice is being challenged in federal court by dis-
gruntled substitutes and part-timers whose pensions are invested in low-
interest accounts instead of a state matching program. 2 °
In 2007, a Florida court denied a beneficiary retroactive retirement
benefits, since nine years earlier she had "failed to timely respond to three"
notices of her right "to monthly retirement benefit[s] following her hus-
band's death." '421 Under Florida's Deferred Retirement Option Program
(DROP), longtime school administrators are entitled to retirement benefits at
the same time they earn their regular salary for five years before they re-
tire.422 One popular Broward County school principal, however, faced
413. Sudan Off-Limits for Florida Pension Fund, MIAMI HERALD, June 9, 2007, at 3C.
414. Breanne Gilpatrick, State Investments Bill Would Drop Firms Active in Iran, Sudan,
MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 2007, at 8B.
415. Wanda J. DeMarzo et al., Pensions at Stake in Police Scandal, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
23, 2007, at lB.
416. Id.
417. Fred Grimm, Firefighter Pensions: It's Another World, MIAMI HERALD, June 24,
2007, at 3B.
418. Id.
419. Nirvi Shah, Substitute Teacher Sues, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 3, 2006, at 3B.
420. Id. Under a 1991 federal tax law, some public employers may "contribute to gov-
ernment retirement programs-instead of to Social Security-on behalf of their employees."
Id
421. Hoffman v. Fla. Dep't of Mgmt. Servs., 964 So. 2d 163, 164, 167 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2007).
422. Nirvi Shah, School's 'Kahuna' on Retirement Wave, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 29, 2007,
at lB.
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forced retirement at age fifty-seven or losing eleven months of retirement
pay for unwisely enrolling in the DROP program.423
G. Working Conditions
Recent surveys reveal that both employers and employees are over-
worked.4 24  One study of small business owners found that 20% said they
carried "their phones or documents on... bathroom breaks." '425 About 50%
"checked voice mail or e-mail or used a cell phone during family time, while
driving or while on vacation." '426 40% said they worked eighty-hour
weeks. 427 40% "had no plans to take a vacation in the next six months."
428
When work spills over into personal lives, "private lives ... are not as pri-
vate anymore. 429 Increasingly, workers face "24/7 client demands, [short]
deadlines, and [volatile] work flows;" therefore, it is no wonder that "45 per-
cent of high-earning [employees] are too tired [at the end of an overlong
workday] to say anything to their spouses or partners., 430 Abusive employ-
ers are also contributing to employee "exhaustion, job tension, nervousness,
depress[ion], and mistrust., 431 Poor morale lowers productivity too.432
In response, more and more workplaces are experimenting with ways of
achieving a reasonable work-life balance.433 For example, some workers
facing child-care emergencies bring a child to work or work from home.434
Some opt to work for a temporary agency, working full-time some weeks but
"turning down jobs when family demands" emerge.4 35 It is no surprise that
423. Id.
424. See generally Jane Bussey, Work Life Overtakes Leisure, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 9,
2007, at IC [hereinafter Bussey, Work Life]. But a 2007 study found that "[t]he average
worker wastes 1.7 hours a day [surfing the Web], socializing with co-workers, and conducting
personal business." Average Time Slacking: 1.7 Hours in a Workday, MIAMI HERALD, Aug.
27, 2007, at 9G.
425. Bussey, Work Life, supra note 424.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Should We Ever Get Involved?, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 21,
2007, at 1C.
430. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Struggling to Escape 'The Dead Zone', MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 28, 2007, at IC [hereinafter Goodman, Struggling to Escape].
431. Brent Kallestad, Got a Bad Boss? You're Not Alone, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 2, 2007, at
5B.
432. Id.
433. Cindy Krischer Goodman, The Art of the Exit, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 11, 2006, at IC.
434. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Bring Kids Get Fired, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 25, 2007, at
IC [hereinafter Goodman, Bring Kids].
435. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Lovin' Tempin', MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 27, 2006, at IC.
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temp agencies are projected to "grow faster than any other industry" in the
next ten years, producing 1.6 million jobs.436 Today, temp jobs are held by
2.9 million people.43 7 Telecommuting-working at home-offers flexibility,
eliminates commuting time, lowers absenteeism, and improves recruitment
and retention.438
Innovative solutions to child-care responsibilities are emerging. For ex-
ample, some hospitals offer "sick-child day-care center[s]."43 9 Bringing chil-
dren to work, however, is sometimes not an option-either owing to em-
ployer inflexibility or hazardous workplaces."'
Flexible schedules are yet another popular option for achieving a rea-
sonable balance between the demands of work and family. While flexible
schedules are options for two-thirds of working parents earning over $71,000
a year, it is offered to less than one-third earning under $28,000 a year.44 A
voluntary overtime system would be welcomed by many working parents as
well.
Workers enlist a host of strategies for reducing job-related stress: some
use the commute to decompress; others relax after work with a drink or two;
some turn to physical activity; and some "negotiate a time out" at home
where family members leave the tired worker alone and undisturbed until
dinner.44
2
H. Health and Safety
"[I]n 2005, 406 people lost their lives on the job" in Florida while
"246,300 were injured or became ill [thanks to] unsafe [working] condi-
tions."" 3 Florida has less than fifty Occupational Safety and Health Admini-
stration (OSHA) inspectors covering the whole state. 444
Nationwide, 5734 workers died at work, "and 4.2 million were injured"
in 2005." According to the Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention,
workplaces today are about "40,000 lives a year safer than they were in the
436. Id.
437. See id.
438. See Mark Cheskin & Kristen Foslid, So You're Thinking About Offering Telecommut-
ing? Think Carefully, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 12, 2007, at 9G.
439. Goodman, Bring Kids, supra note 434.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Goodman, Struggling to Escape, supra note 430.
443. Fred Frost, Letter to the Editor, Support Job Safety, MIAMI HERALD, May 6, 2007, at
4L.
444. Id.
445. Id.
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1930s.,, 446  Among several factors credited for safer workplaces is the
marked "increase in the number of ... women, whose accident rate is [only
one] tenth that of men.""' 7 The four leading causes of job-related deaths
include: 1) highway deaths; 2) falls; 3) a category known as "struck by ob-
ject;" and 4) homicide. 48 Roughly 75% of workplace killings stem from
robberies. 449 Workplace homicides decreased to 564 in 2005 compared to
1080 in 1994.450
Since 2001, OSHA enforcement of workplace safety weakened as
OSHA's Secretary moved "aggressively away from regulations in favor of
corporations' pledges to police themselves. 45' In addition, Congress re-
pealed an ergonomics regulation for employees. 52 The Bush Administration
successfully rolled back what it deemed onerous OSHA rules that put un-
needed "costs on businesses and consumers. 453 Since 2001, OSHA issued
fewer significant standards in its history.454
I. Public Unions
In agency shops, public employees must pay union dues whether or not
they join the union. Thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that states must constitutionally recognize the agency shop for public em-
ployment so long as union dues go toward collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment.455 At the same time, the ruling
recognized that public employees' freedom of association is unduly burdened
when the union forces them to contribute to the support of an ideological
cause they oppose.456 What remained unresolved until 2007 was whether the
employee must take the initiative and specifically object to having a portion
of the fees used for political causes she opposes, or whether the union must
obtain the objecting employee's consent before diverting fees for that pur-
pose. 4
57
446. Greve, Workplaces, supra note 66.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id
450. Id.
451. Editorial, Crippling Government from Within, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at A26.
452. Id.
453. Stephen Labaton, OSHA Leaves Worker Safety Largely in Hands of Industry, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 25, 2007, at Al.
454. See id
455. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977).
456. Id. at 241.
457. Mark Sherman, Use of Union Dues at Issue, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 27, 2006, at 7A.
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In Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 5 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the State of Washington's "opt-in" law shifting the
burden to the union to obtain objecting employees' consent,459 in contrast to
the traditional "opt-out" alternative already approved of in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education46 where the employee bears the burden of taking the
initiative.46' In vacating the Supreme Court of Washington's ruling, striking
down the "opt-in" provision as an unconstitutional burden on a union's rights
of free speech and association, the United States Supreme Court said states
are free to adopt either the "opt-in" or "opt-out" approach without violating
the First Amendment.462
Other federal level developments affecting public unions nationwide in-
clude a ruling by the District of Columbia Circuit Court interpreting a provi-
sion in federal law ensuring that Homeland Security "employees may organ-
ize, bargain collectively, and participate through labor organizations of their
own choosing in decisions which affect them., 463 In National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Chertoff,46 the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the
Department of Homeland Security illegally restricted collective bargaining
rights of its employees.465
In 2007, President Bush and his Senate allies threatened to oppose an
anti-terror bill if Congress approved it containing a provision entitling fed-
eral airport screeners to unionize. 46  Nevertheless, on March 13, 2007, the
United States Senate enacted a measure extending collecting bargaining
rights to Transportation Security Administration airport screeners.467
A Florida court in 2007 upheld the constitutionality of a law 4 6t that pro-
hibits public employee unions, "their members, agents, or representatives, or
... persons acting on their behalf... from soliciting public employees dur-
ing working hours. 469
458. 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007).
459. Id. at 2379.
460. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
461. Linda Greenhouse, Rights of Unions and Non-Members Vie at Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2007, at A24.
462. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2382.
463. 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(4) (2000 & Supp. 112002).
464. 452 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
465. Id. at 867.
466. Laurie Kellman, Terrorism Bill Draws Veto Threat Bush, Senators Reject Union for
Screeners, SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 28, 2007, at 3A.
467. Improving America's Security Act of 2007, S.4, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted).
468. Menegat v. City of Apopka, 954 So. 2d 681, 683 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
469. FLA. STAT. § 447.509 (2007).
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IV. DISCIPLINE, RETALIATION, FIRST AMENDMENT, AND HATCH ACT
REMEDIES
A. Discipline
At the federal level, the Congressional Research Service urged that at-
will employees, who are quarantined after exposure to dangerous viruses be
protected under the doctrine of wrongful discharge on the grounds that the
employer violates public policy by undermining acts that are "beneficial to
the public welfare."47
In 2007, the Florida House passed a bill prohibiting "the bullying of
students and employees at school, on school buses, at school events, and
online."47' "The Senate version of the [anti-harassment] bill is stalled in that
chamber.
4 72
Discipline cases involving public school teachers fall more or less into
two categories: misconduct committed at school and off-duty misconduct.
A 2007 analysis of thousands of Florida teacher investigations revealed that
over 50% of the "750 teachers punished since 1997 for sexual misconduct or
physical and verbal assaults on students ... [continued] to keep their li-
cense[s] to teach." '473 "While principals and superintendents can" dismiss
errant teachers if they have notice of prior misconduct allegations, the state
licensing board decides if the teacher should still be certified to teach in other
Florida schools.
4 74
Beginning in 2008, state education officials will unveil the website,
MyFloridaTeacher.com, enabling parents to learn whether complaints have
been lodged against teachers, the county where the misconduct occurred, and
the ultimate resolution of any disciplinary action.
4 75
Disciplinary action recently taken pursuant to complaints against teach-
ers over misconduct committed at school include: a) "indefinite suspension
[of a middle school arts teacher] after he showed students a documentary
470. CRS Says Wrongful Discharge Claims Could Protect At-Will Quarantined Workers,
U.S. LAW WK., Aug. 22, 2006, at 2103.
471. House Passes Bill to Ban Harassment at Schools, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 25, 2007, at
9B.
472. Id.
473. Editorial, Teachers Instruct Despite Infractions, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 19, 2007, at
6B.
474. Id.
475. Nirvi Shah, Website Shows How Teachers Disciplined, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 3, 2007,
at 5B.
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[portraying] images of aborted fetuses;" '4 76 b) resignation of a second-grade
teacher who admitted hitting students with a belt or ruler or shaking or grab-
bing them to control their behavior;477 c) suspension of a high school teacher,
in part, for using his "school-issued laptop to [view] sexually explicit web-
sites;" ' and d) potential dismissal of a teacher for lifting a student by his
head.479
Disciplinary action recently taken against teachers for off-duty miscon-
duct include: a) potential dismissal of a teacher after he was arrested for
fondling an eleven-year-old boy while on vacation in Hawaii;48 b) potential
discipline of a high school culinary arts teacher after he was charged with
possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia;4"' c) a history teacher quit
after students saw pictures of her posing for the U.S. National Bikini Team
on a website;482 and d) a part-time high school music teacher was threatened
with dismissal if he refused to pull out of a community theater production of
The Full Monty, where he bared his bottom.483
Turning to the judiciary, a judge ordered a court stenographer-and all
her equipment-sent to jail until she completes an overdue transcript of a
child rape case.4" Judges themselves faced disciplinary action on several
grounds including being arrested for smoking marijuana in a public park and
for making insensitive comments in court about minority groups.485 A Mi-
ami City Commissioner was removed from office after engaging "in a drun-
ken fight with police at [an airport]. 486 In 2007, three police officers "re-
476. Nirvi Shah, Teacher in Bind for Controversial Project, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 27,
2006, at 9B.
477. Teacher Who Hit Students Resigns, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2007, at 2B (stating that
while corporal punishment is permitted by Florida law, Broward County had banned it).
478. Two Teachers Accused of Misconduct Suspended, MIAMI HERALD, July 25, 2007, at
3B.
479. Nirvi Shah, Board to Rule on Firing Two Teachers, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 2, 2007, at
3B.
480. Id.
481. Cops: Teacher Received Marijuana in the Mail, MIAMI HERALD, July 26, 2007, at
3B.
482. Christina DeNardo, Former Teacher Poses for Playboy, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 13,
2007, at 6B.
483. Teacher Sticks by 'Full Monty', MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 2007, at 8B.
484. Scott Andron, Tardy Transcriber Is Jailed, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 11, 2007, at 3B.
485. Nikki Waller & Kathleen McGrory, Longtime Judge Charged with Smoking Mari-
juana, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 20, 2007, at IA.
486. Editorial, No-Contest Plea Isn 't an Acquittal, MIAMI HERALD, June 6, 2007, at 16A.
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signed after an investigation [found] they had sex with prostitutes and some
[traded] drugs for [sex]. 487
B. Retaliation
1. Federal Whistleblower Statutes
The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, passed by the House
of Representatives in 2007, would extend protection against official retalia-
tion to the FBI, to intelligence agencies, "[a]nd non-government workers
employed by federal contractors. 488 In addition, the measure extends anti-
retaliation rights to employees who complain "about the politicization of
science by patronage appointees and to airport security workers. 489
Under the Federal False Claims Act (FCA), public employees who re-
port government fraud are protected against retaliation, and may also recover
"a percentage of the funds recovered. ' 490 An amendment to the FCA, effec-
tive January 2007, requires public employers to instruct their workers on
how to detect health care fraud and how to be whistleblowers once they ex-
pose it.491 It is estimated that there is one billion dollars a year of Medicaid
fraud in South Florida alone. 492 A former accountant at a Miami public hos-
pital claimed she was discharged after blowing "the whistle on a financial
scandal. 493
Under the FCA, a person bringing a cause of action must be an original
source of the information.494 In 2007, the United States Supreme Court
ruled, in Rockwell International Corp. v. United States,495 that "[a]n 'original
487. Three Officers Resign over Illicit Sex Charges, MIAMI HERALD, July 27, 2007, at
10B.
488. Editorial, Protecting Those Who Speak Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.16, 2007, at A22.
489. Id.
490. John Dorschner, Hospital Workers Learning How to Be Whistle-Blowers, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 29, 2006, at 1C [hereinafter Dorschner, Hospital].
491. HCA, Florida False Claims Statutes Policy (October 2006),
http://www.nfrmc.comi/CPM/HCAFalseClaimsAct.pdf. In 2003, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that counties may be subject to suit under the FCA. See Cook County, Ill. v.
United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 122 (2003).
492. Dorschner, Hospital, supra note 490.
493. Tere Figueros Negrete, Fired Whistle-Blower Wants Job Back, MIAMI HERALD, July
14, 2007, at 5B.
494. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
495. 127 S. Ct 1397 (2007). The laid-off engineer's FCA claim failed because he lacked
the "direct" and "independent knowledge" of the alleged violations to qualify as an "original
source" eligible to bring the qui tam suit. Id. at 1409.
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source' is [defined as] 'an individual who has direct and independent knowl-
edge of the information on which allegations are based.""496
2. Florida Whistleblower Statute
Three retaliation cases were decided in 2007 under the Florida Private
Sector Whistleblower Act (FPSWA).4 97 One retaliation claim was granted
because the plaintiff offered evidence that the defendant was given an oppor-
tunity to remedy the misconduct. 9 In addition, the plaintiff offered evi-
dence that he complained to his employer on numerous occasions about the
misconduct and, thus, his employer was aware of the misconduct before fil-
ing suit. 99 Another circuit court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
whistleblower claims against an archdiocese given the First Amendment's
bar against secular court review of religious policy and administration. 500 A
third Florida circuit court dismissed a whistleblower's claim because the
FPSWA excludes employees of independent contractors from its definition
of "employee." 50'
C. First Amendment and Hatch Act Issues
1. Public Employee Speech
In 2006, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,512 the United States Supreme Court
ruled that public employees, who made statements as part of their official
duties, "are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes," and so
may face employer discipline stemming from work-related communica-
tions.50 3 In the wake of Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
ruled that a public school district in Indiana did not violate the First Amend-
ment by dismissing an at-will school teacher for expressing her view on mili-
tary operations in Iraq because current events were part of the teacher's as-
496. Id. at 1403 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)).
497. See Morin v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 963 So. 2d 258, 261 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2007); El Toro Exterminator of Fla., Inc. v. Cernada, 953 So. 2d 616, 617 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2007); Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. v. Mifiagorri, 954 So. 2d 640, 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2007).
498. Cernada, 953 So. 2d at 618.
499. Id.
500. Mihagorri, 954 So. 2d at 642-43.
501. See Morin, 963 So. 2dat 261.
502. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
503. See id. at 1960.
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signed duties.'0 4 Another Seventh Circuit case explained the impact Garcetti
has on the First Amendment test for weighing public employee speech.5 °5
Before Garcetti, courts first looked at the "'content, form, and context' of the
employee's speech to determine whether the employee spoke as a citizen on
a matter of public concern."5' 6 "After Garcetti, however, the threshold in-
quiry is whether the employee was speaking as a citizen; only then [should
courts] inquire into the content of the speech."5 °7
Two Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cases addressed public speech
in 2006. In Battle v. Board of Regents of Georgia,0 8 the court ruled that a
financial aid counselor at a state university, whose contract was not renewed
after she reported her supervisor's student loan fraud to superiors, was speak-
ing as an employee fulfilling official duties.5"9 Thus, her First Amendment
retaliation claim must fail under the ruling in Garcetti.
In City of San Diego v. Roe,5"' the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the First Amendment did not bar the discharge of a police officer who
sold videotapes of "himself stripping off a police uniform and masturbat-
ing."' ' Such "speech," the Court concluded, did not involve "a matter of
public concern."' 2 Relying on Roe, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal of two Florida deputy sheriffs for selling sexually ex-
plicit photographs and videos over the Internet. 513
2. Freedom of Association
Many police departments have written policies prohibiting all depart-
ment employees from associating with anyone convicted of a felony.5 14 In
fact, a twenty-one-year veteran Miami police officer was warned, "[l]eave
your husband or lose your job," in light of her husband's felony convic-
tion. 5 Such policies have been challenged on freedom of association
504. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007).
505. Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007).
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. 468 F.3d 755 (1 lth Cir. 2006).
509. Id. at 761.
510. 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).
511. Id. at 78, 84.
512. Id. at 84.
513. Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1356-57 (1lth Cir.
2006).
514. Andrea Robinson, Police Under Fire over Ban on Social Contact with Felons, MIAMI
HERALD, May 17, 2007, at IA.
515. Id.
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grounds, as well as on equal protection grounds, given that such policies
disproportionately affect black female officers owing to the huge number of
inmates who are black males.51 6 The Miami Herald condemned this policy
as "morally wrong, socially discriminatory and very likely unconstitu-
tional." '517
A Florida court ruled in 2007 that a county corrections officer was ille-
gally dismissed on the ground that she lived with her boyfriend who was a
convicted felon on parole.1 18 Absent a written policy, the court concluded,
the public employee was denied adequate notice that simply living with a
convicted felon was cause for discharge." 9
3. Hatch Act
The Federal Hatch Act regulates the partisan political activities of fed-
eral employees. 2 ° In 2007, the Justice Department and Congress opened
investigations into whether senior justice department officials improperly
filled career jobs based on applicants' political affiliation.52' "Politicization
of civil service positions could violate [the Hatch Act] .... ,522 The inquiry
centers on whether the replacement of nine U.S. attorneys in 2006 stemmed
from Republican efforts to file more vote-fraud cases against Democrats in
close elections.1 3 The Bush Administration countered "that six [of the] U.S.
attorneys were [terminated] on performance-related" grounds.5 24  "Legal
experts [agree] that the Hatch Act [allows] White House officials to talk
about upcoming [pending] elections and political strategy generally, but [the
Act] would prohibit any official from taking [action to sway] an election."5 25
516. Id.
517. Editorial,A 'Scarlet Letter'Approach to Policing, MIAMI HERALD, May 18, 2007, at
18A.
518. Williams v. Miami-Dade County, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D1764, D1765 (3d Dist. Ct.
App. July 25, 2007).
519. Id.
520. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (2000). Florida law provides for criminal penalties for public offi-
cials who campaign while working at their government jobs. Commissioner's Apology Ac-
cepted, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 22, 2007, at 3C.
521. Margaret Talev & Greg Gordon, Probe Will Cover More than Firings, MIAMI
HERALD, May 31, 2007, at 3A.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Dan Eggen, Deputy Attorney General Defends Prosecutor Firings, WASH. POST, Feb.
7, 2007, at 3A.
525. Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, White House Calls Political Briefings
Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at A25.
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In a nutshell, the Hatch Act "bar[s] consideration of political affiliation in
hiring of [federal employees] for non-political, career jobs. 526
D. Remedies
Under the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 introduced in Congress,
mandatory arbitration clauses that force individuals to seek relief through
arbitration instead of litigation would be rendered unenforceable. 27 While
primarily aimed at clauses in consumer contracts, it would also ban manda-
tory arbitration clauses in employment agreements governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act. 
5 28
In 2007, a Florida court ruled that a county is liable for attorney's fees
owed by a county commissioner who successfully defends himself against
criminal charges where the case stems from performance of official duties.2 9
Another Florida court in 2007 reversed the issuance of a temporary in-
junction to enforce a non-competition clause in an employment contract be-
cause it was issued without notice and did not allege that irreparable harm
would result before defendant could be heard. 30
V. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Generally
A 2007 report found substantial growth in the filing of employment
class actions alleging job discrimination, wage inequities, and post-
employment benefits. 31
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the fifteen-
employee requirement for assessing whether an employer is covered by Title
VII is not a jurisdictional matter that can be raised as a defense at any point
526. Greg Gordon & Margaret Talev, Political Hirings Alleged, MIAMI HERALD, May 7,
2007, at 3A.
527. Angela Tablac, Bill Would Nullify Contract Clauses, MIAMI HERALD, July 25, 2007,
at IC.
528. Id.
529. See Leon County, Fla. v. Dobson, 957 So. 2d 12, 13-14 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(per curiam).
530. See Lewis v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
531. See Press Release, Seyfarth Shaw Attorneys LLP, Third Annual
Workplace Class Action Report from Seyfarth Shaw of 2006 Collective Action Litigation
Defines Trends for 2007 (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.seyfarth.com (follow "News & Press
Releases" hyperlink; then search "Press Releases" for "Third Annual"; then follow hyperlink).
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of litigation.532 Instead, the fifteen employee threshold is a substantive ele-
ment of plaintiffs claim.
5 33
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it did not have ju-
risdiction to review the appeal from the office of a United States Senator
seeking review of a District of Columbia Circuit Court ruling denying it im-
munity under the speech or debate clause from suit by a former worker alleg-
ing employment discrimination.53
4
In 2006, a federal district court ruled that the Florida Civil Rights Act
extends to Florida residents working outside the state.535
In 2006, a federal district court applied eight factors to distinguish be-
tween an employee and an independent contractor for purposes of Title VII
coverage. 536
B. Race
In 2007, a law professor studied "a government survey of 2,084 legal
immigrants [in the] United States ... and found that those with the lightest
skin earned [on] average 8 percent to 15 percent more than [comparable]
immigrants with [far] darker skin., 537
In 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed
a class-action lawsuit against Walgreens Company, alleging the company
"engaged in a 'pattern and practice of race discrimination' in promotion and
store assignments, [especially] against [African-American] managers, phar-
macists, and management trainees. 538
C. National Origin
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that national origin dis-
crimination, by its nature, does not invariably implicate race discrimination,
thereby rendering such claims cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."'
532. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006).
533. Id at 515.
534. Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 127 S. Ct. 2018, 2020 (2007).
535. Parry v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc., No. 8:06-CV-00804-T-17TBM, 2006 WL
3313352, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2006).
536. Dahl v. Ameri-Life Health Servs. of Sara-Bay, LLC, No. 8:05-CV-66-T-17TBM,
2006 WL 2884962, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2006).
537. Travis Loller, Study: Darker Immigrants Make Less Money, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28,
2007, at 5A.
538. Niala Boodhoo, Walgreens Sued for Race Bias, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 8, 2007, at IC.
539. See Tippie v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., No. 05-14384, 2006 WL 1130809, at * 4 (11th
Cir. Apr. 27, 2006).
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According to federal regulations, a blanket ban on non-English speech
at the workplace may "create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and in-
timidation . ..which could result in a discriminatory working environ-
ment."54 In 2007, the Mayor of Nashville, Tennessee, vetoed an ordinance
"that would have made [e]nglish the official language of' the city, warning it
was unconstitutional, unnecessary, and mean-spirited.541
D. Affirmative Action
A 2007 study "found that more diverse companies also have more cus-
tomers, a [bigger] share of their markets and greater profitability. 5412 Of
course, "it may also be [the case that firms] that are successful to begin with"
make more of an effort to recruit and retain minorities.543 Not only do mi-
norities bring new perspectives to the workplace, but they also cause their
white co-workers "to think in new ways.'544
In 2000, Congress enacted the Women's Procurement Program aimed at
growing the participation of women-owned small business concerns in the
federal procurement marketplace.545 A 2007 Rand Corporation study found,
however, that women-owned small businesses remain underrepresented
among companies doing business with the federal government."' Under a
1999 federal law, every federal agency is urged to award at least "3 percent
of their contracts to businesses owned by service-disabled veterans.5 47
Even after Florida abolished affirmative action in 1999, "the state's
spending on contracts with businesses owned by minority group members
and women ha[d] ... tripled" by the end of 2006.548 In 1999, Governor Jeb
Bush ended affirmative action programs and replaced it with his "One Flor-
ida initiative" which merely urges state agencies to promote minority busi-
ness spending. 549 While the Department of Corrections increased its female
540. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2006).
541. Tennessee Mayor Vetoes English-Only Law, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 13, 2007, at 3A.
542. Shankar Vedantam, Diversity Makes a Difference, Studies Find, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
16, 2007, at l1B.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. 15 U.S.C. § 637(m) (2000).
546. ELAINE REARDON ET AL., THE UTILIZATION OF WOMEN-OWNED SMALL BusINESSES IN
FEDERAL CONTRACTING 10 (2007), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/techni-
calreports/2007/RANDTR442.sum.pdf.
547. David Goldstein, Disabled Veterans Not Getting Fair Share of US. Contracts, MIAMI
HERALD, July 2, 2007, at 3A.
548. Minorities Getting More State Business, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 14, 2006, at 1OB.
549. Id.
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and minority contractor spending by 75%, the legislature registered a 70.7%
decline.55
A 2007 lawsuit filed against Broward County alleges that its affirmative
action program is unconstitutional because it forces contractors "to hire sub-
contractors based on race, ethnicity or sex-not quality."55' An earlier suit
forced Miami-Dade County to abolish its minority set-aside program on
equal protection grounds.55 2 Recent United States Supreme Court rulings
have rendered minority set-aside programs highly suspect.553
E. Gender
A study found "that teen [sexual harassment] cases [rose] from two per-
cent of all sexual harassment cases in 2001 to about eight percent in
2004." 554 In 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,"' five to four against a woman who failed to
file her sex-based pay discrimination "lawsuit within the 180-day statute of
limitations from when her first paycheck showed" the existence of the wage
disparity.556 "Employee-oriented organizations called [the decision] a severe
weakening of civil rights. 557
In 2007, a federal jury found that the Florida Department of Corrections
condoned the "sexual harassment of its female nurses by male inmates."
5 8
The nurses alleged "they were harassed on daily rounds [while] examining
inmates and [dispensing] medicine to sick prisoners." '559 In 2007, the Elev-
enth Circuit upheld the dismissal of sexual harassment and retaliation claims
since the victim failed to cooperate with her employer's proposed remedy. 56"
Acting to shield themselves from sexual harassment lawsuits, some em-
ployers are urging senior executives to sign "love contracts" whereby co-
workers disclose romantic relationships.56" ' By openly declaring their ro-
550. Id.
551. Amy Sherman, Lawsuit: White Males Cheated, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 29, 2007, at
lB.
552. Id.
553. See id.
554. G. Thomas Harper, Teen Complaints Up, FLA. EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER, June
2007, at 3.
555. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
556. Stafford, supra note 215.
557. Id.
558. 12 Prison Nurses Win Jury Award, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28, 2007, at 6B.
559. Id.
560. Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1301 (1 lth Cir. 2007).
561. Molly Selvin, In Love in the Office? Sign on the Dotted Line, MiA.mi HERALD, Feb.
14, 2007, at 3C.
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mance to be "voluntary" and "consensual," these contracts should render
employers immune from liability-should the relationship go sour.56 2 By
one estimate, "43 percent of [United States employees] admit to having dated
a co-worker." '563
In 2007, the city manager of Largo, Florida was fired after disclosing he
was undergoing a sex change operation. 64 Largo city commissioners de-
fended their position by "saying they doubted his integrity and ability to lead
the city and its 1200 employees. ' 565 Although the fired city manager can
appeal, his contract makes it clear that he can be dismissed without cause.
5 66
While transsexuals are generally unprotected under federal civil rights
laws,5 67 a few recent cases give limited protection under Title VII.5 68 Legis-
lation proposed at the federal level, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 2007, would ban "employment discrimination on [grounds] of sexual ori-
entation or gender identity." '569 In 2007, an attempt was made to add legal
protections for transgender people in Broward County.5 70 Some gay rights
activists oppose the timing of the ordinance, fearing that "adding 'gender
identity and expression' . . . will jeopardize [protection for all gay men and
women] already on the books. 57'
F. Age
Despite the ban on mandatory retirement under the federal Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA),5 71 the average retirement age in
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Tere Figueras Negrete, Fired Transgender Vies for Sarasota Job, MIAMI HERALD,
May 15, 2007, at 8B.
565. Tere Figueras Negrete, Town Rocked by Sex-Change Case, MIAMi HERALD, Mar. 4,
2007, at IA.
566. Phil Davis, Firing Begins over Sex Change, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 1, 2007, at 8B.
567. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984).
568. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that
a transsexual rejected for a job failed to state a Title VII claim that she was discriminated
against for not conforming to gender stereotypes, but she may claim she was denied employ-
ment because of her sex).
569. Id.
570. Beth Reinhard, GLBT Rights Activist Pulls Back on the 'T', MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 4,
2007, at lB.
571. Id.
572. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000).
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2007 is sixty-two.5 73 "[O]nly 27 percent of Americans retire at age 65 or
later, according to the Employee Benefit Research Institute. 574
In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,575 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the ADEA does not bar employers from favoring
older workers over relatively younger ones who are also protected by the
Act. 576 In response, on August 4, 2006, the EEOC proposed regulations
making clear that the ADEA does not bar employers from favoring older
workers over younger ones577-also over age forty. 78 In addition, the EEOC
revised a portion of 29 C.F.R. § 1625.4(a) that barred job advertisements
favoring older persons to make it clear that it is permissible to encourage
older applicants to apply. 
579
A 1990 amendment to the ADEA, the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act (OWBPA), spelled out some of the ground rules for employers framing
early retirement programs. 580 In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that the OWBPA only requires employers to give discharged workers
detailed information about layoffs in their own department-not nation-
wide. 58" In 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration disclosed "that it will
review its rule forcing airline pilots to retire at age sixty," after the "Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization [rose] the age to [sixty-five]." '582 Any rule
change, however, would be prospective only, leaving pilots already retired,
but under sixty-five, out of luck.583
G. Disability
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) generally prohibits em-
ployment discrimination against the disabled, not only at the hiring and dis-
missal stages, but also involving promotions, transfers, compensation, train-
573. Damon Darlin, Retirement Contrarian Speaks Out, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2007, at B1.
574. Id.
575. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
576. Id. at 600.
577. Coverage Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,177,
46,177-78 (Aug. 11, 2006).
578. 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (2000).
579. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.4(a) (2006).
580. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f).
581. Burlison v. McDonald's Corp., 455 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11 th Cir. 2006).
582. Matthew L. Wald, F.A.A. Review Is Expected on Pilots' Age at Retirement, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2007, at C10; see also Julie Johnsson, US. Pilots in Age Limbo, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 30, 2007, at 1.
583. Wald, supra note 582.
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ing, and virtually every other term and condition of employment.584 In 1800
out of 2000 ADA complaints, the Justice Department, between the years
2001 and 2006, forced public and private employers to comply with the Act
by enlisting mediation and ruling out penalties.585
In 2007, a United States House of Representatives committee ap-
proved a measure aimed at preventing "discrimination by employers and
insurers against people based on genetic information."
5 86
Under the ADA, employers owe a duty to reasonably accommodate
the disabled. 7 In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
retraining a disabled employee is not a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA.588 "With 21 million American diabetics, . . . [employers] are strug-
gling.., with confusion [over] whether diabetes is a legitimate disability and
with concern [over] whether it is [unduly costly], hazardous and disruptive to
accommodate the illness. 589
Disability claims may also be litigated under Florida's civil rights laws.
A 2007 Florida case concluded that the Florida Civil Rights Act "does not
require proof that a plaintiffs HIV [positive] condition amounts to a ... dis-
ability."59 The law bans bias "based upon even the 'perceived results' of an
HIV test, [no matter] the physical condition of the employee."'5 91 Under
Florida and federal laws, anyone with a history of epilepsy is prohibited from
driving certain commercial vehicles.592 Under the law, commercial truck
"drivers must undergo a physical every two years to [confirm] they do not
have any medical conditions that could [impair] their driving. ' 593
584. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). A law review article found that plaintiffs claiming
mental or psychiatric impairments under the ADA are less successful than plaintiffs alleging
bias based on physical disabilities. Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA
Enforcement System Treat People with Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L. REv. 94, 95
(2006).
585. Joshua Freed, Most ADA Violators Escape Penalties, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 6, 2006, at
6A.
586. House OK's Genetics Law, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 15, 2007, at IC.
587. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2000).
588. Warren v. Volusia County, Fla., No. 05-16411, 2006 WL 1818938, at *3 (1 1th Cir.
July 5, 2006).
589. N.R. Kleinfield, Diabetics in the Workplace Confront a Tangle of Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2006, at Al.
590. Byrd v. BT Foods, Inc., 948 So. 2d 921, 927 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
591. Id. at 927-28.
592. Kathleen McGrory & Breanne Gilpatrick, Trucker Drove Despite Epilepsy, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 29, 2006, at lB.
593. Id.
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H. Religion
The two governing sources of law for analyzing religious issues arising
in the workplace are the religious clauses of the First Amendment, which
apply only in the public sector, and Title VII, which protects both public and
private employees against religious discrimination. At least one court has
noted the similar nature of protection afforded by the First Amendment and
Title VII: "the [F]irst [A]mendment protects at least as much religious activ-
ity as Title VII does." '594
Employers intent upon creating "faith-friendly" workplaces must strike
a delicate balance between seeming to favor "one religion over another," and
treating all faiths, even atheists, even-handedly. 595 It is one thing for an em-
ployer to tolerate "well-known faiths such as Judaism, Christianity or Islam,
but" the law dictates equal tolerance for Santeria, Wicca, and other marginal
religions.596
Under Title VII and the First Amendment, employers owe a duty to rea-
sonably accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of their employ-
ees.5 97 For example, in 2007, a Florida park ranger resigned from his job
after his employer denied his request for "Sundays off to go to church." 9
Ultimately, facing a lawsuit, the county offered the park ranger "his job back
and back pay."5 99 Similarly, when Muslim cashiers working for Target "re-
fuse[d] to ring up pork products [on] religious [grounds]" the store accom-
modated these Muslim cashiers by transferring them "to other jobs at the
stores."6 ' What is left unclear, however, is whether wages would be identi-
cal at the new jobs.60 1 What the case illustrates is the employer's legal duty
to strike a balance between "the religious rights of its employees with cus-
tomer demands for service., 60
2
"Legal cases involving workers claiming religious discrimination on the
job have [increased], especially since the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks" and
594. Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995).
595. Niala Boodhoo, Having Faith, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 15, 2007, at IC [hereinafter
Boodhoo, Having Faith].
596. Id.
597. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).
598. Jane Musgrave, Religious Ranger Gets His Job Back, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 15, 2007,
at 6B.
599. Id.
600. Chris Serres & Matt McKinney, Target Stores Reassign Muslim Cashiers Who Avoid
Pork, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 19, 2007, at 3A.
601. See id.
602. Id.
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many of these claims involve Muslim employees.6 3 For example, three-
quarters of the taxi drivers serving the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport are Mus-
lims and recently many of them refuse, on religious grounds, to carry pas-
sengers carrying alcohol.6 °4 "[E]ven blind people with guide dogs have
been" turned away by the religious cabbies in light of Islamic law "that the
saliva of dogs is unclean., 615 In response, the city proposes "a 30-day sus-
pension for a first offense" and a two year license revocation for repeat of-
fenders.60 6 Similarly, in 2005, Christian pharmacists "refus[ed] to fill pre-
scriptions for the 'morning after' anti-contraception pill" on religious
grounds.
607
After a Muslim Congressman announced that he planned to carry the
Koran in one hand and the Bible in the other when he took his oath of office,
another Congressman warned that "more Muslims will follow" if Congress
failed to adopt strict immigration laws.60 8
The constitutionality of state-paid legislative chaplains was largely up-
held by the United States Supreme Court in 1983 in Marsh v. Chambers.6 °9
The Court relied on evidence that the First Amendment framers embraced
the practice of government chaplains-indeed, the First Congress had in-
stalled chaplains in both houses.610 In 2007, "[t]he Army National Guard
[had] 310 chaplain vacancies., 611 One explanation for the shortage is the
fact that "chaplains [are not] covered by a federal law protecting [veterans']
jobs while they are deployed., 612  One legally questionable practice, how-
ever, is that the National Guard makes exceptions to the age range for chap-
lains, such as for Roman Catholic priests.613
Quite apart from state-paid chaplains is the emerging trend of private
corporations nationwide "bringing chaplains into the workplace., 614 Because
these chaplains work for the employers, critics charge, they do nothing to
603. Boodhoo, Having Faith, supra note 595.
604. Leonard Pitts Jr., Muslim Cabbies' Spirited Refusal Is Intolerable, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 22, 2007, at lB.
605. Id.
606. Id
607. Id.
608. Rob Hotakainen, Lawmaker's Letter Irks Muslim Group, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 21,
2006, at 12A.
609. 463 U.S. 783, 794 (1983).
610. Id. at 787-88.
611. Nafessa Syeed, Guard Deals with Chaplain Shortage, MiAMI HERALD, Feb. 18, 2007,
at 6A.
612. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000)).
613. Id.
614. Neela Banerjee, At Bosses' Invitation, Chaplains Come into Workplace and onto
Payroll, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 2006, at A14.
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challenge labor law violations, even when they are blatant.6"5 Even if com-
pany chaplains steer clear of evangelizing, they run the risk of looking like
the boss favors a particular religion.616 "[D]iscussions between chaplains
and employees are confidential, unless the [employee poses] an imminent
[threat] to himself or others. 6 17
Another emerging trend that may bode well for employers but is prob-
lematic for employees is the hands-off approach toward "religious organiza-
tions-especially religious schools-to manage their affairs with [minimal]
interference from the government and their own employees. 6 8 Under the
so-called ministerial exception, judges rarely hear a case calling into question
church "doctrines, governance, discipline or hiring preferences of any reli-
gious faith., 6 19 What is new and troubling, however, is that some judges are
expanding the ministerial exception sanctioned by Title VII to refuse to in-
tervene "when religious groups have [fired] lesbians, unwed mothers and
adulterous couples" because they run counter to their employers' religious
beliefs.62°
A former Broward Community College (BCC) instructor convinced a
federal judge in 2007 that the instructor's Catholic faith played a substantial
role in his being passed over for full-time jobs and that the college "favored
evangelical Protestants in hiring, promotion and class assignments." 62' A
Miami Herald editorial took BCC to task for refusing to say it has begun
"hiring based on academic, not religious, credentials., 622 As a taxpayer-
funded public college, the editorial intoned, "[t]he public has the right to
know."
623
I. Remedies
In 2006, the EEOC recovered "$274 million in monetary" benefits for
victims of employment discrimination.624
615. Id.
616. Id.
617. Id.
618. See Diana B. Henriques, Where Faith Abides, Employees Have Few Rights, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 9, 2006, at Al.
619. Id.
620. Id.
621. Natalie P. McNeal, BCC May Pay for Bias in Favor of Evangelicals, MIAMI HERALD,
July 17, 2007, at lB.
622. Clean House in Religion Department, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 2, 2007, at 14A.
623. Id.
624. Press Release, EEOC, Job Bias Charges Edged up in 2006, EEOC Reports (Feb. 1,
2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-1-07.html.
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In 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled, in Sole v. Wyner,625
that a plaintiff who secures a preliminary injunction that is dissolved when
the merits of the case are finally decided against her is not a "prevailing
party" entitled to receive attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 626
In calculating reasonable attorneys' fees under Florida's Civil Rights
Act, a Florida court ruled that it is an error to apply a multiplier to enhance a
lodestar fee in an anti-retaliation case.
627
625. 127 S. Ct. 2188 (2007).
626. Id. at 2196.
627. Haines City HTMA, Inc. v. Carter, 948 So. 2d 904, 908 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
"A man without ethics is a wild beast loosed upon this world."'
- Albert Camus
Society depends on the ethical conduct of its members. The June 2007
disbarment of Durham district attorney Michael B. Nifong exemplifies the
havoc wreaked when an individual authorized to act on behalf of the citi-
zenry abuses power and breaks canons of ethics. The ethics panel investigat-
ing Mr. Nifong blamed him for the "'fiasco' in which innocent young men
were charged [with sexual assault] and the legal system suffered disrepute. 2
Society demonstrates a broad interest in ethical conduct which includes
promulgating laws and codes of conduct, investigating potential violations,
sanctioning wrongdoing, and advising individuals on ethical conduct in their
daily lives. The Ethicist, a regular column in the New York Times Magazine,
answers questions on matters as mundane and complex as telling the truth
and dividing living expenses.3
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Clin-
ic, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University. Chair, Mediator Ethics Advi-
sory Committee, Florida Supreme Court. B.A. Magna Cum Laude, Hunter College, J.D.
Magna Cum Laude, Nova Southeastern University Law Center. The author expresses grati-
tude to Sharon Press, Director of the Dispute Resolution Center, for her vision and judicious
stewardship of Florida's court-connected alternative dispute resolution programs for which
Florida is recognized as a leader among states. Continued thanks to the Dispute Resolution
staff, with special thanks to Kimberly Kosch and Richard Cox, for their many contributions to
the Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee. The author expresses deep gratitude to the dedi-
cated and collegial members of the Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee. Finally, the author
thanks Florida Bar Foundation Mediation Public Service Fellows, Annette Kabia, Patricia
Rossetti, Armand Rossetti, and Meaghan Korson for their generous assistance, and Ron Ana-
nia, Susan Dubow, Betty Eckelbaum, Kimberly Kosch, Professor Michael Richmond, Elinor
Robin, Chris Shulman, and Geraldine Waxman for their valuable comments on drafts of this
article. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect
opinions or positions taken by the Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee unless specifically
stated.
1. ETHics UPDATE (Dartmouth College Ethics Institute, Hanover, N.H.), Spring 2003,
available at www.dartmouth.edu/-ethics/newsletter/spring03/moral.html (last visited Dec. 20,
2007).
2. Duff Wilson, Hearing Ends in Disbarment for Prosecutor in Duke Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 2007, at 16.
3. Randy Cohen, The Ethicist, N.Y. TIMES MAG. Mr. Cohen's podcasts of The Ethicist
are available at http://www.nytimes.com/ref/multimedia/podcasts.html (last visited Dec. 20,
2007).
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Members of society who depend on the ethical behavior of judges, law
enforcement officials, and lawyers in the public manifestations of our legal
system also depend on the ethical behavior of mediators in the more private
process of mediation. A mediation succeeds not because the parties resolved
their dispute, but because the mediator conducted the mediation within ethi-
cal standards giving the parties an opportunity to meaningfully participate in
the process and exercise self-determination.4 The legislation of ethical con-
duct, investigation of alleged violations, sanctioning of wrongdoing, and
answering of ethical questions that permeates the conduct of lawyers and
judges is mirrored in Florida's ethical standards for mediators.'
Florida is in the forefront of states that have taken initiatives to develop
ethical guidelines for use in mediation.6 "Florida was the first jurisdiction to
develop mediator standards of conduct which include enforcement provi-
sions, [and the first state] to establish a panel to render advisory opinions on
ethical issues arising in mediation."7 The Florida Legislature and judiciary
have created "one of the most comprehensive court-connected mediation
programs in the country."' Over the past twenty-five years, the use of me-
diation has steadily increased to become a vital component of the court sys-
tem.9 Interestingly, mediation has seen its largest growth in the private sec-
tor for both court-ordered cases and matters without court involvement. 0
Increasingly, attorneys and parties directly participate in mediator selec-
tion. l" "[O]ver 90 percent of the parties agree on a mediator,"' 2 allowing
them to base their selection not only on certification status, but also media-
tion style, skill, knowledge, and ethical comportment.
4. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APFrD. MEDIATORS 10.210, 10.220, 10.300, 10.310, 10.400.
The parties decide the extent of their involvement and may choose to share information, better
understand each other's perspective, share confidential communication, problem solve, reality
test, and exercise self-determination. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.2 10.
5. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APTD. MEDIATORS 10. 100-.900.
6. Diane K. Vescovo et al., Ethical Dilemmas in Mediation, 31 U. MEM. L. REv. 59, 62
(2000).
7. Id.
8. SHARON PRESS, Disp. RESOL. CTR., FLORIDA MEDIATION & ARBITRATION PROGRAMS:
A COMPENDIUM ii (19th ed. 2005-06).
9. Florida State Courts, Alternative Dispute Resolution,
http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/adr/adrintro.shtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) [hereinafter
Alternative Dispute Resolution].
10. Id. Private sector refers to private mediators hired by the parties, not mediators em-
ployed by or through court-connected programs. See id.
11. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(0. Parties have ten days from the trial court's order refer-
ring a case to mediation to mutually agree on a mediator, who may or may not be certified.
Id.
12. Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 9.
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"As mediation has grown in popularity over the past few decades as an
alternative to costly and protracted litigation, a whole new field of profes-
sional ethics-mediation ethics-has emerged."' 3 The many and diverse ethi-
cal issues within this field range from practical matters such as business and
conflict of interest, to more abstract matters such as confidentiality and the
nature and scope of the mediation process. 14 A mediator's ethics affect not
only the quality of the mediation process, but also the viability of the media-
tion agreement.'" The ethical precepts governing Florida's more than 500016
mediators require them to abide by the Florida Rules for Certified and
Court-Appointed Mediators.'7 Mediators subject to these rules must also
"comply with all statutes, court rules, local court rules, and administrative
orders relevant to the practice of mediation."' 8 Additionally, some mediators
must follow other ethical codes by virtue of additional professional call-
ings. 9 These multi-faceted obligations may, at times, seem perplexing or
contradictory.
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Florida created a nine member commit-
tee to respond to written ethical questions2" posed by mediators subject to the
Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators.2 From 1994 to
13. Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of
Ethical Rules for Lawyers-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 479, 479
(2000) (footnote omitted).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 480. "[T]he mediator is no ordinary third party .... " Vitakis-Valchine v.
Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094, 1099 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001). "During a court-ordered
mediation, the mediator is, [in effect,] an agent of the court carrying out an official court-
ordered function." Id. Therefore, "the court may invoke its inherent power to maintain the
integrity of the judicial system and its processes by invalidating a court-ordered mediation
settlement agreement obtained through violation and abuse of judicially-prescribed mediation
procedures." Id. A mediator is accountable to the referring court with ultimate authority over
the case, and the court may overturn a mediated agreement entered into based on significant
mediator misconduct. Id; see also Fran L. Tetunic, Florida Mediation Case Law: Two Dec-
ades of Maturation, 28 NOVA L. REv. 87, 124 (2003).
16. PRESS, supra note 8, at iii (stating that there were 5241 certified mediators as of May
2007).
17. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.220.
18. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.520.
19. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.650. Discussion of whether mediation is
a profession is beyond the scope of this article. Mediation is considered a profession in the
Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD
MEDIATORS 10.600. Business and Professional Regulations do not regulate mediators. See
FLA. STAT. § 455.2235 (2007).
20. Mediators address their questions to Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee, c/o Flor-
ida Dispute Resolution Center, Supreme Court Building, Tallahassee, FL 32399.
21. Florida State Courts, Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee (MEAC) Opinions:
Summaries from 1994-2007,
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August 2007, the committee, presently known as the Mediator Ethics Advi-
sory Committee (MEAC), issued 114 opinions.22 Each opinion represents
the concurrence of all deliberating committee members and, in true mediator
fashion, no member has ever issued a dissenting opinion.
MEAC opinions do not carry the weight of law. They do serve as advi-
sory opinions upon which mediators may rely in good faith. While such
reliance will not constitute a defense in a disciplinary action, the Mediator
Qualifications Board (MQB) 23 may consider it as evidence of the mediator's
good faith in its determination of guilt or in mitigation of punishment.24 The
opinions respond directly to the written questions posed to the committee in
the context of the applicable law and ethical rules in effect at the time.
The ethical standards found in the Florida Rules for Certified and
Court-Appointed Mediators apply to all mediations conducted by a certified
mediator,25 and all court-appointed mediators whether or not certified. 6 The
applicability of the professional standards to any given situation will depend
on whether the activity falls within the rubric of "mediation., 27 Individuals
who are mediators perform many non-mediator functions. 2' A mediator who
negotiates a car sale on behalf of a spouse or a business matter for a town
council would act in the role of advocate, not mediator.29 Similarly, during
mediation, actions taken by an attorney or party, who also happens to be a
mediator, will not "be judged as if they were the actions of a mediator., 30
http://www.flcourts.org/gen public/adrbin/MEAC%20opinions/Index%2Oo/20Opinions%2
0-%202007_web.pdf [hereinafter MEAC Summaries]. The rules apply to Supreme Court of
Florida certified mediators as well as mediators appointed by the state courts. FLA. R. CERT.
& CT. APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.200. Mediators who violate the rules are subject to disciplinary
action as determined by the Mediator Qualifications Board. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT. APPTD.
MEDIATORS 10.200 comm. notes, 10.700-.880.
22. MEAC Summaries, supra note 21. MEAC was previously known as the Mediator
Qualifications Advisory Panel (MQAP). FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.900
comm. notes. The Committee will be referred to as MEAC in the text of this article. The
advisory opinions will identify either MQAP or MEAC before the opinion number.
23. The Mediator Qualifications Board (MQB) hears grievances filed against certified
mediators and reviews mediator "good moral character" issues. PRESS, supra note 8, at iii.
The Mediator Qualifications Board has entertained grievances filed against non-certified
mediators who were appointed by the court. See id. The Florida Rules for Certified and
Court-Appointed Mediators pertain to both certified mediators and mediators who are not
certified but are court-appointed. FLA. R. CERT. & CT-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.200,10.700.
24. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.900(f).
25. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.110.
26. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.200.
27. See id.
28. See Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-004 (July 24, 2006).
29. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-003 (Sept. 18, 2004).
30. Advisory Op. 2006-004, supra note 28.
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Nonetheless, "[a] certified mediator is subject to a good moral character re-
quirement and is prohibited from performing any act which would compro-
mise the mediator's integrity. ' 31
In a dozen years and over one hundred opinions, there have been multi-
ple amendments to the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Me-
diators, in addition to multiple statutory changes-the most significant being
the 2004 passage of the Mediation Confidentiality and Privilege Act (Act).3 2
While the body of MEAC opinions has withstood the test of time, some
opinions warrant attention given the statutory and rule changes. This article
organizes and summarizes the MEAC opinions, and identifies those subject
to modification or reconsideration. Even though portions of three opinions
have been rescinded, and other opinions require amendments to conform to
current rules and law, the overwhelming majority still represents the best
practices for mediators. For each rescinded opinion, as well as for those sub-
ject to modification or reconsideration, this article identifies the relevant
statutory or rule changes, and analyzes their significance and effect on the
opinion. Each of the issued opinions is referenced in the hope of offering a
convenient summary and analysis for mediators, for attorneys when selecting
mediators and representing clients, and for participants in the mediation
process.
II. MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Developments and Background
Mediators have an ethical obligation to maintain confidentiality, the be-
drock of the mediation process.33 Effective August 1, 2006, the ethical rule
governing mediator confidentiality changed." Previously, the rule directed a
mediator to "maintain confidentiality of all information revealed during me-
diation, except where disclosure is required by law."35 Presently, "[a] media-
31. Id. Good moral character is a prerequisite to certification and a requirement for con-
tinuing certification. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.110(b).
32. Act effective July 1, 2004, ch. 2004-291, § 4, 2004 Fla. Laws 1770, 1772 (codified at
FLA. STAT. §§ 44.401-.406).
33. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a).
34. In re Petition of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules and Policy Committee on
Amendments to Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, 931 So. 2d 877,
883 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (amending FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS) [hereinaf-
ter Petition].
35. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a) (2005). Although not addressed
in this rule, then as now, if the parties waived their privilege of confidentiality, mediators were
no longer obligated to maintain confidentiality. FLA STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(1) (2007). The
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tor shall maintain confidentiality of all information revealed during media-
tion except where disclosure is required or permitted by law or is agreed to
by all parties."36 This amendment "was proposed in response to the 2004
adoption of the Mediation Confidentiality and Privilege Act, sections
44.401-44.406, [Florida Statutes] (2005)."" 7 The Supreme Court of Florida
amended the rule governing the scope of confidentiality to be consistent with
the language in the Act. 3
This significant rule change, permitting more disclosure by the media-
tor, may have less practical effect than the word change would initially sug-
gest. The Act delineates required and permissive exceptions based on the
type of disclosure.39 For example, the mandatory reporting of abuse and
neglect of children and vulnerable adults applies "solely for the purpose of
making the mandatory report to the entity requiring the report."4 Similarly,
communication to report, prove, or disprove professional misconduct or pro-
fessional malpractice occurring during mediation is limited to the internal
use of the body conducting the misconduct, investigation, or the professional
malpractice proceeding.41 Another exception applies "for the limited pur-
parties, not the mediator, hold the statutory privilege to preserve confidentiality, which they
may assert or waive. Id.
36. Petition, 931 So. 2d at 883; FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a)
(amendment effective Aug. 1, 2006). Rule 10.420(a)(3) was also amended to be consistent
with the Act, requiring a mediator to notify parties that communications during mediation are
confidential except where required or permitted by law. Petition, 931 So. 2d at 883.
37. Id. at 882. The Supreme Court Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules
and Policy recommended changing the rule to read: "A mediator shall maintain confidential-
ity of all information revealed during mediation except where disclosure is required by law or
is agreed to by all parties or where a mediation communication is willfully used to threaten a
crime of violence." In re Petition of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules and Policy
Committee on Amendments to Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators,
No. SC05-998, slip op. at 7 (Fla. 2005) (proposed FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS
10.360(a)), available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/comments/2005/SC05-
998_PublicationNotice.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Official Draft 2005].
38. Petition, 931 So. 2d at 882-83. The rule as amended tracks the Act's language and
provides far broader exceptions to the mediator's mandate to maintain confidentiality than the
rule change proposed by the Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules and Policy.
See id.; FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a) (Proposed Official Draft 2005).
The Act delineates six exceptions (four permissive exceptions, in addition to the required
reporting of child and vulnerable adult abuse and neglect, and privilege waiver by the parties).
FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a) (2007). The committee rule would have added the one exception
for communication willfully used to threaten a crime of violence. Proposed Official Draft
2005, supra note 37.
39. Petition, 931 So. 2d at 882 & n.12.
40. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(3) (2007).
41. Id. § 44.405(4)(a)(4).
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pose of establishing or refuting legally recognized grounds for voiding or
reforming a settlement agreement reached during a mediation.
4 2
While still too early to determine Whether mediator disclosure of media-
tion communications will significantly increase following the August 1, 2006
rule change, the mediator's own threshold determination of the existence of
exceptions will prove crucial. The Act does not provide guidance as to
when, how, or by whom an exception determination is made.4 3 In the past,
mediators reported abuse and neglect based on the threshold established in
the mandatory reporting statutes; 44 that remains the same. Similarly, then
and now, parties may waive the confidentiality privilege they hold.45  As
before, mediators should obtain documentation of the waiver so as not to
unwittingly breach confidentiality. 46 Also, as before, a signed written medi-
ated agreement is not confidential "unless the parties agree otherwise. 47
Although the Act applies to all mediation participants, mediators alone
are bound by the Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, and are
therefore subject to heightened ethical obligations and scrutiny.48 While the
rule requiring confidentiality is less restrictive than before, the other ethical
obligations to which a mediator must adhere, such as impartiality, remain
constant. Mediators continue to have an ethical obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of information revealed during mediation.5" Nonetheless,
now as before, parties may waive their statutory privilege and have the me-
diator disclose mediation communications," and courts may order mediators
to disclose mediation communications for legally recognized purposes, such
as voiding or reforming a settlement agreement.52 Many mediators still con-
tinue to wait for court direction to disclose information so as not to make
42. Id. § 44.405(4)(a)5.
43. See id. § 44.405.
44. Id. §§ 39.201,415.1034.
45. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)1. "A mediation party has a privilege to refuse to testify
and to prevent any other person from testifying in a subsequent proceeding regarding media-
tion communications." Id. § 44.405(2).
46. See id. § 44.402(2).
47. Id. § 44.405(4)(a).
48. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.200. "These Rules provide ethical stan-
dards of conduct for certified and court-appointed mediators ... to both guide mediators in the
performance of their services and instill public confidence in the mediation process." Id.
49. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.330.
50. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a).
51. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)1. Parties, not the mediator, hold a statutory privilege and
may choose to waive it. Id.
52. See, e.g., Brandsmart U.S.A. v. DR Lakes, Inc., 901 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2005); DR Lakes, Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A., 819 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002); McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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"legal" decisions and run afoul of ethical obligations. For these mediators,
the rule change will have little appreciable effect.
Notably, the rule change may well alter the way in which mediators,
subject to two or more ethical codes of conduct, interpret their possibly in-
consistent ethical obligations. For example, a lawyer governed by the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, "who knows that another lawyer has committed
a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects shall inform the appropriate professional authority."53 At the
same time, the lawyer-mediator is obligated to maintain mediation confiden-
tiality pursuant to the Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators. 5"
In this context, the rule change allowing mediators to make disclosures per-
mitted by law allows the lawyer-mediator to reconcile both ethical obliga-
tions. The next section summarizes the MEAC opinions on confidentiality
and discusses the ethical rule changes as they relate to MEAC opinions, in-
cluding those on concurrent ethical obligations.
B. Scope of Confidentiality
Even before the Act's passage, one of the MEAC's early opinions
painted a broad scope for mediation confidentiality, applying confidentiality
before the parties came to the mediation table. In this 1997 opinion, the
MEAC advised that "[i]nformation obtained from the parties prior to the
commencement of mediation, which would be confidential if obtained during
the mediation" is confidential. 55 The Act comports with prior practice in
identifying the beginning of mediation, for confidentiality purposes, as when
a court orders the mediation," or "when the parties agree to mediate, or as
required by agency rule, agency order, or statute, whichever occurs ear-
lier. ' 57 Additionally, the Act provides for the confidentiality of communica-
tions made in furtherance of mediation.18 The Act "appl[ies] to any media-
tion ... [r]equired by statute, court rule, agency rule or order, oral or written
53. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.3(a). The "rule does not require disclosure of informa-
tion.., protected by rule 4-1.6 or information [obtained] while participating in an approved
lawyers assistance program." R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.3(c); see also R. REGULATING
FLA. BAR 4-8.3(d).
54. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a) (amendment effective Aug. 1,
2006).
55. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 97-009 (Dec. 24, 1997).
56. FLA. STAT. § 44.404(1) (2007).
57. Id. § 44.404(2).
58. Id. § 44.405.
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case-specific court order, or court administrative order"59 conducted under
the Act "by express agreement of the mediation parties"6 ° or "[flacilitated by
a mediator certified by the Supreme Court [of Florida], unless the mediation
parties expressly agree" otherwise.61 However, the parties may agree in
writing that some sections of the Act "will not apply to all or part of [their]
mediation., 62 As a general statement, matters that fall within the definition
of mediation communication, 63 but not within any of the enumerated statu-
tory exceptions, 64 remain confidential. 65 Therefore, a written apology given
during a mediation that was not included in the agreement, waived by the
parties, or otherwise falling within a statutory exception, met the definition
of mediation communication.66
Two MEAC opinions clarify the applicability of the Act.67 "[I]f a me-
diation falls within the scope of the Mediation and Confidentiality and Privi-
lege Act, then all mediation participants 6' are obligated to adhere to its pro-
visions.' ,6 9 Additionally, "[e]ach co-mediator is to be treated as a mediator
subject to the ... Act" and "many of the communications made to [staff in]
the mediation unit would be included under the umbrella of confidential-
ity."
70
59. Id. § 44.402(l)(a).
60. Id. § 44.402(l)(b).
61. FLA. STAT. § 44.402(1)(c).
62. Id. § 44.402(2). "[T]he ... parties may agree in writing that any or all of [sections]
44.405(1), 44.405(2) or 44.406 will not apply to all or part of [their] mediation .. " Id.
63. Id. § 44.403(1). The definition of a "mediation communication" by the Florida Stat-
utes is as follows:
"Mediation communication" means an oral or written statement, or nonverbal conduct in-
tended to make an assertion, by or to a mediation participant made during the course of a me-
diation, or prior to mediation if made in furtherance of a mediation. The commission of a
crime during a mediation is not a mediation communication.
Id.
64. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a).
65. Id. § 44.405(1).
66. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-010 (Apr. 18, 2005).
67. See Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2005-005 (Mar. 4, 2006); Mediator Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 2005-003 (Nov. 10, 2005).
68. "'Mediation participant' means a mediation party or a person who attends a media-
tion in person or by telephone, videoconference, or other electronic means." FLA. STAT. §
44.403(2).
69. Advisory Op. 2005-003, supra note 67.
70. Advisory Op. 2005-005, supra note 67.
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C. Rule Changes Suggest Updating Opinions
Two changes to the ethical rules regarding confidentiality may require
modification of several MEAC opinions to make them consistent with the
amended rules. 71 The opinions track the language of the then existing rules
and, if answered today, would necessarily track the language of the current
rules. One significant rule change no longer requires mediators to maintain
confidentiality if the law permits disclosure.7"
Prior to August 2006, a mediator had an ethical obligation to maintain
mediation confidentiality "except where disclosure [was] required by law."73
The present amended ethical rule advises that "[a] mediator shall maintain
confidentiality of all information revealed during mediation except where
disclosure is required or permitted by law or is agreed to by all parties."74 In
1995, the MEAC advised mediators "to preserve and maintain the confiden-
tiality of all mediation proceedings except where required by law to disclose
information."75 The then cited authority for this opinion is no longer appli-
cable. Now, mediators must make disclosures required by law and must
make decisions on whether to make disclosures permitted by law. 76 Addi-
tionally, the Mediation Confidentiality and Privilege Act specifically permits
mediators to communicate with a party's counsel.77 However, an act not
legally prohibited is not necessarily an advisable act. Interestingly, the op-
tions presented by the MEAC in 1995 remain sound advice, even with the
rule and statutory changes. 71 Similarly, in 2005 MEAC again advised a me-
diator to maintain confidentiality unless required by law. 79 The opinion dealt
with a document given during mediation which, as a mediation communica-
71. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a), 10.420(a)(3).
72. Petition, 931 So. 2d 877, 883 (Fla. 2006). See also supra discussion accompanying
notes 36-37.
73. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a) (2005); Petition, 931 So. 2d at
883.
74. Id.
75. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 95-010 (Feb. 13, 1996).
76. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a).
77. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(1) (2007).
78. See Advisory Op. 95-010, supra note 75. The question posed to MEAC dealt with a
party's phone call to his attorney's office during a break in mediation. Id. Following the
phone call, the party told the mediator that he had spoken with the attorney's assistant who
advised him that he would not have to pay any attorney's fees and the attorney for the other
side was "known to 'rape' his clients financially." Id. MEAC offered two options to the
mediator: "inform the party that he or she may wish to speak with his/her attorney, rather
than a member of the attorney's staff," or "advise the party to contact his/her attorney to in-
form the attorney of [the assistant's advice]." Id.
79. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-011 (Apr. 18, 2005).
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tion not subject to statutory exception, remained confidential.80 For this opi-
nion, the rule change alters neither the result nor the reasoning.
Presently, a mediator also has an ethical obligation to inform the par-
ticipants that "communications made during the process are confidential,
except where disclosure is required or permitted by law."'" Prior to August
1, 2006, a mediator only needed to inform the participants of the exception as
required by law.82 Consequently, one MEAC opinion issued in 2001 should
be updated to reflect the permissive disclosure. 3 As before, a mediator need
not "'go into detail as to any specific statutory provisions."' 84 Mediators are
also advised to remind a party, who wishes to make a phone call to aid deci-
sion-making during mediation, of the confidentiality privilege.85 This is in-
creasingly important, for following passage of the Act, a "mediation partici-
pant who knowingly and willfully discloses a [confidential] mediation com-
munication" is subject to civil penalties.8 6 Additionally, mediators should
not provide information that would lead a participant to breach confidential-
ity. 87 Accordingly, it would be unethical for a mediator to "sugges[t] that a
party, without the consent of all parties, discuss mediation communications
with someone who does not attend the mediation" for the mediator's sugges-
tion could lead the party to breach confidentiality.88
D. Disclosure of Information by Mediator
Under no circumstances should a mediator report to the court that a par-
ty failed to mediate in good faith, as there is no requirement that a party me-
80. Id.
81. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.420(a)(3).
82. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a) (2005); see also Petition, 931
So. 2d 877, 884 (Fla. 2006).
83. See Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2000-010 (Jan. 12, 2001). This opinion
requires the update to reflect the change: The mediator is required to inform mediation par-
ticipants that mediation communications are confidential, except where "required or permitted
by law." FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.420(a)(3).
84. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-003 (May 22, 2003) (citing Advisory
Op. 2000-010, supra note 83).
85. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 95-003 (Oct. 5, 1995).
86. FLA. STAT. § 44.406(1)(a)-(c) (2007). "Any mediation participant who knowingly
and willfully discloses a mediation communication in violation of s. 44.405 shall, upon appli-
cation by any party to a court of competent jurisdiction, be subject to remedies, including: (a)
[e]quitable relief; (b) [c]ompensatory damages; [and] (c) [a]ttomey's fees, mediator's fees,
and costs incurred in the mediation proceeding." Id.
87. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-007 (Apr. 9, 2007).
88. Id.
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diate in good faith.89 "A mediator's report should be limited to only those
matters authorized by applicable court rule."9 Pursuant to the rules, the me-
diator's report should not contain the reason for the mediation's cancellation
or postponement. 9 However, a mediator may complete a statistical form so
long as the mediator does not reveal any confidential communications from
the mediation.9" Similarly, "any mediator notes which relate to confidential
information cannot be part of a file which is open to the public."9 3
Mediators must maintain the confidentiality of mediation communica-
tions made during caucus94 unless the party consents to disclosure.95 "[A]
mediator may establish as a ground rule for the mediation that nothing in
caucus will be deemed confidential unless a party specifically indicates that
it should be confidential, if the party has expressly consented to such a pro-
cedure."96 However, the MEAC advised that the better practice would be for
the mediator to get the party's consent for specific communications before
disclosing them to a party who was not present during the caucus.97 This
would relieve the party from the burden of having to identify each and every
sentence he did not want communicated, and allow the mediator to confirm
the substance and form of the purposeful communications.
MEAC opinions over the last decade have addressed the confidentiality
of mediator testimony, affidavits, and reports of threats. In 1997, the MEAC
advised that a mediator should neither voluntarily report nor testify about
threats made during mediation.98 This opinion warrants discussion given the
2006 rule change. 99 The Mediation Confidentiality and Privilege Act states
there is no confidentiality or privilege for any mediation communication that
is "willfully used to plan a crime, commit or attempt to commit a crime, con-
ceal ongoing criminal activity, or threaten violence.""1° The Act does not
offer guidance in determining when a communication meets this statutory
89. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-006 (Jan. 17, 2005); see also Avril v.
Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
90. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-004 (May 2, 2001).
91. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2000-003 (Sept. 12, 2000).
92. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-007 (Dec. 4, 2003); Mediator Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-008 (Oct. 22, 2003).
93. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 99-010 (Dec. 10, 1999).
94. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(b). Caucus refers to private
meetings between the mediator and one or some of the mediation participants. See id.
95. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(b).
96. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-005 (July 31, 2003) (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 96-005 (Feb. 8, 1997).
99. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a) (2006).
100. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(2) (2007).
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exception. '01 Some mediators may wait to be ordered by the court to provide
information.0 2 Others may view the statutory exception as disclosure "per-
mitted by law."' ' Those mediators should also take into account their other
ethical obligations, notably, maintaining impartiality"° and responsibility to
the profession, 5 and weigh the need for immediate communication against
waiting for the legal determination of whether the communication was will-
fully used for criminal activity or to threaten violence. 6 Mediators well
know that the same words, differently conveyed through voice and body
language, take on markedly different meanings and are subject to the inter-
pretation of the listener. Determining when a mediation communication fits
within this exception may not be an easy task.
Many mediators are bound by ethical codes in addition to the Rules for
Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators. In 1997, the MEAC advised that
a psychologist-mediator did not have a duty to warn an individual of a threat
which became known to the mediator during mediation.'07 The opinion con-
sidered case law, 118 the Florida statutory privilege for psychologists,' 0 9 and
the American Psychological Association's Ethical Principles of Psycholo-
gists and Code of Conduct"0 in reaching its opinion."' The MEAC rea-
soned that the mediator's primary obligation was to follow the ethical rules
for mediators in the event of inconsistency with other ethical obligations."l
2
101. See id.
102. Advisory Op. 96-005, supra note 98.
103. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a).
104. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.330(a).
105. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.600.
106. See FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(2) (2007).
107. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 97-006 (Dec. 24, 1997).
108. Green v. Ross, 691 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Boynton v. Bur-
glass, 590 So. 2d 446, 451 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
109. FLA. STAT. § 490.0147 (1997). The statute has not been amended since 1997. See
FLA. STAT. § 490.0147 (2007). Similar provisions for mental health professionals were and
are found at Florida Statutes section 491.0147. Id,
110. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS
AND CODE OF CONDUCT § 4.05 (2002), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code2002.html
(last visited Dec. 20, 2007).
111. Advisory Op. 97-006, supra note 107.
112. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.030(b) (1997) read: "Nothing herein
shall replace, eliminate, or render inapplicable relevant ethical standards, not in conflict with
these rules, which may be imposed upon a mediator by virtue of the mediator's professional
calling." The current (renumbered) rule on concurrent standards reads: "Other ethical stan-
dards to which a mediator may be professionally bound are not abrogated by these rules. In
the course of performing mediation services, however, these rules prevail over conflicting
ethical standards to which a mediator may otherwise be bound." FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD.
MEDIATORS 10.650.
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As mediators were then required to maintain confidentiality unless disclosure
was required by law,1"3 and reporting threats was not required, mediators
were obligated to maintain confidentiality.11 4 Now, however, mediators are
ethically required to maintain confidentiality, "except where ... required or
permitted by law."' 5 Psychologists may report a clear and immediate prob-
ability of physical harm to the patient or other individuals.. 6 and a statutory
exception exists for mediation communications threatening violence.1 7 The
mediator is then left to determine whether the specific mediation communi-
cation was willfully used to threaten violence. In an earlier opinion, the
MEAC also stated that, based on the rules and statutes governing mediation,
"a mediator had no duty to warn because the [facts presented] did not rise to
the level of imminent harm." 18 To date, the MEAC has not offered an opin-
ion on a realistic threat of imminent harm made during mediation.
Mediators may testify in court if all parties waive their privilege; if or-
dered to testify by the court, mediators should abide by the court order."I9
Further, "if subpoenaed, [the mediator] should either file a motion for protec-
tive order, or notify the judge ... that the mediator is statutorily required to
maintain the confidentiality."' 20 "A mediator should always determine what,
if any, statutory confidentiality provisions are applicable. 12.1
Predating the Act's determination that a mediation participant may dis-
close a mediation communication to another mediation participant's counsel,
the MEAC, in 1999, advised that "a mediator may, under certain conditions,
disclose to the party's attorney(s) the factual circumstances surrounding the
mediation agreement." 22 However, the MEAC cautioned that it would be
inappropriate for the mediator to offer a personal opinion about the case.'23
The Act codifies and broadens permissible communication with parties' at-
torneys by allowing mediation participants to disclose mediation communi-
113. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.080(a) (1997).
114. Advisory Op. 97-006, supra note 107.
115. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a).
116. FLA. STAT. § 490.0147(3) (2007). "[T]he person licensed under this chapter commu-
nicates the information only to the potential victim, appropriate family member, or law en-
forcement or other appropriate authorities." Id.
117. Id. § 44.405(4)(a)(2).
118. Advisory Op. 97-006, supra note 107 (citing Advisory Op. 96-005, supra note 98).
119. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 99-012 (May 11, 2000).
120. Id. (citing Advisory Op. 96-005, supra note 98). If a party believes the court "has
inappropriately obtained testimony from the mediator, the party may wish to obtain a review
through the appellate courts which could strike such testimony" it deemed confidential from
the record. Id.
121. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-008 (Nov. 6, 2001).
122. Advisory Op. 99-012, supra note 119; but see Advisory Op., 95-010, supra note 75.
123. Advisory Op. 99-012, supra note 119.
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cations to other participants and their counsel.' 24 Also predating the Act, a
MEAC opinion, issued in 2000, advised that a mediator was not ethically
prohibited from signing an agreement to mediate stating that the mediator
agrees not to voluntarily testify unless a mediation participant engages in
behavior specifically identified in the mediation agreement as excluded from
confidentiality. 125 The question dealt with a U. S. Postal Service mediation
program which excluded "genuine threat[s] of physical harm," "suspected
child or elder abuse," as well as reports of criminal activity on or "fraud or
abuse of postal property.," 126  The MEAC further advised that, if an issue
listed in the agreement was revealed during mediation, the mediator could
"report the activity without committing an ethical violation. '27
The Act, in addition to delineating confidentiality exceptions, also al-
lows for parties to opt-out of confidentiality provisions. 128 On two occasions
in 2001, and once again in 2006, the MEAC addressed the confidentiality of
bar grievances. '29 Most recently, the MEAC advised that "the filing of a
grievance with The Florida Bar [is] ... not prohibited by the statutory and
rule confidentiality requirements." 130 In contrast, in two earlier opinions,
both pre-Act and pre-rule change, the MEAC advised mediators not to vol-
untarily agree to testify in a bar grievance proceeding to preserve the statu-
tory and court rule confidentiality provisions, 13' and advised the non-attorney
mediator not to disclose communications made during a Florida Bar Griev-
ance mediation session, even if such testimony might be relevant in a subse-
quent proceeding.'32 In reconciling these opinions, three critical factors are
operative: statutory law, ethical rules, and whether the mediator is a non-
lawyer. 13
3
Mediators maintain the confidentiality of mediation, except where re-
quired or permitted by law. The Act only requires disclosure for abuse and
124. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(1) (2007).
125. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2000-002 (June 27, 2000).
126. Id. The agreement is signed by everyone who participates in the mediation. Id.
127. Id.
128. FLA. STAT. § 44.402(2).
129. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-005 (Sept. 21, 2006); Mediator Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-005 (June 1, 2001); Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-
002 (May 2, 2001).
130. Advisory Op. 2006-005, supra note 129.
131. Advisory Op. 2001-002, supra note 129; see Advisory Op. 2001-005, supra note 129.
132. See Advisory Op. 2001-005, supra note 129. In Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Op. 2002-002 (Mar. 22, 2002), the committee expressed its retained confidence in MEAC
2001-005. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2002-002 (Mar. 22, 2002).
133. See Advisory Op. 2006-005, supra note 129; Advisory Op. 2001-005, supra note
129; Advisory Op. 2001-002, supra note 129.
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neglect of children and vulnerable adults.'34 Therefore, disclosure of profes-
sional misconduct is not required by statute. However, a Florida lawyer is
obligated to report another lawyer who he knows has "committed a violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to
that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other re-
spects."' 35 Further, the mediator rules covering concurrent standards advise
that, although "[o]ther ethical standards to which a mediator may be profes-
sionally bound are not abrogated,.. . [i]n the course of performing mediation
services, [mediation] rules prevail over any conflicting ethical standards."' 36
Accordingly, the lawyer-mediator may resolve the apparently conflicting
ethical dilemma by deciding that the rules for mediators permit disclosure as
required by the rules for lawyers. This is consistent with the Act, which
states there is no confidentiality or privilege for any mediation communica-
tion, "[o]ffered to report, prove, or disprove professional misconduct occur-
ring during the mediation, solely for the internal use of the body conducting
the investigation of the conduct."' 37 On the other hand, the non-lawyer, hav-
ing no obligation to report, may wait to be ordered to testify.
III. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
A. Developments and Background
The Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators gov-
erning conflict of interest were last amended in 2000 to require mediators to
decline or withdraw from mediation entailing a clear conflict of interest.
13 8
While previously, conflicts were subject to waiver by the parties following
disclosure by the mediator, presently, a clear conflict is not subject to waiver
under any circumstances. 9 The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar saw sig-
nificant pertinent amendment in 2006, when third-party neutrals were in-
134. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(4)(a)(3) (2007).
135. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.3(a).
136. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.650.
137. FLA. STAT. § 44.405 (4)(a)(6).
138. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340(a). "A mediator shall not mediate a
matter that presents a clear or undisclosed conflict of interest." Id. See also 2000 Revision
Committee Notes, advising that "[a] conflict of interest which clearly impairs a mediator's
impartiality is not resolved by mere disclosure to or waiver by, the parties." FLA. R. CERT. &
CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340(a) comm. notes.
139. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340(c). "[I]f a conflict of interest clearly
impairs a mediator's impartiality, the mediator shall withdraw regardless of the express
agreement of the parties." Id.
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cluded in the rule regarding conflict of interest, 4° and a new rule for third
party neutrals was added. 4'
The Rules of Professional Conduct provide that, "a lawyer shall not rep-
resent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a ... mediator,"142 and parallel the preexisting
rule governing representation by a former judge. 4 3 In significant contrast
with the mediator rules, The Florida Bar rules do permit representation, if
"all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writ-
ing."' 44 Reconciling the difference, the Bar rules acknowledge "[a] Florida
Bar member who is a certified mediator is governed by the applicable law
and rules relating to certified mediators."' 145 Further, the mediator rules es-
tablish that while other ethical standards are not abrogated, "[i]n the course
of performing mediation services," the mediator "rules prevail over any con-
flicting ethical standards to which a mediator may otherwise be bound.""'
The newly issued Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, do not alter the MEAC
opinions regarding lawyer mediators. As a result, lawyers may be precluded
from representing a client based not only on the rules regulating lawyers, but
on the rules regulating mediators.
B. Required Disclosure by Mediator
Mediators, prohibited from mediating matters that present clear con-
flicts of interest, are also prohibited from mediating matters that present un-
disclosed conflicts of interest. 147 The burden to disclose potential conflicts of
interest rests on the mediator, who shall disclose them as soon as practical
after the mediator becomes aware of a potential conflict.' 48
Several MEAC opinions provide guidance on permissive and manda-
tory disclosure. An early MEAC Opinion advised that a mediator may dis-
close that she has mediated with an attorney, claims representative, or other
140. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12. The amended rule governs arbitrators, mediators
and other third-party neutrals. Id.
141. R. REGULATINGFLA. BAR4-2.4.
142. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12(a). The rule forbids representation unless all parties
to the proceedings give informed consent in writing. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12
cmt.
143. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12 cmt. (stating rule generally parallels R. REGULATING
FLA. BAR 4-1.11).
144. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12(a).
145. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12 cmt.
146. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.650.
147. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-009 (Dec. 16, 2001).
148. Id.
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parties, but is not required to do so unless there is a "close personal relation-
ship" or other circumstances specifically referenced in the rules.'49 In con-
trast, in 2001, the MEAC advised that a mediator must disclose former asso-
ciations, such as previous employment, but need not withdraw unless such
past relationship constitutes a clear conflict. '50 If the conflict is not clear, the
mediator must still disclose prior referral relationships and, if all parties con-
sent, may proceed with the mediation. 5' Similarly, in 2003, the MEAC cau-
tioned a mediator to be mindful of the extent of her relationship with a par-
ticular adjuster or carrier and determined "that a mediator who is routinely
selected by a particular carrier or adjuster, is obligated to disclose this to the
other side.., and may only continue to serve if all parties agree."1
5 2
In contrast, if the extent of the relationship does create a clear conflict,
the conflict would be non-waivable.'53 Clear "conflicts occur when circum-
stances or relationships involving the mediator cannot be reasonably re-
garded as allowing the mediator to maintain impartiality"'54 and are "not
resolved by mere disclosure to, or waiver by, the parties."' 55 Distinguishing
a waivable and non-waivable conflict, the MEAC determined that a father
would not be able to mediate a case his attorney daughter was handling be-
cause it represented a clear conflict not subject to waiver.'56 However, a case
handled by the daughter's firm, if she had no involvement with the case,
might be subject to waiver by the parties after disclosure. '57 The mediator is
ultimately responsible for determining whether a conflict is clear or waiv-
149. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 98-004 (Aug. 7, 1998); see also FLA. R.
CERT & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340.
Potential conflicts of interests which require disclosure include the fact of a mediator's mem-
bership on a related board of directors, full or part time service by the mediator as a representa-
tive, advocate, or consultant to a mediation participant, present stock or bond ownership by the
mediator in a corporate mediation participant, or any other form of managerial, financial, or
family interest by the mediator in any mediation participant involved in a mediation. A media-
tor who is a member of a law firm or other professional organization is obliged to disclose any
past or present client relationship that firm or organization may have with any party involved
in a mediation.
FLA. R. CERT & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340 comm. notes.
150. Advisory, Op. 2001-009, supra note 147.
151. Id.
152. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-001 (Apr. 22, 2003).
153. Id.
154. FLA. R. CERT & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340 comm. notes. "Impartiality means
freedom from favoritism or bias in word, action, or appearance, and includes a commitment to
assist all parties, as opposed to any one individual." FLA. R. CERT & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS
10.330(a).
155. FLA. R. CERT & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340 comm. notes.
156. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-008 (Feb. 1, 2005).
157. Id.
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able.'58 "[I]f a conflict of interest clearly impairs a mediator's impartiality,
the mediator shall withdraw regardless of the express agreement of the par-
ties" to proceed. '59
C. Lawyer-Mediator Conflicts
The MEAC opinions identify clear conflicts prohibiting a lawyer from
subsequent representation of a prior mediation party. In its second issued
opinion, the MEAC confirmed that an attorney who mediated a case may not
subsequently serve as co-counsel regarding the same case. 160 Predictably, in
the MEAC's next issued opinion, it reaffirmed that serving as counsel fol-
lowing service as a mediator for the same case was not permitted.161 It is
similarly impermissible "for a mediator to represent either party in [a] . . .
proceeding or in any matter arising out of the subject mediation."' 62 The
prohibition against future representation is not solely based on having medi-
ated the same subject matter for the same parties. A mediator who meets
with prospective mediation parties to discuss their case, yet never mediates
their case, may not ethically represent either party in their pending legal mat-
ter. 163 In these fact patterns presented to the MEAC, the mediator may have
been privy to confidential information that might work to a party's detri-
ment. " In all three fact patterns, the mediator is precluded from represent-
ing one of the parties for whom the mediator previously provided mediation
services. 16' For these matters, the ethical rules for mediators preclude repre-
sentation regarding the same or related legal matter. 1
66
Lawyer mediators need to be mindful that the ethical rules for mediators
may mandate greater restrictions on representation than do the ethical rules
for lawyers. The amended rule governing conflict of interest for lawyers
who serve as mediators provides that the "lawyer shall not represent anyone
158. See FLA. R. CERT & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340 comm. notes.
159. FLA. R. CERT & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340(c).
160. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 94-002 (Jan. 19, 1995).
161. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 94-003 (Jan. 19, 1995).
162. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2005-004 (Nov. 10, 2005) (quoting Advisory
Op. 94-003, supra note 161).
163. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-011 (Apr. 4, 2002).
164. See id.; Advisory Op. 2005-004, supra note 162; Advisory Op. 94-003, supra note
161.
165. Advisory Op. 2005-004, supra note 162; Advisory Op. 2001-011, supra note 163;
Advisory Op. 94-003, supra note 161.
166. Id Same subject matter does not refer to case category, such as automobile collisions
generally, but rather the specific automobile collision. Same subject matter would refer to a
post dissolution action following the same parties' dissolution of marriage. See Mediator
Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-007 (Nov. 22, 2004).
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in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a ... mediator, unless all parties to the proceeding give
informed consent, confirmed in writing. '  Written, informed consent will
not permit a certified or court-appointed mediator to represent a party regard-
ing any matter arising from the subject mediation.'68 The provision of ser-
vices, albeit limited and preliminary to formal mediation, precludes the at-
torney from representing a party regarding the same subject matter. 69 This
heightened ethical standard for mediators is sanctioned in the Rules Regulat-
ing the Florida Bar, which provide in the commentary: "[a] Florida Bar
member who is a certified mediator is governed by the applicable law and
rules relating to certified mediators."' 7 ° Mediators subject to multiple ethical
codes follow all codes to the extent they are consistent.'71 When inconsis-
tent, the mediator code prevails regarding mediation matters. 172
Reversing the order of events so representation precedes mediation does
not change the result. An attorney, who has acted as an advocate for a party,
may not ethically conduct mediation for the same parties and same subject
matter involved in the initial matter, irrespective of waivers from the par-
ties.173 Similarly, an attorney whose firm has contemporaneous cases-in
addition to the mediation matter-pending against a mediation party would
have a clear conflict of interest precluding mediation of a case with the par-
ty 174
Some consecutive work as lawyer then mediator, or mediator then law-
yer, is ethically permissible. A mediator may handle legal work on a matter
other than the subject of the mediation. 175 However, having done so, the
mediator would be precluded from re-mediating with the original parties
regarding the original subject. 176 The MEAC has advised that "[p]rior repre-
sentation of a party to a mediation, which involved different parties, a differ-
167. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12(a).
168. See FLA. R. CERT & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340(c).
169. See Advisory Op. 2001-011, supra note 163; Advisory Op. 94-003, supra note 161;
Advisory Op. 94-002, supra note 160.
170. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-2.4.
171. See FLA. R. CERT & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.650.
172. Id.
173. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-006 (Sept. 16, 2003).
174. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2002-005 (Nov. 7, 2002).
175. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 97-002 (Apr. 18, 1997); see also Media-
tor Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 99-001 (Apr. 26, 1999) (finding no rule prohibiting an attor-
ney mediator from serving as an attorney in a case unrelated to the mediation against a party
who participated in the mediation). In contrast, a mediator must decline serving as a special
master following mediating the subject matter for the parties. Mediator Qualifications Advi-
sory Panel, Op. 96-002 (Aug. 14, 1996).
176. Advisory Op. 97-002, supra note 175.
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ent case or different subject matter would be subject to disclosure and may be
waivable based on a case by case determination." 177
Highlighting the importance of analyzing each situation with careful at-
tention to the factual and relational variables, the MEAC gave different an-
swers to two similar questions posed by one mediator. "A mediator (who is
also an attorney) engaged in an ongoing legal relationship with a third party
administrator must not serve as a mediator in cases involving the third party
administrator because it is a clear, non-waivable conflict of interest."' 78 The
MEAC noted that "some third party administrators are vested with full deci-
sion-making authority and hire counsel."' 79  For purposes of determining
mediator conflict of interest, the third party administrator is, in essence, the
attorney's client.180 In contrast, "[a] mediator (who is also an attorney) may
serve [as a mediator] in cases involving a reinsurer, ... if the relationship is
disclosed and the parties waive any potential conflict . ".1..81 Unlike the
third party administrator, the reinsurer is not a "party" to the case and does
not have decision-making authority.'82
D. Other Potential and Actual Conflicts of Interest
A mediator who had a prior professional relationship with individuals,
who are now parties to mediation, will not automatically be precluded from
mediating for the parties. The MEAC has advised that mediating for parties
who have been marriage counseling clients of the mediator,' 3 or for whom
the mediator provided training, is permissible, if following disclosure by the
mediator, the parties request the mediator's service.'84 Similarly, "[a] media-
tor is not precluded from mediating a case in which one of the parties [previ-
ously] attended a parenting course taught by the mediator."'' 85  When the
relationship does not create a clear conflict, the mediator discloses the rela-
tionship, and all parties request the mediator's service, the mediator may
177. Advisory Op. 2004-007, supra note 166. Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 86-8, with-
drawn in 2007, stated: "[T]he lawyer should not undertake mediation if he previously pro-
vided representation to either of the parties." Fla. Bar Prof I Ethics Comm., Op. 86-8 (Oct.
15, 1986). As this opinion is no longer in force, Florida mediator ethics and attorney ethics
appear consistent in this area. See Fla. Bar Prof I Ethics Comm., Op. 07-2 (Sept. 7, 2007).
178. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2005-006 (Jan. 18, 2006).
179. Id
180. Id
181. Id The result depends on finding that no clear conflict exists. Id.
182. Advisory Op. 2005-006, supra note 178.
183. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 97-003 (Apr. 18, 1997).
184. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 99-008 (Nov. 9, 1999).
185. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2000-006 (Aug. 31, 2000).
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ethically mediate for the parties.'86 However, some relationships create
clear, non-waivable conflicts requiring the mediator to decline or withdraw
from the mediation. Service as an evaluator of the parent and guardian in a
dependency case is such a conflict, thus precluding the evaluator from medi-
ating the case. '87
The MEAC has often addressed whether a person's primary employ-
ment prohibited him from becoming a certified mediator, or privately medi-
ating cases. In two opinions, the MEAC advised that a guardian ad litem is
not expressly prohibited from becoming a certified mediator and serving as a
dependency mediator.'88 Additionally, the rules do not prohibit a full-time
mediator, who is employed by the county, from mediating privately on her
own time. 189 Consistently, a mediator's employment as a Deputy Clerk does
not inherently cause ethical problems,1 9 and working as a judicial assistant
does not automatically prohibit one from mediating.19' Notably, mediators
have an on-going obligation to determine on a case by case basis that the
matters they mediate do not present either clear or undisclosed conflicts of
interest. 192
IV. PROCESS
A. Developments and Background
"A mediator is responsible for safeguarding the mediation process."' 193
Whether the case actually settles is secondary to the mediator confirming that
each case is suitable for mediation and conducting the mediation "in an in-
formed, balanced, and timely fashion."'' 94 Mediators have responsibilities to
the parties, 195 the courts, 196 the profession, " and the process. 198 Virtually all
186. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340.
187. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2000-007 (Jan. 12, 2001). This opinion also
discusses improper appointment of a non-certified mediator for a court-ordered case. Id.
188. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2000-008 (Dec. 14, 2000); Mediator Qualifi-
cations Advisory Panel, Op. 99-007 (Nov. 9, 1999).
189. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 99-009 (Dec. 10, 1999).
190. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 99-006 (July 3, 1999).
191. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2005-002 (Nov. 10, 2005).
192. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.340(a).
193. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.400. If there is no mediator, there is no
mediation. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 98-005 (Aug. 7, 1998).
194. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.400. Process is paramount. Id. Media-
tors give participants the opportunity to come together and exercise self-determination. See
FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.3 10(a).
195. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.300.
196. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.500.
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of the MEAC opinions have an impact on the mediation process. Some
opinions clearly fit within one subject heading, while others may fall under
two or more subjects. To avoid duplication, with few exceptions, this article
discusses the MEAC opinions in only one subject section. Therefore, refer-
ence to the other subjects in this article will provide a broader overview of
the mediation process.
Over the past few years, Florida has seen significant changes in media-
tion law, including passage of the Act, amendments to the Florida Rules for
Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, and amendments to the Rules Re-
gulating the Florida Bar related to mediation. Accordingly, in 2006 the
MEAC for the first and only time changed a published position, thereby re-
scinding portions of three previously issued opinions.199 Changes in the
statutory law governing confidentiality necessitated a change in the MEAC's
position that approved a mediator reporting to the court that a party who
lacked full settlement authority failed to appear for mediation. This section
will discuss the changed position, identify opinions subject to reconsidera-
tion, and summarize the remaining MEAC opinions relating to the process of
mediation.
B. Changed Position-Lack of Full Settlement Authority
In several opinions, the MEAC advised that a party who appeared for
mediation without the requisite settlement authority had not appeared for
mediation, and his lack of appearance could be reported to the court.2"' This
conclusion was premised on the applicable Florida Rule of Civil Procedure,
which defined appearance as requiring the individual to have full settlement
authority.' While seemingly illogical that one who physically appears has
not legally appeared, case law interpreting the procedural rule supports this
conclusion.2 2 The law remains the same regarding the individual's obliga-
197. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.600.
198. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.400.
199. Compare Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-003 (July 24, 2006), with
Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-010 (Mar. 22, 2002), Mediator Qualifications
Advisory Panel, Op. 99-002 (July 3, 1999), and Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op.
95-009 (Dec. 22, 1995).
200. Compare Advisory Op. 2006-03, supra note 199, with Advisory Op. 2001-010, supra
note 199, Advisory Op. 99-002, supra note 199, and Advisory Op. 95-009, supra note 199.
201. FLA.R.CIv.P. 1.720(b).
202. Carbino v. Ward, 801 So. 2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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tion to appear for mediation. 23 The law regarding the mediator's reporting
such nonappearance has changed.
The Mediation Confidentiality and Privilege Act provides that all me-
diation communications are confidential unless the parties agree otherwise or
the statute provides an exception. 20 4 For confidentiality purposes, mediation
commences when the court orders mediation, the parties agree to mediate, or
as required by agency or statute. 25 Therefore, by the time the participants
appear for the scheduled mediation and advise the mediator of less than full
settlement authority, the mediation has commenced and the mediator has the
ethical obligation to maintain confidentiality unless required or permitted by
law or the parties agree to the disclosure. No statutory exception to confi-
dentiality exists for advising the court of lack of settlement authority learned
by the mediator during the course of the mediation. Therefore, it is a confi-
dential communication unless the parties agree to its disclosure. Admittedly,
a participant positioned to be sanctioned by the court for his nonappearan-
ce 206 is likely disinclined to grant permission for the mediator to communi-
cate this information.
In MEAC 2006-003, the Committee states the reasons for its departure
from its previous position and rescinds portions of three previously issued
opinions.20 7 In two earlier opinions, the MEAC distinguished between in-
formation learned by the mediator in caucus as opposed to joint session.20 8
Previously and presently, the information learned in caucus necessitated con-
fidentiality because an ethical rule prohibited the mediator from disclosing
this information without party permission. 209 The same analysis now applies
to information regarding settlement authority learned of in joint session; sta-
tutory law requires the mediator to keep the communication confidential
absent a legally recognized exception." ' Therefore, the mediator's obliga-
tion to maintain confidentially is now consistent and not altered by whether
information was learned in caucus.
203. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b)(1); see also Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2002-001
(Mar. 22, 2002) (stating that a party's appearance requirement is not satisfied by appearance
of party's counsel or in-house counsel).
204. FLA. STAT. § 44.405(1) (2007).
205. Id. § 44.404(1).
206. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.720(b). "If a party fails to appear at a duly noticed mediation con-
ference without good cause, the court upon motion shall impose sanctions, including an award
of mediator and attorneys' fees and other costs, against the party failing to appear." Id.
207. Advisory Op. 2006-003, supra note 200.
208. See Advisory Op. 2001-010, supra note 199; Advisory Op. 99-002, supra note 199.
209. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(b).
210. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.360(a)-(b).
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C. Appearance, Authority to Settle
Mediators may report lack of appearance by a party when the party does
in fact fail to physically appear."' Failing to appear is not a mediation com-
munication 2 and may be reported to the court. A mediator's "report to the
court regarding nonappearance should not include any reason for the nonap-
pearance. ' 213
A mediator lacks the authority to compel attendance at mediation and
does not have an affirmative duty to inquire about settlement authority.214
Nonetheless, if an attomey-in-fact appears for a party found to be incompe-
tent to proceed in criminal court, the legal authority of the representative
should be resolved before proceeding with the mediation.215
Notably, although parties may be court-ordered to mediation, no rule
requires a party to "negotiate in good faith., 216 Thus, a mediator should not
report failure to mediate in good faith and should limit reported matters to
those authorized by applicable court rule.217 Further, a mediator has the af-
firmative obligation to decline to mediate if the order of referral to mediation
requires the mediator to report to the court whether the parties mediated in
good faith. 18
"When the mediation is court ordered, the parties are required to appear
at mediation., 219 In 1995, the MEAC advised that if a party leaves prior to
the mediator completing an opening statement, the mediator may report non-
appearance. 2 ° However, eleven years later the MEAC receded from the
opinion "relating specifically to the mediator's report to the court based on
211. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-008 (Mar. 29, 2007); Advisory Op.
2006-003, supra note 200; see also Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2007-001 (Mar.
29, 2007). Parties, at times and as appropriate, may attend a mediation by telephone, video
conference, or other electronic means. FLA. STAT. § 44.403(2) (2007).
212. See FLA. STAT. § 44.403(l). "Mediation communication means an oral or written
statement, or nonverbal conduct intended to make an assertion, by or to a mediation partici-
pant made during the course of a mediation, or prior to mediation if made in furtherance of a
mediation." Id.
213. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2005-007 (Apr. 6, 2006).
214. See Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-009 (Oct. 22, 2003). Parties should
be advised that their failure to appear may lead to court sanctions. See FLA. R. Civ. P
1.720(b).
215. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 98-007 (Jan. 28, 1999).
216. Advisory Op. 95-009, supra note 199.
217. Id.
218. Advisory Op. 2004-006, supra note 90.
219. Advisory Op. 95-009, supra note 199.
220. Id.
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nonappearance. ' '221 MEAC has not been asked to revisit this opinion since
the passage of the Act; it is not known whether the MEAC would continue to
maintain that failure of a party to sit through the opening statement is tanta-
mount to a party's failure to appear.
D. Advice and Forms
While prohibited from giving legal advice, mediators must at times ad-
vise parties of their right to counsel.222 "When a mediator believes a party
does not understand or appreciate how an agreement may adversely affect
legal rights or obligations, the mediator shall advise the party of the right to
seek independent legal counsel. 22'  However, a mediator does not have a
duty to advise a party of the specific legal ramifications of a considered
agreement."' Similarly, a mediator has no ethical obligation to advise a par-
ty who does not have counsel in a family mediation to take the signed
agreement to an attorney for review.22 ' The mediator does have a duty to
advise the parties of the importance of understanding the legal consequences
of an agreement and giving the parties an opportunity to seek advice if they
desire.226 The applicable Rule Regulating the Florida Bar reads:
A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepre-
sented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not un-
derstand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain
the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral
and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.227
221. Advisory Op. 2006-003, supra note 200.
222. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-006 (Jan. 10, 2007).
223. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.370(b).
224. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.370 comm. notes.
225. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-002 (May 22, 2003). See also Kalof v.
Kalof, 840 So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (limiting FLA. FAM. L. R. P.
12.740(f)(1) to the unusual situation in which a party's counsel leaves the mediation before
the agreement is ready for signature and the client remains to sign the mediated agreement).
Under these circumstances, party's counsel would have ten days from service of a copy of the
agreement to serve a written objection on the mediator. See id. at 366-67.
226. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.370 comm. notes.
227. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-2.4(b). The Florida Bar has withdrawn Florida Bar Eth-
ics Opinion 86-8, see Fla. Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 07-2 (Sept. 7, 2007), which required
attorneys who mediate to "explain the risks of proceeding without independent counsel and
advise the parties to consult independent counsel during the course of the mediation and be-
fore signing any settlement agreement." Fla. Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 86-8 (Oct. 15,
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The commentary to the rule further provides that disclosure will vary based
on the parties, subject matter, and dispute resolution process.228
Mediators may, while maintaining their impartiality and preserving par-
ty self-determination, provide information they are qualified by training and
experience to provide.229 Mediators are, however, strictly prohibited from
predicting how the court will rule,23° and from directly or indirectly giving
legal advice.23 Posing questions rather than making statements does not
negate the impropriety of the legal advice.232 For example, inquiring
whether a party is aware that the agreement provides for a significantly
higher interest rate than would a judgment is inappropriate.233 Similarly, a
mediator may not inform a party "of a right to make a claim., 234 A mediator
may not ask why a claim is not being made, but should determine the compe-
tency of the party to enter into negotiations and proceed without counsel.235
Consistently, if a party is unaware of a potential cause of action, a mediator
is precluded from pointing this out as doing so would be giving legal ad-
vice.236 Inappropriate advice may also arise in a mediator's provision of
additional services. For example, "[d]rafting pleadings and providing advice
on how to file them would be an inappropriate additional service not directly
related to the mediation process.
237
"While a mediator may assist the parties in completing authorized
forms, a mediator should stop short of 'drafting' the Petition for Dissolution,
Answer, or other pleadings.,, 238 "[A]ssisting pro se litigants with filling out
forms approved by the Supreme Court of Florida after a mediation is not a
per se violation of the mediator ethical standards., 23 9 However, a mediator
should exercise caution "to ensure compliance with mediation rules and oth-
er professions' standards of conduct. 240 Additionally, non-lawyer mediators
1986). As this opinion is now withdrawn, Florida mediator ethics and attorney ethics appear
consistent in this area.
228. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-2.4 cmt.
229. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.370(a).
230. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-011 (Feb. 13, 2004).
231. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 95-002 (Oct. 5, 1995).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 96-003 (Jan. 2, 1997).
235. Id.
236. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 95-005 (Oct. 5, 1995).
237. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-004 (Jan. 17, 2005).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-003 (May 2, 2001); Mediator Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 2000-009 (Feb. 19, 2001).
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must be cautious not to give legal advice so as to engage in the unlicensed
practice of law-a third degree felony.24'
E. Withdrawing from, Declining, and Discontinuing Mediation
Mediators are, at times, ethically required to decline to mediate, with-
draw from the mediation, adjourn, or terminate the mediation. A mediator
should decline to mediate when the court order "contains provisions contrary
to the mediator's role and requires the mediator to act in a manner inconsis-
tent with the mediator's ethical rules. 242 For example, a court order requir-
ing the mediator to advise the court if the parties are not mediating in good
faith would create an irresolvable ethical dilemma for the mediator. 243 Fur-
ther, a mediator is also ethically obligated to withdraw if a party requests that
he no longer continue or the mediator is no longer impartial. 2' However, if
the parties agree, the mediator may continue the mediation in a different
format such as a co-mediation or a bifurcated proceeding.245
A mediator is required to adjourn or terminate a mediation if he believes
it "entails fraud, duress, absence of bargaining ability, or unconscionabil-
ity. '' 246 Upon the request of a party, "[a] mediator should declare an impasse,
... but need not immediately cancel a mediation because a party calls an
attorney or other.., advisor."247 Significantly, a mediator should not prema-
turely declare an impasse based on arbitrary time limits or because a judge
requests that the mediation be concluded.248 "While a judge may interrupt
the mediation and request that it be concluded," the mediator should not de-
clare impasse unless the parties have in fact reached impasse. 249 "The ap-
propriate report to the court should be an 'adjournment' if the parties will
return at a future time, or 'termination by the court' if the parties will not
return to mediation. '  Mediation emphasizes self-determination, 25 1 the
241. FLA. STAT. § 454.23 (2007).
242. Advisory Op. 2004-006, supra note 89.
243. Id.
244. Advisory Op. 2005-005, supra note 67. For discussion of MEAC opinions on con-
flict of interest requiring the mediator to withdraw, see supra Part III B.
245. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2000-005 (Aug. 31, 2000).
246. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-009 (Mar. 18, 2005); see also Advisory
Op. 2003-001, supra note 152 (advising the mediator to "adjourn or terminate a mediation
where there is a complete absence of bargaining ability").
247. Advisory Op. 2001-004, supra note 90.
248. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-007 (Sept. 26, 2001).
249. Id.
250. Id.
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parties' needs and interests, fairness, and procedural flexibility. 2 2 "Deci-
sions made during a mediation are to be made by the parties." '53 Should a
mediator decide an impasse is reached based on arbitrary time limits, it
would violate "the parties' self-determination and the mediator's responsibil-
ity to protect such self-determination."2 4
F. Scheduling Mediation
When scheduling cases, a "mediator must allow 'sufficient' and 'appro-
priate' time for completing mediation, and should not double.., book me-
diations. 255  Although a mediator may schedule a mediation without the
advance agreement of all parties, a party may request that the mediation be
rescheduled. 256 As a general rule, "[i]f a party [requests] that the mediation
be rescheduled for 'good cause,' the mediation should be rescheduled to a
mutually convenient time., 257 A mediator may violate ethical rules through
scheduling mediations by: 1) "[i]nitiating the mediation process without the
required judicial involvement;" 2) "[r]eferencing sanctions for failure to par-
ticipate in a mediation" when the case was not "court-ordered to mediation;"
or 3) "[b]y contracting with only one party in a dispute," possibly violating
the impartiality requirement.258
G. Non-Party Participants and Contact with Parties
Early MEAC opinions addressed a mediator's permissible contact with
the parties, stating that a "mediator is not prohibited from having contact
251. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.230. "The rules adopted in April 2000
[did] not impose ... additional requirements [on] the mediator" regarding self-determination.
Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2000-004 (Aug. 31, 2000).
252. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.230.
253. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.310.
254. Advisory Op. 2001-007, supra note 251. The mediator asked whether a judge, using
a bailiff, may interrupt the mediation after a specific period of time, based on the judge's
determination that if the matter was not resolved within a time frame determined by the judge,
an impasse should be declared with the parties signing a statement of non-agreement. Id.
255. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-002 (June 18, 2004).
256. Advisory Op. 2005-007, supra note 216.
257. Id.
258. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-004 (May 22, 2003). The facts pre-
sented to the MEAC stated that the mediator was hired by the attorney of one party. Id. The
mediator then sent a letter to the unrepresented party stating that by Administrative Order, the
party was required to attend mediation. Id. The mediator also gave the date of the scheduled
mediation and advised that failure to participate in mediation prior to trial may result in sanc-
tions. Id.
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with either party ... before or after the mediation., 25 9 Objection of a party's
counsel to have contact with his client does not prohibit the mediator from
contact with the party, but the mediator should consider the impact of the
action.260 Additionally, with the consent of counsel, the parties, and stipula-
tion of confidentiality, contact with the parties after mediation in an effort to
resolve the case was also permissible. 6'
Parties, in their exercise of self-determination, decide who will attend
their mediation. Accordingly, a mediator is not permitted to dictate who
attends the mediation. 262 If all parties agree on the attendance of non-party
participants, the participants would be bound by confidentiality pursuant to
the Act.263 If the parties agree, a non-lawyer may participate and assist a
party during mediation.2 4
Significantly, as both the number and types of cases going to mediation
increase, parties are increasingly making decisions about who will participate
in their mediation. In criminal matters, parties may choose to proceed with a
deputy inside or right outside the mediation room.265 However, in respond-
ing to a question regarding a civil case, the MEAC advised that if an armed
guard is a necessary ingredient to a mediation and the mediator believes
there is an absence of bargaining power or a troubling power imbalance, "the
mediator should suspend or terminate the mediation.,
266
H. Mediated Agreements
"[A] mediator is obligated to see that a mediated agreement is reduced
to writing," but a mediator is not obligated to personally draft the agree-
ment.
267
This rule is consistent with the statutory provision requiring a family
mediator to prepare a consent order because the statute merely requires that
the mediated agreement be incorporated into the consent order the mediator
prepared.268 A mediator does have the obligation to see that the agreement is
properly memorialized. 269  "While a mediator cannot compel parties who
259. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 97-001 (Apr. 18, 1997).
260. Advisory Op. 99-002, supra note 202.
261. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 94-001 (Jan. 14, 1995).
262. Advisory Op. 2006-007, supra note 87.
263. Id.
264. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 99-004 (July 3, 1999).
265. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 97-004 (July 24, 1997).
266. Id.
267. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2003-010 (Feb. 13, 2004).
268. Id.
269. Id.
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have reached an agreement to put such agreement in writing, the mediator
does have the obligation to 'discuss with the parties and counsel the process
for formalization and implementation of the agreement.' 27" Having medi-
ated a case, the mediator may not escape ethical obligations by claiming to
act as scrivener rather than mediator.27 ' Additionally, when memorializing
the "agreement, a mediator must observe the ethical rules regarding imparti-
ality, professional advice, and other professions' standards, such as the unau-
thorized practice of law., 27 2 It is not appropriate for a mediator to routinely
attach a copy of the mediated agreement to the Mediation Disposition Report
which is submitted to the court.273 It is never "the mediator's role to make
substantive decisions for the parties. 274
V. BUSINESS
A. Developments and Background
"A mediator's business practices should reflect fairness, integrity and
impartiality" 275 and "[a] mediator is responsible for maintaining . . . forth-
right business practices." '276 These obligations appear in the Florida Rules
for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators in the sections governing me-
diators' responsibilities to the parties and the profession, respectively.277
Such obligations underscore the importance of business matters in the ethical
performance of mediation. Approximately twenty-five percent of the ethical
questions posed to the MEAC regard business matters. 278 This section or-
ganizes, summarizes, and discusses the business MEAC opinions issued over
the last thirteen years.
2 79
270. Id.
271. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-002 (June 30, 2006).
272. Advisory Op. 2004-004, supra note 237.
273. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2007-002 (May 1, 2007). The parties may
agree to have a copy of the mediated agreement attached to the report which is submitted to
the court. Id.
274. Advisory Op. 2004-004, supra note 240.
275. Fla. R. Cert. & Ct.-Apptd. Mediators 10.300.
276. Fla. R. Cert. & Ct.-Apptd. Mediators 10.600.
277. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.300, 10.600.
278. This section on Business MEAC opinions includes 29 of the 114 opinions issued
through August 2007.
279. Although the 2006 Rules were amended to substantially change mediator certification
requirements, MEAC's jurisdiction does not include certification matters and therefore they
will not be addressed in this section. See Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-001
(Apr. 6, 2006). The Supreme Court Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules and
Policy filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Florida proposing amendments to the Florida
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B. Referral and Selection
"A mediator may not compensate another for merely making a referral,
but may compensate a colleague or mediation service for actual work per-
formed .... ,2 8o The MEAC provided examples of actual work subject to
compensation that included "scheduling and noticing mediations, and billing
[and] collecting mediation fees."2'1 This opinion reaffirms the mandate that
"[n]o commissions, rebates, or similar remuneration shall be given or re-
ceived by a mediator for a mediation referral. 282
In a second opinion regarding referrals, the MEAC addressed the matter
of attorney-mediators referring cases to and receiving referrals from a firm
for a fee.283 The questioner stated that, he occasionally both referred cases
for which he received referral fees and accepted cases for which he paid re-
ferral fees. 284 The MEAC opinion does not discuss the ethics of attorneys
taking or receiving referral fees-for this is clearly not within its limited
jurisdiction. Attorneys, as mediators, are prohibited from taking or receiving
referral fees.285 They may give and receive compensation for actual work
performed. The questioner may well have used the term "referral attorney
fees" loosely, and the work may have justified the financial transaction. As
with all matters having to do with ethical considerations based on codes of
conduct for other professions, the professional is governed by the applicable
code of conduct. 286 Notably, in the case of attorney-mediators, the codes are
consistent in prohibiting fees for the mere referral of cases. 287
Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators. Petition, 931 So. 2d 877, 878 (Fla. 2006)
(per curiam). With some modification, the Court adopted the proposed amendments which
replace the previous mediator certification requirements. Id. at 879. The Supreme Court of
Florida adopted the Committee's recommendation that certification for Circuit Civil mediators
no longer require Florida Bar membership. In re Petition of the Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Rules and Policy Committee on Amendments to the Florida Rules for Certified and
Court-Appointed Mediators, No. SC05-998, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Nov. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2007/scO5-998.pdf.
280. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-001 (May 2, 2001).
281. Id. This opinion also states that "a mediator may compensate another for [the] use of
office space." Id.
282. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.380(e).
283. Advisory Op. 2001-009, supra note 147. The MEAC advised that "[r]eferring cases
to [and] receiving referrals from a firm for a fee may constitute a [clear] conflict" necessitat-
ing the mediator's withdrawal. Id. Additionally, the MEAC advised that a mediator must
disclose former associations, such as previous employment. Id.
284. Id.
285. FLA. R. CERT.& CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.380(e); R. REGULATINGFLA. BAR 4-1.5.
286. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.12 cmt.
287. See FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.380(e); R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-
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Mediators, in addition to getting referrals, often get cases by court ap-
pointment or agreement of the parties.288 In 1998, the MEAC advised that
the rules of procedure "[do] not contemplate the court appointing a corpora-
tion" as a mediator; however, courts may and do appoint individuals associ-
ated with a mediation group.289 During the same year, also regarding media-
tion referrals, the MEAC advised that pre-suit mediation agreements that
"nam[e] a specific individual as the exclusive mediator" are suspect. 290
Two MEAC opinions address the propriety of mediators working with
mediation services corporations or organizations.29' In 1999, it advised that
a non-lawyer may start a private mediation network of certified mediators,
both lawyers and non-lawyers, who conduct mediations across the state.
292
Accordingly, the non-lawyer may pay the lawyer and non-lawyer mediator
based on a flat fee arrangement for the mediation services they render.293
However, even if an entity solicits business and handles bookings and pay-
ment arrangements, the individual mediator is the one bound to abide by all
the ethical rules and "adhere to the highest standards of integrity, impartial-
ity, and professional competence. 294 Similarly, a law firm may maintain a
mediation department within the firm as long as the mediation practice is
conducted in conformity with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Under
Florida Bar ethical constraints, non-lawyers "may not have an ownership
interest in either the law firm or [its] mediation department," and the attorney
advertising rules apply to the firm's mediation department.295
Mediator networking also raises ethical issues. An early MEAC opin-
ion identified problems with the networking organization described in the
posed question.296 The concerns included "mediator impartiality, fee ar-
rangement, and [mediator] integrity. ' 297 The MEAC noted the critical dis-
tinction between the allowable administrative fee and the prohibited referral
288. See Advisory Op. 2000-007, supra note 187 (advising when the appointment of non-
certified mediators violates procedural rules).
289. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 98-003 (Aug. 14, 1998).
290. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 98-006 (Sept. 22, 1998).
291. See Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 99-011 (Dec. 10, 1999); Advisory
Op. 96-001, supra note 196.
292. Advisory Op. 99-011, supra note 291.
293. Id.
294. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.030 (1999); Advisory Op. 99-011, supra
note 291. This opinion does not address the matter of appropriate business solicitation and
should be read in conjunction with MQAP 98-003 regarding courts not appointing corpora-
tions as mediators. See Advisory Op. 99-011, supra note 291; Advisory Op. 98-003, supra
note 289.
295. Fla. Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 94-6 (Apr. 30, 1995).
296. Advisory Op. 96-001, supra note 196.
297. Id.
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fee banning remuneration for the "'referral of clients for mediation or related
services. ""98 Also troubling to the MEAC was the company's hope of enter-
ing into business relationships with "attorneys, businesses, [and] insurance
companies" as their "exclusive purveyor of [mediation and arbitration] ser-
vices.,, 2 99 The MEAC cautioned the mediator against entering into a rela-
tionship resulting in a financial connection that might cause "the mediator
[to] lose objectivity and impartiality."300 It also cautioned that a mediator's
use of questionable marketing strategies-in derogation of the traditional
court system-might raise questions about the mediator's integrity, for a
mediator is charged with "'adher[ing] to the highest standards of integrity'
and prohibited from "'undertak[ing] any act ... compromis[ing] the media-
tor's integrity.""'3 °
C. Advertising and Soliciting
A Supreme Court of Florida certified mediator must "ensure that 'all
advertising ... represent[s] honestly the services to be rendered [and makes]
[n]o claims of specific results or promises which imply favoritism to one side
• ..for the purpose of obtaining business.' 3 2 Additionally, "' [a] mediator
shall make only accurate statements about the mediation process, its costs
and benefits, and the mediator's qualifications."' 303 It is therefore unethical
to advertise that mediation is "'a dispassionate evaluation by a neutral par-
ty,"' as this definition is inaccurate and inconsistent with the statutory defini-
tion of mediation.3" Consequently, it would be misleading and unethical
298. Id. (citing FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.100(c) (1996)). The applica-
ble rule following the 2000 Revision is 10.380(e). FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS
10.380(e).
299. Advisory Op. 96-001, supra note 196.
300. Id.
301. Id. (quoting FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.030(a)(1) (1996)). The
applicable rule following the 2000 Revision is 10.620. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD.
MEDIATORS 10.620.
302. Advisory Op. 96-001, supra note 196, (quoting FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD.
MEDIATORS 10.130 (1996)). The applicable rule following the 2000 Revision is 10.610. FLA.
R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.610.
303. Id. (quoting FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.130 (1996)).
304. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 95-007 (Oct. 5, 1995). Florida's statu-
tory definition of mediation reads:
"Mediation" means a process whereby a neutral third person called a mediator acts to encour-
age and facilitate the resolution of a dispute between two or more parties. It is an informal and
nonadversarial process with the objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually ac-
ceptable and voluntary agreement. In mediation, decisionmaking authority rests with the par-
ties. The role of the mediator includes, but is not limited to, assisting the parties in identifying
issues, fostering joint problem solving, and exploring settlement alternatives.
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"for mediators to advertise that they are providing evaluation services under
the guise of mediation.,
315
The MEAC has addressed several questions regarding the content of
advertisements. It has advised that a certified mediator should not use the
state seal or the seal of the Supreme Court of Florida "on any advertisement
without express permission" to do SO.3 0 6 Additionally, "[t]he generic desig-
nation, 'certified mediator,' is inherently misleading," and its use without
identifying the specific areas of mediation certification is violative of the
ethical rule governing advertising.3"7 Also misleading and violative of the
rule, is the use of letterhead which includes two names and the statement
"Circuit Court Mediation," where only one of the named parties is a certified
circuit court mediator.38 Similarly, a mediator's advertisement in which the
mediator is referred to as a judge, "may confuse or mislead the public," re-
quiring the mediator to include clarifying information for use of the term
judge to be permissible.3 9
Mediators are permitted to send letters to attorneys and other individu-
als advertising their services.3t0 They may also send follow-up letters with
information about their available services after the mediation has ended.311
The letters must be consistent with the advertising requirements and the re-
quirement for mediator impartiality.312 Additionally, mediators are not pro-
hibited from soliciting letters of reference from persons for whom they have
mediated. 313 These evaluations are not categorically prohibited in advertis-
ing, so long as the advertising is truthful.314
The MEAC has also answered questions about mediator sponsored
events and the purchase of items and meals, determining "that logo em-
bossed items of minimal value are permissible forms of advertising," whe-
reas items of greater value "may create the appearance of mediator bias and
FLA. STAT. § 44.1011(2) (2007).
305. Advisory Op. 95-007, supra note 303.
306. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 95-006 (Oct. 5, 1995).
307. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2002-003 (May 7, 2002) (citing FLA. R. CERT.
& CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.610).
308. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 99-013 (Mar. 16, 2000).
309. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-001 (May 14, 2004) (citing FLA. R.
CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.610). The MEAC was asked about a part-time judge
from another state, who in an advertisement for mediation services "was described in part as a
Family Court Judge." Id.
310. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2001-006 (Aug. 14, 2001).
311. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 98-001 (Mar. 11, 1998).
312. Id.
313. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 96-004 (Feb. 8, 1997).
314. Id.
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raise doubts as to the mediator's neutrality., 315 "[L]unches and golf outings
[paid for by the mediator] for the purpose of developing goodwill and attract-
ing.., clients can create the appearance of bias," and therefore, are inappro-
priate activities.316 However, sponsoring a sports tournament which is open
to the public or holding a silent auction to raise money for charity, while
incorporating the name of a mediation firm in advertising the event, is per-
missible if consistent with the rules for impartiality, conflict of interest, ad-
vertising, and integrity.317
While mediators may not use the mediation process to solicit future
business,318 they may provide information such as a mediator's business
card.319 Specifically, a mediator may respond to a party's request for a busi-
ness card as they walk back to the court following mediation, even if the
other party is not a witness to the request. 32° The mediator could have pro-
vided the card at a point in time earlier in the mediation, and is also allowed
to do so at a later time.321
Mediators may use creative means that are consistent with ethical re-
quirements to advertise. For example, a mediator may produce a television
show with real parties in a live mediation, so long as "the parties are in-
formed of their statutory right to confidentiality and they waive that right.
'
"
322
However, if a mediator was not competent to handle the cases for which he is
advertising, or he provided information that was false or misleading, then the
advertisement would violate rule 10.610 of the Florida Rules for Certified
and Court-Appointed Mediators. 
3 23
D. Fees and Payment
"A mediator must comply with ethical and procedural rules in relation
to charging fees for mediation. 324 Failure to do so [results in] an ethical vio-
315. Advisory Op. 2001-006, supra note 310.
316. Id. A mediator is not precluded "from giving or accepting de minimis gifts or inci-
dental items . . . to facilitate the mediation." FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS
10.330(c) comm. notes.
317. See Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2002-004 (June 10, 2002); FLA. R. CERT.
& CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.330, 10.340, 10.610, 10.620.
318. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 97-007 (Oct. 7, 1997).
319. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-005 (Nov. 22, 2004).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 97-008 (Oct. 7, 1997).
323. Advisory Op. 2006-001, supra note 279.
324. Advisory Op. 2003-004, supra note 258.
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lation., 325 Accordingly, a mediator must notify the parties of payment terms
"within a reasonable period of time prior to the mediation., 326 A mediator
who participates in a program, such as the Department of Business and Pro-
fessional Regulation's Homeowners Association Program, providing for fee
allocation, must disclose the fee allocation sufficiently before mediation be-
gins to give the parties the opportunity to either agree to the allocation or
negotiate another fee arrangement. 327 Additionally, a mediator who agreed
"to perform services for a specified fee [via court order, must] perform such
services at that fee unless relieved of that duty by the court., 328 Like other
professionals, mediators who are not paid for services they rendered, "may
seek payment in any lawful manner.,
329
E. Notes and Records
On two occasions, the MEAC declined to answer questions regarding
retention or disposal of mediation records, stating the matter was not ethical
in nature, and therefore, not within the scope of its jurisdiction. 3 ' The
MEAC has replied to two questions regarding mediation notes, advising that
"[t]here is no statutory rule or requirement that a mediator's notes taken dur-
ing a family mediation be kept in the [court] file. 331  To the contrary, any
"notes which relate to confidential information [shall not] be part of a [pub-
lic] file., 33 2 "[T]he voluntary disclosure of a mediator's notes ... is fraught
with potential risks and hazards. 333 While a mediator does have discretion
with regards to providing his or her notes upon request of a party, "a media-
tor should carefully weigh the benefits and perils of sharing this information,
and should proceed with the utmost caution. 334
325. Id.
326. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 97-005 (Oct. 7, 1997).
327. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2005-001 (May 31, 2005).
328. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 95-008 (Oct. 16, 1995).
329. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 95-001 (Apr. 12, 1995).
330. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 95-004 (Oct. 5, 1995). The MEAC did
not find an ethical obligation requiring a mediator to retain mediation files. Id. The MEAC
did advise that mediators are required "to maintain adequate records to support charges for
[rendered] services." Id.; see also FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.380(d). In
1998 when MEAC was again asked about the length of time necessary to store mediation
records, it referred to Advisory Op 95-004. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 98-
002 (August 7, 1998).
331. Advisory Op. 99-010,supra note 94.
332. Id.
333. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 99-003 (Aug. 23, 1999).
334. Id.
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F. Mentorship, CME, and Gifts
Certified mediators have an ethical obligation to allow a minimum of
two observations of their mediations per year, but are not obligated to allow
co-mediation or supervised mediation. 35 "[A] certified mediator is required
to preserve the quality of the profession, to maintain forthright business prac-
tices,... [refrain from] provid[ing] any service that would compromise [his]
integrity or impartiality, . . . and.., support the advancement of mediation
by participating in public education., 36 Consistent with these provisions,
charges for continuing mediator education programs may be determined by
the competitive market.
337
In 1999, the MEAC wrote that the rules imply mediators may not give
gifts to court personnel. 38 However, subsequent to that opinion, the 2000
Revision Committee Notes read, "[g]iving gifts to court personnel in ex-
change for case assignments is improper. De minimis gifts generally distrib-
uted as part of an overall business development plan are excepted." '339 The
impropriety seems to arise from the intent to improperly influence court per-
sonnel, rather than the giving of generally distributed de minimis gifts. Ad-
ditionally, a mediator has an affirmative obligation to maintain impartiality,
including "neither giv[ing] nor accept[ing] a gift, favor, loan, or other item of
value... [d]uring the mediation process."' 340
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida stands squarely in the forefront of the establishment and en-
forcement of mediator ethical standards. With over two decades of experi-
ence with court-connected mediation, a vast body of mediation case law,
statutes, rules of procedure, and finely tuned ethical rules, Florida offers a
wealth of information to attorneys, mediators, and mediation participants.
Building on the firm foundation of the comprehensive Act, the 2006 amend-
ments to the Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators and Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar provide further direction regarding concurrent
ethical standards, and go a long way in providing mediators with ethical
335. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 2000-001 (Mar. 16, 2000). "An experi-
enced mediator should cooperate in training new mediators, including serving as a mentor."
FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.690(b); see also Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSCO6
-9 (Fla. May 11, 2006) (on file with Clerk, Fla. Sup. Ct.).
336. Mediator Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2004-012 (Mar. 18, 2005).
337. Id.
338. Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, Op. 99-005 (Aug. 23, 1999).
339. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.530 comm. notes.
340. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS IO.330(c).
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guideposts. Yet, there will always be some unmarked and unforeseen forks
in the road. The MEAC opinions provide a roadmap of past questions asked
and answered to assist with present and future decisions. This article is part
of the continuing dialogue in which mediators engage to identify ethical is-
sues, consider and evaluate options, and reach satisfactory resolution. The
MEAC opinions serve as additional signage for mediators to locate and fol-
low the highest road.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the world of consumer debt collection in the State of Florida, the
boundaries within which a debt collector may communicate with a debtor in
an attempt to collect a consumer debt are proscribed by both the Federal Fair
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Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and the Florida Consumer Collec-
tion Practices Act (FCCPA).' In order to avoid a lawsuit for improper com-
munication with a debtor, a Florida attorney acting as a debt collector must
comply with the communication provisions of both the federal and state stat-
utes.2 The FDCPA only invalidates state laws dealing with consumer debt
collection if such laws are inconsistent with the federal statute.3 State con-
sumer debt collection statutes that provide more protection for the consumer
than the federal statute are not considered inconsistent for the purposes of
preemption.4
A dilemma exists, however, when the FDCPA meets modem technol-
ogy-the FDCPA "was enacted in 1977," prior to the common usage of an-
swering machines. 5 Thus, the limited types of communication made compli-
ance with the FDCPA's communication restrictions fairly straightforward.6
The technological advances that have occurred over the past three decades,
however, have made compliance with the FDCPA difficult.7 These compli-
ance issues have, "for the most part, . . . been [left] unaddressed by case
law.",8 With answering machines being "used in more than 77 percent of all
[United States] households," debt collectors are unsure as to whether leaving
a message would violate various provisions of the FDCPA. 9 In light of the
* The author is a J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. Shera Erskine has a B.A. in Music from the University of Florida. The
author wishes to thank her mother, Kathy, sister, Reva, fiancee, Marc, and his family for their
continuing love and support. In addition, the author would like to extend special recognition
to her father, Stanley, for his continuing encouragement, guidance, and mentoring. Finally,
the author would like to thank the staff of the Nova Law Review for their dedication and hard
work.
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 559.55-.785 (2007).
2. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1700.
3. Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
5. Posting of Meghann Marco to The Consumerist,
http://consumerist.com/consumer/fair-debt-collection/is-it-legal-for-debt-collectors-to-leave-a-
message-26681.php (June 7, 2007, 16:36 EST). When the FDCPA was enacted, "[t]here were
no cell phones," fax machines, or e-mails--"[e]ven the telephone answering machine was still
in its infancy." Cindy D. Salvo, Technology and the Law (Debt Collection), N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1,
2005, at 5. The FDCPA was "the first consumer protection bill passed by the 95th Congress."
John Tavormina, Comment, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act-The Consumer's An-
swer to Abusive Collection Practices, 52 TuL. L. REv. 584, 584 (1977).
6. Salvo, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Debt collectors are required to provide meaningful disclosure as to their purpose
and identity, however, may not disclose information regarding the debt to a party other than
the debtor, thus creating a dilemma when leaving a message on an answering machine. Id.
(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692d(6) (2000)).
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technological advances, especially in the communication arena, the FDCPA
is "a technological dinosaur that should be updated to include directives
aimed at the new technology."'0  Categorized as "static legislation,"" the
FDCPA is no longer serving its purpose in the rapidly advancing technologi-
cal world. 12
Without any congressional or court directives regarding compliance
with the FDCPA and the recent technological advances, debt collection at-
torneys also face the issue of simultaneous compliance with state law.' 3 The
solution for Florida attorneys, however, may lay in the preemption provision
of the FDCPA. 14 This provision expressly states that the FDCPA does not
preempt any state statute concerning debt collection if that statute provides
more protection for the consumer.' 5 The FCCPA does not explicitly require
a communication from a debt collector to disclose that it is an attempt to
collect a debt, rather requires the debt collector to disclose his or her identity
and purpose only upon being asked to do so.' 6 This appears to provide more
protection for the consumer in the form of upholding their expectations of
privacy by preventing disclosure of private information to third parties. 7
This paper will explore the reasons why Florida attorneys acting as debt
collectors should follow the FCCPA, rather than the FDCPA, because it pro-
vides more protection for the debtor or consumer. Part II of this paper will
10. Salvo, supra note 5. "With recent advances in computer and information technology,
the acquisition and distribution of private information has created new and perplexing privacy
issues. Technology has created these issues faster than the courts are able to address them."
Robert H. Thornburg, Florida Privacy Law: Potential Application of Intentional Tort Princi-
ples and Florida's Constitutional Right of Privacy as Safeguards to Governmental and Pri-
vate Dissemination of Private Information, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 137, 137 (2003).
11. Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection
After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 711, 723 (2006). "The most successful legislative regimes
are open-ended and worded to anticipate future behavior." Id.
12. Id. at 723-24. This could be due to the fact that the FDCPA's purpose is currently to
correct harassment associated with debt collection that "haunted the country's debt-collection
industry before its enactment." Id. at 723.
13. See John H. Bedard, Jr., Update on FDCPA Compliance and Litigation, 61
CONSUMER FfN. L. Q. REP. 25, 146 (2007).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
15. Id. Despite the fact that the Legislature is scheduled to convene in October 2007 to
tackle the anti-technology nature of this statute, their efforts may be delayed by other political
maneuvers such as the "war in Iraq" or the 2008 Presidential election. Caitlin Devitt, The
Mid-Year Washington Outlook; Reviewing the FDCPA Will Be a Major Issue, COLLECTIONS
& CREDIT RISK, June 2007, at 30. At this hearing, the legislature intends to review data collec-
tion practices, including the new communication technology available. Id.
16. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(15) (2007).
17. Id. § 559.72(5). The FCCPA prohibits disclosure of the debtor's information to third
parties without express consent from the debtor. See id.
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discuss the Foti v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc. 18 decision and its effect on
Florida attorneys acting as debt collectors. Part III of this paper will discuss
the underlying purpose of the FDCPA. Part IV of this paper will discuss
exactly what constitutes "communication" within the statutory meaning pro-
vided by the FDCPA. Part V will outline the consumer protections provided
by the FDCPA via its restrictions on communication with the consumer or
debtor in comparison with the protections provided by the FCCPA. Part VI
will discuss the FDCPA's meaningful disclosure requirement and the poten-
tial of infringement of consumer or debtor privacy rights. Part VII will dis-
cuss potential tort liability that attorneys may face in dealing with the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act. Part VIII will briefly discuss how the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act constructively excludes attorneys' use of tech-
nology when practicing under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
how this constructive exclusion may constitute an infringement upon one's
right to earn a living. Part IX will provide the author's conclusion as to why
the FCCPA provides consumers or debtors with more protection than the
FDCPA.
II. THE FOTI v. NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC. DECISION AND ITS EFFECT
ON FLORIDA LAWYERS
A debt collector 9 receives instructions from a client to recover a bal-
ance left unpaid by a debtor.20 In response to these instructions, the debt
collector sends a letter to the debtor followed by two phone calls consisting
of a pre-recorded, standardized message.2' The pre-recorded, standardized
message consisted of a greeting and a request for the debtor to return the
phone call as it dealt with "a personal business matter that requires ... im-
mediate attention., 22 The debt collector was then sued by the debtor for vio-
18. 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
The term "debt collector" means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any
debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due
or asserted to be owed or due another.
Id. In addition, "[a] lawyer who regularly attempts to obtain payment of consumer debts
through litigation or legal proceedings is considered a 'debt collector' under the FDCPA."
Brussels v. Newman, No. 06-61325-CIV-COHN/SNOW, 2007 WL 676189, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 28, 2007) (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292, 299 (1995)).
20. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 647.
21. Id at 648.
22. Id. The exact message was as follows: "Good day, we are calling from NCO Finan-
cial Systems regarding a personal business matter that requires your immediate attention.
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lating various sections of the FDCPA, specifically, for a failure to identify to
the debtor that the message was in fact from a debt collector.23
In an attempt to defend against the allegations made, the debt collector
asserted that the messages left on the debtor's answering machine did not
constitute "communication" as defined by the FDCPA. 24 Thus, the debt col-
lector argued that he was not required to provide notice to the debtor that the
message was an attempt to collect a debt.25 The debt collector also attempted
to argue that even if the message was considered a "communication" for the
purposes of the FDCPA,26 that the provision requiring the debt collector to
identify to the debtor that the message was an attempt to collect a debt owed
would "[place] debt collectors in a virtual 'Hobson's choice."' 27  The debt
collector went on to suggest that a debt collector could not simultaneously
comply with the notification requirement of the FDCPA and the provision of
the FDCPA prohibiting any disclosure of information to a third party without
violating either provision. 2' The court disagreed with both arguments pro-
posed by the debt collector, holding that the messages left were "communi-
cations" for the purpose of FDCPA, and thus the debt collector failed to
comply with the notification requirement.29 In addition, the court held that
the debt collector could avoid the issue surrounding disclosure of the deb-
tor's information to third parties by utilizing a debt collection method other
than leaving messages on answering machines.3 °
Please call back 1-866-701-1275, once again please call back, toll-free, 1-866-701-1275, this
is not a solicitation." Id.
23. Id. at 649-50 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1 1)).
24. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 654. "The term 'communication' means the conveying of
information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium." 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(2).
25. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 654.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).
27. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 658. "Hobson's choice" is defined as "an apparently free
choice when there is no real alternative." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 551
(10th ed. 1999).
28. See Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 658 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692e(1 1)).
29. Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a(2),1692e(l 1)).
30. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 659 ("Debt collectors, however, could continue to use other
means to collect, including calling and directly speaking with the consumer or sending appro-
priate letters."); see also Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (citing Joseph v. J.J. Mac
Intyre Cos., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing how "disclosure to third
parties was 'less likely' in the context of a [message being placed] to a debtor's residence")).
"The collector was 'cornered between a rock and a hard place, not because of any contradic-
tory provisions of the FDCPA, but because the method they have selected to collect debts has
put them there."' Court Rakes Collector Over Misleading Prerecorded Messages, CONSUMER
FIN. SERVS. L. REP., Oct. 18, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Court Rakes Collector] (quoting Leyse v.
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Following this recent court decision, debt collection attorneys through-
out the country have been faced with whether to leave a message or not-an
issue which the Federal Trade Commission has declined to address. 31 This
refusal by the Federal Trade Commission is surprising because the overall
number of complaints submitted by consumers in regards to harassing debt
collection practices has quadrupled between 2001 and 2006.32 In addition to
the growing number of complaints, the number of debt collectors continues
to grow,33 thus leaving debtors and debt collectors alike confused about the
ability to leave a message in an attempt to collect a debt.
While plaintiff attorneys feel that "[i]t's not difficult for someone who
wants to comply to stay in the straight and narrow,, 34 debt collection attor-
neys feel that it is not so simple, and rather that the "vague and broad lan-
guage" of the FDCPA leaves them especially vulnerable to lawsuits. 35 The
FDCPA seems to "cause[] honest and diligent debt collectors" difficulty in
complying with its ambiguous provisions. 36 Even further, some debt collec-
tion attorneys feel that the abundance of litigation alleging violations of the
FDCPA is a tactic employed by plaintiff attorneys in order "to get their cli-
ents out from under lawful debt-collection activities., 37  Regardless of the
reason behind the increase in litigation against debt collection firms, debt
collectors are left in the dark as to how to keep up with technology without
violating multiple provisions of the FDCPA.38
Corporate Collection Servs., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 8491 (DAB), 2006 WL 2708451, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006)).
31. Bedard, supra note 13, at 146-47.
32. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 712. "The Federal Trade Commission ... regularly
receives more consumer complaints about debt collectors than any other industry." Audri
Lanford & Jim Lanford, A Scary New Breed of Debt Collectors and Debt Collection Scams,
INTERNET SCAMBUSTERS, http://www.scambusters.org/debt.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
The Federal Trade Commission received 69,204 complaints related to violations of the
FDCPA in 2006-almost four percent higher than the amount received in 2005. Consumers
Complaining About Wide Range of Issues, Exclusive Analysis Finds, COLLECTIONS & CREDIT
RISK, July 2007, at 12.
33. Lanford & Lanford, supra note 32.
34. Sheri Qualters, Debt Firms Slammed by Consumer Lawsuits, NAT'L. L.J., June 12,
2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 181552737289 (last visited Nov. 3,
2007).
35. Id.
36. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 723.
37. Qualters, supra note 34.
38. See Salvo, supra note 5.
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III. THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT
The purpose of the FDCPA is expressly stated within the statute as be-
ing "to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to in-
sure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses."39 "[More]
[s]pecifically, the FDCPA 'prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection
methods, conduct which harasses, oppresses or abuses any debtor, and the
making of any false, misleading, or deceptive statements in connection with
a debt, and it requires that collectors make certain disclosures."' 40 This pur-
pose is justified by Congressional findings that debt collectors were utilizing
"abusive, deceptive, and unfair" practices in their attempts to collect debt.4
Congress further found that these "abusive, deceptive, and unfair" practices
were contributing factors in "personal bankruptcies, [] marital instability, ...
loss of jobs, and [] invasions of individual privacy. ' 42 Thus, the FDCPA was
enacted as a remedial statute,43 based on the additional congressional finding
that the existing laws and remedies at the time were "inadequate to protect
consumers." 44  Thus, "[t]he FDCPA establishes a civil cause of action
against 'any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this
subchapter with respect to any person,"' 45 and allows for parties to enforce
the legislation through private litigation.46
In considering claims under the FDCPA, including claims dealing with
"communications," the court should analyze the claim from the perspective
of the "least sophisticated [consumer]" standard.47 In applying this objective
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2000). Apropos to the concept of protecting the consumer,
"[t]he government regulation strengthens the hand of the weaker party, providing in effect the
rules that party would have demanded if it had the bargaining power." Scott J. Burnham,
What Attorneys Should Know About the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or, the 2 Do's
and the 200 Don'ts of Debt Collection, 59 MoNT. L. REv. 179, 183 (1998).
40. Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting
Acosta v. Campbell, No. 6:04CV76lORL28DAB, 2006 WL 146208, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan.
18, 2006)).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).
42. Id.
43. Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b).
45. Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (quoting Sakrani v. Koenig, No. Civ. A. 05-1192 (JAG),
2006 WL 20514, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2006)).
46. Burnham, supra note 39, at 183.
47. Brown, 464 F.3d at 453 (citing Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d
Cir. 2000)); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991).
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standard, the court must analyze "whether a hypothetical least sophisticated
consumer would be deceived or misled by the debt collector's practices."4
The hypothetical "least sophisticated consumer" can, however, be supposed
to possess a basic amount of comprehension about the world. 49 "'The basic
purpose of the least-sophisticated-consumer standard is to ensure that the
FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd."' 50 This
standard has been held to be "consistent with 'basic consumer-protection
principles. "'
The "least sophisticated consumer" standard, while applicable to most
claims under the FDCPA, does not apply directly to FDCPA claims dealing
with the placement of telephone calls by a debt collector without meaningful
disclosure of his or her identity. 2 Thus, courts view these claims from the
viewpoint of "'a consumer whose circumstances makes [sic] him relatively
more susceptible to harassment, oppression or abuse."' 53 This standard is
analogous to the "least sophisticated consumer" standard. 4 Further, when
looking to whether a debt collector has failed to provide meaningful disclo-
sure, the court should look to the context of and the inferences drawn from
the message at issue.55
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES "COMMUNICATION" UNDER THE FDCPA?
In order to invoke the protections provided by the FDCPA, correspon-
dence between the debt collector and the debtor must be considered a
'"communication"' within the meaning set out by the statute.56 The FDCPA
broadly defines "communication" as "the conveying of information regard-
ing a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium."57 In
addition, the FDCPA should be broadly construed because it serves as a re-
medial statute. 8 In interpreting and applying the meaning of legislation,
48. Kuehn v. Cadle Co., No. 5:04-cv-432-Oc-10GRJ, 2007 WL 1064306, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 6, 2007) (citing.Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11 th Cir. 1985)).
49. Id. (citing Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993)).
50. Foi, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 661 (quoting Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318).
51. Brown, 464 F.3d at 453 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131,
136 (4th Cir. 1996)).
52. Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing
Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1179).
53. Id. at 1110 n.8 (quotingJeter, 760 F.2d at 1179).
54. Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1179.
55. Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
56. Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000).
58. Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Blair v. Sher-
man Acquisition, No. 04 C 4718, 2004 WL 2870080, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2004) ("Be-
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". [t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare
cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result demon-
strably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."'
59
Here, the plain meaning of the term "communication" appears to be
consistent with the underlying purpose of the FDCPA. 60 This apparent con-
sistency, however, has been called into question when the issue of whether a
message left on an answering machine constitutes a "communication" within
the statutory meaning. 6' Even if a message left on an answering machine
does not specifically mention detailed information regarding a debt, that
message still constitutes a "communication" as defined by the FDCPA be-
cause it "indirectly" conveys information about the debt.62 Courts have rea-
soned that such a message is conveying information regarding a debt based
on the underlying purpose of getting the debtor to return the call and discuss
the debt owed.63 Some courts, on the other hand, have recently held that a
communication in which a debt is not specifically mentioned is not a "com-
munication" within the aforesaid statutory meaning.' The lack of judicial
consistency may be due to the statute's "misdirected and poorly drafted"
cause it is designed to protect consumers, the FDCPA is ... liberally construed in favor of
consumers to effect its purpose.").
59. Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
60. Id. (citing Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1996)).
61. Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 8491 (DAB), 2006 WL
2708451, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006); Belin v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, No. 8:06-cv-
760-T-24, 2006 WL 1992410, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2006); Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 654-
56; Hosseinzadehv. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1115-16 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
62. Hosseinzadeh, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. "15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) applies 'equally to
automated message calls and live calls."' Id. at 1111 (quoting Joseph v. J.J. Mac Intyre Cos.,
281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2003)) (reasoning that the plain language indicates that
the statutes "prohibit the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure."). In
addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has addressed the issue of contacts in which
the debt collector does not specifically mention the debt and has come to the conclusion that a
communication in an attempt to collect a debt can still violate the FDCPA because the com-
munication "indirectly" conveyed information regarding a debt, "even if the obligation [was]
not specifically mentioned." Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commena-
try on the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,099 (FTC Dec. 13,
1988).
63. Belin, 2006 WL 1992410, at*4.
64. Horkey v. J.V.D.B. & Assocs., 179 F. Supp. 2d 861, 868 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (denying
"[p]laintiff's motion for summary judgment" for claim involving defendant's violation of
FDCPA because defendant's contacts did not constitute "communications" within the statu-
tory definition). Additionally, one court has found that a fax was not communication because
it did not convey any information about a debt. Fava v. RRI, Inc., No. 96-CV-629 RSP/DNIH,
1997 WL 205336, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1997). Later courts, however, have avoided
upholding this finding by labeling it as dicta. See Belin, 2006 WL 1992410, at *4.
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nature, despite the fact that the number of complaints against debt collectors
has decreased since 1970.65
The reasoning behind such a school of thought is based on the notion
that if it were to be construed any other way, it would create a loophole 66
67allowing debt collectors to avoid the disclosure requirement, as well as
other provisions of the FDCPA, by not conveying specific details regarding
the debt.6" Further, courts rationalize that messages left on an answering
machine in an attempt to collect a debt are "intended to initiate further dia-
logue regarding [the debtor's] ... debt, and therefore constitute 'communica-
tions."'' 69 Thus, in a majority of jurisdictions, the restrictions imposed by the
FDCPA apply to all debt collection-related contacts, regardless of whether or
not the debt is specifically mentioned.7
V. THE PROTECTION OF CONSUMERS VIA RESTRICTIONS ON
COMMUNICATION WITH A DEBTOR IN AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT
The primary foundation upon which both the FDCPA and the FCCPA
are premised is the protection of the privacy and reputation of the consumer
or debtor,71 as well as the prevention of harassing debt collection practices.7"
In order to promote the underlying purpose, each statute provides the debtor
with a certain degree of protection.73 Subsection A will discuss the protec-
tion provided by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and subsection B
will discuss the same for the Florida Consumer Credit Practices Act.
A. Protections Provided by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
The FDCPA places restrictions upon how, when, and why a debt collec-
tor may contact or communicate with a debtor in order to preserve the deb-
65. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 722-23.
66. Court Rakes Collector, supra note 30. "Under such an exception, debt collectors
would be able to abuse and harass consumers with phone calls and other forms of correspon-
dence so long as there is no express mention of the consumers' debts." Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1l) (2000).
68. Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
69. Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 8491 (DAB), 2006 WL
270845 1, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006).
70. Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005);
Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commenatry on the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,099 (FTC Dec. 13, 1988).
71. Mathis v. Omnium Worldwide, No. CIV. 04-1614-AA, 2006 WL 1582301, at *5 (D.
Or. June 4, 2006).
72. Foti, 424 F.Supp. 2d at 653.
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692b (2000); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 559.55-.785 (2007).
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tor's privacy and reputation, as well as prevent loss of employment.7 4 Spe-
cifically, "[t]he FDCPA regulates a debt collector's contacts with both the
debtor and third parties. 75 As per the FDCPA, a debt collector may not,
without prior consent from the debtor, communicate with the debtor in con-
nection with the collection of a debt "at any unusual time or place" if the
"debt collector knows [that] the [debtor] is represented by an attorney;" or at
the debtor's "place of employment if the debt collector knows... that the...
employer prohibits ... such communication. '76 In addition, "a debt collec-
tor, may not communicate, [in an attempt to collect a debt,] with a third party
... without the prior consent of the consumer, the express permission of a
court, or unless reasonably necessary to effectuate a post-judgment judicial
remedy. ' 77 An attempt to obtain location information about the debtor is the
only exception to the prohibition against third party disclosure. 78  Further,
the FDCPA "expressly prohibits [a] debt collector from mentioning that 'the
consumer owes any debt' and from identifying himself as a debt collector
when he [or she] seeks location information., 79 If a debt collector attempts
to contact a third party in violation of the statute's provisions, such contacts
are considered to be illegitimate collection practices.8"
In addition to the FDCPA's restrictions on who a debt collector can
communicate with,81 the FDCPA requires a debt collector to provide a "mea-
ningful disclosure" of his or her identity.82
74. Mathis, 2006 WL 1582301, at *5.
75. Henderson v. Eaton, No. Civ. A. 01-0138, 2001 WL 969105, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 23,
2001).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1)-(3) (2000).
77. Henderson, 2001 WL 969105, at *1.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b; Mathis, 2006 WL 1582301, at *5. In attempting to collect loca-
tion information, the debt collector may only state that he or she is "confirming or correcting
location information, and may not identify his [or her] employer unless expressly asked to do
so." Mike Voorhees & Sharon Voorhees, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Communi-
cations, and Privacy Issues, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 78 (2004).
79. Henderson, 2001 WL 969105, at *2 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b)). Contacting a
third party for information regarding the whereabouts of a debtor is further limited by the
"one-contact" rule. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 721 n.64. As per the "one-contact" rule, a
debt collector may not contact a third party more than once. Id. "The debt collector is permit-
ted to contact the third party more than once upon the third party's request or if the collector
'reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and
that correct or complete information is now available."' Id. (quoting David A. Schulman, The
Effectiveness of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 2 BANKR. DEV. J.
171, 174 (1985)).
80. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 722.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c.
82. Id. § 1692d(6).
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[T]he "meaningful disclosure" required by section 1692d(6) has
been made if an individual debt collector who is employed by a
debt collection company accurately discloses the name of [his or]
her employer and the nature of [his or] her business and conceals
no more than [his or] her real name. 83
The meaningful disclosure requirement also requires the debt collector
to disclose that the communication is an attempt to collect a debt.84 This
"meaningful disclosure"85 requirement is "often referred to as the [m]ini-
Miranda" warning. 86  The "mini-Miranda' warning" applies to the initial
written communication with the debtor or consumer. 87 If the initial commu-
nication is oral, the warning is required for that communication as well.88
The debt collector must make a proper disclosure in every communication
subsequent to the initial communication. 89 Failure to provide proper disclo-
sure renders the communication a "false, deceptive, or misleading represen-
tation or means" in attempting to collect a debt.9°
Though aimed at protecting the debtor, the "mini-Miranda" warning re-
quirement loses its appeal when left as a message on an answering machine,
able to be overheard by someone other than the consumer or debtor.91
Courts have held that the disclosure requirement is applicable to answering
machine messages despite the risk of disclosure to third parties.92 Courts
83. Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quot-
ing Wright v. Credit Bureau of Ga., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 591, 597 (N.D. Ga. 1982)). A debt
collector satisfies this requirement if he or she "disclose[s] enough information so as not to
mislead the debtor as to the purpose of the call." Bedard, supra note 13, at 28.
84. MANUEL H. NEWBURGER & BARBARA M. BARRON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 1.05[2] (2007).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6).
86. Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
87. NEWBURGER & BARRON, supra note 84, 1.05[2].
88. Id.
89. Id. The Sixth Circuit has even held that attorneys must give the requisite warning in
post-judgment communications. Id. (citing Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516 (6th Cir. 1992)).
90. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e) (quotations omitted). A message left on a debtor's
answering machine urging the debtor to call the same day or the next day was deceptive with-
in the statutory meaning, because it "created a false sense of urgency." Court Rakes Collec-
tor, supra note 30.
91. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Check Enforcement, No. Civ. A. 03-2115 (JWB), 2005
WL 1677480, at *8 (D.N.J. July 18, 2005).
92. Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 8491 (DAB), 2006 WL
2708451, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006); Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 643,
659 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Hosseinzadeh v. M.R.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1112
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Joseph v. J.J. Mac Intyre Co., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal.
2003)).
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have also avoided providing debt collectors with the appropriate means to
utilize the answering machine technology without violating at least one pro-
vision of the FDCPA.93 In essence, the courts have cut off an efficient tech-
nological avenue while simultaneously blaming the FDCPA's inadequacies
on the debt collectors. 94 Thus, a gap exists in the FDCPA's protections be-
cause it is unlikely that debt collectors will stop using available technology. 95
It is thus up to the legislature to fill this void.96
B. Protections Provided by the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act
The Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) 97 "is a reme-
dial statute ... designed to prohibit certain conduct." 98 The FCCPA allows a
debtor99 to bring an action against "any person"1 0 who violates any provi-
sion of the FCCPA. '01 Courts have interpreted the broad "any person" lan-
guage of the FCCPA to permit a debtor to sue "persons generally,"' 2 includ-
93. See Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 659 n.26; Bedard, supra note 13, at 147; Salvo, supra
note 5.
94. Bedard, supra note 13, at 147.
95. The new technologies available, such as sophisticated "phone systems and computer
software," make it inefficient for a debt collector to adhere to the historical door-to-door
means of debt collection. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 729-30.
96. Cox Communications has reported that eighty to eighty-five percent of their out-
bound collections calls end up as voicemail messages. VMS Makes a Quiet Entrance,
COLLECTIONS & CREDIT RISK, Sept. 2004, at 22. [hereinafter VMS]. But, as stated by Judge
Deborah A. Batts, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, "[t]he Court has no
authority to carve an exception out of the statute just so [a debt collector] may use the tech-
nology they have deemed most efficient." Court Rakes Collector, supra note 30 (quotations
omitted).
97. FLA. STAT. §§ 559.55-.785 (2007).
98. Campbell v. Providian Nat'l Bank, 14 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 644a (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct.
2007) (citing Harris v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Jacksonville, 338 So. 2d 196, 200 (Fla. 1976)).
99. The FCCPA defines a "debtor" as "a natural person obligated or allegedly obligated
to pay a debt." FLA. STAT. § 559.55.
100. See FLA. STAT. § 559.72. "The prohibited practices contained in the FCCPA do not
apply just to collection agencies and debt collectors. Section 559.72 [of the Florida Statutes]
mandates [that] 'no person' shall engage in the prohibited activities." Fla. S. Comm. on Judi-
ciary, CS for SB 94 (2001) Staff Analysis 2 (Mar. 6, 2001).
101. Belin v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, No. 8:06-cv-760-T-24, 2006 WL 1992410, at *7
(M.D. Fla. July 14, 2006). The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. Kaplan v. Assetcare, Inc.,
88 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2000). "The strict liability view of the [FDCPA] is
supported by a closer examination of the FDCPA itself." Id. at 1362. Unlike the FDCPA, the
FCCPA "requires an allegation of knowledge or intent by the debt collector in order to state a
cause of action." Id. at 1363.
102. Cook v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc., 332 So. 2d 677, 679 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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ing corporations, °3 businesses, °4 and law firms.' °5  Further, the FCCPA
continues to be updated and amended by the legislature-unlike the
FDCPA-in ways which provide additional protection for the debtor.'06 One
possible reason as to why the updates to the FCCPA continue to provide sig-
nificant protection is that the FCCPA is much "narrower in scope than" its
federal counterpart. 1
07
Similar to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the FCCPA prohibits
disclosure of information regarding the debt to anyone other than the debtor
or his or her family. 10 8 In order to state a valid cause of action for violation
of this provision, a debtor need only show "that there was a disclosure of
information to [someone] other than" the debtor or his or her family; "that
such person [did] not have a legitimate business need for the information;
and... that such information affected the debtor's reputation. '  Courts are
very strict with this provision in that a debt collector cannot even disclose
information to an intimate friend cohabiting with the debtor. 110
Also similar to the FDCPA, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices
Act prohibits communications so frequent in nature that they constitute har-
assment. "' Specifically, the FCCPA makes it a violation to:
103. Id. "The word 'person' includes individuals, children, firms, associations, joint ad-
ventures, partnerships, estates, trusts, business trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries, corporations, and
all other groups or combinations." FLA. STAT. § 1.01(3) (2007).
104. See Williams v. Streeps Music Co., 333 So. 2d 65, 67 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that defendant music store violated a provision of the FCCPA by attempting to col-
lect a debt that had already been satisfied).
105. Sandlin v. Shapiro & Fishman, 919 F. Supp. 1564, 1570 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (holding
that a law firm was considered a "debt collector[] under the FDCPA"). Courts have also
applied this section to automobile finance companies. Schauer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 819 So. 2d 809, 812 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002). A company "in the business of
repossessing vehicles, however," did not fall within the parameters of the statute. Seibel v.
Society Lease, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 713, 716 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that absent evidence of
company contacting debtors or being assigned any debts, company did not fit within statute's
meaning).
106. Dale T. Golden, Florida Legislature Considers Changes to Debt Collection Law,
DEF. DIG., Mar. 2005,
http://www.marshalldennehey.com/CM/DefenseDigest/DefenseDigest286.asp.
107. See Cooper v. Litton Loan Servicing, 253 B.R. 286, 290 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2000).
108. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(5) (2007).
109. Heard v. Mathis, 344 So. 2d 651, 655 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
110. Id. at 654. The meaning of the word "family," however, "has been extended beyond
marital or blood relationships to include families 'in fact."' Id. To qualify as a family "in
fact," the homestead must consist of "(1) [a] legal duty to maintain arising out of the relation-
ship [or] (2) a continuing communal living by at least two individuals under circumstances
where one is regarded as the person in charge." Id.
111. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(7).
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[w]illfully communicate with the debtor or any member of her or
his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to
harass the debtor or her or his family, or willfully engage in other
conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the
debtor or any member of her or his family. 1
12
Courts have further held that communication with a debtor regarding
the debt which has passed the point of negotiation or persuasion constitutes
harassment within the statutory meaning. 113
Unlike its federal counterpart, the FDCPA only requires a debt collector
to disclose his or her purpose and identity when asked to do so.114 Specifi-
cally, the statute makes it a violation to "[r]efuse to provide adequate identi-
fication of herself or himself or her or his employer or other entity whom she
or he represents when requested to do so by a debtor from whom she or he is
collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt."'1 5 This allows debt
collectors to utilize available technology while still protecting the privacy
and reputation of the debtor-the risk of third party disclosure via an answer-
ing machine would no longer exist. From this perspective, the FCCPA per-
mits the use of available technology without compromising the protection of
the debtor's privacy or reputation.
VI. POTENTIAL PRIVACY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT'S "MINI-MIRANDA" WARNING REQUIREMENT
By requiring debt collectors to provide a "meaningful disclosure,"'1 6 the
"mini-Miranda" warning requirement of the FDCPA yields a number of po-
tential privacy issues. Specifically, there is a high risk of disclosure of in-
formation to a third party when a debt collector opts to use an answering
machine as a means of contacting a debtor.117 This is especially true since a
large number of debtors are college students living with a roommate. 18
112. Id.
113. Story v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 343 So. 2d 675, 677 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
114. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(15).
115. Id.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) (2000).
117. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Check Enforcement, No. Civ. A. 03-2115 (JWB), 2005
WL 1677480, at *8 (D.N.J. July 18, 2005). "[T]he Court acknowledges that disclosure during
an automated call could compromise the debtor's privacy if another party such [as] a neighbor
or relative inside the home picks up the debtor's phone and hears the automated call." Joseph
v. J.J. Mac Intyre Cos., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163-64 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
118. Seventy-two percent of college freshmen have a credit card. NELLIE MAE,
UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS IN 2004 4 (2005), available at
http://www.nelliemae.com/pdf/ccstudy.2005.pdf. In 2004, the average credit card debt for
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In Federal Trade Commission v. Check Enforcement,"9 the court held
that messages left by a debt collector on the debtor's home answering ma-
chine were a violation of the FDCPA. 120 The court found that the messages,
which were attempts to obtain payments from an alleged debtor, were over-
heard by family members of the debtors and other third parties. 2'1 Because
there is no way of knowing whether the "debtor will answer the phone," 122
the chance of violating the federal statute is high. In order to violate the pro-
hibition against third party disclosure provision of the FDCPA-and thus
invade the privacy of the debtor-communication need only be "'in connec-
tion with the collection of any debt."",1
2 3
The Florida Constitution sets forth a much broader right to privacy than
that set forth in the Federal Constitution.12 "Florida's right to privacy 'em-
braces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to the individual
in those interests, than does the Federal Constitution.""'2 5 "Florida is one of
only a handful of states wherein the state constitution includes an independ-
undergraduate students was $2,169, with seven percent of undergraduate students carrying a
debt of $7,000 or more. Id. at 7-8. For Florida debt collectors, a large number of debtors are
undergraduate college students based on the fact that seventy-eight percent of undergraduate
students in the southern region of the United States carry credit cards, with sixteen percent of
those students carrying a balance between $3,000 and $7,000. Id. at 10. Including under-
graduate college students, the number of unmarried households-which includes unrelated
persons such as roommates-has steadily increased. Thomas F. Coleman, Unmarried House-
holds in the United States, UNMARRIED AMERICA, Sept. 12, 2007,
http://www.unmarriedamerica.org/Census_ 1990-2001/unmarried-majority-table.htm. In
Florida, 52.1% of households were unmarried as of 2005. Id. This number leaves debt collec-
tors with difficulty in determining who will actually be listening to any given answering ma-
chine message. The risk of disclosure to a third party is especially great when multiple
roommates share an answering machine:
[T]he way our voicemail was configured, one had to listen to a message in its entirety to get to
the next message or to save a message. The only way you could cut a message short was to
erase it. So I ended up having to listen to the messages and then saving them for my room-
mate.
Posting of ACAMBRAS to The Consumerist, http://consumerist.com/consumer/fair-debt-
collection/is-it-legal-for-debt-collectors-to-leave-a-message-26681.php (June 7, 2007, 16:58
EST).
119. No. Civ. A. 03-2115 (JWB), 2005 WL 1677480, at *1.
120. Id. at *8.
121. Id.
122. VMS, supra note 96. If the debtor is not the person answering the phone, the debt
collector placing the call risks violating FDCPA provisions. Id.
123. Henderson v. Eaton, No. Civ. A. 01-0138, 2001 WL 969105, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 23,
2001) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)(2000)).
124. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Palm Beach v. D.B., 784 So. 2d 585, 588 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001) (citing Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla.
1985)).
125. Id. (quotinglnreT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989)).
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ent, freestanding Right of Privacy Clause." 126 The Florida Constitution ex-
plicitly grants "Floridians the right of privacy."' 127  Under this right of pri-
vacy, each person has a "right to 'determine for themselves when, how and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others.""' 128 This
explicit grant of privacy, however, only protects Floridians from governmen-
tal intrusion, as does the Federal Constitution. 129  In applying it to the
FDCPA's "mini-Miranda warning," on the other hand, a debtor could argue
that the provision was enforced by a state or federal judge-either of which
is considered to be a state actor. 130 A state actor, such as a judge, enforcing
an unconstitutional statute constitutes governmental action.'' An action
against a state official to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional fed-
eral statute is a viable cause of action. 1
32
Thus, in applying the right of privacy to the FDCPA's "mini-Miranda"
warning requirement, this provision could pose a variety of claims against
the government, as well as attorneys. The "mini-Miranda" warning, being
enforced by courts, contradicts one of the FDCPA's underlying purposes-to
protect the debtor's privacy.'33
126. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 206 (Fla. 2007) (quoting N. Fla.
Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 634 (Fla. 2003)).
127. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Johnson, 959 So. 2d 1274, 1276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
128. Id. (quoting Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1989)).
129. Sparks v. Jay's A.C. & Refrigeration, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1433, 1441 (M.D. Fla.
1997). "The United States Supreme Court has refused to recognize a general, constitutionally-
protected right of privacy." Thomburg, supra note 10, at 140-41.
130. People v. Garberding, 787 P.2d 154, 156 (Colo. 1990) ("State judges are ... actors
within the meaning of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment."); Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 689 n.7 (N.D. Ohio 2007) ("[T]his case involves state action by the
federal government.").
131. Fla. Dep't. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982).
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar all claims against officers of the State, even when di-
rected to actions taken in their official capacity and defended by the most senior legal officers
in the executive branch of the state government.... [Aln action brought against a state official
to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute is not a suit against a State barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. at 684.
132. See Crespo, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 689 n.7. "[T]he Court will review the ... claims
under the Fifth Amendment because this case involves state action by the federal government.
enforcing... a federal statute." Id.
133. See Tavormina, supra note 5, at 590. "These communications constitute unwarranted
invasions of the consumer's privacy .... " Id. The FDCPA's provisions prohibiting disclo-
sure of a debt to third parties was intended to prevent unnecessary loss of jobs as well as pro-
tect against "serious invasions of privacy." Pearce v. Rapid Check Collection, Inc., 738 F.
Supp. 334, 337 (D.S.D. 1990) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-382 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699).
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VII. POTENTIAL TORT LIABILITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT'S "MINI-MIRANDA" WARNING REQUIREMENT
"The Supreme Court of [Florida] has recognized the right of privacy as
a ... tort" in addition to a constitutional guarantee. 134 Generally, where the
right to privacy is recognized, the "oppressive treatment of a debtor" in an
attempt to collect a debt may constitute "an invasion of privacy."'135 In addi-
tion, "oral communication ... accompanied by sufficient publicity" can cre-
ate a cause of action for invasion of privacy. 36 "'In some torts the entire
injury is to the peace, happiness or feelings of the plaintiff .... "" ' The
FDCPA "was enacted [in order] 'to eliminate abusive debt collection prac-
tices' which 'contribute to ... invasions of individual privacy."' 138 Thus, if
required to adhere to the "mini-Miranda warning," debt collection attorneys
may open themselves up to pendent state law claims concerning the privacy
of the debtor in addition to undermining the purpose of the FDCPA. 1
39
Part A of this section will discuss public disclosure of a debt as an inva-
sion of privacy, and part B of this section will discuss the tort of intrusion
upon an individual's seclusion.
A. Public Disclosure of a Debt as an Invasion of Privacy
Unreasonable publicity given to a private debt has generally been "rec-
ognized as an actionable invasion of the debtor's right of privacy." 140 Courts
have held that a debtor has a valid cause of action where a debt collector has
placed "calls to the debtor's relatives or neighbors.'' 4. The extent of the
134. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 10-11 (5th Cir. 1962)
(citing Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1944)).
135. Id. at 11.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 184 S.E. 452, 454
(Ga. Ct. App. 1936).
138. Miller v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 483-84 (4th Cir. 1991) (quot-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), (e) (2000)).
139. Mullins v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 07-cv-00397-RPM-PAC, 2007 WL 1795871, at *1 (D.
Colo. June, 21, 2007).
140. J.L. Litwin, Annotation, Public Disclosure of Person's Indebtedness as Invasion of
Privacy, 33 A.L.R. 3D 154, 156 (1970); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). "A
person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his
affairs known to others ... is liable to the other." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867. The tort of
invasion of privacy "has generally been more successful for debtors than.. . the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional harm." DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER
CREDIT AND THE LAW § 13:4 (2007).
141. Litwin, supra note 140, at 156.
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publicity, even via oral communication, determines whether the debtor has a
cause of action for invasion of privacy. 14 2 In Florida, all communications
accompanied by sufficient publicity are sufficient to support a debtor har-
assment case. 143  In addition, a creditor is liable for invasion of privacy
where he or she has divulged information about the debt to one who had no
legitimate interest in the information. "
A number of states have ruled that an oral declaration can constitute an
invasion of one's privacy. 145 In particular, Florida courts are split on this
concept. 146 In other states, courts have reasoned that "the oral publication of
a private matter with which the public has no proper concern may be just as
devastating and damaging as a written communication."'
' 47
"A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's in-
terest in not having his [or her] affairs known to others . . . is liable to the
other."' 48 This rule protects an individual's interest in living with some pri-
vacy. 149  This tort is particularly applicable to the "mini-Miranda" warning
insofar as "liability exists . . . if the defendant's conduct was such that he [or
she] should have realized that it would be offensive to" a reasonable per-
son. '50 In order for an action for invasion of privacy to be viable, there must
have been a disclosure of private information.' 5 ' Private information in-
cludes an individual's "financial dealings"5 2 or "debts."' 53 Public disclosure
142. Id. at 157.
143. Id. at 165.
144. See id. at 156.
145. I.J. Schiffres, Annotation, Invasion of Right of Privacy by Merely Oral Declarations,
19 A.L.R. 3D 1318, 1321-22 (1968).
146. See Sacco v. Eagle Fin. Corp. of N. Miami Beach, 234 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1970) (recognizing communication of insults to public regarding debt as possible
invasion of privacy); Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir.
1962) (recognizing that an oral communication could invade a person's right to privacy if
"accompanied by sufficient publicity" of such communication); but see Cason v. Baskin, 20
So. 2d 243, 252 (Fla. 1944) ("mere spoken words cannot afford a basis for an action based on
an invasion of the right of privacy").
In order to constitute an invasion of the right of privacy, an act must be of such a nature as a
reasonable man can see might and probably would cause mental distress and injury to anyone
possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence, situated in like circumstances as the complain-
ant; and this question is to some extent one of law.
Cason, 20 So. 2d at 251.
147. Schiffres, supra note 145, at 1322 (quoting Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v.
Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Mo. 1959)).
148. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
149. See id.
150. Id. Thus, a cause of action only exists when the defendant knew or should have
known of the offensive nature of his or her act. Id.
151. Id.
152. Mason v. Williams Disc. Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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includes oral communications. 114 While public disclosure usually requires
communication to a large number of persons, such disclosure can also occur
where one merely initiates the process of the information eventually being
disclosed to a large group of people. '55
Generally, "[c]ommunication regarding a debt" to a third person-
including the debtor's family--"is... found to be an invasion of the debtor's
privacy."
156
B. Intrusion upon an Individual's Seclusion
Because Florida's Constitution explicitly does not provide for protec-
tion against the unauthorized distribution of private information by private
entities, 57 courts have identified four privacy torts in order to protect the
citizens of Florida. 158 The four privacy torts recognized by the State of Flor-
ida include: "1) the misappropriation of an individual's name or likeness; 2)
the intrusion upon an individual's seclusion; 3) the right of publicity; and 4)
false light invasion of privacy."'' 9 Out of the four recognized privacy torts,
"the ... intrusion upon [an individual's] seclusion" is most applicable to the
FDCPA's potential privacy issues. 1
60
To establish a claim for the intrusion upon seclusion theory of invasion
of privacy, a debtor must prove three separate elements: "1) an intentional
intrusion, physical or otherwise, 2) upon the plaintiffs solitude or seclusion
or private affairs or concerns, 3) which would be highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person."'' This particular tort is aimed at "protecting the privacy
surrounding the activities inside the home."' 162 The tort of intrusion upon
153. Challen v. Town & Country Charge, 545 F. Supp. 1014, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see
also Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941).
154. Schiffres, supra note 145, at 1322.
155. See Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321, 322 (Ala. 1961).
156. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 140, § 13:4 (citing Norris, 132 So. 2d at 325); see
also Boudreaux v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 217 So. 2d 439, 444 (La. Ct. App. 1968); La Salle
Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 253 N.W. 424, 426 (Neb. 1934)).
157. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
158. Thornburg, supra note 10, at 138 (citing Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 250-51
(Fla. 1944)). The four torts recognized by Florida courts can be traced to "The Right to Pri-
vacy, an infamous Harvard Law Review article written by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis." Id. at 141.
159. Id. at 141.
160. Id. at 149. "The tort of intrusion upon seclusion has been recognized as the privacy
tort most directly available to protect an individual's basic right 'to be let alone."' Id.
161. Hilburn v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc., No. 06-6096-HO, 2007 WL 1200949, at
*4 (D. Or. Apr. 19, 2007) (quoting Mauri v. Smith, 929 P.2d 307, 310 (Or. 1996)).
162. Thornburg, supra note 10, at 150.
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seclusion "'requires proof of an actual invasion of 'something secret, se-
cluded or private pertaining to the plaintiff .... "',"'
Intrusion upon seclusion "consists of a collector's interference with a
debtor's interest in solitude or seclusion."'" When telephone calls to a deb-
tor become "'repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a
course of hounding the [debtor], . . . privacy is invaded."""5 Further, courts
have held that a message left with debtor's sister-in-law and wife constituted
a "wrongful intrusion" invasion of privacy. 166 In applying the "intrusion
upon seclusion" tort to debt collection,
[t]he mere efforts of a creditor ... to collect a debt cannot without
more be considered a wrongful and actionable intrusion. A credi-
tor has and must have the right to take reasonable action to pursue
his [or her] debtor and collect his [or her] debt. But the right to
pursue the debtor is not a license to outrage the debtor. 1
67
One court has further held that a single call made to a debtor in an at-
tempt to collect a debt may constitute an invasion of privacy by intrusion
upon one's seclusion.'68
VIII. THE CONSTRUCTIVE EXCLUSION OF TECHNOLOGY FROM METHODS
AVAILABLE FOR DEBT COLLECTORS TO COLLECT DEBT MAY CONSTITUTE
INFRINGEMENT UPON ONE'S RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING
"The right to work, earn a living and acquire and possess property from
the fruits of one's labor is an inalienable right."' 169 The Florida Constitution
163. Id. (quoting Nelson v. Me. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977).
164. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 140, § 13:4.
165. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). One court has held
that repeated phone calls to a debtor's workplace disturbed the debtor's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and therefore instilled liability upon the debtor for invasion of privacy. Kuhn
v. Account Control Tech., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1443, 1448-49 (D. Nev. 1994).
166. Cartwright v. Tacala, Inc., No. CIV A 99-W-663-N, 2000 WL 33287445, at *15
(M.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 2000) (citing Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321, 324-25 (Ala.
1961)).
167. Jones v. U.S. Child Support Recovery, 961 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (D. Utah 1997)
(quoting Norris, 132 So. 2d at 323).
168. Diaz v. D.L. Recovery Corp., 486 F. Supp. 2d 474, 479 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The court
reasoned that "the important point [of the tort] is not that the intrusions be persistent, but that.
. [they] rise to the level of 'highly offensive' to a reasonable person. Id. at 480; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
169. Lee v. Delmar, 66 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. 1953). To illustrate, a court has found that a
real estate resolution prohibiting a real estate broker to employ any real estate salesman who
worked a second job was unlawful. Id. at 254.
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provides that citizens have an inalienable right "to be rewarded for [their]
industry."'70 Therefore, the right to earn a living is recognized in Florida as a
fundamental right."'7 Where one is negatively impacted by a rule restricting
his or her profession an injury in fact exists. 172 Statutes which restrict "the
right to earn a living" pose a serious threat to due process. 173 Thus, the
"mini-Miranda" warning provision of the FDCPA, which essentially prohib-
its the use of answering machines, negatively impacts debt collectors and
therefore an injury in fact exists. 17
IX. CONCLUSION
Simultaneous compliance with both the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act is near impossible for
Florida debt collectors, keeping in mind the technological advances which
have occurred since the creation of the FDCPA. 17  Specifically, the "mini-
Miranda" warning is clearly at odds with not only the technological ad-
vances,176 but with the remainder of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
as well. 17' The only answer for Florida debt collectors-until the FDCPA is
updated with technology in mind-is utilizing the preemption provision of
the FDCPA.'78 The FDCPA explicitly states that it does not preempt any
state collection law which affords the consumer greater protection. 179
Because federal courts in a variety of states 80 have held that a message
left on an answering machine is a "communication" within the statutory
meaning,' 8 ' debt collectors must properly disclose their identity when leav-
170. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
171. Id. "All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law, and have
inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue
happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property ..... Id.
172. Ward v. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 651 So. 2d 1236, 1237
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). "A real and sufficiently immediate injury in fact has been
recognized where the challenged rule or its promulgating statute has a direct and immediate
effect upon one's right to earn a living." Id.; see also Jacoby v. Fla. Bd. of Med., 917 So. 2d
358, 360 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Fla. Med. Ass'n, Inc. v. Dep't. of Prof I Reg.,
426 So. 2d 1112, 1113-14 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
173. Callier v. Dir. of Revenue, 780 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Mo. 1989) (Blackmar, C.J., dissent-
ing).
174. See Ward, 651 So. 2d at 1237.
175. See Thornburg, supra note 10, at 137.
176. See id.
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000).
178. Id. § 1692n.
179. Id.
180. See cases cited supra note 30.
181. Hosseinzadeh v. MR.S. Assocs., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
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ing a message. 82 With the growing number of people living with persons
other than their "family,"' 83 the chances of disclosing private financial in-
formation to a third party is nearly inevitable.' 84 The reality of this risk
opens debt collectors up to a variety of federal and pendent state law
claims. 185 Debt collectors may be left vulnerable to invasion of privacy
claims, 86 as well as actions for violation of the FDCPA provision prohibit-
ing disclosure to third parties. 187
Debt collectors are not the only ones left vulnerable by the "mini-
Miranda" warning requirement; 188 the government may be subjected to
claims for invasion of privacy, as well. 189 Judges are state actors, 190 and a
state actor enforcing a statute which invades the privacy of a citizen is a vio-
lation of both the Florida and United States Constitutions. 191
Not only does the "mini-Miranda" warning open debt collectors up to a
variety of liabilities, and place the government in a difficult situation, it less-
ens the protection to the consumer, as well. With the disclosure requirement
in place, consumers now have no control over who may be informed of their
financial situation, especially with the utilization of new technologies. With
the potential for disclosure of private financial information, consumers are
left in a bad situation.' 92 The FCCPA, unlike the FDCPA, does not require
disclosure of a debt collector's identity unless requested by the consumer. 193
This gives the consumer more control over the disclosure of information
without infringing upon the debt collector's ability or right to earn a living.
This solution leaves everyone in a "win-win" situation.
In conclusion, Florida debt collectors should adhere to the FCCPA dis-
closure requirement when attempting to collect a debt because it provides
182. NEWBURGER & BARRON, supra note 84, 1.05[2].
183. Coleman, supra note 118.
184. See Mason v. Williams Disc. Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
see also Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321, 322, 325 (Ala. 1961).
185. See, e.g., Mullins v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 07-cv-00397-RPM-PAC, 2007 WL 1795871,
at *1 (D. Colo. June, 21, 2007).
186. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 10-11 (5th Cir. 1962)
(citing Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 250-51 (Fla. 1944)). The right to privacy claims
include four distinct privacy torts, namely intrusion upon one's seclusion. Thornburg, supra
note 10, at 138, 141 (citing Cason, 20 So. 2d at 250-51).
187. Henderson v. Eaton, No. Civ. A 01-0138, 2001 WL 969105, at *1, *3 (E.D. La. Aug.
23, 2001).
188. See NEWBURGER & BARRON, supra note 84, 1.0512].
189. Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 689 n.7 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
190. People v. Garberding, 787 P.2d 154, 156 (Colo. 1990).
191. See Crespo, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 689 n.7.
192. See Mason v. Williams Disc. Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
193. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(15).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a time when quality health care is essential and medical malpractice
befalls patients on a daily basis,' peer review has become an institutionalized
practice,2 while information generated in the process has become a hot and
controversial commodity in legal discovery proceedings.' As an integral part
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter; B.S., University of Miami, School of Communications. The author wishes to give a spe-
cial thank you to her family for their continued love and encouragement in all that she does.
She would also like to thank Professor Debra Moss Curtis, Professor Kathy Cerminara, and
Professor David Cleveland for their guidance and direction.
1. See42U.S.C. § 11101(1) (2000).
2. Susan 0. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer
Review Information: More Imagined than Real, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 169 (1992-93).
3. See Christina A. Graham, Comment, Hide and Seek: Discovery in the Context of the
State and Federal Peer Review Privileges, 30 CUMB. L. REv. 111, 111 (2000). Discovery is
"[c]ompulsory disclosure, at a party's request, of information that relates to the litigation."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 498 (8th ed. 2004).
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of today's health care industry, "[p]eer review serves as one of medicine's
most effective risk management and quality improvement tools."4 By engag-
ing physicians in a review process of their colleagues' work,5 the "incompe-
tence in the medical profession" is weeded out, inevitably leading to better
patient care and a decrease in health and medical expenses. 6 Serving to ap-
plaud excellent medical care and uncover that which is inferior and sub par,7
peer review has truly made a name for itself in the medical community.8
It is with the help of statutory protection that this practice has become a
reality.9 Peer review statutes are geared toward guaranteeing participants
confidentiality, immunity, and/or privileges, l0 so as to stimulate sincere and
reliable discussions." However, this security is gradually starting to erode
as information, documents, and records linked to the peer review sessions
reach the public through the discovery process. l
While the purpose of peer review statutes appear to be sound and guile-
less, courts are still laboring to stabilize the particulars regarding discovery
4. Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protections of State and Federal
Peer Review Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 541 (2003). Peer review occurs in
other areas besides just hospitals. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High
Cost But No Benefit-Is It Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7 n.1 (1999). The
process is also administered "by nonhospital institutional providers such as freestanding sur-
gery centers, and by third-party payers of health care expenses." Id. Nevertheless, hospitals
still make the most frequent use of the process. Id.
5. David W. Jorstad, Note, The Legal Liability of Medical Peer Review Participants for
Revocation of Hospital Staff Privileges, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 692,692 (1978-79).
6. Alissa Marie Bassler, Comment, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with States and
Recognize a Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REv. 689, 692 (2003).
7. Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical
Malpractice Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1175, 1177 (2006).
8. See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 169.
9. See George E. Newton II, Comment, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the
Social and Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REv. 723, 727
(2001); see also Cruger v. Love (Love fl), 599 So. 2d 111, 113 (Fla. 1992).
10. Nijm, supra note 4, at 546.
11. LovelI,599So.2datll4.
[T]he purpose of a statute that shields medical review committee records and materials from
discovery and prevents their use as evidence in certain civil actions is to promote candor and
frank exchange in peer-review proceedings, and that a statute protecting the proceedings, re-
cords, and files of medical review committees from discovery in civil actions was intended to
provide broad statutory protection and was based on legislative appreciation that a high level
of confidentiality is necessary for effective medical peer review.
81 AM. JuR. 2D Witnesses § 537 (2004).
12. See Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 590 (Fla. 2007) (holding that a
hospital's list of a physician's privileges is discoverable). "[P]eer review information might
fall vulnerable to discovery for claims brought under federal law, because no federal peer
review privilege exists." Nijm, supra note 4, at 542.
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of peer review documents and records as to be employed in legal actions. 3
Naturally, there are those who advocate for peer review and the good they
believe it brings 4 while there are those who criticize the process for the neg-
ative effects they allege it causes. 5 As a result, "an aura of controversy has
surrounded the idea of allowing health care personnel to police them-
selves." 16
To date, a peer review statute of some kind has been passed in almost
every state. ' 7 Notwithstanding the fact that most statutes are read and inter-
preted differently, they still uniformly strive to further the same goals.1 8
Historically, Florida peer review statutes have been construed extremely
broadly.' 9 Litigants seeking materials during discovery that were generated
in peer review sessions were hard pressed to recover anything."0 Such a
statutory interpretation allowed physicians and hospitals to freely partake in
the peer review process without the looming fear of litigation and liability
haunting them in the future.2'
Recently, however, these consistent Florida rulings of denying produc-
tion of materials associated with peer review during discovery have suddenly
come to a standstill. Bending the shield of statutory protection, the Supreme
Court of Florida has taken an atypical approach in resolving a recent case.22
Widening the eyes of both proponents and critics of peer review, the Su-
preme Court of Florida granted the release of hospital records containing
physician privileges.23 In addition to serving as a great stride for litigants
13. Graham, supra note 3, at 111.
14. See Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1177.
15. Bassler, supra note 6, at 695.
16. Christopher S. Morter, Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986:
Will Physicians Find Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REv. 1115, 1115 (1988).
17. Bassler, supra note 6, at 694; see also Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 198-217.
These pages provide a list of each state that furnishes a statute relating to peer review. See
Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 198-217. The chart accompanying the list provides a
"[s]ummary of [s]tate [p]eer [rieview [s]tatutes" and includes information about the state, their
statute, and whom and what it protects. Id.
18. See Nijm, supra note 4, at 546.
19. Karen 0. Emmanuel, The Peer Review Privilege in Florida, FLA. B.J., July/Aug.
1994, at 64; see also Tenet HealthSystem Hosps., Inc. v. Taitel, 855 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
20. Graham, supra note 3, at 125-26.
21. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1178.
22. See Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 595 (Fla. 2007). The Supreme
Court of Florida granted the rltease of a hospital's list of physician privileges during discov-
ery. Id. at 590. In the past, it has restricted discovery of most materials related to peer review.
See, e.g., Cruger v. Love (Love I1), 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992).
23. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 590.
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seeking certain discovery materials in medical malpractice suits, 24 this case
awakes attention to the split between the district courts in Florida.25
This article will examine peer review in Florida, focusing on a recent
case from the Supreme Court of Florida that has generated a split among the
district courts. The first section discusses the history, background, and gen-
eral statutory protection surrounding peer review. It will additionally probe
into the opinions of both proponents and critics of the process. Part III spe-
cifically outlines the history of peer review in Florida and looks at the rele-
vant statutes that govern the process today. Additionally, this section ex-
plores the case of Brandon Regional Hospital v. Murray.26 Part IV discusses
the split among the Florida district courts and explicitly looks into the hold-
ings of certain cases. Part V considers the implications of each side of the
split, scrutinizing both the benefits and consequences.
II. THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS
Peer review is a process whereby specifically qualified medical associ-
ates of a hospital evaluate "the qualifications, training, and experience" 27 of
other practicing medical physicians and personnel, as well as monitor their
"medical outcomes and professional conduct. 28 The medical review staff
seeks to ascertain whether the aforesaid physicians and personnel are capable
and competent to practice medicine in the hospital and, in the event that they
are, what the boundaries and limitations of their practice consist of.29 De-
spite the fact that a hospital makes the final judgment as to whether or not a
doctor may practice and, if so, to what extent, it is peer review reports and
analysis which provide the foundation for such a hospital decision.3 Conse-
quently, a hospital's choice to authorize admittance to their medical staff, as
24. Daniel Ostrovsky, Hospital Privileges Must Be Revealed in Med-Mal Cases, DAILY
Bus. REV., May 11, 2007, at Al.
25. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 591-93.
26. Id. at 590.
27. Nijm, supra note 4, at 543.
28. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 13. The initial portion of the process is generally known
as "credentialing." Id. at 14. Once a physician has been granted privileges and they begin
practicing, the peer review process additionally includes an evaluation of "quality assurance
data, diagnostic and laboratory utilization reports, and other information regarding each staff
member's actual practice at the hospital." Id. Typically, a physician must undergo peer re-
view of their hospital privileges every two years; nevertheless, if concerns arise regarding
their behavior before said time, a review will be in order. Id.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Newton II, supra note 9, at 725.
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well as grant or deny certain privileges, is largely influenced by the peer re-
view process, committee, and their findings.3
A. History of Peer Review
A general survey of medical peer review history reveals that in 1918,
the American College of Surgeons established the Hospital Accreditation
Program, which ultimately grew into the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO).32 JCAHO mandates that hospitals
have an abiding system by which physicians are to be evaluated.33 "[T]o
receive JCAHO accreditation, hospitals must" partake in certain procedures
which will ensure quality health care, including but not limited to, peer re-
view."4 "Accreditation plays a vital role in the economic survival of a hospi-
tal, as eligibility for federal funds, such as Medicare and Medicaid, depends
upon it."
35
In addition to JCAHO and the assistance it provides in attempting to
improve the health care industry, 36 Congress has addressed the issue by pass-
ing federal legislation known as the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986 (HCQIA).37 Concerned with the "overriding national need to provide
incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective professional
peer review,"3 Congress enacted HCQIA as an initial step toward a solu-
tion.39 Operating with the specific function of promoting "good faith peer
review,"4 and medical care, the Act fosters two chief objectives.4  Fore-
31. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 13.
32. Bassler, supra note 6, at 691. In an effort to address the inferiority of patient health
care, the Hospital Accreditation Program was enacted. Id. "[T]his organization attempted to
combat the problem by establishing minimum standards of quality." Morter, supra note 16, at
1116.
33. Morter, supra note 16, at 1117.
34. Nijm, supra note 4, at 544.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1179. Before Congress passed HCQIA, the only protec-
tion afforded to medical peer review was that provided by the states. Scheutzow & Gillis,
supra note 2, at 177. Currently, federal law does not provide "a medical peer review privi-
lege." Nijm, supra note 4, at 542.
38. 42U.S.C. § 11101(5)(2000).
39. Morter, supra note 16, at 1120. HCQIA is the only piece of federal legislation on the
issue of peer review. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 177.
40. Morter, supra note 16, at 1115.
41. Yann H.H. van Geertruyden, Comment, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: How the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and State Peer Review Protection Statutes
Have Helped Protect Bad Faith Peer Review in the Medical Community, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 239, 245 (2001).
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most, HCQIA grants immunity from damages to those individuals actively
involved and contributing in the peer review process.42 However, it "does
not grant a federal evidentiary privilege to the records and deliberations of
the peer review process. 43 Furthermore, HCQIA was implemented to gen-
erate the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), a "national clearinghouse
of information."'  By making it obligatory that hospitals submit reports con-
cerning physicians and medical staff who have had disciplinary problems 4
5
and clinical privileges reduced or removed, NPDB prevents incompetent
individuals from moving to other hospitals without exemption from punish-
ment.46
B. Statutory Scheme Overview
For peer review to be an effective tool in the health care industry there
must be regulations that accompany its use.47 While the purpose of peer
review is to generate better patient care and improve the quality of physi-
42. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 9. The peer review board must satisfy four procedural
criteria to become eligible for immunity from damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1111 l(a)(1) (2000).
First, the board's actions must have been exercised with a sound belief that it was fostering
quality health care. Id. § 11112(a)(1). Second, in acquiring the facts, the board must have
employed a reasonable effort. Id. § 111 12(a)(2). Third, the board must provide the physician
with sufficient notice and a hearing or other measures which under the circumstances are just.
Id § 111 12(a)(3). Last, after complying with the aforementioned requirements, the board
must believe that the actions they took were reasonably justifiable. Id. § I 1112(a)(4). It is
presumed that the peer review board's actions satisfy the four procedural criteria; however,
this is a "rebuttable presumption." Anthony W. Rodgers, Procedural Protections During
Medical Peer Review: A Reinterpretation of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986, 111 PENN ST. L. REv. 1047, 1053 (2007). If it can be illustrated through a preponder-
ance of the evidence that at least one of the four criteria have not been complied with, a physi-
cian may disprove this presumption. Id. at 1053-54; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a).
43. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 9-10. The question of whether the "'peer review privi-
lege' applies to the discovery of documents created during the peer review process" is still
lingering as unanswered. Graham, supra note 3, at 112.
44. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 10.
45. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1180. Disciplinary actions include when a physician's
privileges are reduced, temporarily withdrawn, or entirely recalled. Id.
46. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 10. In addressing the nationwide quandary of incompe-
tent physicians traveling from state to state to practice medicine, HCQIA demands that hospi-
tals and other medical personal report to the NPDB "peer review actions resulting in limita-
tions to a physician's medical staff or clinical privileges and to report when physicians volun-
tarily surrender their medical staff privileges in lieu of facing a peer review investigation." Id.
Additionally, the punitive and corrective measures that a physician is sanctioned with must be
communicated to the NPDB. Graham, supra note 3, at 112.
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(5).
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cians practicing,48 this will only occur with honest and outspoken discus-
sions.4 "It is obvious that both complaints and free discussion about the
activities of physicians would be markedly discouraged if their contents were
to be held open to public perusal."5° Accordingly, without some definitive
security guaranteed to those who participate, this practice will never become
a reality."
In the past, physicians have been averse to participating in peer re-
view.2 While currently, the process appears to be sound, the possibility of
future consequences is a brewing fear.53 Physicians do not want to find
themselves entangled in a web of legal action initiated by an unhappy medi-
cal associate who was given poor reviews or had privileges revoked.54 The
negative repercussions that may strike a physician after a substandard review
can have lasting effects, including but not limited to, a damaged reputation,
loss of income, patients, and malpractice insurance, the stigma of having
received negative reviews, and possibly the inability to find employment
elsewhere." The aforesaid reasons are all ammunition for future lawsuits
and no physicians would choose to partake in a process that would leave
them behind the barrel of a loaded gun. "While a physician may be willing
to chastise a physician in private and, for example, suggest sanctions such as
remedial training, the physician almost assuredly would not like his com-
ments aired on the six o'clock news. 56
As a result, almost every state has fashioned some version of a peer re-
view statute57 in which they guarantee privileges, immunity, and/or confi-
dentiality.18 "In granting these protections, legislatures have determined that
limiting the rights of physicians to seek damages for peer review actions and
denying malpractice plaintiffs and other litigants information relevant to their
lawsuits are justified in order to encourage effective peer review."59
48. Matthew J. Cate, Physician Peer Review: Serving the Patient or the Physician?, 20
J. LEGAL MED. 479, 483 (1999).
49. See 81 AM. JuR. 2D Witnesses § 537 (2004).
50. Dade County Med. Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 119 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(5).
52. Newton II, supra note 9, at 726.
53. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 16.
54. See Newton II, supra note 9, at 727.
55. Rodgers, supra note 42, at 1049-51.
56. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 174.
57. Josephine M. Hammack, Comment, The Antitrust Laws and the Medical Peer Review
Process, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 419, 440-41 (1993).
58. Nijm, supra note 4, at 546.
59. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 8.
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1. Privileges
An authorized privilege in law safeguards particular information from
discovery and use in civil litigation.6" The court assumes the role of "bal-
anc[ing] privilege against a plaintiffs right to due process and the judicial
need for the fair administration of justice.,, 61 Accordingly, a court acknowl-
edging the existence of a privilege is essentially saying, without speaking,
that "it values that social policy goal [of keeping information free from dis-
covery or use in civil litigation] over and above the potential impact of the
privilege on the truth-seeking process."62 As a result, a judicially granted
privilege functions as an exemption from the everyday liability one would
incur in having to provide information during a judicial proceeding.63
2. Confidentiality
Confidentiality mandates that a party abstain from revealing any and all
information pertaining to, and discussed in, the peer review process, outside
a court of law.' 4 A party may be obliged "to keep information confidential"
by means of law or contract. 65 This requirement absolves physicians of the
fear that their direct and blunt communications will be exposed to those be-
60. Nijm, supra note 4, at 546. To be specific, "forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia have" passed statutes dealing with the peer review privilege. Bassler, supra note 6,
at 694. In the discovery process, when a party to a lawsuit asserts the peer review privilege
the burden of proof rests on them to demonstrate that the information requested is statutorily
protected. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 537 (2004).
61. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 537 (2004).
62. Nijm, supra note 4, at 547. In Trammel v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court proclaimed that "[tiestimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the funda-
mental principle that 'the public.., has a right to every man's evidence."' 445 U.S. 40, 50
(1980) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). As a result, the United
States Supreme Court has warned courts dealing with privileges to be prudent, as granting
them endorse a strong social message. See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 180. "Even
in discussing the widely accepted attorney-client and priest-penitent privileges, the Court has
urged caution in their application." Id.
63. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 179.
64. Nijm, supra note 4, at 548. The court in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc. under-
scored the fundamental reasoning behind implementing confidentiality statutes. See Bredice
v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970); Gregory G. Gosfield, Medical Peer
Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 566 (1979).
65. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 192. While many states claim to protect confi-
dential information through statutory law, they provide no punishment or remedy should such
information be revealed. Nijm, supra note 4, at 548-49. Nonetheless, there are eight states
which do impose sanctions for a violation of confidentiality statutes. Id. at 549.
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ing reviewed.66 Generally, information which is privileged is also confiden-
tial.67
3. Immunity
Immunity operates as a shield for participants from civil litigation that
may emerge in the future.68 When a physician is unhappy with the outcome
of his or her peer review session, his actions are unpredictable and may result
in a lawsuit. 69 As such, the grant of immunity may range from hospitals, to
the peer review board, and anyone who may submit evidence to the board. 7°
However, while immunity may protect participants from civil suits, it does
not automatically protect the information generated in the session.7'
C. Two Sides to Every Story
For as long as it has been around, peer review has been an issue of dis-
pute.72 The discipline and regulation of medical professionals is a sensitive
matter and must be handled with the utmost justice.73 Debates surrounding
whether peer review is the correct and best way to manage the health care
industry have been argued at length.74 Debates surrounding the discoverabil-
ity of peer review materials are more recent arguments but nonetheless seem
to be the new black of medical malpractice disputes.75 As with everything,
there are two sides to every story!
1. Proponents of Peer Review
Advocates of medical peer review urge that "physicians possess the
specialized knowledge necessary to make accurate medical judgments and
66. See Newton II, supra note 9, at 729.
67. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 192.
68. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 17. To be specific, forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have passed statutes dealing with peer review immunity. Id. at 28.
69. Seeid.at10-11.
70. Newton II, supra note 9, at 730.
71. Cate, supra note 48, at 483-84. "While the notion of immunity is somewhat consis-
tent in the law, the status of peer review information as privileged information is not." Id. at
484.
72. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1182.
73. See id.
74. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 16.
75. See Graham, supra note 3, at 111; see also infra notes 110, 112 and accompanying
text.
2007)
277
: Nova Law Review 32, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
can routinely observe one another in the workplace setting."76 It is this pro-
ficient and expert knowledge that makes the peer review process superior to
other procedures, such as, "lay review boards or judicial oversight.,7 7 The
judgments rendered during these sessions inexorably lead to first rate patient
care, safer medical procedures, and doctors who are truly equipped to prac-
tice medicine.7" Additionally, peer review impels doctors to practice with a
greater and more sophisticated degree of care and attention.79
Peer review offers an incentive for similarly trained physicians
working in the same environment to identify colleagues with
knowledge gaps or deficiencies in technical skills, facilitate their
remediation, and monitor their progress and performance, in pref-
erence to external parties assuming this responsibility. In addition,
when serious problems are identified, appropriate steps can be tak-
en to limit doctors' contact with patients well before government
agencies are involved or can act. Peer review may also lead physi-
cians to seek and accept help for medical, psychiatric, or impair-
ment issues. Finally, peer review groups can promptly refer safety
and quality issues they identify to committees or authorities em-
powered to address them within an institution. 0
Above and beyond the aforementioned benefits of peer review is that of
protecting a hospital's reputation.8' Although hospitals open themselves up
"to antitrust liability when" they engage in the peer review process, 82 the
salutary effect it has in discovering and controlling "incompetent physicians"
before a medical malpractice suit is filed is sensational.8 3 Consequently, a
hospital can deal with the physician accordingly, before problems escalate
and the hospital begins to build a horrible reputation or worse, finds itself
vicariously liable in a lawsuit.'
76. Nijm, supra note 4, at 543.
77. Morter, supra note 16, at 1118.
78. Jorstad, supra note 5, at 693.
79. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1177.
80. Id. at 1177-78.
81. Barbara K. Miller, Note, Defending the System: Application of the Intraenterprise
Immunity Doctrine in Physician Peer Review Antitrust Cases, 75 TEX. L. REV. 409, 411
(1996).
82. Id. at 409.
83. Id. at411.
84. Id. at410.
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2. Critics of Peer Review
In spite of the rah-rah that surrounds peer review there are still those
who have their doubts.85 Arguing that peer review performs a great disser-
vice to the general public, critics base their reasoning on "a 'conspiracy of
silence' that [they believe] enables health care practitioners to cover up evi-
dence of neglect."86 Subsequently, the court system feeds into this conspir-
acy by denying those patients seeking to prosecute ill practicing hospitals
and physicians, materials produced during peer review.87 As a result, peer
review and its accompanying statutes end up concealing information during
discovery, which could make or break a medical malpractice case.88 Addi-
tionally, those opposed to peer review contend that it "does not adequately
improve healthcare quality and safety" as the process does not tackle true
areas of concern and is never fully followed through with.89 Quite often two
situations present themselves: 1) physicians facing severe consequences
simply resign instead of complying with the peer review board's disciplinary
orders; 90 or 2) a hospital will recognize a doctor's resignation as quid pro
quo for silence. 91 To add insult to injury, many times when a hospital ac-
cepts a physician's resignation they fail to inform the NPDB about such inci-
dents, consequently eliminating its purpose.92 Moreover, many critics urge
that peer review "is used as a tool for economic or political motives-in es-
sence a review performed in bad faith, or with malice."93 However, despite
such opposition to the peer review process and the limitations it places on
discoverable material,94 critics are slowly getting what they wished for as the
barriers blocking information generated in peer review are collapsing little
by little. 95
85. Bassler, supra note 6, at 695.
86. Morter, supra note 16, at 1115 (quoting B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review Privi-
lege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 160-61 (1984)).
87. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1182.
88. See id. at 1183; see also Columbia/JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P'ship v. Sanguonchitte, 920
So. 2d 711, 712 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
89. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1186.
90. Id.
91. Newton II, supra note 9, at 732.
92. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1186.
93. H.H. van Geertruyden, supra note 41, at 241.
94. Graham, supra note 3, at 114.
95. See Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 590 (Fla. 2007).
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III. PEER REVIEW IN FLORIDA
Having been legislatively cultivated, the peer review privilege is not ac-
knowledged as being a product of any common law principles.96 Conse-
quently, the protection afforded to hospitals and physicians are rooted in the
statutory protection that each state provides.97 Currently, such statutory se-
curity is "inconsistent" among the states. 98  Where some states impart a
heavy safeguard against peer review information being accessed during dis-
covery, others provide mild assurance that confidential information will not
be readily available to the public.99
As it stood until recently, Florida acquiesced to the group of states
which yielded strong protection against peer review information, or that re-
lated to it, being procurable during discovery.' 00 Pioneering the idea of the
"expansive privilege approach" with regard to the peer review statute, Flor-
ida has been a forerunner in the enactment of legislation concerning this mat-
ter.'01 Long before peer review legislation was a thought in the mind of
Congress or other states, Florida had already passed statutes pertaining to the
subject; these statutes have since been restructured and revised.'02
Historically, case law in Florida has supported the proposition of broad-
ly construing peer review statutes. '03 Insisting that peer review records, in-
formation, and documents remain privileged and confidential, it has been
difficult for anyone bringing a lawsuit against a hospital, physician, or peer
review committee to gain access to said information in the discovery proc-
ess. "0 The Supreme Court of Florida in Holly v. Auld... stated, "[w]e must
96. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 181.
97. Nijm, supra note 4, at 546.
98. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 171.
While there appears to be widespread belief that information presented in peer review proceed-
ings and the deliberation of such committees are privileged and are to remain confidential, the
reality is that peer review proceedings are afforded very little privilege and confidentiality pro-
tection pursuant to federal law and very inconsistent protection by state law.
Id.
99. See JONATHAN P. TOMES, MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES AND PEER REVIEW: A LEGAL
GUIDE FOR HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 133 (1994); Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at
198-217; Bassler, supra note 6, at 694; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
100. Emmanuel, supra note 19, at 61; Graham, supra note 3, at 125-26; see also infra note
112 and accompanying text.
101. Graham, supra note 3, at 125.
102. Id.
103. Emmanuel, supra note 19, at 64.
104. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth. v. Lopez, 678 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that even though the information was not kept confidential by the hospi-
tal, the records of the medical peer review committee were privileged); Love v. Cruger (Love
1), 570 So. 2d 362, 362-63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla.
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assume that the legislature balanced this potential detriment [of preventing
disclosure of material in discovery] against the potential for health care cost
containment offered by effective self-policing by the medical community and
found the latter to be of greater weight." 106 However, as will be seen in the
later analysis of Brandon Regional Hospital v. Murray, this steady corner-
stone of Florida judicial case law is slowly starting to change, permitting the
discovery of certain information. 
107
A. Statutory Protection
Florida Statutes section 766.101 provides for the peer review privi-
lege.'0 8 Moreover, sections 395.0191 and 395.0193 encompass information
which serves to protect "hospital investigations and proceedings pertaining to
medical staff membership, clinical privileges, and disciplinary actions by
hospitals against members of its medical staff."' 0 9  The pertinent part of
Florida Statutes section 766. 101 states:
The investigations, proceedings, and records of a committee as de-
scribed in the preceding subsections shall not be subject to discov-
ery or introduction into evidence in any civil or administrative ac-
tion against a provider of professional health services arising out
of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by
such committee, and no person who was in attendance at a meeting
of such committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any
such civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or
presented during the proceedings of such committee or as to any
findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions
of such committee or any members thereof.110
1992) (holding that a physician's application to the hospital for staff privileges were undis-
coverable); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 221 (Fla. 1984) (holding that the records of a cre-
dentialing committee were privileged from discovery as well as an investigation into those
participants involved in the decision-making process of whether or not to grant privileges).
105. 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984).
106. Id. at 220.
107. Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 595 (Fla. 2007).
108. FLA. STAT. § 766.101 (2007).
109. Emmanuel, supra note 19, at 61; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 395.0191, .0193 (2007).
110. FLA. STAT. § 766.101(5). Subsection five of this statute also states that:
[tInformation, documents, or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be
construed as immune from discovery or use in any such civil action merely because they were
presented during proceedings of such committee, nor should any person who testifies before
such committee or who is a member of such committee be prevented from testifying as to mat-
ters within his or her knowledge, but the said witness cannot be asked about his or her testi-
2007]
281
: Nova Law Review 32, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
Florida Statutes section 395.0191 states:
The investigations, proceedings, and records of the board, or agent
thereof with whom there is a specific written contract for the pur-
poses of this section, as described in this section shall not be sub-
ject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action
against a provider of professional health services arising out of
matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such
board, and no person who was in attendance at a meeting of such
board or its agent shall be permitted or required to testify in any
such civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or
presented during the proceedings of such board or its agent or as to
any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other ac-
tions of such board or its agent or any members thereof. "'
The aforesaid two statutes have been utilized by hospitals and peer re-
view committees as a perpetual weapon to combat discovery requests made
by malpractice victims. 112 Because Florida's past interpretation of these stat-
mony before such a committee or opinions formed by him or her as a result of said committee
hearings.
Id.
111. FLA. STAT. § 395.0191(8). Subsection eight of this statute also states that:
[I]nformation, documents, or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be
construed as immune from discovery or use in any such civil action merely because they were
presented during proceedings of such board; nor should any person who testifies before such
board or who is a member of such board be prevented from testifying as to matters within his
or her knowledge, but such witness cannot be asked about his or her testimony before such a
board or opinions formed by him or her as a result of such board hearings.
Id.
112. See Columbia/JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P'ship v. Sanguonchitte, 920 So. 2d 711, 713 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding in a suit for medical malpractice that section 766.101(5)
protects information and documents regarding a physician's credentials); Tenet HealthSystem
Hosps., Inc. v. Taitel, 855 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding in medi-
cal malpractice action that blank forms created by the peer review committee for examining
and assessing a nurse's capability to practice medicine were protected by Florida Statute
section 766.101(5)); Columbia Hosp. Corp. of So. Dade v. Barrera, 738 So. 2d 505, 505-06
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that under section 766.101(5) and section 395.0191(8) a
hospital is not required to produce a physician's application for staff privileges in discovery);
Ornda Healthcorp. v. Berghof, 722 So. 2d 961, 962 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
in the discovery proceedings of a malpractice case the hospital was not obliged to produce the
doctor's application for staff privileges or malpractice insurance according to section
766.101(5)); Munroe Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Rountree, 721 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that under section 766.101(5) a doctor was not required to respond to
deposition questions pertaining to his interim suspension of staff privileges as his answers
could only have been materialized from peer review committee knowledge and information);
Palm Beach Gardens Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 651 So. 2d 783, 784 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding in a malpractice action that a list of complaints regarding the physician's
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utes has been all encompassing, hospitals and peer review committees are
able to shield information they deem to be private and confidential, regard-
less of the fact that such information may be pertinent, and many times in-
dispensable, to a fair and just trial.113 Furthermore, on the off chance that a
court does not find for protecting the requested information pursuant to Flor-
ida Statutes section 766.101 and/or section 395.0191, the public policy ar-
gument in favor of doing so has found its way to the top of justifications for
nondisclosure. 114
B. Amendment 7
Because Florida has always taken such an active role in the peer review
process and the legislation that accompanies it,"' it came as no surprise
when one of its citizens, in 2004, proposed Amendment 7 on the Florida bal-
lot. 16 Amendment 7, also known as the "Patients' Right-to-Know About
Adverse Medical Incidents Act," is intended to authorize patients "access to
any records made or received in the course of business by a health care facil-
ity or provider relating to any adverse medical incident."" 7 However, with
care of other patients were privileged from discovery under § 766.101(5)); Mount Sinai Med.
Ctr. of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Bernstein, 645 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that a request for specific information pertaining to the medical peer review commit-
tee was inappropriate and not discoverable); Tarpon Springs Gen. Hosp. v. Hudak, 556 So. 2d
831, 832 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a physician's application for staff privi-
leges was protected by section 766.10 1).
113. O'Brien, 651 So. 2d at 784 (stating that the "inability to get this information will
make it difficult for [the claimants] to prosecute a claim."); Sanguonchitte, 920 So. 2d at 712
(stating that it was irrelevant that the plaintiffs would have an arduous time prosecuting their
claim without peer review and hospital documents and information).
114. Sanguonchitte, 920 So. 2d at 712. "[T]here is an overwhelming public policy in
favor of maintaining the privilege to encourage self-regulation by the medical profession." Id.
115. See Graham, supra note 3, at 125.
116. Amendment 7: The Patients' Right to Know Flexes It's Muscle in Florida, LAW
WATCH (Foley & Lardner LLP, Orlando, Fla.), May 25, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Amendment 7].
117. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(a). For purposes of this statute, "have access to any re-
cords" signifies the standard procedures for procuring records in addition to "making the
records available for inspection and copying upon.., request by the patient.., provided that
current records which have been made publicly available by publication or on the Internet
may be 'provided' by reference to the location at which the records are publicly available."
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(c)(4). "Records" describe the ultimate and finished report of an
adverse medical incident. FLA. STAT. § 381.028(3)0) (2007). This does not include drafts,
outlines, or rough copies of documents. Id. Anything which is protected by the attorney-
client privilege or the attorney-client work product will not be deemed a record. Id. Adverse
medical incidents as defined in the statute constitute "medical negligence, intentional miscon-
duct, and any other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility or health care provider that
caused or could have caused injury to or death of a patient." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(c)(3).
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that said, the Florida Legislature also explicitly maintained the position that
Amendment 7 was not designed to abolish or alter current peer review
laws. '18
The enactment of Amendment 7 in Florida triggered a whirlwind of liti-
gation. " 9 In Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 20 and Notami Hos-
pital of Florida, Inc. v. Bowen,12' Florida courts addressed and responded to
the confusion and questions which surrounded this new piece of legisla-
tion. 122 A chief issue encasing Amendment 7 was the inquiry into whether or
not it preempted the already established statutory privilege by now allowing
the discoverability of peer review information that these statutes have sought
to protect. 123 The response by both courts was uniform in that Amendment
7 did preempt the statutory privilege. 124
Reading the provisions of Amendment 7 in parimateria so it forms
a congruous whole, and construing the provisions broadly and giv-
ing them a more liberal interpretation than we would a statute, we
come to the conclusion that Amendment 7 preempts the statutory
privileges afforded health care providers regarding their self-
policing procedures to the extent that such information is obtain-
able through a formal discovery request made by a patient or pa-
tient's legal-representative during the course of litigation. 125
Amendment 7 is extremely explicit about what is and is not discover-
able in litigation. 126 As it stands today, the lingering question seems to be
whether or not it can be applied retroactively. 127 Both Buster and Bowen
reached different conclusions concerning this matter. 28  Buster held that
Amendment 7 does not apply retroactively 129 while Bowen held that it should
be "prospective in operation" while applying retroactively to existing re-
118. FLA. STAT. § 381.028(2). On account of the fact that Amendment 7 was not men-
tioned as an area of concern in the trial or appellate dealings of Murray there is no reason to
analyze or apply it. Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 591-92 n.2 (Fla. 2007).
119. Amendment 7, supra note 116, at 1.
120. 932 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
121. 927 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
122. See Amendment 7, supra note 116, at 1; see also Bowen, 927 So. 2d at 143-44; Bus-
ter, 932 So. 2d at 348-51, 353-55.
123. Buster, 932 So. 2d at 348.
124. Amendment 7, supra note 116, at 1; see also Bowen, 927 So. 2d at 143 n.1; Buster
932 So. 2d at 351.
125. Buster, 932 So. 2d at 350-51.
126. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25; FLA. STAT. § 381.028 (2007).
127. Bowen, 927 So. 2d at 144; Buster, 932 So. 2d at 353.
128. Amendment 7, supra note 116, at 2.
129. Buster, 932 So. 2d at 354.
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cords.'30 Currently, the Supreme Court of Florida has approved a hearing of
both cases. 3'
C. Brandon Regional Hospital v. Murray
Presently in Florida, the buffer of statutory protection that has been fur-
nished to its citizens and institutions is slowly starting to crumble. Shying
away from the routine and typical court decisions which prevent discovery of
peer review information or that pertaining to it,'32 the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida, in May 2007, rendered a verdict with an unusual holding.'33 In Murray,
the Court held that in discovery proceedings, a person bringing a medical
malpractice action is empowered to procure from the hospital the privileges
granted to a physician. '34 However, claimants are "not entitled to the" con-
crete documents which the peer review credentialing committee utilized in
aiding the hospital in their decisions to grant or deny such privileges.'35
Therefore, even though the actual peer review documents themselves are still
privileged,'36 the ultimate result of what was decided in their meeting, which
hospitals use as a guiding source,' 37 is discoverable.'38
In Murray, a medical malpractice suit was initiated against Brandon
Regional Hospital (BRH). 139  The Murrays contended that Dr. Wayne S.
Blocker, the physician who operated on Mrs. Murray, was inappropriately
credentialed to perform her surgery. '40 As a result of his negligence in carry-
ing out the operation, Mrs. Murray was gravely injured. '' The complica-
tions of the lawsuit arose during the discovery process when the Murrays
sought to obtain a list of the privileges granted to Dr. Blocker by the hospi-
tal. 142 Such privileges were based upon communications which took place
130. Bowen, 927 So. 2d at 142.
131. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1184.
132. See Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla. 2007); see supra note
112 and accompanying text.
133. See Murray, 957 So. 2d at 590.
134. Id. The "clinical privileges" granted to a physician are defined by JCAHO as the
ability to offer medical treatment or other such care to patients in a hospital. TOMES, supra
note 99, at 13. Such treatment and care is founded upon the doctor's experience, proficiency,
and qualifications. Id.
135. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 590.
136. Id.
137. H.H. van Geertruyden, supra note 41, at 243-44.
138. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 590.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 590-91.
141. Id. at 591.
142. Id.
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among the peer review credentials committee.143  BRH and Dr. Blocker
countered the discovery request with a demand for a protective order, pursu-
ant to Florida Statutes sections 395.0191 and 766.101.'" After denying the
motion, the trial court directed BRH to come forth with the list of privi-
leges.145 Upon BRH's challenge to this decision, the Second District, al-
though recognizing discord among other district court decisions, confirmed
the trial court's order.'46 The Supreme Court of Florida permitted review of
the case as a result of "the Second District's decision being in express and
direct conflict with other district court decisions."' 47
The core question facing the Court "is whether a list generated by a
hospital, which includes a peer review committee recommendation delineat-
ing the privileges given to a member of a hospital staff, is protected from
discovery under the confidentiality provisions of sections 395.0191 and
766.101, Florida Statutes."'48 This inquiry merits an explanation from the
Supreme Court of Florida as the opinions among the Florida district courts
regarding this issue differ, creating a split. 149 The Second District, which
governed this case, is notably of the opinion that information resulting from
peer review sessions currently in the hands of a hospital, in particular a phy-
sician's privileges, should be discoverable. 5 ' That notion stands in stark
contrast to the holdings emerging from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts
143. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 591.
144. Id. A protective order is "[a] court order prohibiting or restricting a party from en-
gaging in conduct (esp. a legal procedure such as discovery) that unduly annoys or burdens
the opposing party or a third-party witness." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (8th ed. 2004).
145. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 591.
146. Id. Although the Supreme Court of Florida granted the production of documents in
the discovery process, their rationale was different than that of the Second District. Id. at 595.
The Second District's justification for reaching its decision was based upon the holding in
Bayfront Medical Center, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin. Id. at 593. In this case, the
court held that while the records used by the peer review committee for the purpose of inves-
tigative research were privileged and undiscoverable, the final write up of their findings did
not retain that same privilege and was therefore discoverable. Bayfront Med. Ctr., Inc. v.
Agency for Healthcare Admin., 741 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). How-
ever, it is important to note that this case centered on the Agency for Healthcare Administra-
tion (AHCA), which was already granted authority through certain statutes to examine par-
ticular records. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 594. The Second District in Murray amplified the
reasoning in Bayfront to now permit the discovery of physician privileges in private lawsuits,
which were based upon the communications and opinions of those in the peer review commit-
tee. Id. at 593.
147. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 591.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
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which are much more stringent regarding the discoverability of doctors' pri-
vileges. '
In first scrutinizing the rationale behind the decision in Murray, it must
be noted that the Court took the time to recognize the importance and history
of peer review in Florida. 152 Before rendering its justification for backing the
Second District's holding, the Court acknowledged its own consistency in
finding for broad statutory protection,'53 citing specifically to its decision of
Cruger v. Love (Love I1), ' 4 which has been referenced by countless other
Florida decisions in the past.' In Love II, the Supreme Court of Florida
rejected the holding in Jacksonville Medical Center, Inc. v. Akers,'56 which
held that a physician's application for hospital privileges and those docu-
ments accompanying it were discoverable and not privileged.'57 In recogniz-
ing the split, the Supreme Court of Florida referenced three specific district
decisions, in contrast to that of the Second, and conceded that as a result of
its past holdings, these district courts had followed suit and rendered similar
decisions preventing the discovery of peer review materials.'58 Per se, when
the Second District strayed from the precedent Florida had set, it yielded the
current clash.
After disagreeing with the Second District's reasoning,'59 the Court
simply stated that there was "nothing in the legislative scheme for peer re-
view that would prevent a patient from securing such information from a
hospital that has granted a physician practice privileges within the hospi-
151. Id. at 592; see also infra note 196 and accompanying text. In March of 2006, The
Fifth District of Florida rendered a decision in Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, in
which it permitted the plaintiff during discovery to obtain hospital information and documents
resulting from the peer review process. In the past, as seen in this article, the Fifth District,
along with that of the Third and Fourth Districts, had been extremely steadfast in its decisions
to prohibit medical malpractice victims from procuring peer review information during dis-
covery. While this 2006 decision lends itself toward following the holding of the Second
District in Brandon Regional Hospital v. Murray, it by no means solidifies its position on the
issue. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
152. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 591-92.
153. Id. at 592.
154. 599 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1992).
155. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592.
156. 560 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
157. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 594; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of
Florida did not agree that the rationale in Bayfront Medical Center, Inc. was appropriate and
should be expanded to include malpractice litigation. Id. The case at hand deals with parties
in search of documents and information generated from peer review, as opposed to the latter
which deals with AHCA. Id. AHCA already has statutory permission to search these types of
documents. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 594.
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tal."' 160 It was irrelevant that the peer review committee played a hand in
determining which privileges were to be granted. 16' Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that the privileges granted to a physician play an elementary and
vital role to any patient making the decision to permit performance of a med-
ical procedure.162 Therefore, it is a patient's right to be informed about the
privileges his or her doctor possesses. 163  Because there is nothing in the
Florida Statutes that protects hospital records, even those which may be
based upon peer review analysis, the Court was not willing to stretch the
statutory protection to do so. 164
At the close of the trial, Murray's attorney, George A. Vaka, enthusias-
tically stated, "[i]t just seems to me to be a huge win for patients on an issue
that jumps out at me to be so basic and so fundamental."' 165
IV. FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS SPLIT
Murray seems to be an aberration, especially at a time when Florida sta-
tutory protection has provided a strong safekeeping on peer review materi-
als. 166 While Florida courts seem to agree that documents, records, and in-
formation generated directly from the peer review committee are privi-
leged, 167 the same line of thinking has failed the Second District with regard
to a hospital's list of physicians' privileges. 168 As stated previously, the Sec-
ond District's holding regarding such a discovery request vastly differs from
the holdings derived by the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts. 169 These dis-
tricts have stood strong in their almost always recurring decisions not to
permit any information related to peer review to be recoverable in discov-
ery.'70 Murray continuously cited to the Supreme Court of Florida's deci-
sion of Love H for support,' 7 ' where the Court there held that "a physician's
application for staff privileges is a record of the committee or board for pur-
160. Id.
161. Id. at 594-95.
162. Id. at 595.
163. See id.
164. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 595.
165. Ostrovsky, supra note 24. George A. Vaka is currently employed in Tampa at the
law firm of Vaka, Larson & Johnson. Id.
166. See supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 395.0191,
766.101 (2007).
167. FLA. STAT. § 766.101(5).
168. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592-93.
169. Id. at 592.
170. Id.; see also infra note 197 and accompanying text.
171. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592.
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poses of the statutory privilege."' 17 2 Relying on past decisions such as that,
the district courts in their own course of judgment have found that
"[d]ocuments created or considered by a hospital peer review or credential-
ing committee are privileged."' 173 Respectively, a list of hospital privileges
granted to a physician "falls within the purview of this privilege as a matter
of public policy.' ' 174 As such, the rationale of these three districts simply
does not coincide with that of the Second in Murray. 175
The following analysis illustrates Florida cases which are in direct op-
position to the decision the Supreme Court of Florida just rendered.
In Iglesias v. It's a Living, Inc., 176 a doctor was assaulted and grievously
wounded while on the property of the defendants. 177 In an action for dam-
ages, the defendants sought in discovery a list of the doctor's privileges at
any hospital he was currently working at or had worked at in the past. '78 The
trial court granted the request for such information. 179 The Third District
Court of Appeals of Florida reviewed the case and held that such a decision
by the trial court "departed from the essential requirements of law in order-
ing the discovery and that immediate relief [was] appropriate."'' 0  The
Court's rationale followed that these privileges were developed with the pur-
pose of advocating outspokenness and openness in peer review communica-
tions. " ' Disclosing a doctor's privileges would destroy the candidacy of
peer review and create a "'chilling effect' on the public. 182 Because the
defendants lacked a "'showing of exceptional necessity' or . . 'extraordi-
nary circumstances' they failed to legitimize why it was they needed such
information. '83
A second illustration of a doctor's privileges not being released in dis-
covery was seen in Boca Raton Community Hospital v. Jones.18 4 A medical
malpractice suit was brought against a practicing physician, Dr. Rankin, in
which claimants requested "Dr. Rankin's applications for staff privileges,
172. Cruger v. Love (Love 11), 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992).
173. Iglesias v. It's a Living, Inc., 782 So. 2d 963, 964 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
174. Id.
175. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592-93.
176. 782 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
177. Id. at 963.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 964.
180. Id.
181. Iglesias, 782 So. 2d at 964.
182. Id. (quoting Cruger v. Love (Love I1), 599 So. 2d 111, 115 (Fla. 1992)).
183. Id. (quoting Dade County Med. Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 121 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979)).
184. 584 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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reports of reviewing committees, and memoranda, correspondence and other
documentation indicating that the doctor was given staff privileges at the
hospital."' 85 Subsequent to denying protective orders, the trial court granted
the claimants' demand for the aforementioned information. 8 6 On appeal, the
Fourth District Court of Appeals of Florida reversed, acknowledging the
confidentiality of that which was sought.' 87 The court held that the informa-
tion requested is not of a nature that should be disclosed and is accordingly
privileged. '88
In a similar case, Columbia Park Medical Center, Inc. v. Gibbs,'89 the
husband of deceased patient, Gibbs, initiated a medical malpractice action
against the hospital.'90 Gibbs requested production of the hospital privileges
of the two doctors who were responsible for his wife."'9 Claiming that such
information was privileged pursuant to Florida Statute section 766.101(5),
the hospital refused to turn over the list of privileges.'92 As per usual, the
trial court granted production of the privileges. " The Fifth District Court of
Appeals of Florida reasoned that "committee reports, including documenta-
tion that a physician was given staff privileges and delineating the privileges
extended, [were] privileged from discovery."'94
Although the Supreme Court of Florida has already rendered a decision
regarding the discovery of a hospital's list of physician privileges,"' the rift
between the districts is still important. There will most certainly be analo-
gous cases in the future and, depending upon what district they originate in,
could impact the final decision of the case.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTRICT SPLIT
Murray has left the discoverability of peer review information in Flor-
ida in a state of some abashment. Should future courts rely on the holding in
Murray and continue to presuppose that Florida peer review statutes do not
protect hospital based documents regardless of the fact that they are rooted in
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. 723 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
190. Id. at 295.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Gibbs, 723 So. 2d at 295-96.
195. Brandon Reg'I Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 590 (Fla. 2007).
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peer review communications?' 96 Or, do future courts trust in the past deci-
sions of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts, and on occasion the
Supreme Court of Florida, by supporting the broad construction of peer re-
view statutes and the concealment of information in discovery proceed-
ings? 97 Regardless of whether Florida courts in the future follow the more
liberal open door policy for peer review information in discovery or the iron
clad non-disclosure tactic, there will be implications and benefits for both.
If future courts opt to continue in the footsteps of Murray, medical mal-
practice claimants will be thrilled while hospitals and physicians will be dis-
traught. Peer review works because the committee is comprised of experts
and specialists in the field of medicine who understand what is required to
practice appropriately and safely.198 These experts and specialists, usually
physicians in the hospital, partake in peer review, many times against their
better judgment, as statutory protection guarantees them some mode of secu-
rity. 9 9 With this in mind, if future courts yield to the holding in Murray, and
hospital information founded upon peer review decisions is leaked to the
public in discovery, participating doctors will most likely entirely stop or
seriously curb their involvement in this process. 200 As it stands, they get paid
minimally, and the risks are plentiful.2 1 Without complete protection, there
will either be no doctors willing to participate in peer review, 202 or those who
do will inadequately perform and fail to speak out honestly. 23 Either way, it
is a catch-22.
On the upside, patients suffering from medical malpractice will benefit
by having a fair and just trial with all the evidence. 2°4 Following in the path
of Murray will no longer allow peer review boards to hide proof of hospital
or physician mistakes and/or carelessness °.2 5 Accordingly, injured patients
196. See id.
197. See Cruger v. Love (Love 11), 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992) (holding that a doctor's
application for staff privileges were protected by Florida Statutes section 766.101(5)); see
also Iglesias v. It's a Living, Inc., 782 So. 2d 963, 964 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
that "[d]ocuments created or considered by a hospital peer review or credentialing committee
are privileged"); Gibbs, 723 So. 2d at 295 (holding that a doctor's privileges at a hospital
constitute privileged information); Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp. v. Jones, 584 So. 2d 220, 221
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a doctor's application for staff privileges and
evidence that he was actually given these privileges was confidential and not discoverable).
198. Hammack, supra note 57, at 439.
199. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 16-17.
200. See Hammack, supra note 57, at 442-43.
201. Cate, supra note 48, at 480.
202. Id. at 482.
203. See Bassler, supra note 6, at 694.
204. See Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1183.
205. See Morter, supra note 16, at 1115.
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will now be able to successfully asseverate their rights,2 °6 without the dis-
covery process interfering and hindering the growth of their case.207 More-
over, patients seeking operations will have access to the privileges their phy-
sicians possess, which will enable them to make more informed decisions
about whether or not to proceed with the particular doctor they are seeing.20 8
At the other end of the spectrum lie the decisions of the Third, Fourth,
and Fifth District Courts.0 9 Should future courts choose to proceed in their
footsteps, hospitals and physicians being sued for malpractice will continue
to be greeted with strong statutory protection210 while those victimized will
be left stranded with only bits and pieces of information supporting their
claims.2"' In the past, the system of peer review in Florida has generally
operated according to this model of thinking.2t 2 To rehash what has already
been stated, solid statutory protection will continue to allow participants in
peer review to veraciously speak their mind and formulate decisions in the
best interest of the hospital and patients.1 3 Limiting their liability in law-
suits, physicians will maintain their active involvement in the process.2 4
Additionally, this type of security will permit peer review to continue operat-
ing to better the quality of hospital care and the treatment of patients.15
Unfortunately, this approach leaves claimants with the short end of the
stick. While courts have acknowledged that with strong statutory protection
plaintiffs may have a difficult time prosecuting their claim, they nonetheless
deem this to be irrelevant and an unconvincing justification for the disclosure
of the information sought.2t 6 As stated by critics, peer review will continue
to shield vital information from patients who seek to sue hospitals thereby
furthering injustice in today's judicial system.21 7 As such, the self policing
tactic which is strongly guarded will continue to further the "'conspiracy of
silence.'" 21
8
206. Cate, supra note 48, at 482.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is a very fine line between that which Florida peer review statutes
protect and that which they do not. As so clearly seen by the close of this
paper, it has been the legislature's goal right from the outset to provide safe
and effective medical care to patients while controlling rising health care
costs. Florida peer review statutes incontestably protect records generated
from the peer review process and any documents utilized in their considera-
tions and decision-making. However, never does it state that this protection
will linger long after the committee has reached their decision and new doc-
uments have been created by other medical bodies, even if based upon the
committee's assessments. Murray was simply the first case in which it was
acknowledged that the peer review process must end somewhere, and it starts
with the privileges a doctor is granted by a hospital. As stated by the Su-
preme Court of Florida, this information is not of a nature that should be kept
confidential as it is fundamental in any patient's decision to permit surgery.
Although there is a split among the district courts, there has been limited
rationale provided as to why, after a peer review committee convenes, newly
generated documents founded upon some of their information or decisions
should remain confidential. Perhaps after this case, physicians will be more
cautious in practicing medicine in an area they are not privileged or prepared
to do so as this information is now discoverable in civil litigation. Whilst the
peer review process is a valuable tool to the healthcare industry, and should
only continue to thrive as such, there must be boundaries. With that said, the
Florida Statutes as they stand provide excellent protection for doctors par-
ticipating in peer review, but it must stop there. Presently, only time will tell
whether Murray was the first case in a new line of thinking or simply just an
isolated decision.
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